

# Alexander's Marshals

Second Edition



A Study of the Makedonian  
Aristocracy and the Politics of  
Military Leadership

Waldemar Heckel



# Alexander's Marshals

This substantially revised and updated second edition of *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (1992) examines Alexander's most important officers, who commanded army units and were involved in military and political deliberations. Chapters on these men have been expanded, giving greater attention to personalities, bias in the sources, and the social as well as military setting, including more on familial connections and regional origins in an attempt to create a better understanding of factions. The major confrontations, military and political, are treated in greater detail within the biographies, and a discussion of the organization and command structure of the Makedonian army has been added.

**Waldemar Heckel** is a Research Fellow in the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, and was previously Professor of Classics.

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A study of the Makedonian aristocracy  
and the politics of military leadership

**Second edition**

**Waldemar Heckel**



LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1993  
This edition published 2016  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge  
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*  
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*  
Names: Heckel, Waldemar, 1949- author.  
Title: Alexander's marshals: a study of the Makedonian aristocracy and the politics of military leadership / Waldemar Heckel.  
Other titles: Marshals of Alexander's empire  
Description: Second edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.  
Identifiers: LCCN 2016002278| ISBN 9781138934696  
(hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781315677781 (ebook)  
Subjects: LCSH: Alexander, the Great, 356 B.C.-323 B.C.—Friends and associates. | Generals—Macedonia—Biography.  
Classification: LCC DF234.2.H38 2016 | DDC 938/.07—dc23  
LC record available at <http://lccn.loc.gov/2016002278>

ISBN: 978-1-138-93469-6 (hbk)  
ISBN: 978-1-315-67778-1 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman  
by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK

*In Memoriam*  
**Brian Bosworth**

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# Preface

Much of what is contained in the pages that follow was published in 1992 under the title *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*. But the intervening twenty-four years have seen a large number of new publications in the field of Alexander studies (to say nothing about the resurgence of interest in the Diadochoi), and it is perhaps fair to say that more work has appeared on the individuals who helped to create Alexander's Empire than was available to me when I wrote the previous versions of this study; the first was my doctoral dissertation, *Marshals of the Alexanderreich*, submitted to the University of British Columbia in 1978, and examined by Truesdell S. Brown. Furthermore, the appearance of my *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great: Prosopography of Alexander's Empire* (Oxford and Malden, MA, 2006) has led many scholars to bypass the detailed treatment in the *Marshals* in favor of the more succinct entries in the *Who's Who*, which admittedly has the attraction of offering *vitaे* of all the known individuals of the period. That the original *Marshals* was more than a catalogue of individuals, accompanied by complete references to the primary sources and modern scholarly literature, escaped even some of the book's reviewers. I was thus extremely grateful to Graham Shipley, whose belated review in *Classical Review* (1999), drew attention to my true aim:

to focus on the men (and they are all men) who are arguably the real authors of Alexander's success, and to straddle the divide between Alexander's reign and the early years of the Successors, who owed their positions to having served with the king.

(p. 481).

When I came to consider a revised and updated version of the book, it became clear to me that the discussions of the lesser individuals had indeed been superseded by the entries in the *Who's Who*, but that those of the important commanders—those who could truly be classified as marshals—needed to be rewritten in order to take into account the fine and thought-provoking comments of scholars who published their works after 1992. Not surprisingly, much of this new scholarship has dealt with the last years of Alexander's life and the first years of the age of the Diadochoi. As a result, I have chosen to focus on the major players and have

added more background material, while taking some of the compressed material from the footnotes and expanding it in the main narrative. A quick tour of the book will make it clear that footnotes are still a substantial and vital part of my study. But in the end, I hope that I have created a more readable work which, nevertheless, does not sacrifice scholarly accuracy in the attempt to reach a wider audience.

I have chosen to retain the transliterated Greek forms of personal names, rather than the Latinized forms familiar to many, although I have used Alexander, Philip and Ptolemy for the Makedonian kings and the later ruler of Egypt; others who share those names appear as Alexandros, Philippos and Ptolemaios. Extant authors appear in Latinized form, as is the normal practice, and are cited in a familiar style (though not necessarily always as they appear in *OCD*<sup>3</sup>). But the lost historians and those writers who were also involved in the events described appear in their Greek forms: for example, Nearchos, Onesikritos, Kallisthenes. I have referred to the fragments of these authors as they appear in C. Müller and F. Jacoby, but I have indicated where there are now new translations and commentaries in *BNJ* (*Brill's New Jacoby*, edited by Ian Worthington, which is appearing in stages online).

In the main text, I have tried to avoid using untranslated material from other languages (ancient and modern), but have found it impractical and unnecessary to do so in the footnotes. I have included in many cases the original Greek or Latin texts that are discussed in the main narrative, especially those that are less accessible to the reader (for example, passages from the *Suda*). The method of citation is, I think, clear enough, though some will be confused by the section numbers for Plutarch's *Lives*. Here I have used the numbering system of K. Ziegler's Teubner editions, which is more precise than that of the Loeb text and which is the one used by J.R. Hamilton in his commentary of Plutarch's *Alexander*. Unfortunately, I have found it too cumbersome to cross-reference passages using the Loeb numbering system. I have, for the most part, indicated whose English translation I have used, though there are places where I have given my own or, in the case of Justin and Curtius, that of my former colleague and collaborator, John Yardley.

The revision of this book was, in many ways, a “stroll down memory lane,” since the marshals, in one form or another, have been with me since I was a graduate student. Now, from the comfortable perch of retirement, I look back on the years and realize just how many people I have encountered on that “stroll” and how much I have learned from their work. When I came to the University of British Columbia in 1973, I chose Alexander as my dissertation area even though I had never read Arrian in the original or even in English. Quintus Curtius Rufus was not even on my radar, much less Justin. But, as an M.A. student at McMaster, I was introduced to prosopography by William J. Slater, who pushed J.K. Davies' *Athenian Propertied Families* under my nose and completely changed the direction of my academic career. Of course, I admired Syme and Broughton, but it was my first look at Helmut Berve's *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* that drew me into the world of the marshals. It

was a book I had to own, and it has never been more than an arm's length from by desk. Even now, when I use my own *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander* as a quick reference tool, I still seek confirmation in Berve's masterpiece. In the Preface to the first edition, I mentioned that one scholar—I'm afraid I do not remember his name—called my work “prosobiography.” That was indeed the form that it took. Had I been familiar then with works such as James Lockhart's *Men of Cajamarca* or Douglas Southall Freeman's *Lee's Lieutenants*, I might have produced a very different book. But once the blueprint is finalized there is no room for deviation.

Nevertheless, it was a good choice: Alexander. It brought me into contact with people whom I cherish as friends and as sources of inspiration. Hence I wish to thank what is a veritable who's who of Alexander scholarship. First and foremost, I thank the man to whom I have dedicated this book: Brian Bosworth. The devastating news of his death on 22 December, 2014, reached me in Cabo San Lucas and dampened the joys of a family Christmas in Mexico. Nevertheless, I am sure that I (and my wife) left no doubt in his mind (or that of his partner Liz Baynham) that he has been from the very beginning my inspiration in all things academic. Furthermore, I cannot think of a better role model. Brian was always gracious and never spoke ill of his colleagues, even when they had treated him unfairly. But there are others as well, many others. I name them here in alphabetical order, for it would be unfair to rank order those whom I esteem so highly. Some are, unfortunately, no longer with us. W. Lindsay Adams, Miguel José Alonso Nuñez, Victor Alonso Troncoso, John Atkinson, Barry Baldwin, Richard Billows, Gene Borza, Pierre Briant, Truesdell S. Brown, Stan Burstein, Andrew Collins, Bob Develin, Albert Devine, Kirk Grayson, Peter Green, Bill Greenwalt, Erich Gruen, Robert Hannah, Phillip Harding, Johannes Heinrichs, Frank Holt, David Karunanthy, Holger Koch, Franca Landucci Gattinoni, Brian Lavelle, Malcolm McGregor, Alexander Meeus, Daniel Ogden, Jeanne Reames, Yossi Roisman, Klaus Rosen, Catherine Rubincam, Cynthia Schwenk, Graham Shipley, Diana Spencer, Giuseppe Squilace, Richard Stoneman, Carol Thomas, Michael Walbank, Gregor Weber, Gerhard Wirth, Ian Worthington, and Michael Zahrnt. My students at the University of Calgary were, and continue to be, a great inspiration and loyal friends. I thank especially Erin Edward Garvin and Graham Wrightson, as well as Chris Jesse, Ryan Jones, Jolene McLeod, Carolyn Willekes, and Nicole Wilson. Other students from my earlier days in Calgary, who helped in different ways with my work on the *Marshals*, are Bill Mills, Cindy Lou Nimchuk, Andrew Sherwood, Ralph Siferd, and Julia Wong. In the late stages of revising the *Marshals* I was able to spend two fruitful months at the University of Waterloo as the Onassis Visiting Professor. I am grateful to the Onassis Foundation and the faculty of the Department of Classics there, particularly, Sheila Ager, Riemer Faber, Andrew Falkner, Christina Vester, and to the ever-cheerful Monica D'Agostini, with whom I taught a seminar on Macedonian monarchy. Also, I thank my most steadfast friends over the years: Ed Anson, Liz Baynham, Beth Carney, Christopher Collom, Liz Hardy, Timothy Howe, Chris Kelk, Colin Lewis, Sabine Müller, Larry Tritle, John Vanderspoel (who

helped me prepare the stemmata), Pat Wheatley, and (of course) John Yardley. I thank Jonathan Hoare for his careful copy-editing, as well as Matthew Gibbons, Tamsin Ballard, Lizzy Thomasson, and Geraldine Martin of Taylor and Francis for their help in bringing this second edition of the *Marshals* into print.

Finally, I wish to thank Gordon Shrimpton, who was my first teacher of ancient history and who has been my friend and my source of encouragement and support for over forty-five years. In addition to my obligations to friends and scholars, I cannot forget my family: my sister, Anneli Purchase, who proofread the entire typescript; my wife, Lois; my children, Darren and Julia; my son-in-law Kevin DeWolfe, and especially my grandson, “Alexander the Best.” I would like to be able to say that they now have my undivided attention, but that is not how the scholarly world works.

*Waldemar Heckel, Calgary, 10 January, 2016*

# Abbreviations

- Anson, *Eumenes*
- Anson, *Heirs*
- Anson, *Themes and Issues*
- Anspach I–III
- Ashley, *Macedonian Empire*
- Atkinson I–II
- Atkinson, *Curzio Rufo* I–II
- Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius*
- Badian, *Collected Papers*
- Baumbach, *Kleinasien*
- Baynham, *Quintus Curtius*
- Beloch
- Bengtson, *Diadochen*
- Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander*
- Bengtson, *Strategie*
- E.M. Anson. *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians*. Leiden. 2004.
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- H. Bengtson. *Philipp und Alexander der Grosse*. Munich. 1985.
- H. Bengtson. *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit*. Munich. 1937–52.

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- Benveniste, *Titres et noms*
- Berve I-II
- Bevan, *House of Ptolemy*
- Billows, *Antigonos*
- Billows, *Kings and Colonists*
- Blackwell, *Absence of Alexander*
- BNJ
- Boerma, *Justinus*
- Borza, *Makedonika*
- Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*
- Bosworth I-II
- Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*
- Bosworth, *Legacy*
- Breloer, *Bund mit Poros*
- Breloer, *Kampf gegen Poros*
- Briant, *Alexander and His Empire*
- E. Benveniste. *Titres et noms propres in iranien ancien*. Paris. 1966.
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- Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*  
 Briant, *Darius*
- Briant, *Persian Empire*
- Brown, *Onesicritus*
- Brunt, *Arrian I–II*
- Burn, *Alexander and the Middle East*  
 Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism*
- CAH*  
 Carney, *King and Court*
- Carney, *Olympias*  
 Carney, *Women and Monarchy*
- Cartledge and Spawforth,  
*Sparta*
- Cawkwell, *Philip*
- CDCC*
- Champion, *Antigonus*
- CHI*  
 Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers*  
 Cook, *PE*
- Davies, *APF*
- P. Briant. *Antigone le Borgne*. Paris. 1973.  
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- Develin, *AO*
- Dittenberger, *OGIS*
- Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>
- Droysen
- Eggermont, *Sind*
- Ellis, *Philip II*
- Ellis, *Ptolemy*
- Engel, *Machtaufstieg*
- Engels, *Logistics*
- English, *Army*
- English, *Field Campaigns*
- English, *Sieges*
- Errington, *Hist. Mac.*
- Faure, *Vie quotidienne*
- Ferguson, *HA*
- FGrH*
- Flower, *Theopompos*
- Fuller, *Generalship*
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- Gehrke, *Phokion*
- Geyer, *Makedonien*
- Goukowsky I-II
- Grainger, *APS*
- Grainger, *Rise of Seleukid Empire*
- Grainger, *Seleukos*
- Grainger, *SPG*
- Granier, *Heeresversammlung*
- Green, *Alexander*
- Green, *Alexander to Actium*
- Griffin, *Sikyon*
- Griffith, *Mercenaries*
- Habicht, AA
- Habicht, *Gottmenschenstum<sup>2</sup>*
- Hamel, *Generals*
- Hamilton, *Alexander*
- Hamilton, *Arrian*
- Hans-Joachim Gehrke. *Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt.* Zetemata, Heft 64. Munich. 1976.
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- Hamilton, PA
- Hammond, *Genius*
- Hammond, *MS*
- Hammond, *Philip*
- Hammond, *Sources*
- Hammond, *THA*
- Harding
- Hatzopoulos I-II
- Hauben, *Vloot.*
- Heckel, *Conquests*
- Heckel, *LDT*
- Heckel, *Who's Who*
- Hill, *Sources*
- HMac.* II
- HMac.* III
- Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen*
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- Hofstetter, *Griechen in Persien*
- Holt, *Bactria*
- Holt, *Land of Bones*
- Hornblower, *Comm.* I-II
- Hornblower, *Hieronymus*
- Hünerwadel, *Lysimachos*
- IG*
- Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos*
- Judeich, *Kl. Studien*
- Justi
- Kaerst I<sup>2</sup>–II<sup>2</sup>
- Kagan, *Outbreak*
- Karttunen, *India*
- Karunanithy, *War Machine*
- Kebric, *Duris*
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- Meiggs, *Ath. Empire*
- Milns, *Alexander*
- Mossé, *Alexander*
- Müller, *FHG*
- Müller, *Jahr der Könige*
- Müller, *Makedonien und Persien*
- Müller, *Maßnahmen*
- Nawotka, *Alexander*
- Niese
- OCD<sup>3</sup>*
- Ogden, *MGS*
- Ogden, *PPD*
- Olmstead, *HPE*
- Osborne, *Naturalization*
- Papastavru, *Amphipolis*
- Pape-Benseler, *Wörterbuch*
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
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- Pearson, *LHA*
- Pédech, *Historiens*
- Poralla, *Lakedaimonier*
- Prandi, *Diodoro*
- Rathmann, *Perdikkas*
- RE*
- Rhodes & Osborne
- Rogers, *Alexander*
- Roisman, *Veterans*
- Romm, *Ghost*
- Sandberger, *Prosopographie*
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xxiv *Abbreviations*

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- Stein, *Alexander's Track*
- Stewart, *Faces*
- Strasburger, *Ptolemaios*
- Syll.
- Tarn I-II
- Tarn, AG
- Tarn, GBI
- Tataki, *Beroea*
- Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad*
- Thomas, *Alexander in His World*
- Tod I-II
- Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*
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- Westlake, *Thessaly*
- Whitehorne, *Cleopatras*  
Wilcken, *Alexander*
- Wilkes, *Illyrians*  
Will, *Athen und Alexander*
- Wilson, *Photios*
- Wirth, *Kampfverband*
- Wood, *Footsteps*
- Worthington, *By the Spear*
- Worthington, *Man and God*
- Worthington, *Philip*
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Alexander's Empire (image courtesy of the author)

# Introduction

The army that crossed the Hellespont in 334 saluted its young king with admiration and enthusiasm. He had just hurled his spear into Asian soil, and then leapt ashore to embark on a war of conquest that would change the history of the world. But, from the top down, this was still very much the army of Philip II, its leaders chosen from the firmly entrenched aristocratic families of Makedon. Two years earlier, their loyalty to the son was in doubt: challenging his right to the throne, a powerful faction might, if it chose, reassert the claims of Amyntas son of Perdikkas III who, in the face of a national crisis, had been swept aside in favor of Philip. Yet, for Alexander, Philip's assassination could scarcely have occurred at a better time, with both Parmenion and Attalos absent in Asia Minor; with them was at least one member of the Lynkestian royal house, and other magnates whose influence at Court translated into power within the army—though perhaps the reverse was true. Antipatros, for reasons that may have had more to do with faction than devotion to Alexander, engineered the prince's accession, despite being the father-in-law of Alexandros Lynkestes, brother of the suspected regicides. Arrhabaios and Heromenes were arrested and summarily executed as confidants of the assassin, Pausanias. In truth they posed a greater threat to the new king than the old one. Some of their relatives and adherents preferred to share the fortunes of the Great King and his Greek supporters. Amyntas Perdikka was resigned to his fate; at least his most loyal supporters had time to flee. But, whether in the name of justice, filial piety, or security, it was neither in Alexander's power nor to his advantage to conduct a full-scale purge: for the military aristocracy was a many-headed hydra, and each regeneration threatened greater dangers. He would have to make his peace with the “Old Guard.”

Some could, of course, be left behind to manage the affairs of the homeland, kept in check by Antipatros, if indeed he could be trusted. But the new king could reform the command structure of the expeditionary force only slightly without creating new enemies or encouraging old ones. Whatever he did affected morale and efficiency. More immediate was the threat of mutiny and assassination that accompanied any attempt to deprive the troops of their regional commanders. For the moment, a realignment of the “Old Guard” would have to suffice. Alexander made his peace, and launched his epoch-ending campaign,

## 2 Introduction

with an army and a group of courtiers not unlike those who had served his father, particularly once they had been merged with the army dispatched to Asia Minor in spring of 336. But the leaders of this contingent had also been compelled to reconsider their options. Attalos had offended at a time when he gave little thought to the consequences of his arrogance. Now even the most earnest protestations of loyalty could not save him. His father-in-law Parmenion acquiesced in his elimination, possibly for the good of the state, but certainly for his own. Likewise, the Lynkestians understood that they had been spared only as long as it took for Alexander to grow into the kingship. Others proved themselves in word and deed, but in the end could not escape their territorial and familial origins, the very things that brought them to prominence in the first place. Their impact on the early stages of the campaign was significant, but soon the “Old Guard” gave way to the “New Men.”

The emergence of Alexander’s “New Men” was both the result and the cause of the erosion of the entrenched aristocracy’s domination of the highest military commands, which constituted nothing less than the political offices of a peripatetic state. This state, represented by the army, began to coalesce around Alexander, whose kingship came to be regarded as personal rather than circumscribed by geography. Victories in the East relegated the homeland to a sideshow on the western fringes of a burgeoning empire, a source of reinforcements and guarantor of European stability. Here, while Achaemenid Persia was in its death throes, Antipatros fought a “battle of mice” against the Spartan king, Agis.

It was a logical development of their training as *syntrophoi* of the prince that the “New Men” also identified the state with the person of the King. Friendship and trust played no small part in advancing their careers, and—as *hetairoi*, phalanx commanders, hipparchs, and *somatophylakes*—they formed and dominated the King’s *consilium*. Publicly, and in private, they influenced his policy, advanced and jeopardized the careers of others. Inevitably, they came into conflict with one another. Divided on the matter of his orientalizing policies, they nevertheless exhibited an unshakeable loyalty to the King, whom they served unsparingly. Each shared in his exploits, all died young. So that their lives intertwined with Alexander’s in fate’s Gordian knot. But because they labored in the shadow of the great man, their own careers have received too little attention from historians, ancient and modern. Heroic fame (*kleos*) eludes them, a reward their own service has helped to bestow upon Alexander. The so-called Hellenistic kingdoms were destined for other, arguably lesser, men. It is idle to speculate what may have been, but the path that led the Makedonian state and army to Triparadeisos and beyond reveals that, although each of the “New Men” had striven to be second only to the King, none could be justly considered a second Alexander.

Hence the triumph of the “New Men” proved both ephemeral and incomplete. At Triparadeisos in northern Syria (320), the Makedonian empire redefined itself and submitted to the will of two grizzled veterans, Antipatros son of Iolaos and Antigonos Monophthalmos (“the One-Eyed”). The champions of its integrity were outlawed by the assembled veterans of the eastern campaigns, while the new guardians of the Kings pursued a relentless course of separatism or,

at least, usurpation. Antipatros, who had quietly resisted Alexander's authority, reluctantly escorted the inept living symbols of Argead rule to Europe; clearly, he would have preferred to leave them in Asia. In the end, it was not a matter of where they would live, only where they would die. To Antigonos he assigned the extirpation of the Perdikkan party—perhaps the only true advocates of unity and Argead rule—thereby supplying both the resources for, and the impediments to, the rise of Asia Minor's oldest satrap. Now dispersed among the forces of Eumenes, Perdikkas' brother Alketas, and Attalos son of Andromenes, and looking in vain to Polyperchon for leadership, the champions of Alexander's house were outlawed by the very troops who had risked life and limb for the conqueror.

Alexander died on 10/11 June 323 before reaching his thirty-third birthday. Accomplished marshals of his own age group had predeceased him, and the most gifted would follow him to an early grave. When the dust of internal warfare settled, the dismantling of an empire debilitated by self-inflicted wounds became the work of aging traditionalists, late bloomers, and relative upstarts. The brilliant marshals of Alexander's army had been consumed either by the conquest or in the void created by the conqueror's death. This is their story.

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# **Part I**

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# 1 The house of Attalos

In 331, the last attested member of the house of Attalos died on the battlefield of Gaugamela, though the family continued to play a role in Alexander historiography. Hegelochos son of Hippostratos was perhaps the most important Makedonian to die in that battle, and yet the fact of his death was recorded only in passing, in a different context, and not noted in accounts of the battle itself.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the names of both Attalos and Hegelochos resurface in the drama of the following years, when the political tensions at the Court and in the camp revealed once again the implacable hatred of Alexander for Attalos in particular. In spite of the family's impact on the political and military events of the 330s, its history must be pieced together from scattered references and with a fair amount of conjecture.

## Attalos uncle of Kleopatra-Eurydike

Judeich, *Kl. Studien* 302, 304–5; Kaerst, *RE* s.v. “Attalos (4)”; Berve II, 94 no. 182; Bosworth 1971a: 102 ff.; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 97; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 62 “Attalus [1]”; Hatzopoulos 2005; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 273–4 no. 322; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 40–2; Worthington, *Philip* 176–8; Howe 2015a.

### *The giver of the bride*

Attalos was clearly a prominent Makedonian, although his patronymic and regional origin are unknown. He was born, perhaps, as early as 390 and was the uncle of both Philip’s seventh wife, Kleopatra, and her brother Hippostratos, and

<sup>1</sup> Arr. 3.15.2: “And here about sixty of Alexander’s Companions fell, and Hephaestion himself and Koinos and Menidas were wounded.” Arr. 3.15.6: “Of those with Alexander, about one hundred died. . . .” Diod. 17.51.3: “About five hundred Makedonians were killed, and a large number wounded, among them, of the most prominent commanders, Hephaestion was injured after being struck on the arm with a spear (he commanded the *somatophylakes*), and of the generals (*strategoi*) Perdikkas and Koinos, and also Menidas. . . .” Curt. 4.16.26 notes that fewer than 300 Makedonians were lost, and at 4.16.32 he names the most notable wounded (Hephaestion, Perdikkas, Koinos and Menidas). Hegelochos’ death is known only from Curt. 6.11.22: *Hegelochum, qui in acie cecidit*. The reference is clearly to Gaugamela, where Hegelochos served as ilarch (Arr. 3.11.8).

## 8 The house of Attalos

thus a brother of Amyntas.<sup>2</sup> By the time of Kleopatra's wedding to Philip II in the autumn of 337,<sup>3</sup> both her father and brother had died, leaving Attalos as the bride's guardian. Nothing is known of his career before the niece's marriage, which may in fact have been the source of his influence at Court ( $\varepsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma \ddot{\omega}v \tau\ddot{\omega}v \dot{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\ddot{\lambda}\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\pi \pi\alpha\ddot{\lambda}\nu \delta\mu\nu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\pi \pi\alpha\ddot{\rho}\alpha \tau\ddot{\rho}\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota$ : Diod. 16.93.7).<sup>4</sup> The assertion that "Philip was acting at the behest of an influential group of nobles, headed by Attalos and his father-in-law Parmenio," when he married Kleopatra is mere speculation.<sup>5</sup> Attalos' importance could be more easily determined, if we knew the date of his own marriage to Parmenion's daughter: did it occur before or after Philip took his last wife?<sup>6</sup> Elizabeth Carney suggests that "Philip may have chosen a wife from Attalos's family to avoid the divisiveness that would ensue if he took a bride from the families of either Parmenio or Antipater. . . ."<sup>7</sup> This is an interesting suggestion, and indeed Parmenion and Antipatros both had daughters of marriageable age. But the argument fails to take into account the fact that at this time Philip, unlike Alexander in 336–334, was under no apparent pressure to take another bride;<sup>8</sup> Philip could just as easily have arranged for Alexander to marry Attalos' ward—and the sources state explicitly that Philip's last marriage was a love match, differentiating between it and others that were influenced by political

2 Guardian and uncle of Kleopatra-Eurydike, the last wife of Philip II (Plut. *Alex.* 9.7; Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13.557d; Paus. 8.7.7; wrongly Kleopatra's brother, Diod. 17.2.3; Justin 9.5.9; Ps.-Kall. 1.20.1; or nephew, Diod. 16.93.9); thus also the uncle of Kleopatra's brother, Hippostratos, whom we may identify (tentatively) as the son of Amyntas. Marsyas of Pella (*FGH* 135/6 F17; cf. Heckel 1980b: 456), singles out Hippostratos son of Amyntas, as one of the prominent *hetairoi* of Philip II who perished in the Illyrian campaign of 344/3. The death of Hippostratos in 344/3 would explain why Attalos, and not he, was Kleopatra's guardian in 337; it is self-evident that the father, Amyntas, had died before 337.

3 October was the wedding season in Makedonia (see Hatzopoulos 1982a: 41; Hammond 1992: 360).

4 Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 97; Diodorus refers only to the time after Philip's marriage to Kleopatra; cf. Heckel 1986b: 297–8.

5 Hamilton, *PA* 24; cf. Green, *Alexander* 93–4. Badian 1963 assigns the initiative for the new marriage to Philip himself, who was anxious to produce a new heir. But the idea that Philip intended to replace Alexander with a son of Kleopatra was largely in Alexander's mind, though it had clearly been fueled by the fears of Olympias and by Attalos' unfortunate remark. Worthington, *Philip* 176 notes that "[t]he main reason for her [Olympias'] feelings towards Cleopatra . . . lies in the ethnicity of the two women and the succession, for Olympias, albeit the mother of the heir, was from Epirus and Cleopatra was a full-blooded Macedonian, perhaps from Lower Macedonia"; cf. Mossé, *Alexander* 49. Thomas, *Alexander in His World* 91 observes "[a] wife's ancestry does not appear to have been a decisive factor in the matter of the succession." Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 72 adds that "[e]ven if Cleopatra had immediately borne a son, years would have passed before he could threaten his older rival, Alexander"; cf. Carney, *Olympias* 33.

6 Curt. 6.9.17; she was presumably the same woman who married Koinos son of Polemokrates in 334; cf. Curt. 6.9.30, and Arr. 1.24.1, 29.4 for Koinos' status as a "newly-wed" (*neogamos*) in late 334.

7 Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 70.

8 On this see Diod. 17.16.2, with Baynham 1998c; Prandi, *Diodoro* 19 on the source question. For the view that Alexander contemplated marrying Kleopatra see Howe 2015a: 139–45.

considerations.<sup>9</sup> Even if he had been concerned about a shortage of suitable heirs, his timing and approach to the matter were clearly at fault. Too much has been read into Attalos' prayer at the wedding feast, that Kleopatra might produce legitimate heirs to the Makedonian throne.<sup>10</sup> That was the tactless remark of a drunken man, and ultimately fatal: Alexander never forgave him and considered him a threat to his life (Curt. 8.8.7; cf. 6.9.17).

### *Attalos and Pausanias of Orestis*

According to Diodorus, Attalos was a friend of a certain Pausanias, who had supplanted his namesake from Orestis as Philip's *eromenos*.<sup>11</sup> This young man confided to him the details of insults uttered by Pausanias of Orestis and his own plans for a glorious death (Diod. 16.93.5), which he soon realized in a battle with the Illyrians of King Pleurias, probably in early 336. Not long afterwards, Attalos avenged his friend's death by plying Pausanias of Orestis with wine at a dinner party and handing him over to his mule-teers to be gang raped.<sup>12</sup> By this time, Attalos had been designated one of the generals of the advance force that was to cross into Asia (Diod. 16.93.8–9). When Pausanias petitioned Philip II for justice, the king was unwilling to act

9 Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 172–3, rejects the view that this was a “love match,” arguing that the political motive for the marriage was Philip’s need to secure the loyalty of Attalos in the upcoming campaign against Asia (“Philipps siebte Heirat ist als Teil der Vorbereitung seines anstehenden Persienfeldzugs zu betrachten, für den er die Loyalität seiner führenden Generäle gewinnen musste”: 173). Cf. Wirth, *Kampfverband* 130–1. I do not understand why the same concerns about the support of the aristocracy for the Persian campaign did not apply to Alexander as well. On the motive for the marriage, I agree with Whitehorne, *Cleopatras* 34: “This is not to imply, of course, that passion and political advantage have to be mutually exclusive.”

10 Satryus, frg. 5 (Müller); Plut. *Alex.* 9.7 ff.; cf. Justin 9.7.3. Ps.-Kall. (L) 1.20.1 calls him Lysias; but Ps.-Kall. (A) 1.21.1 and Jul. Valer. 1.13–4 distinguish between Attalos and Lysias (see Berve II, 424 no. 47). On Philip’s marriages, see Ogden, *PPD* 17–29, with notes; for Kleopatra-Eurydike, Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 72–4. Worthington, *Philip* 178 suggests that Attalos “may have thought that, as Philip’s father-in-law, he could get away with a joke in doubtful taste anyway.” Attalos’ remark about “legitimacy” has often been taken to mean that he himself was of Lower Makedonian descent, but in fact the strongest argument for such an origin is one that many scholars reject: his relationship to Hegelochos son of Hippostratos. This man was an ilarch of the Companions, and his troops were most likely of Lower Makedonian origin. The bride was presumably absent from the banquet. On this and the question of female participation in symposia see Carney 2015b.

11 Diod. 16.93.3–4; see Fears 1975. For Philip’s fondness for pederasty see Justin 9.6.4–6; Alexander’s rejection of offers of young boys (e.g., Plut. *Alex.* 22.1: ἐρωτῶν τι πώποτε Φίλόξενος οἰσχρὸν αὐτῷ συνεγνωκός τοιαῦτα ὄνειδη προζενῶν κάθηται) may have been a reaction against his father’s behavior.

12 Diod. 16.93.7; Justin 9.6.5–6, alleging that he was abused by Attalos himself. For this episode and the sources see Fears 1975; cf. Worthington, *Philip* 182–4; Antela-Bernárdez 2012 (implausible). For the date of Pausanias’ death see Heckel 1981c: 56, and Wilkes, *Illyrians* 119–22 for a brief summary of Makedonian relations with Illyria. For full discussion of this problem see Heckel, Howe and Müller 2016 (forthcoming).

because of Attalos' important role in the launching of the Asiatic campaign and on account of their familial relationship (cf. 16.93.8). Attalos thus went unpunished, and Pausanias avenged himself by killing the man who seemed to condone the crime.<sup>13</sup>

M.B. Hatzopoulos puts a new twist on Diodorus' account of Philip's death. He too equates the Illyrian campaign against Pleurias with that against Pleuratos (which he dates to 345), in which Philip suffered a serious collarbone injury. He notes similarities between the campaign described by Diodorus and that against Pleuratos. But most of these are so general as to be useless—the campaigns were both against the Illyrians, they involved invasions of Illyria by Philip, the King's life was in danger and one of his men was killed (2005: 54–5). Only the similarity of the two names of the Illyrian kings deserves attention.<sup>14</sup>

This is followed by the mind-boggling assertion: “It is difficult to escape the *obvious* conclusion that the real name of the bodyguard heroically dead was Hippostratos” (55: emphasis added). First of all, Hippostratos (whose death is mentioned in a fragment of Marsyas of Pella, *FGrH* 135/6 F17) is not described as a member of the bodyguard. The fragment merely states that 150 of the *hetairoi* (presumably the Companion Cavalry) were wounded and that Hippostratos was killed. Hatzopoulos attempts to link the *hetairoi* with guardsmen by referring to Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F348; cf. Morison, *BNJ*), who says the *pezhetairoi* acted as *doryphoroi*. But it is most likely that these troops were the ones later known as *hypaspistai* (something that is clear from the nature of their recruitment).

Hatzopoulos continues: there was some argument about who was responsible for Hippostratos' death and the blame must have fallen on Pausanias, who was subsequently sexually violated at the instigation of Attalos and Kleopatra (“as revenge for his alleged responsibility for the death of Hippostratos,” who was Kleopatra's brother, 56). Not only is there no shred of evidence for this “obvious conclusion,” but it is complicated by the fact that Hatzopoulos accepts the testimony of Justin (9.6.5) that Pausanias was raped “in the early years of puberty” (*in primis pubertatis annis*). Now how it is that the thirteen-year-old Pausanias was fighting among Philip's elite *pezhetairoi* and could

13 For the death of Philip II and the motives behind it see Köhler 1892; Willrich 1899b; Badian 1963; Hamilton 1965; Kraft 1971: 11–42; Bosworth 1971a; Ellis 1971; Fears 1975; Heckel 1981c; Develin 1981; Will 1987; Fredricksmeier 1990; Carney 1992; Hammond 1992; Hatzopoulos 2005; Badian 2007 (= *Collected Papers* 496–511); Landucci, *Filippo* 127–35; Antela-Bernárdez 2012; Howe 2015a; Heckel, Howe and Müller 2016 (forthcoming). See also Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 97–101; Lane Fox, *Alexander* 35–42; Green, *Alexander* 88–110; Rogers, *Alexander* 27–37; Worthington, *Philip* 172–86; Anson, *Themes and Issues* 53–5, 75–6. For closely related issues: Heckel 1979a; Carney 1983; Tronson 1984; Unz 1985.

14 There is no need to identify Pleurias with Pleuratos (Marsyas of Pella, *FGrH* 135/6 F17) or to date the campaign to the mid 340s. The conflation of the campaigns goes back to Meyer 1909 and was enshrined in scholarship by Papazoglou 1965: 156–7; Hammond 1967b: 245 sees Pleuratos as king of the Ardiaioi and Pleurias as a chieftain of the Autariatai.

be held responsible for Hippostratos' death he does not say. Furthermore, he follows this with the allegation that Philip fell in love with Kleopatra because he "felt responsible for the death of Hippostratos" (56). Finally, Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.6) says that the outrage against Pausanias had been sanctioned by Attalos and Kleopatra (Παυσανίας Ἀττάλου γνώμῃ καὶ Κλεοπάτρας ύβρισθεῖς). If it occurred, as Hatzopoulos contends, in 345/4, then Kleopatra (according to most estimates of her age) would have been between eight and ten years old at the time. It is more likely that the events—the Illyrian campaign, the rape of Pausanias, and the murder of Philip II—occurred in rapid succession, just as Diodorus reports.

### ***The Asian campaign and the death of Attalos***

Attalos crossed the Hellespont at the beginning of the spring of 336, sharing command with Parmenion and Amyntas;<sup>15</sup> he had, some time before, married Parmenion's daughter.<sup>16</sup> Their force of 10,000 advanced as far as Magnesia-on-the-Maandros, where they were caught off guard and defeated with heavy losses by Memnon the Rhodian and forced to withdraw inside the city walls.<sup>17</sup> On the news of Philip's death, Attalos plotted rebellion,<sup>18</sup> trusting in his popularity with the troops and communicating with the anti-Makedonian party in Athens.<sup>19</sup>

15 For the date: Justin 9.5.8; cf. Diod. 16.91.2. For the commanders: Diod. 17.2.4; cf. Justin 9.5.8–9. Amyntas may be the son of Arrhabaios; the son of Antiochos is also a possibility, and although he is said to have fled from *Makedonia* at the time of Amyntas Perdikka's death, he need not necessarily have returned from Asia after Philip's death. On the other hand, as a possible *syntrophos* of Amyntas Perdikka (thus born in the last half of the 360s), the son of Antiochos appears to have been somewhat young for a position of this sort.

16 Curt. 6.9.17; she was presumably the same woman who married Koinos son of Polemokrates in 334; cf. Curt. 6.9.30. The date of Attalos' marriage is unknown, but it probably belongs to 337/6; there is no evidence of any children from the union. Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 280 n.108 comments that the wording of Curt. 6.9.17 (*Hic [sc. Philotas] Attalo, quo graviorem inimicum non habui, sororem suam in matrimonium dedit*), which describes Attalos as Alexander's "most bitter enemy" implies that the marriage occurred after that of Philip and Kleopatra. But we should not take Curtius literally, since it is hardly likely that Philotas himself was the giver of the bride (*in matrimonium dedit*).

17 Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.44.4. Judeich, *Kl. Studien* 303 n.1 for Magnesia-on-the-Maandros, drawing attention to the pro-Makedonian party in Ephesos. For the Makedonian campaigns of 336 see also Ruzicka 1997: 124–5.

18 Diod. 17.5.1; at 17.2.3 he is called a rival for the throne, though he scarcely had any legal claims to it. Hatzopoulos 1986: 290–1 suggests that, in the event of Philip's death, Attalos might have expected to act as regent for a son born to Kleopatra. But this assumes that the Makedonian nobility would have been willing to overlook Alexander.

Some scholars believe that Attalos was present in *Makedonia* when Philip was assassinated. Hammond 1978c: 346 n.37, for example, suggests that he was the *somatophylax* Attalos of Diod. 16.94.4 and thus one of the Seven. This is impossible, since the *somatophylakes* in this case are *hypaspistai basilikoi* and not the seven-man Bodyguard, as is clear from the names of the other *somatophylakes* on this occasion (cf. Heckel 1979b). What, one wonders, was Attalos doing at Philip's Court when the King was celebrating the marriage of his daughter by Olympias and when his services were badly needed in Asia Minor?

19 Diod. 17.2.4, 5.1; cf. 17.3.2, naming Demosthenes; cf. Judeich, *Kl. Studien* 304.

Whether he was in fact guilty is a moot point; for Alexander the charge sufficed to justify his murder.<sup>20</sup> Judeich regards the Makedonian movement north from Magnesia to the Hellespont as part of Attalos' plan to overthrow Alexander at home.<sup>21</sup> This implies that Parmenion was either subordinate to Attalos or a willing accomplice in his scheme, neither of which is likely. Hekataios was sent to secure his execution, which he could not have effected without Parmenion's complicity. Whatever the old general's personal feelings towards his son-in-law, he acted quickly and decisively for his own political gain.<sup>22</sup> Justin's claim (11.5.1) that Alexander, before his departure for Asia, killed all Kleopatra's relatives whom Philip had placed in positions of power is nothing more than rhetorical exaggeration, and refers only to Attalos. In fact, the new King may even have made an attempt at reconciliation by promoting Hegelochos to higher military office.<sup>23</sup>

### **Hegelochos son of Hippostratos**

Berve II, 164–5 no. 341; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 49–54; Heckel 1982a, and *Who's Who* 131–2.

#### ***Family background***

Hegelochos son of Hippostratos, commander of both cavalry forces and, temporarily, Alexander's Aegean fleet,<sup>24</sup> was in all likelihood the great-nephew of Attalos. His familial ties illuminate his career:<sup>25</sup> in particular, the allegation that he conspired against Alexander in Egypt, which many have dismissed as invention, becomes perfectly understandable.<sup>26</sup>

20 Cf. Badian 1963: 249–50. Diod. 17.5.1 says that although he had been in contact with Demosthenes, Attalos sent Demosthenes' letter to Alexander in order to prove that he was not planning to rebel against him. Howe 2015a: 144 believes that Attalos was, in fact, attempting to prove his loyalty, but Alexander never forgave his insult at the wedding feast.

21 Judeich, *Kl. Studien* 304–5.

22 Diod. 17.2.5–6, 5.2; Curt. 7.1.3; see also Curt. 8.1.42; cf. 8.1.52; and 8.7.4; Justin 12.6.14. Where Attalos' murder occurred, whether in Magnesia or in Aiolia, is not stated. Müller, *Maßnahmen* 43 notes that the elimination of Attalos meant an increase in military power for Parmenion, though I do not think she means to impute seniority to Attalos; Cartledge 2004: 97 speaks of Parmenion's "pragmatic calculation that his own personal advantage, and that of his immediate family members, would be better served by sticking with Alexander . . .".

23 This did not include, as Rzepka 2008: 46–9 suggests, command of half the *ile basilike* at Gaugamela.

24 Cavalry commands: Arr. 1.13.1; 3.11.8; cf. Curt. 6.11.22. On his command of Alexander's reconstituted fleet see Hauben 1972: 56–8; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 49–54. That this Hegelochos who reconstituted the Aegean fleet is someone other than the cavalry commander is remotely possible (cf. Atkinson II, 242–3), but unlikely.

25 First proposed in Heckel 1982c. See *Stemma I*.

26 Curt. 6.11.22–9. Badian 1960a: 332: "Curtius . . . has a story of a plot between Parmenio and Hegelochus (then dead), which Philotas is said to have divulged under torture. Since no charge was in fact brought against Parmenio, it is almost certain that none could be: the plot with Hegelochus

Arrian (3.11.8) identifies the ilarch Hegelochos as son of a certain Hippostratos. The father's name occurs only twice in the accounts of the period before 336: Marsyas of Pella mentions Hippostratos son of Amyntas, who died in Philip's Illyrian campaign of 344/3;<sup>27</sup> Satyrus (*ap. Athen.* 13.557d = Müller, *FHG* III, frag. 5) notes that the brother of Kleopatra was called Hippostratos. All three passages may refer to the same individual, the father of the ilarch at Gaugamela. Hegelochos may thus have been Kleopatra's nephew.

K.J. Beloch objects that Kleopatra's brother could not have had a son old enough to command a squadron of Companions at Gaugamela.<sup>28</sup> But is this actually the case? Plutarch does say that Philip fell in love with Attalos' niece in spite of her age (*Alex.* 9.6: [Κλεοπάτρα], ἦν ὁ Φίλιππος ἡγάγετο παρθένον, ἐρασθεῖς παρ' ἡλικίαν τῆς κόρης). This tells us nothing certain about her age: indeed, Ian Scott-Kilvert, in the Penguin translation, renders the passage "a girl with whom Philip had fallen in love and whom he had decided to marry, although she was far too young for him" (1973: 261). Berve's estimate that she was born c.353 appears to suit Plutarch's description; she may, however, have been considered young in comparison with Olympias, then in her late thirties. Hence 355–353 may be a good, conservative, date for her birth.<sup>29</sup> Berve II, 94 suggests that Attalos

must be an effort of later *apologia*." Cf. Fears 1975: 133 n.77. Hegelochos' conspiracy is ignored by Green, Schachermeyr and Hamilton; Lane Fox, *Alexander* 289 mentions Hegelochos without judgment on the historicity of the incident. A more balanced discussion can be found in Atkinson II, 243–4. Berve II, 165 treats the matter with caution. We must, however, ask why Curtius chose to tell this particular story about this individual. What was it about Hegelochos that might make the existence of such a conspiracy plausible? The author knew certain details about Hegelochos' career and he must have derived these from his primary source. That primary source is also unlikely to have selected Hegelochos as conspirator without good reason, and that reason can best be understood as his relationship with Attalos and Kleopatra-Eurydike. If Philip's last wife is the Eurydike of the statue-group in the Philippeum (Paus. 5.20.10; cf. 5.17.4, see Palagia 2010; Eurydike is generally assumed to be Philip's mother: see, for example, Carney 2007a: 34, with n.27, 2015b: 38; Worthington, *Philip* 164–6), then there is no reason to doubt the evidence of Arr. 3.6.5 concerning her name. But the argument comes dangerously close to circularity. The significance of this renaming is controversial. My explanation (Heckel 1978a, 1983a; also Bosworth I, 283) has met with spirited resistance: see Prestiani-Giallombardo 1981; Badian 1982a; Ogden, *PPD* 24 ("The naming of a wife 'Eurydice' had more to do with Philip's projection of himself than with his projection of his wife"); Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 280 n.113 (skeptical).

27 *FGrH* 135/6 F17, from Didymus' commentary on Demosthenes, on which see Harding 2006: 239–40. For Marsyas' historical contribution see Heckel 1980d, although the system for attributing the more obscure fragments to either Pellaeus or Philippensis is, admittedly, simplistic.

28 Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.70: "Ein 'Ηγέλοχος' Ἰπποστράτου befehligte bei Arbela eine Ille der Hetaerenreiterei (Arr. *Anab.* III 11, 8); aber Kleopatras Bruder kann nicht wohl einen Sohn gehabt haben, der in 331 alt genug gewesen wäre, ein solches Kommando zu führen."

29 Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 73 is somewhat more cautious ("between 355 and 351 seems reasonable") and adds on p. 280 n.101 that my "suggestion that Plutarch's description of her age somehow compares her to Olympias does not make sense in the context of the passage." But Plutarch makes it clear that Philip's marital affairs caused problems with the jealous older wife (*Alex.* 9.5). Greenwalt 1988a has argued persuasively that Makedonian women married at a later age than their Greek counterparts to the south. Eighteen was thus not unusual. A birthdate of 355 would certainly be supported by the physical evidence, if Kleopatra is indeed the woman in the

was born c.380, making him a contemporary of Philip II. He could have been somewhat older.

Felix Staehelin believes that the Hippostratos who died in the Illyrian campaign could have been Kleopatra's brother, but rules out identification with the father of Hegelochos on the grounds that Alexander had all Kleopatra's relatives killed.<sup>30</sup> This view, however, places too much faith in the reliability of Justin (or Trogus, for that matter), who was notoriously fond of generalizations and rhetorical plurals.<sup>31</sup>

According to all the sources that record her death (and these include Justin), Kleopatra and her daughter were the victims not of Alexander but of Olympias.<sup>32</sup>

antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina (as suggested by Burstein 1982). But the identities of the occupants are far from certain and, although the attribution of Tomb II to Philip is stubbornly defended by some scholars (see especially Lane Fox 2011: 1–34), many scholars hold the view that the occupants of the tomb belonged to the generation after Philip. Borza 1999: 70–2 supports the revisionist view that Tomb II housed Adeia-Eurydike and Philip Arrhidaios, arguing that the man, woman, and child of Tomb I may have been Philip II, Kleopatra and Europa. See also Worthington, *Philip* 234–41; Whitehorne, *Cleopatras* 50–6; Bartsikas and Carney 2007–8; and Borza and Palagia 2007, with extensive bibliography on 118–25.

30 Stähelin 1905: 151: “man könnte ebensogut an Hippostratos, den Bruder Philipps zweiter Gemahlin Kleopatra denken, den Satyros . . . in einer Weise erwähnt, die uns vermuten lässt, das der Mann sich irgendwie besonders hervorgetan haben muss. . . . In keinem Falle ist Hippostratos, der Vater des Hegelochos, mit Hippostratos, dem Bruder der Kleopatra, identisch, denn wir wissen, dass Alexander bei seinem Übergang nach Asien die sämtlichen Verwandten seiner Stiefmutter umbringen liess (Justin 11,5,1).”

31 Justin 11.5.1: *proficiscens ad Persicum bellum omnes novercae suae cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiore dignitatis locum provehens imperiis praefeccerat, interfecit*. Justin's Alexander was one who *non in hostem, sed in suos saeviebat* (9.8.15: “used to rage not against the enemy but against his own men”). And, where Justin (Trogus) knows of only one incident or one victim of cruelty, he speaks of many. *hic [sc. Alexander] amicorum interfector convivio frequenter excessit* (9.8.16) refers only to Kleitos' murder (cf. Curt. 3.12.19). He speaks of many sons of Philip II, though he can name only one (to except, momentarily, the fictitious Karanos): *genuit ex Larissaea saltatrice filium Arridaeum, qui post Alexandrum regnavit. habuit et multos alios filios ex variis matrimonii regio more susceptos, qui partim fato, partim ferro periere* (9.8.2–3); but see the comments of Ogden, *PPD* 26. Likewise, although he names only one brother (the fictitious Karanos, whose existence is contradicted by Justin himself at 9.7.12), whom Alexander put to death, he speaks of *fratres interficti* (12.6.14: cf. Lane Fox, *Alexander* 504). *nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit, ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedonia remaneret* (11.5.2) refers only to Amyntas Perdikka (*tunc Amyntas consobrinus . . . interfec[us]*, 12.6.14). And, there is only one relative of Alexander's *noverca* (= Kleopatra) who might be described as [*quem*] *Philippus in excelsiore dignitatis locum provehens imperiis praefeccerat* (11.5.1): Attalos (cf. again 12.6.14, with Yardley & Heckel 1997 *ad loc.*). *omnes novercae suae cognatos . . . interfecit* must be another generalization. Cf. 10.1.1, 4 ff.; 11.6.11 for fantastic numbers.

32 Cf. Carney, *Olympias* 44 and 2009: 197. Plut. *Alex.* 10.7, it was done against Alexander's wishes; Justin 9.7.12 says that she was forced by Olympias to hang herself; Paus. 8.7.7 says that both mother and son were pushed onto an oven. Karanos, as son of Philip and a wife other than Olympias, has again been resurrected. Tarn rightly did away with him (II, 260–2, Appendix 9: “Caranus”); he was followed by Burn 1947: 143. But Karanos has been accepted as the son of Kleopatra (denying, therefore, the existence of Europa) by Grote XII, 8; Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 70; Welles 1970: 15; and as Kleopatra's second child by Lane Fox, *Alexander* 503–4 (cf. Lane Fox 2011:

On Attalos, however, Alexander did take vengeance, through the agency of Hekataios, and with Parmenion's acquiescence.<sup>33</sup> There is no mention of any other male relatives of Kleopatra. Her father and her brother were already dead before she married Philip in 337—had either been living at the time, Attalos would not have been her guardian—and this will explain why Kleopatra is consistently identified not as the daughter of Amyntas but as the niece of Attalos. Berve's objection (II, 185) that Satyrus speaks of Hippostratos as if he were still alive in 337 is not convincing: the wording of the passage allows no such conclusion. Satyrus does, however, contribute to our picture of Kleopatra's family history. Amyntas may have predeceased his son, Hippostratos, leaving Kleopatra (and possibly her mother) in the custody of her brother until he too died in 344/3. At that time, the girl, now between nine and eleven years of age, became the ward of her uncle, Attalos. Thus her only two known male relatives still living in 337 were the prominent Attalos and her nephew, Hegelochos, now at an age to exercise military command.<sup>34</sup>

### *Hegelochos' military career*

It appears that Hegelochos, like Amyntas son of Arrhabaios, began his service in Asia with the advance force of his kinsman Attalos and Parmenion; for the *prodromoi* (also called *sarisophoroi*) appear to have been part of the advance force, and these joined the 1,800 Companions who crossed to Asia with Alexander. In the early stages of the Makedonian advance towards the Granikos River, Amyntas son of Arrhabaios is found in command of a larger cavalry force, which included four *ilai* of *prodromoi*.<sup>35</sup> These *ilai* were probably led by Hegelochos, who took them, along with 500 light infantrymen (*psiloi*), to reconnoiter the

5–6, 385–6) and Green, *Alexander* 108 ff., 523–4. That he was the son of another wife, most likely Phila the Elimote, is proposed by Willrich 1899b: 177; Staehelin, *RE* XI, 734–5 “Kleopatra [2]”; Berve II, 199–200 no. 411; Wilcken, *Alexander* 62; Macurdy, *HQ* 54; Niese I, 52; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 102, with n.84, 104. Ellis, *Philip II* 306 n.54 supports Tarn. The child is clearly meant to be the potential son of Kleopatra (who is the *noverca* of Justin 11.2.3, as Tarn has proved conclusively). The child mentioned by Pausanias is the one referred to as *filia* by Justin 9.7.12, and this is Europa, so Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13.5573. See Heckel 1979a; contra Unz 1985; also Ogden, *PPD* 26.

33 Diod. 17.2.5–6, 5.2; Curt. 7.1.3. Despite my earlier suggestion that Hekataios may be identical with the tyrant of Kardia (Heckel, *Who's Who* 131 “Hecataeus [2]”), an enemy of Eumenes, I now believe that Berve II, 148 no. 292 was right to reject the idea, proposed by Droysen 2012: 73; cf. Staehelin, *RE Supplbd* III, 891. Curt. 7.1.38 mentions a youth, also named Hekataios, who was a favorite at the court of Olympias, and it may be that he was a relative of Alexander's agent (whom Diod. 17.2.5 describes as one of Alexander's Friends/*hetairoi*: τῶν φίλων), who was thus probably a Makedonian and member of the “Alexander-Olympias faction.” Hence there may have been three men of that name attested in the Alexander historians.

34 Those who object to this family relationship on the grounds that the nephew is of the same age as the aunt or older have obviously never been confronted by the reality of family life disrupted by war and multiple marriages. Generations do not fall into neat blocks of twenty years, without overlaps and anomalies.

35 Arr. 1.12.7: Amyntas' force included the *ile* of Sokrates son of Sathon.

Persian position at the river on the last stage of this march.<sup>36</sup> In the actual battle, we find Amyntas once again in command of *hippeis sarissophoroi*, as well as the Paionians and Sokrates' squadron; we may assume that Hegelochos was again Amyntas' subordinate. And, since the cavalry forces of Amyntas son of Arrhabaios remained with Alexander over the winter of 334/3 (while Parmenion took the allies and the military wagons from Sardis into Phrygia), it is likely that Hegelochos also participated in the Pisidian campaign.

It was during the winter of 334/3 that Alexander learned of the treasonous activities of Alexandros Lynkestes. Not long after the arrest of the Lynkestian, Amyntas son of Arrhabaios, commanded the Makedonian left at Sagalassos and is never heard of again. Hegelochos, who had previously served as his subordinate, was soon sent to the Hellespontine region to reassemble a fleet and assume command of it.<sup>37</sup> It may be that his previous experience of the region (in 336–334) made him a logical choice, but the fact that he was to act in tandem with Amphoteros,<sup>38</sup> the brother of Krateros and the very man who facilitated the arrest of Alexandros Lynkestes, suggests that Alexander wanted to remove him from the army and meant to keep him under surveillance. Hegelochos effectively recaptured the Aegean states that had defected as a consequence of the activities of Memnon the Rhodian—namely Tenedos, Chios, Mytilene and the remainder of Lesbos, and Kos (the last primarily the work of Amphoteros)—and brought their leaders to Alexander in Egypt.<sup>39</sup>

36 Arr. 1.13.1: Hegelochos' cavalry are called *hippeis sarissophoroi*. Bosworth I, 110 observes that the *prodromoi* and *sarissophoroi* were identical—the names denote function and armament—and that “the corps of *prodromoi* was probably able to act in two capacities, depending on the circumstances of the action.” The use of the cavalry sarissa (clearly a shorter version of that carried by infantrymen) and the presence of the *psiloi* suggests that the Makedonian troops were prepared for an encounter with the forward units of the Persian army. English, *Army* 42 argues that they functioned “as anti-cavalry troops and they were deployed in open order; this being necessary in order to prevent danger from the butt-spikes of the sarissa to friendly troops riding behind the front line.”

37 Arr. 2.2.3; Curt. 3.1.19–20. Hegelochos and Amphoteros were given 500 talents to cover their expenses.

38 Curt. 3.1.19: *Amphoterum classi ad oram Hellesponti, copiis autem praefecit Hegelochum, Lesbium et Chium Coumque praesidiis hostium liberaturos*. The apparent contradiction of Arr. 3.2.6 (seen by Berve I, 161 and II, 32 no. 68) is perhaps explained by Hauben 1972: 57, who regards this as “a diarchic fleet command,” in which “the head of the marines also functioned as the supreme commander of the whole formation.” Thus Amphoteros controlled the purely naval matters, but under Hegelochos’ direction. Arr. 3.2.6 speaks of Hegelochos sending Amphoteros to Kos in 332, suggesting that the latter was a subordinate (cf. Berve II, 164 “untergeordnet”). A lower rank for Amphoteros does not rule out the likelihood that his task was to keep an eye on Hegelochos’ activities (compare the roles of Kleomenes as *hyparchos* of Ptolemy and Meleagros as Perdikkas’ *hyparchos*). For the balancing of power within the army and administration in Alexander’s lifetime and the age of the Diadochoi, see Heckel 2002a. For Amphoteros’ career see Heckel, *Who’s Who* 23.

39 The Aegean campaign: Arr. 2.2.3; Curt. 4.5.14–22. Return to Alexander in Egypt: Curt. 4.8.11; Arr. 3.2.3–7. The notable captives were, from the Chian garrison, Apollonides and Athanagoras (Arr. 3.2.5 adds Phesinos and Megareus), and the tyrants, Aristonikos of Methymna and Eurysilos of Eresos (Curt. 4.8.11 calls him Ersilaus); Pharnabazos was also captured, but he escaped when

In Egypt (332/1), Hegelochos rejoined the army, and it was at this time that he allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to inveigle Parmenion in a conspiracy against Alexander (Curt. 6.11.22–9). Many of the army’s senior officers were offended by Alexander’s acknowledgement of Amun as his divine father and its implied rejection of Philip II; doubtless, Hegelochos heard with approbation the diatribes of Philotas, those derogatory comments about the King which were being secretly monitored by Krateros.<sup>40</sup> The details of Hegelochos’ abortive “conspiracy” came to light only in the autumn of 330. At some point after his return, Hegelochos had been reinstated as ilarch, only to be killed leading his troops at Gaugamela.<sup>41</sup>

### *Hegelochos, Parmenion and Philotas*

Only a literal interpretation of Justin prevents us from identifying Hegelochos as a nephew of Kleopatra. And this testimony has been discredited. The career of Hegelochos is thus instructive. When Alexander set out for Asia, he left many enemies, potentially seditious, alive both in Makedonia and within the army: witness the series of intrigues and conspiracies that followed the death of Philip II. Alexander could, and did, eliminate his most dangerous political rivals, but he was forced to adopt a policy of conciliation; for the very bases of his power were the Makedonian nobles, some of whom had supported, and others contested, Philip’s power. These now hastened to realign themselves in accordance with the needs of the new regime. Some of the victims had opposed Alexander with

the fleet put in at Kos. The Chians were imprisoned on Alexander’s orders in Elephantine; the tyrants were returned to their own cities, where they were tortured and killed. See Brunt, *Arrian I*, 453–6, Appendix II “Naval Operations 334–332”; also Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 47–54. On the shadow war that went on in Greece and the eastern Aegean, which came to a head with the war of Agis III, see Wirth, *Kampfverband*.

40 Plut. *Mor.* 339e–f = *de fort.* Al. 2.7; *Alex.* 48.4–49.2. Parmenion’s remark that Philotas “should make less of himself” (*χείρον μοι γίνου*: Plut. *Alex.* 48.3) reflects his own concerns that his son’s ill-advised *parrhesia* might reach the ears of the King. But primarily Hegelochos was clearly incensed by Alexander’s claim to be the son of Amun, the Egyptian Zeus (Curt. 6.11.23: *cum primum Iovis filium se salutari iussit rex*).

41 Curt. 6.11.22; cf. Arr. 3.11.8. His identity may, perhaps, account for the sources’ failure to mention him, even though they name a number of commanders who were wounded in the engagement (Arr. 3.15.2; Curt. 4.16.32; Diod. 17.61.3). The “official” history of Kallisthenes is the most likely primary source of these details. Where Curt. 6.11.22 got the information is difficult to say (Hammond, *THA*, has virtually nothing to offer on the sources for the Philotas affair, in which the story of Hegelochos is embedded).

Rzepka 2008: 46–9 argues, unconvincingly, that the Royal Squadron (*ile basilike*) was divided into two parts and that the reading of Arr. 3.11.8 (*τελευταῖα δὲ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἵλων ἡς Ὑγέλοχος ὁ Ἰπποστράτου ἥλαρχης ἦν*) should not be emended, and that the word *βασιλικῶν* should not be bracketed. But the Greek, translated literally, would have to read “lastly, of the Royal Squadrons, [came] the one of which Hegelochos son of Hippostratos was ilarch,” and this suggests that all the preceding *ilai* were royal (*basilikai*). What was the point of dividing the King’s cavalry guard into two parts and moving one part to the end of the cavalry line, where it would be in no position to protect Alexander?

little thought for the consequences of Philip's death, others could not escape the circumstances of their birth and the inherited privileges that threatened the new king's security; but Alexander was concerned to limit the slaughter, far more so than his vengeful mother. Parmenion could buy peace, and indeed strengthen his position in the army, but the price was Attalos' head.

Nevertheless, numerous enemies remained alive and in positions of power. Alexandros Lynkestes came to no harm in 336, though he was later arrested for intrigues with the Persians.<sup>42</sup> Yet the King could have been expected to fear him on account of the execution of Heromenes and Arrhabaios.<sup>43</sup> Amyntas, the nephew of Lynkestian Alexandros and son of the executed Arrhabaios, also retained his rank until the arrest of his uncle led, apparently, to his own fall (cf. Berve II, 30). And so it follows that Hegelochos too should survive. Kleopatra's brother, Hippostratos was long dead and forgotten by the time Alexander purged the Court and the army of his most dangerous enemies. Hegelochos himself presented no challenge to Alexander's rule and the King could ill afford to extend his feud with Attalos to include Kleopatra's nephew. The Makedonian nobility were too numerous, too influential and too much interrelated to make such an action feasible. As Badian once remarked, "Alexander could not afford (and had hardly intended) to engage in wholesale slaughter of the Macedonian nobility" (1960a: 335).

Opposition to Alexander intensified upon his accession and continued until the death of Alexandros the Lynkestian and the murder of Black Kleitos at Marakanda, if not beyond.<sup>44</sup> Friction existed throughout Alexander's reign between his true supporters and those who espoused traditional Makedonian values.<sup>45</sup> In the course of this struggle there were many casualties and, while Hegelochos appears to have died in battle, there is no reason to assume that he was not hostile and capable of plotting. Kleopatra's murder, and that of her infant child, remained fresh in her nephew's mind in 332/1. Curtius (or his source) did not invent his conspiracy in Egypt, which in the light of Hegelochos' family background appears entirely plausible.

42 His dealings with Sisines (Arr. 1.25.3–10) are doubted by Badian 2000a: 57–60, but see Heckel 2003a: 210–3.

43 Berve II, 80, 169 nos. 144, 355; Heckel, *Who's Who* 52, 139.

44 Kleitos, although he may be regarded as a supporter of Alexander, compared the actions of Alexander in the middle of his campaign unfavorably with those of Philip, and there were many around him who would have approved. We cannot say what the political leanings were of the fathers of the Pages involved in the Hermolaos conspiracy of 327.

45 Whom Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 363 calls "alitmakedonisch gesinnt."

## 2 The house of Aëropos

The ruling house of Lynkos or Lynkestis is first attested in the context of the events of 424/3 by Thucydides, who mentions an Arrhabaios, “king of the Lynkestians” (Thuc. 4.79.2: Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα); the historian describes him in greater detail four chapters later as “Arrhabaios son of Bromeros, king of the Lynkestian Makedonians” (Thuc. 4.83.1: Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Βρομεροῦ Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα). Like the Argeadai (or Temenids) and the Molossian Aiakidai, the Lynkestian rulers claimed Greek descent, tracing their ancestry back to the Bakchiadai of Korinth.<sup>1</sup> It is clear that in the 420s the Upper Makedonians, and the Lynkestians in particular, were fiercely independent and that Perdikkas II was far more concerned with them than with his commitments to his Greek allies.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, we know very little about the chronology of Arrhabaios’ reign. Much depends upon the date of the peace treaty between Perdikkas and Athens (*IG* I<sup>2</sup> 71 = I<sup>3</sup> 89), which mentions *philia* and *symmachia* between Perdikkas and Arrhabaios. This has been dated by many scholars to 423/2, after Perdikkas’ defection from Brasidas (Thuc. 4.132), but some have placed it as early as the middle of the fifth century or as late as 415; the letter forms appear to support a later date.<sup>3</sup> What we can say with certainty is that Arrhabaios I (the son

1 Strabo 7.7.8 C326.

2 Thuc. 4.79.2 (καὶ μάλιστα βουλόμενος Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι). Thuc. 4.83.3: Brasidas’ Chalkidian allies urged him not to bring about the speedy demise of the Lynkestians, since this would lessen Perdikkas’ commitment to their cause.

3 The editors of *IG* I<sup>2</sup> proposed 423/2 (followed by *SEG* X, 86); cf. Beloch II<sup>2</sup> 1.338; Geyer, *Makedonien* 61; Laistner, *Greek World* 111; Ellis, *Philip II* 38. Errington, *Hist. Mac.* 267 n.3 suggests a date in the 440s; Kagan, *Outbreak* 276, with n.13, believes the treaty was made “soon after his [sc. Perdikkas’] accession to the throne,” adding that he considers the date of 436 proposed by the editors of *ATL* (cf. Hill, *Sources* 307 no. 66) unnecessarily late; but see the comments of Mattingly 1996: 242, from an article originally published in 1968. Meiggs, *Ath. Empire* 428–30, provides an overview of the dating problem but notes that the letter-forms suggest a later date; Hammond, *HMac.* II, 136, favors c.415. Indeed, Lewis, *CAH* V<sup>2</sup> 429 n. 148, dates it “towards the end of Perdiccas’ reign.” The epigraphers will, no doubt, continue to debate the matter, but arguments about whether Perdikkas would have trusted Arrhabaios at one point or another (e.g., Meiggs, *Ath. Empire* 430) strike me as extremely subjective, especially in a world where trust was in short supply and agreements were dictated by necessity or expediency.

of Bromeros) acceded to the kingship no later than the mid-420s, and that there is no compelling evidence for the view that the king of the same name, who waged war in conjunction with Sirras against Perdikkas' successor, Archelaos (whose reign ended in 399), was a different individual.<sup>4</sup>

Sirras may have been the leader of the Illyrian force that had come to aid Perdikkas in 423 but defected to Arrhabaios (Thuc. 4.125.1; for Sirras' ethnicity see Appendix I); though perhaps the Illyrian chieftain at the time was Sirras' father.<sup>5</sup> The alliance with the Illyrians was strengthened by political marriage, with Sirras marrying a daughter of Arrhabaios; the offspring of this union was Eurydike, who later married Amyntas III and became the mother of Philip II and his brothers (Strabo 7.7.8 C326). The son-in-law supported Arrhabaios at some unspecified point in the reign of Archelaos.<sup>6</sup> The time of Arrhabaios' death and the name of his successor are unknown. If, as is generally believed, the father of Aëropos and grandfather of Alexandros Lynkestes was also named Arrhabaios, it may be that he was the next to rule Lynkestis and that he was the grandson of Bromeros. Hammond (*HMac.* II, 15), however, argues that the successor of Arrhabaios I was the father (name unknown) of Arrhabaios II, since “it was customary not to name father and son alike but to give the grandfather’s name to a grandson.” This was, of course, common practice but not a hard and fast rule. Indeed, sons were often named after their fathers in exceptional circumstances, and Hammond (*HMac.* II, 19) does not help his case by postulating two men named Derdas as the son and grandson of Derdas II of Elimeia. Beloch’s suggestion that Arrhabaios was succeeded by his namesake is probably correct for chronological reasons.<sup>7</sup>

If we calculate from the time of Philip’s assassination in 336, we might assume that Arrhabaios son of Aëropos, who was probably the eldest of the three known brothers, was born no later than c.360, and that Aëropos himself was roughly coeval with Philip II. And, if the father of Aëropos was also named

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.8.11 (1311b). Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.76 is undecided: “es bleibt aber ungewiss, ob hier der Sohn des Bromeros gemeint ist, oder sein Sohn gleichen Namens.” Hammond, *HMac.* II, 15: “We hear of another Arrhabaeus in Aristotle . . .” Hammond concludes that he was a grandson of Arrhabaios I. Borza, *Shadow of Olympus* 164: “Arrhabaeus II and the Illyrian Sirras (the son and son-in-law of Perdiccas’ nemesis, Arrhabaeus).” Greenwalt 1988b: 36 assumes that it was the same Arrhabaios who fought against Perdikkas and Archelaos.

<sup>5</sup> Possibly Grabos: *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 72 = I<sup>3</sup> 162; cf. Hornblower, *Comm.* II, 393.

<sup>6</sup> Since Eurydike married Amyntas III at some point between 393 and 390, her birthdate was probably c.410 (see Greenwalt 1988a for the age of marriageability in Makedonia). Hence, if we assume that she was born reasonably soon after her parents’ marriage, the agreement with Sirras and the war against Archelaos probably occurred very early in the latter’s reign, which is what one might expect.

<sup>7</sup> Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.76–7. Hammond, *HMac.* II, 16, calculates generations in convenient units of thirty years beginning with 475 as the floruit of the founder of the Lynkestian royal house. But these calculations present unnecessary problems (e.g., they make a campaign by Arrhabaios I against Archelaos difficult to accommodate and equally less likely for Arrhabaios II). On Hammond’s stemma, Arrhabaios and Heromenes are listed as in their prime eleven years after their execution.

Arrhabaios, the latter could have been born no later than about 405. This would make Arrhabaios II a slightly younger brother of the woman who married Sirrhas, and Aëropos himself would have been Eurydike's cousin. The assumption that Sirrhas exercised the regency for his underaged brother-in-law may thus be correct.<sup>8</sup> But the matter becomes more confused if we accept that Neoptolemos and Amyntas are the sons of the same Arrhabaios who was executed by Alexander on the suspicion of regicide. Amyntas was well advanced in the command structure of the Makedonian army in 334/3 (see below) and thus born c.360. I am now less certain that he shared the command in Asia with Attalos and Parmenion in the spring of 336.<sup>9</sup> At any rate, if Arrhabaios son of Aëropos was the father of Amyntas and Neoptolemos, his birth must be dated to c.380 and that of his father to the late fifth century. Hence, Aëropos may have been the son of Arrhabaios I and grandson of Bromeros and, as far as the kingship of Lynkestis is concerned, there was no Arrhabaios II.<sup>10</sup>

The fortunes of the family now become even more confused, and what follows is speculative at best. If Menelaos Pelagon (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 110 = Rhodes & Osborne no. 38*) is identical with Menelaos son of Arrhabaios (*Syll.<sup>3</sup> 188*), who is designated “Athenaios” (since he had been awarded Athenian citizenship: both men are honored for their *euergesia*) and the father in question is Arrhabaios I,<sup>11</sup> then the following picture emerges. Upon the death of Arrhabaios, his son Menelaos succeeded him, but he was deposed from his kingdom in the 360s. If his brother

<sup>8</sup> Thus Hammond, *HMac*. II, 15, but under different circumstances.

<sup>9</sup> Justin 9.5.8: *Initio veris tres duces in Asiam Persarum iuris praemittit, Parmenionem, Amyntam et Attalum*. Since he is placed on the same footing as Attalos and Parmenion, this Amyntas must have had some seniority. But there is no certainty that we are dealing with the son of Arrhabaios, though we cannot rule him out as a candidate. Wirth, *Kampfverband* 133, identifies him with the son of Antiochos. Arr. 1.17.9 says that this man fled “from Makedonia” (ἐκ Μακεδονίας) and not from Asia Minor, but this may involve too literal an interpretation. In either case, Philip appears to have been intent upon balancing the power of his generals in Asia, along regional/factional lines.

<sup>10</sup> Possibly, the father of Amyntas was not the son, but rather the brother, of Aëropos and thus a cousin, rather than a nephew, of Alexandros Lynkestes (as indicated on the alternative stemma), but this would mean that Arrhabaios was probably the son of Arrhabaios I or Arrhabaios II (if there was a second Arrhabaios who ruled the Lynkestians). That would cast even further doubt on the identity and career of Menelaos son of Arrhabaios.

<sup>11</sup> See Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.76–7. Beloch noted that in earlier times Pelagonia, which was adjacent to Lynkestis, may have been under the power of its neighbor. But Hammond, *HMac*. II, 20, dismisses Beloch's equating of Menelaos Pelagon with the son of Arrhabaios II. “It is, however, an improbable view. Menelaus was a Pelagonian and not a Lyncestian at all. . . . To suppose that ‘Pelagonian’ and ‘Lyncestian’ were alternatives and that the kings of Lyncus and Pelagonia were interchangeable is as absurd as to suppose that kings of France and Prussia were interchangeable.” In fact, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 110*, which honors Menelaos Pelagon as *euergetes*, does not call him “king of the Pelagonians,” and the name may have another derivation (perhaps the man was born there). Furthermore the comparison of Lynkos and Pelagonia with France and Prussia is supercilious and utterly disingenuous; for Hammond if anyone understood the ethnic composition of these cantons. It is possible that Menelaos son of Arrhabaios was Lynkestian but not identical with Menelaos Pelagon, since the honors accorded the latter are similar to those given to his *progonoi*, which may include a certain “P- king of the Pelagonians” (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 190*). The difficulties are manifold.

Aëropos ruled after him, it can only have been for a short while; for Philip II put an end to Lynkestian independence in the 350s. Aëropos reappears in the service of Philip II, apparently at the time of the Chaironeia campaign.

Philip was campaigning against Thebes. The officers, Aëropos and Damasippos, hired a female harpist from an inn and brought her into camp. They did not escape the notice of Philip. But he, when he learned of the matter, banished both officers from the boundaries of his kingdom.<sup>12</sup>

That Aëropos and his otherwise unknown companion were banished for what was surely a relatively minor offence (inasmuch as it involved high ranking officers) suggests that Philip had reason to fear or distrust Aëropos and used the opportunity to rid himself of a political rival.<sup>13</sup> This may have been the cause of the grievance against him by the younger Arrhabaios and his brother Heromenes, both of whom were executed for their alleged involvement in the assassination plot. Nevertheless, it appears that the Lynkestians did not in fact conspire against Philip, but were executed on false (but convenient) charges of regicide.<sup>14</sup> It is more likely that they opposed Alexander's kingship in 336/5, as the context of Plutarch, *Moralia* 327c suggests (see below). It has often been assumed that the claims of the Lynkestians to the throne were tenuous at best, but this is hardly the case.<sup>15</sup>

### Alexandros son of Aëropos: Alexandros Lynkestes

See Berve II, 17–9 no. 37; Kaerst, *RE I* (1894) 1435 no. 12; Bosworth 1971a: 93 ff.; Carney 1980 = *King and Court* 127–39; Heckel, *Who's Who* 19 “Alexander [4].”

One of three attested sons of Aëropos of Lynkestis,<sup>16</sup> Alexandros was a member of that canton's royal house, which had very close connections with the Argeads.

12 Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.2.3: Φύλιππος ἐπὶ Θηβαίους ἐστράτευεν. Αέροπος καὶ Δαμάσιππος ἡγεμόνες ἀπὸ πανδοκείου μισθωσάμενοι ψάλτριαν ἐξ στρατόπεδον εἰσῆγαγον. οὐ μὴν ξλαθον Φύλιππον, ὅλλα καταμαθών ἄμφω τῷ ἡγεμόνε τῶν ὄρων τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας ἔξεκήρυξεν.

13 Worthington, *By the Spear* 122: “Philip had exiled [Aëropos] when he suspected him of treason.” This may be true, but it is no more than an inference.

14 Cf. Atkinson in Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 100: “I am inclined to favour the view that they were not involved (so Badian (1963), 248–9), but vulnerable because the family was related to the Macedonian royal family.”

15 Bosworth I, 159 doubts that they had “the broad base of support enjoyed by the Argead house.” Green, *Alexander* 203, comments that Alexandros’ “alleged claim on the throne was, as we have seen, *flimsy in the extreme* (emphasis added).” Greenwalt 1988b: 37 rightly remarks on the importance of the union of Argead and Bakchiad houses, and he notes (1988b: 42 n.50): “The special status of Eurydice and her family appears confirmed by the status of Alexander the Lyncestian, who was related to Alexander the Great (almost certainly through Eurydice) and who could be considered a threat to the great Alexander's throne . . .” Cf. Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 175, commenting on the Lynkestian house: “Somit besaß sie nicht nur Geblütsrechte auf den Thron, sondern konnte sich auch noch auf eine Herrschaftstradition berufen.”

16 Arr. 1.7.6, 17.8; Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5; 8.8.6; Justin 11.2.2, 7.1. That he was the youngest son, as Müller, *Maßnahmen* 36, assumes, is uncertain. See *Stemma II* (simplified).

His brothers, Heromenes and Arrhabaios,<sup>17</sup> were thought to have espoused the cause of Amyntas Perdikka or to have had their own designs on the throne (Plut. *Mor.* 327c) and were both executed for their alleged complicity in a “plot” to assassinate Philip II.<sup>18</sup> Although strong arguments have been put forward for Upper Makedonian resistance to Philip II (or perhaps to his succession plans), it appears that whatever dealings the Lynkestians had with, or on behalf of, Amyntas Perdikka belong to the first year of Alexander’s reign (see Appendix II).

The brothers were officially charged with conspiring to murder Philip,<sup>19</sup> but Alexandros was spared on account of his familial connections with Antipatros (thus Badian 1963: 248), his father-in-law, and because he was the first to hail his namesake as “King.”<sup>20</sup> He was promptly appointed *strategos* of Thrake (Arr. 1.25.2). Indeed, at Thebes it was rumored in 335 that the approaching Makedonian army was led by the Lynkestian, coming from Thrake; for certain politicians had encouraged a false report that Alexander the Great was dead.<sup>21</sup> When the Asiatic expedition began in 334, Alexandros accompanied the King, who clearly did not trust him with the *strategia* of Thrake in his absence. For the Lynkestian it was undoubtedly a demotion that was soon offset by his elevation to *hipparch*: he assumed control of the Thessalian cavalry, when Kalas son of Harpalos received the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, although the King’s *consilium* appears to have voiced suspicions about Alexandros’ reliability.<sup>22</sup>

17 Arr. 1.25.1. Arrhabaios: Berve II, 80 no. 144; Bosworth 1971a; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 52. Heromenes: Berve II, 169 no. 355; Bosworth 1971a; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 139.

18 Arr. 1.25.1–2; cf. Justin 11.2.1. For the assumption that they were involved in an Upper Makedonian uprising, but were not necessarily of the Lynkestian royal house, see Bosworth 1971a. If they were not actually guilty of complicity in the plot of Pausanias, their execution suggests strongly that they were too dangerous to be left alive, which must mean that they had important family ties. Bosworth I, 159 believes they “could never command the broad base of support enjoyed by the Argeads.” But the house of Arrhabaios had strong Argead connections, as we have seen. Carney, *King and Court* 138, has revised her views on Aëropos (398/7–395/4) as a Lynkestian usurper.

19 Arr. 1.25.1; Justin 11.2.1–2; cf. Diod. 17.2.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10.7.

20 Son-in-law of Antipatros: Curt. 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1; Diod. 17.80.2 wrongly calls his father-in-law “Antigonos”; for the marriage of Alexandros Lynkestes and his descendants see Habicht 1977; cf. Heckel 1989: 32–3, 37. First to hail Alexander as King: Arr. 1.25.2; Justin 11.2.2 (with Yardley & Heckel: 81–2).

21 Arr. 1.7.6. I see nothing to support the claim of Lane Fox (*Alexander* 146) that “Alexander the Lyncestian . . . was known to be present with an army of Thracians at Thebes.” Arrian merely states that the rumor was in circulation that it was not Alexander the Great’s army but that of Alexandros. The truth was otherwise. Cf. Lane Fox’s implausible argument that Alexandros, the leader of the Thracians who raped Timokleia at Thebes and was murdered by her, was the Lynkestian (Plut. *Mor.* 259e–260d, the only source to call the commander Alexandros; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 12; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.40). The names have been chosen deliberately to create a contrast between the “good” and “bad” Alexander. See also Heckel and McLeod 2015: 256–8.

22 Arr. 1.25.5 (suspicions of the *hetairoi*). It is not explicitly stated the *hetairoi*, who in 334/3 expressed the view that Alexander had been unwise in giving the *hipparchy* to the Lynkestian, had actually given voice to this opinion several months earlier. There were no doubt some members of the Thessalian cavalry who had links to the defector Aristomedes of Pherai, who was now serving with Dareios III (cf. Arr. 2.13.2). I see no evidence for Green’s claim (*Alexander* 184, 202) that Alexandros commanded the Thracian cavalry; he also confuses the details of the career of Philippos son of Menelaos, who succeeded to the command of the Thessalians (compare 184 with 203–4).

Alexandros was hipparch for only a few months, helping Kalas establish himself in the Troad. But in the winter of 334/3 incriminating evidence came to light: a Persian agent was intercepted bearing a message purportedly from Dareios III to Alexandros Lynkestes (see below).<sup>23</sup> Deposed from office and kept under guard until 330, he was eliminated in the aftermath of the Philotas affair.<sup>24</sup> The Thessalian horse were entrusted to Philippos son of Menelaos.<sup>25</sup>

### *Conspirator or innocent victim?*

The arrest and belated execution of Alexandros Lynkestes offer an interesting glimpse of factional politics in the early stages of Alexander's kingship and the expedition.<sup>26</sup> The exact nature of the Lynkestian's involvement in a plot against Alexander is unclear, since the sources disagree on both details and chronology. Hence modern scholars offer different interpretations, some even doubting the existence of the conspiracy itself.<sup>27</sup> Arrian (1.25.1) claims that it occurred over the winter of 334/3, while Alexandros was in Parmenion's camp, and the King, with a portion of the army, was campaigning in southwestern Asia Minor. News of the plot reached Alexander in the vicinity of Phaselis. This finds support in Justin and Curtius, although the latter also knows of the version reported by Diodorus,<sup>28</sup> which places Alexandros' arrest shortly before the battle of Issos:

Alexander's mother wrote at this time to him, giving him other useful advice and warning him to be on his guard against the Lyncestian Alexander. This was a man distinguished for bravery and high spirit who accompanied the King in the group of his Friends in a trusted capacity. There were many other plausible circumstances joining to support the charge, and so the Lyncestian was arrested and bound and placed under guard, until he should face a court.

(Diod. 17.32.1–2. Bradford Welles tr.)

23 Kalas in the Troad: Arr. 1.17.8; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.15. Sisines: Arr. 1.25.3, according to whom the Great King was responding to a letter from Alexandros carried by the deserter Amyntas son of Antiochos (Berve II, 28–9 no. 58). The message may have come from Dareios' chiliarch, Nabarzanes (Curt. 3.7.12).

24 Curt. 7.1.5–9; Diod. 17.80.2; Justin 12.14.1.

25 The first explicit references to Philippos' command of the Thessalian cavalry are Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.4; Curt. 4.13.29, all in the context of Gaugamela. See Berve II, 384 no. 779; Heckel, *Who's Who* 212 “Philip [4].”

26 For an overview of the scholarly debate see Carney, *King and Court* 138–9.

27 Lane Fox, *Alexander* 144–8; Badian 2000a: 56–60; see Wirth, *Kampfverband* 44 n.127, 139. Green, *Alexander* 203–4, suggests that the Lynkestian was framed by Parmenion: “If Parmenio fabricated a convincing story designed to prove that Alexander of Lyncestis was a traitor, some of the mud was bound to stick” (204). Green’s belief that Alexander’s choice of cavalry commanders (of the Thessalian and allied cavalry: Alexandros, Philippos son of Menelaos, Erygiros) undermined Parmenion’s authority is unconvincing.

28 Justin 11.7.1–2 (with Yardley & Heckel 118–21) reports the arrest of Alexandros in his discussion of events of 334/3, before Alexander reunited with Parmenion at Gordion. Curtius’ account is discussed below.

Although the nature of the charges against the Lynkestian is not made clear, Diodorus has the support of Curtius for both the timing of his arrest and Olympias' warning to her son.<sup>29</sup> In his account of the “trial” of Alexandros, Curtius writes:

This Alexander had been denounced by two informers, *as I stated above*, and was now in the third year of imprisonment. It was thought certain that he had also conspired with Pausanias to murder Philip, but the fact that he had been the first to salute Alexander as King had gained him a reprieve, though not an acquittal. Moreover the pleas of Lyncestes' father-in-law, Antipater, also served to reduce the King's warranted anger.

(Curt. 7.1.6–7. J.C. Yardley tr.)

Curtius' comment that he had previously mentioned the incident and the two informants appears to indicate that he reported these matters in the lost second book of his history, and thus in the same chronological context as Arrian (cf. also Justin 11.7.1).<sup>30</sup> The second informant must clearly have been the Persian who carried the message from Dareios III (or perhaps from his chiliarch, Nabarzanes) to Alexandros but was intercepted and arrested by Parmenion. This part of the story is told by Arrian, probably based on Ptolemy, in the context of the events of the winter of 334/3. A Persian agent by the name of Sisines was intercepted by Parmenion's men and found to be carrying a message from Dareios III, offering Alexandros a thousand talents of gold and the kingship of Makedon, if he assassinated Alexander. The offer was in response to a letter that had been brought to the Great King on Alexandros' behalf by the deserter, Amyntas son of Antiochos. Sisines was sent out under the cover of visiting the Persian satrap Atizyes and it has been assumed that the message was to be delivered orally rather than by letter.<sup>31</sup> When he divulged the true purpose of

29 Abramenco 1992 identifies the μήτηρ τοῦ βασιλέως with Ada of Halikarnassos (Heckel, *Who's Who* 3 “Ada [1]”), the King's adoptive mother (Arr. 1.23.8). I find the argument intriguing but implausible: Ada may have had access to information from Halikarnassos (where Neoptolemos, a kinsman of Alexandros, died fighting), but it seems unlikely that Diodorus would refer to Ada as the King's mother without giving her name or qualifying the statement in any way. On the other hand, he may have taken the information from his source without fully understanding the details. See Heckel 2003a: 211 n.59; Carney, *Olympias* 166 n.97; Prandi, *Diodoro* 46–7).

30 Heckel 1991b: 125; cf. Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 100.

31 The wording of Arr. 1.25.3 seems to imply an oral message, but the letter written by the Great King, or his chiliarch Nabarzanes, was probably written in Aramaic and required a bilingual individual (such as Sisines) to report to Alexandros the gist of the letter. There are various possibilities: at the point of his capture he may have tried (perhaps successfully) to destroy the letter or, if it was found on him, he was pressured to reveal its contents. Alexander's bilingual friend, Laomedon (Arr. 3.6.6: διγλωσσος ἦν ἐξ τὰ βαρβαρικὰ γράμματα), was probably not in Parmenion's camp and unable to check the contents of the letter. What makes the existence of a letter more likely is the fact that, in Curtius' reworking of the episode, Sisines' fate is directly linked to an incriminating letter (Curt. 3.7.11–5). Curtius may have had information from another source that Sisines was eliminated by Alexander's agents shortly before the battle of Issos. See Heckel 1994a for Curtius' narrative technique.

his mission to Parmenion, he was sent on, with an escort, to Phaselis, where he revealed the information to Alexander. On hearing the news, Alexander called together a meeting of his *consilium* (his most trusted *hetairoi*), who advised him to rid himself of Alexandros with all speed (*vñ χρῆναι αὐτὸν κατὰ τάχος ἐκποδῶν ποιεῖσθαι*).<sup>32</sup> The King responded by sending Amphoteros, the brother of Krateros, in disguise to Parmenion with orders that Alexandros be deposed from office and arrested.<sup>33</sup>

The details of the story have raised some red flags, and some scholars believe that Arrian and his source are not telling the whole truth; one in particular argues that the story masks rather sinister behavior on the part of the King, who is guilty of “staging his namesake’s ‘treason’.”<sup>34</sup> Certainly there is disagreement about the timing of the Lynkestian’s arrest, but this need not imply deliberate falsification of the facts on the part of the primary sources. Nor is Arrian’s account as implausible as many have argued. Although he avoided the fate of his brothers, who were executed by the man for whom Alexandros had helped secure the throne, there should be little doubt that the Lynkestian was both ambitious and vengeful. For the elimination of dangerous rivals, Arrhabaios and Heromenes, charges of complicity in Pausanias’ murder of Philip II proved sufficient. In the heat of factional strife,

32 Arrian 1.25.5, who adds that it was feared that Alexandros would use the Thessalians under his command to help him overthrow the King. This in itself would help to explain why Alexander took the precaution of sending Amphoteros to Parmenion’s camp in disguise, lest his appearance—for it would have been known that he came from Alexander—might precipitate an uprising (but see Wirth, *Kampfverband* 44 n.127, who rejects the story as “sachlich sinnlos”).

33 Amphoteros’ role is mentioned only by Arrian (1.25.9–10). He was Orestian and probably, like his brother, fiercely loyal to the King. There may well have been a traditional rivalry, if not open animosity, between the leading men of Orestia and Lynkos.

34 Badian 2000a: 60. Badian alleges that the King fabricated the conspiracy against the Lynkestian, and he uses this theory to establish a precedent for the argument that the Dimnos conspiracy was also a fiction intended to entrap Philotas. “The opportunity was too good to be allowed to pass. Alexander had at the start of his reign had to accept and even honour Antipater’s son-in-law. By now he was far enough away from Antipater, and sufficiently secure in his own power, to remove the man, provided a plausible reason could be found. With his usual genius for recognizing and seizing an opportunity, Alexander at once saw that the capture of a Persian messenger would serve his purpose. We may even conjecture (although this is not a necessary or even a secure hypothesis) that Parmenio was informed of Alexander’s plan. However, it was the opportunity of needing interpreters to transmit Sisines’ message to Greeks and Macedonians that invited exploitation. It provided a perfect setting. If they were slaves, they obviously had no choice. If (as is quite possible) Alexander called on Laomedon and his staff (cf. Arr. 3.6.6), there can be no doubt of his devotion to Alexander: after all, he had suffered for his devotion under Philip (Arr. 3.6.5) and he would not let him down on an important occasion. The interpreters would produce the required message, and Sisines would never know about it (*there is no reason to think he understood Greek* [emphasis added]). Nor would the Greeks and Macedonians who, even if they heard them, would not understand Sisines’ own words. Parmenio’s loyalty, whether or not he knew of the plot, was not in doubt: the man who had organized the murder of his own son-in-law would not hesitate to act against the son-in-law of Antipater” (Badian 2000a: 59). Against this view see Heckel 2003a: 210–3. Green, *Alexander* 204, also believes that the “conspiracy” of the Lynkestian was fabricated, but he sees Parmenion as the instigator of this fraud because Alexandros’ appointment as leader of the Thessalians “undercut Parmenio’s authority.”

cooler minds with rational arguments find silence far more beneficial than the spoken truth. One wonders why, if they really were intent upon gaining power for themselves (either by putting a Lynkestian on the throne or by supporting the claims of Amyntas Perdikka), Heromenes and Arrhabaios did not bother to enlist the aid of their brother or ask him to sound out his father-in-law. Would it not have been dangerous to proceed without Antipatros' support? In fact, the real "crime" of the Lynkestians was hostility toward the new King, Alexander, and support for Amyntas, who could assert a prior claim to the throne. It is important to note that, when Plutarch (*Mor.* 327c) says that "all Makedonia was festering and looking to Amyntas and the sons of Aëropos" (*πᾶσα δ' ὑπουλος ἦν Μακεδονίᾳ πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Αερόπου παιδας*), he is speaking of the early months of Alexander's reign, not the end of Philip's.<sup>35</sup>

Curtius, however, gives a radically different version of the arrest of Sisines, which he reports in the context of events shortly before the battle of Issos,<sup>36</sup> with no reference to his earlier participation in Alexandros' plot. In all likelihood, Curtius attempted to reconcile the conflicting reports of his sources and manipulated the story of Sisines in order to do so.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, Curtius does give information he is unlikely to have invented: he claims that Sisines had once sought refuge at the court of Philip and had accompanied Alexander on the Asiatic expedition in a trusted capacity.<sup>38</sup> What his motive for betraying the Makedonian King was, we cannot say: perhaps he was a double agent, or during his self-imposed exile he had developed ties with the sons of Aëropos or Amyntas Perdikka, or possibly he still retained a certain loyalty to Achaimenid Persia. At any rate, he chose to act on behalf of Alexander's enemies and was well placed to do so.

35 Arrian 1.25.1 treats the involvement of Arrhabaios and Heromenes in the murder of Philip as certain (*τῶν ξυνεπιλαβόντων τῆς σφαγῆς τῆς Φιλίππου*); Curtius 7.1.6 says that it was believed that Alexandros too had a part (*eundem in Philippi quoque caedem coniurasse cum Pausania pro comperto fuit*). But they merely repeat Alexander's official propaganda; their testimony has no independent value. It would have been far from flattering to admit that the Lynkestians had opposed his kingship.

36 Curt. 3.7.11–5; cf. Atkinson I, 183–7.

37 For the Sisines episode in Curtius as a literary device see Baynham, *Quintus Curtius* 144–5. Bosworth I, 161 believes that the Sisines of Curtius is not the same man as the one mentioned by Arrian because the "stories differ in almost every particular." But this fails to take into account Curtius' manipulation of the evidence (see Heckel 1994a; also Yardley & Heckel 119).

38 Curt. 3.7.11: "There was in the King's army one Sisines, a Persian. He had once been sent to Philip by the satrap of Egypt and, since he was showered with gifts and shown every courtesy, he had chosen exile rather than his native land. Subsequently, he went with Alexander into Asia and was regarded as one of his loyal associates" (J.C. Yardley tr.). He may have come to Makedonia along with Artabazos and his family. These may be the Persians who, according to Plut. *Alex.* 5.1–3, were interrogated by the young Alexander. Despite Philip's hospitality, Artabazos opposed the Makedonian advance, and this was probably true of Sisines as well. For Sisines see Berse II, 356 no. 710; Heckel, *Who's Who* 250–1 "Sisines [I]"; Berse was right to distinguish between the "conspirator" and the son of Phrataphernes. The name was not uncommon (cf. Briant, *Persian Empire* 703). Badian 2000a: 57 n.14 thinks they are the same person, but it is clear that such an identification would support his view that there was collusion between Sisines and Alexander.

That these enemies existed is beyond doubt, and their names show that they constituted a faction that had unsuccessfully attempted to depose Alexander. Amyntas son of Antiochos—the man who allegedly had carried a letter from the Lynkestian to Dareios—was a friend and supporter of Amyntas Perdikka, who fled from Makedonia when the latter was executed by the new King; another who fled at that time was Neoptolemos son of Arrhabaios, apparently the son of the alleged “regicide.” Thymondas son of Mentor, Aristomedes of Pherai and Bianor of Akarnania are described, along with Amyntas son of Antiochos, as deserters (*αὐτόμολοι*), but we cannot be sure that they were all (at least, initially) members of the same faction. Aristomedes had certainly joined the Persians as early as 341/0, and we cannot say with certainty what grievance or danger induced him to do so. Arrian (2.13.2) is probably wrong in calling Thymondas a deserter, although he was a Greek in Persian service, since both his father and his uncle, Memnon, had served the Great King.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, these men doubtless shared a desire to defeat and kill the Makedonian ruler. Communication between the disloyal members of Alexander’s army and those who were now in exile was easily facilitated by a man who was trusted by the Makedonians and (contrary to Badian’s assertion) reasonably fluent in Greek.

Arrian (1.17.9) tells us that Amyntas son of Antiochos fled from Makedonia, fearing Alexander, although he had not suffered in any way at the King’s hands. That, at least, is the version given by Arrian’s apologetic source(s), and we should not be taken in. His flight cannot be precisely dated, but it was almost certainly prompted by the arrest and death of Amyntas Perdikka.<sup>40</sup> It may be that he took a letter from Alexandros Lynkestes when he left Makedonia. Or, possibly, the son of Antiochos fled in the company of Neoptolemos son of Arrhabaios, who gave him a letter from his uncle. Once established as exiles in Asia Minor, their ability to communicate with Alexandros would have been more difficult and dangerous.

In the winter of 334/3, the commander of the Thessalian cavalry, who had powerful support in Makedonia and relatives and friends both in the army and among the exiles in Asia Minor and in Dareios’ camp, posed a real danger. Hence the secrecy and caution of both Parmenion and Alexander himself. At this

<sup>39</sup> Hofstetter, *Griechen in Persien* 182 no. 319; Berve II, 182 no. 380; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 267.

Thymondas may have been at Dareios’ court as a hostage for the good behavior of his father and uncle (for such precautions see Diod. 17.23.5). See also Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries* 158; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 199 argues that, after Issos, Thymondas did not share the (mis) fortunes of Aristomedes and Amyntas. Bianor may have belonged to the anti-Makedonian party in Akarnania and was thus exiled after Chaironeia (Bosworth I, 222).

<sup>40</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.22 says that Alexander killed Amyntas Perdikka, at the time when he crossed into Asia (*όπότε εἰς τὴν Ασίαν διέβανε*), but this is not intended to be precise. Arr. 1.5.4 implies that Amyntas Perdikka was dead by early spring 335, and it is probably at that point that Amyntas son of Antiochos fled to Asia Minor. But he did not join the Great King until after the battle of the Granikos. At that time he left Ephesos and Dareios and his army were in the vicinity of Babylon. Amyntas resurfaces in Arrian’s account in the discussion of Dareios’ strategy at Sochoi, before the battle of Issos (Arr. 2.5.3). This might argue in favor of the Lynkestian’s arrest in November 333, but we cannot conclude from Arr. 1.25.3 that Amyntas brought the Lynkestian’s letter to Dareios in person. He may have sent it on to Aristomedes, who brought it to the Great King.

point in the campaign, and so early in his kingship, Alexander could not afford an open confrontation with a man of Alexandros' pedigree and political connections. What remains unclear is whether one (or more) of the lost primary sources was mistaken about the timing and context of the Sisines affair—or, indeed, about the man's position—or if the cashiering of Alexandros occurred in two stages, as some scholars have suggested.<sup>41</sup> The version given by Arrian—even if we allow for some bias on the part of Ptolemy—contains circumstantial evidence that is difficult to dismiss.<sup>42</sup>

But Alexandros' incarceration was not the end of the story. In 330, he was finally put on trial and executed after he could find no words to speak in his defense. This has generally been treated as a “housekeeping” item. Together with Philotas and Demetrios the Bodyguard, the Lynkestian was finally executed on the charge of having conspired against the King. He, like Orontas in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, had disappointed his leader too many times.<sup>43</sup> This fails to take into account the true background to the Philotas affair. Modern scholarship has been preoccupied with the trial of Philotas (the *Philotasprozess*) and failed to give sufficient attention to the real conspiracy that Philotas chose to disregard.

In 330, a Makedonian *hetairos* by the name of Dimnos joined a conspiracy against Alexander, the details of which were leaked by a certain Nikomachos (Dimnos' lover) to his brother Kebalinos. This man sought to bring the news of the conspiracy to the King through the agency of Philotas son of Parmenion. Philotas, however, did not pass on the information, claiming later that he had not taken it seriously. But the matter was too important to be ignored; for it involved some prominent individuals, including Demetrios the Bodyguard.<sup>44</sup> An influential article by E. Badian, arguing that the information given to Philotas by Kebalinos was a fabrication on the part of the King intended to entrap Philotas, has, in addition to its inherent implausibility, diverted scholarly attention from a very

41 Thus Atkinson writes: “The letter *from* the Lyncestian would not have been in Sisines’ possession when he was arrested, and could only have been found (or invented) later, perhaps after the capture of the Persian camp at Damaskos. This in turn might explain the time gap between the removal of the Lyncestian from his command early in 333 (the date implied by Arrian and Justin 11.7.1) and his arrest later in 333 (as implied by the tradition that he was a prisoner for three years before being brought to trial at the end of 330)” (Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 100–1). But the alternative tradition (that of Diodorus) places Alexandros’ arrest *before* Issos, and not after the battle, when Damaskos was captured.

42 The role of Sisines, given what we know about his background, can hardly have been invented, and the cover story concerning Atizyes is plausible. The same is true of the part played by Amyntas son of Antiochos. The conspiracy theorists ascribe a greater attention to detail on the part of those who misrepresent the facts than to those who report them accurately. It is also difficult to understand why Ptolemy would go to such trouble to invent a conspiracy on the part of the Lynkestian and yet fail to mention his elimination in 330.

43 See Xen. *Anab.* 1.6; Heckel 1983b. Similarly, Curt. 8.8.6: *Lyncestem vero Alexandrum bis insidiatum capit meo liberavi a duobus indicibus rursus convictum per triennium tamen distuli, donec vos postularetis ut tandem debito supplicio scelus lueret* (following K. Müller’s text).

44 Curt. 6.7.6: *Tum Dymnus aperit in tertium diem regi insidias comparatas seque eius consilii fortibus viris et inlustris esse participem.* Curt. 6.10.17: Philotas said that if Dimnos’ report had proved to be false he would have endangered the lives of many of the King’s friends, that is, of the named “conspirators” (*et ego viderer multis amicorum regis fuisse periculi causa*).

real conspiracy against Alexander.<sup>45</sup> The underlying grievances of many leading Makedonians are clear enough, but they have been overlooked by those who, like Badian, see mischief in every action of the young King and prefer the nefarious to the obvious. The popular Alexander tradition—that which is routinely, though not always correctly, traced back to Kleitarchos—provides the background. Arrian, of course, does not report these things, because they shed a bad light on Alexander. The evidence of Curtius, Justin and Diodorus is, however, compelling and the actions taken to suppress the conspiracy show that Alexandros Lynkestes was a key figure, even if he did not actively plot against the King.

The victory at Gaugamela, punctuated by the flight of Dareios, and the subsequent (one might say, consequent) sack of Persepolis, sent a clear message to the allied troops, who were serving under the terms of the League of Korinth, that the Panhellenic war of vengeance was over. Any military strategist could see that, as long as Dareios lived and was capable of mobilizing another army, the war could not be regarded as won. But for the Greek common soldier this was an unwelcome prolongation of the campaign, and there were many Makedonians who concurred. They were being asked to soldier on, while the King himself, through his adoption of Persian dress and practices, was styling himself as the new “King of Asia.”<sup>46</sup> The extended service was burdensome, and the changes at the Court and in the military leadership made it clear that the professed aims of the campaign and the manifestations of its success were two different things. The allied troops were finally demobilized, some at Eekbatana, others at Hekatompyleos. But the Makedonians felt betrayed: their victories over the barbarian had amounted to little more than the lessening of their own positions. Particularly offensive was the enrolment of Persians in the King’s guard, the appointment of Persian ushers, and orders that the *hetairoi* and the cavalrymen adopt a new style of dress. The matter came to a head in the region of Seistan, where Demetrios and other notables plotted to murder Alexander.<sup>47</sup> Their primary goal was to end the unpopular measures by eliminating the man who instituted them, and they may have given little thought to who might ascend the throne and lead them out of the proverbial wilderness.<sup>48</sup> Philotas and Parmenion were not acceptable candidates, despite what some, ancient and modern, have written.<sup>49</sup> In truth,

45 Badian 1960a; reiterated in 2000a; 2003 = *Collected Papers* 489–93. Contra Heckel 1977b; 2003a: 215–9; also Müller, *Maßnahmen* 86 n.458.

46 The adoption of Persian attire and court practices: Curt. 6.6.1–8; Diod. 17.77.4–6; Justin 12.3.8–12; *ME* 1–2.

47 Curt. 6.7–11; Arr. 3.27.5 is clearly intent on suppressing the details of the plot and does not even record Demetrios’ execution.

48 For conspiracies of this kind, see the remarks of Carney 1983: 261–2 = *King and Court* 156–7.

49 Curt. 6.7.30 makes Alexander ask Dimnos the rhetorical question: “What is the vicious crime I have plotted against you to justify your decision that Philotas deserves royal power more than I myself” (J.C. Yardley tr.). This is what one might expect from a writer with experience of Roman imperial politics, and it betrays a lack of understanding of how the Makedonian monarchy functioned. Hamilton, *Alexander* 95, remarks that “Alexander evidently now felt that his namesake, being of royal blood, might become a focus for plots against his own life.” Hamilton is clearly

the man with the strongest claim to the throne, was incarcerated in the Makedonian camp: Alexandros Lynkestes. His elimination in the wake of Philotas' trial and execution is treated by most sources as an afterthought, and this has obscured the fact that he posed a real threat to the King. It is said that he was given the opportunity of speaking in his defense and that he found himself at a loss for words—something that was seen as proof of his guilt. In fact, it did not suit Alexander's purpose to grant the man a proper hearing, since it would merely bring old grievances to light.

### Amyntas son of Arrhabaios

See Berve II, 29–30 no. 59; Kirchner, *RE* I (1894) 2006 no. 5; Bosworth I, 109; Heckel, *Who's Who* 24 “Amyntas [3].”

The son of Arrhabaios and brother of the defector Neoptolemos,<sup>50</sup> Amyntas is usually identified as the grandson of Aëropos and the nephew of Alexandros Lynkestes, and this has some interesting chronological implications, as noted above. If we place the birth of Aëropos roughly at the end of the fifth century, then it would appear that, in his early sixties, Aëropos was perhaps a little old to be smuggling a dancing girl into camp in 338. But, of course, the point of the story is Aëropos' disregard for Philip's authority and not his personal dealings with the harpist. Berve II, 29 identifies Amyntas tentatively with the man who, along with Klearchos, was sent by Philip as an envoy to Thebes in 338 (*Marsyas*, *FGrH* 135/6 F20 = Plut. *Dem.* 18.1–2). Given the frequency of the name in Makedonia, this is far from certain; Berve's no. 62 comes to mind, though even he must be ruled out if the correct form of the man's name is actually Anemoitas (*Dem.* 18.295). Berve identifies the son of Arrhabaios with that Amyntas who, along with Attalos and Parmenion, led the advance force in Asia Minor in 336–334. His position in 334 would, however, have to be regarded as a demotion.<sup>51</sup>

In 334, he led the scouting party (four *ilai* of *prodromoi*, and the squadron of Sokrates son of Sathon) from Hermotos in the direction of the Granikos (Arr. 1.12.7), and in the battle at that river, his squadrons (*sarissophoroi* and Paionians: Arr. 1.14.1) were stationed on the right wing and initiated the assault

thinking of future plots, but in fact Alexander must have realized that, had the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard succeeded, the Lynkestian would almost certainly have been elevated to the kingship.

50 Son of Arrhabaios: Arr. 1.12.7; 1.14.1, 6; 1.28.4. Although Amyntas remained in Makedonia and served Alexander faithfully, Neoptolemos fled to Asia Minor after his father's execution. He perished in a skirmish at the gates of Halikarnassos. Diodorus (17.25.5; cf. Welles 1983: 188 n.1) places him on the Makedonian side; Arrian (1.20.10) says that he had deserted to the Persians, which seems more likely (cf. Brunt, *Arrian* I, 89 n.6). For his career see Berve II, 273 no. 547; Hofstetter, *Griechen in Persien* 136 no. 230; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 203 no. 12; Heckel, *Who's Who* 174 “Neoptolemus [1].”

51 Wirth, *Kampfverband* 133 n.352, who prefers Amyntas son of Antiochos. On the other hand, if the son of Arrhabaios shared the command with Parmenion in 336–334, the disgrace (and punishment) of his father and uncle may explain the apparent demotion.

on those Persian forces who occupied the opposite riverbank (Arr. 1.14.6–15.1; cf. 1.16.1). Later in that year, Amyntas reappears in the battle at Sagalassos, commanding the entire left, a task normally assigned to Parmenion but given to Amyntas in the latter’s absence (Arr. 1.28.4). All three attested commands show that the son of Arrhabaios was an officer of high standing, militarily competent, and trusted by the King. This makes his disappearance from history all the more intriguing. Had he died—in battle or from illness—in the first year of the campaign, the sources would almost certainly have recorded the fact. More likely, his disappearance is to be explained by the arrest of his kinsman Alexandros.

The battle of Sagalassos was, of course, chronologically later than the arrest of Alexandros Lynkestes (cf. Arr. 1.25), unless there is some truth to Diodorus’ claim that Alexandros was arrested shortly before the battle of Issos (Diod. 17.32.1–2; cf. Curt. 7.1.6). But the arrest was conducted in secret, by Amphoteros, the brother of Krateros (Arr. 1.25.9–10), and was probably not revealed to Alexander’s forces until all forces reunited at Gordion. Bosworth rejects the identification of Amyntas’ father with the suspected regicide Arrhabaios, and wonders why Amyntas would have been removed after the arrest of his uncle, when “he had successfully survived the treason of his father and his brother.”<sup>52</sup> For Alexander in Makedonia—where he was doubtless influenced by Antipatros, Alexandros’ father-in-law—it may have seemed possible to give Amyntas another chance. If he had gone to Asia Minor in 336 in the company of Attalos and Parmenion, his authority may have been curtailed after the disgrace of the Lynkestians. But it was only after the apparent treason of his uncle that Amyntas’ presence became dangerous and his removal a necessity (cf. Heckel 1986b: 299, with n.22). His successor was apparently Protomachos.

52 Bosworth I, 109.

### 3 Antipatros son of Iolaos

Berve II, 46–51 no. 94; Kaerst, *RE* I (a8940 2501–8 no. 12); Kanatsulis 1958–9: 14–64, 1968: 121–84; Adams 1985; Baynham 1994, 2003; Poddighe 2002; Heckel, *Who's Who* 35–8.

A letter of his [sc. of Demades] . . . leaked out, in which he had urged Perdiccas to seize Macedonia and deliver the Greeks, who, he said, were fastened to it only by an old and rotten thread (meaning Antipater).<sup>1</sup>

Apart from the royal houses, there are few families in Makedonian and Hellenistic history about which we are better informed than that of Iolaos. Nevertheless, what we know about the family's background is disappointing: the first attested member may be Iolaos, a deputy of Perdikkas II who appeared at Potidaia with the Makedonian cavalry in 432.<sup>2</sup> Gomme (1945 I, 219) speculates that this man, bearing the name of Herakles' nephew, may have belonged to the Makedonian royal house, which claimed descent from the mythical Herakles.<sup>3</sup> This is unlikely, if our man is an ancestor of Antipatros; for neither the latter nor his son Kassandros was able to make a claim to the Makedonian throne on the basis of kinship.<sup>4</sup>

#### Family and early career

Born in 399/8,<sup>5</sup> Antipatros son of Iolaos was from Paliura, the exact location of which is uncertain.<sup>6</sup> At least eleven children are attested: four daughters and seven sons,

1 Plut. *Dem.* 31.5: Γράμματα γάρ ἔξεπεσεν αὐτοῦ, δι’ ὧν παρεκάλει Περδίκκαν ἐπιχειρεῖν Μακεδονίᾳ καὶ σώζειν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ὡς ἀπὸ σαπροῦ καὶ παλαιοῦ στήμονος (λέγων τὸν Αντίπατρον) ἥρτημένους. English translation by B. Perrin.

2 Thuc. 1.62.2; Hornblower, *Comm.* 1.105.

3 Cf. Baynham 1994: 338 n.23.

4 Why then would Diodorus say Kassandros was anxious to establish a connection with the royal house (19.52.1: σπεύδων οἰκεῖον αὐτὸν ἀποδεῖξαι τῆς βασιλικῆς συγγενείας)?

5 *Suda* A 2704; cf. [Lucian] *Macrob.* 11; *Marm. Par.* = *FGrH* 239 B12. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.125 regards him as coeval with Philip II, pointing to the relative youth of his eldest attested son, Kassandros. But Antipatros would scarcely have been described in a letter of Demades as “an old and rotten thread” (Arr. *Succ* 1.14; Plut. *Dem.* 31.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 30.9 says the letter was addressed to Antigonos) if he had not been well advanced in age in 323/2. There was clearly some animosity between Demades and Antipatros, who likened the former to an animal after the sacrifice—nothing but tongue and guts (Plut. *Phoc.* 1.3).

6 Kanatsulis 1942: 1 n.2 tentatively suggests Palaeorium, mentioned by Pliny, *HN* 4.37, on the Athos peninsula; Paliuri at the tip of Pallene also comes to mind; cf. Casson 1926: 59.

of whom the names of all but one (the wife of Alexandros Lynkestes; Heckel, *Who's Who* 276 F37) are known. Phila, Nikaia and Eurydike became the currency of their father's political dealings in the years after Alexander's death.<sup>7</sup> Philippos, Perilaos, Alexarchos, Iolaos, Pleistarchos<sup>8</sup> and Nikanor<sup>9</sup> are identified in various contexts as sons of Antipatros or brothers of Kassandros. Whether these children all had the same mother is uncertain, though unlikely. Nor is it probable that Kassandros was Antipatros' first-born son. His was the name of Antipatros' brother (the grandfather of Berenike I of Egypt), and we should expect to find the first (or, at least, second) son named for the paternal grandfather. Iolaos, born c.341,<sup>10</sup> was the youngest son. I suspect that an earlier son of that name did not live to manhood or, at least, died before the late 340s. Daniel Ogden (*PPD* 54) suggests that "Cassander was not Antipater's eldest son, but merely his most favoured—perhaps, if Antipater did have more than one wife (serially or concurrently), he was the eldest of a line drawn from one particular mother."

If the *Suda* is right about Antipatros' age and the composition of a historical work on the Illyrian campaign of Perdikkas III (*Suda* A 2704: οἱ πράξεις Ἰλλυρικαῖ),<sup>11</sup> Antipatros was already militarily active—and possibly influential at the Court—during the reign of Philip's predecessor (365–360/59). Already nearing forty at the time of Philip's accession, it is doubtful that he rose from obscurity at that age to become the most powerful of Philip's *hetairoi*.<sup>12</sup> He and Parmenion were involved in the peace negotiations in the spring of 346; earlier he had campaigned in Thrake against Kersobleptes.<sup>13</sup> About Antipatros' diplomatic efforts in Athens little is known. It was at this time that he made the acquaintance of Isokrates; his friendship with Phokion may, however, belong to the period after Chaironeia.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See the useful discussion in Landucci, *L'arte del potere* 58–69 "La sorelle di Cassandro"; also Seibert, *Verbindungen* 11–9; Heckel 1989.

<sup>8</sup> Philippos: Berve II, 383 no. 777; Sandberger, *Prosopographie* 19; Heckel, *Who's Who* 213 "Philip [8]." Perilaos: He is named only in Plut. *Mor.* 486a and appears to have remained in Pella with his father. Alexarchos: Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 266–8; Tarn, *AG* 185; Berve II, 21 no. 41, and also Heckel, *Who's Who* 291 n.72. Iolaos: Berve II, 184 no. 386; Heckel, *Who's Who* 143 "Iolaus [1]." Pleistarchos: H. Schaefer, *RE* XXI.1 (1951) 196–9 no. 2. For Pleistarchos' career in the time of the Diadochoi see Burstein 1977b and especially Gregory 1995. See *Stemma III*.

<sup>9</sup> Berve II, 274 no. 553; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 382 no. 40; Heckel, *Who's Who* 176–7 "Nicanor [3]."

<sup>10</sup> Berve II, 184 no. 386 suggests c.350 or possibly after 345; the first date is clearly too high, since Iolaos would not have been a *pais basilikos* in 323 at the age of 27.

<sup>11</sup> See Walsh 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 179b; Karystios *ap.* Athen. 10.435d shows that Philip placed a great deal of faith in Antipatros, although it also indicates that by Makedonian standards he was not a heavy drinker.

<sup>13</sup> Negotiations in 346: Dem. 19.69; Aes 3.72; Din. 1.28. Cf. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 1.504. Buckler 1989: 132–3. Eurylochos (Justin 12.6.14 calls him a victim of Alexander) appears as their ambassador in the *Hypothesis to Dem.* 19. See also Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F165. Against Kersobleptes: Theopompos *ap.* Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀπρος = *FGrH* 115 F160; cf. Kanatsulis 1958–9: 19–24. For the fragments of Theopompos see also Morison, *BNJ*.

<sup>14</sup> For Antipatros' friendship with Phokion see Plut. *Phoc.* 26.4–6; 30.3; Plut. *Mor.* 142c–d; cf. 64c; 188f; 533d; Plut. *Agis* 2.2.

In the summer of 342 Antipatros represented Philip II as *theoros* at the Pythian Games (Dem. 9.32; cf. Libanius 23.311) and served as regent of Makedonia in the king's absence (Isoc. *Ep.* 4). In 340, when his services were needed in Thrake, Antipatros turned over the affairs of the state to Alexander, now sixteen,<sup>15</sup> and campaigned at Perinthos<sup>16</sup> and against the Tetrachoritai (Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F217; cf. Morison, *BNJ*). After Chaironeia (338), he went to Athens as Philip's agent to negotiate a peace; both he and Alkimachos were later awarded *proxenia* and citizenship (though apparently this involved a grant of citizenship to one and a proxeny to the other).<sup>17</sup>

He played no small part in securing the throne for Alexander after Philip's assassination: it was undoubtedly at his urging that Alexandros Lynkestes was the first to hail his namesake as King.<sup>18</sup> Thereafter, Antipatros acted as regent whenever Alexander was absent from Makedonia. Thus we find him sending an embassy—albeit ineffectual—to the Isthmus in an attempt to prevent the Arkadians from aiding Thebes in 335.<sup>19</sup> Rumor at Thebes held that Antipatros himself was coming to deal with their uprising, a story encouraged by false reports that Alexander's army had been annihilated in the north. Polyaenus says that Antipatros played a significant role in the capture of Thebes, a claim unsupported by the Alexander historians and inherently improbable.<sup>20</sup> When he set out for Asia in 334, Alexander left Antipatros firmly in charge of European affairs with 12,000 infantry and 1,500 horse,<sup>21</sup> having ignored his advice to produce an heir to the throne before his departure.<sup>22</sup>

## Regent in Alexander's absence

Antipatros' position was soon strained by the recruitment of fresh levies for Asia,<sup>23</sup> the defense of the European mainland against the planned counter

15 Plut. *Alex.* 9.1; but see Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 93 n.74, against Hamilton, *PA* 22.

16 Diod. 16.76.3; Front. *Strat.* 1.4.1; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.2.8 (a doublet assigning the same ruse to a different context).

17 Probably Alkimachos son of Agathokles (Heckel, *Who's Who* 9–10, 287 n.32); Justin 9.4.5; Harpocration s.v. Ἀλκίμαχος = Hyp. frag. 19.2 [Burtt], *Against Demades*, frag. 77; cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 239 = Tod II, no. 180, see p. 237 for the problem of grants of both citizenship and *proxenia*. The grant was made in early 336, in the archonship of Phrynicchos. See also Schwenk 27–30.

18 Arr. 1.25.2; Curt. 7.1.6–7; cf. Ps.-Kall. (L) 1.26; Justin 11.2.2. Badian 1963: 248.

19 Din. 1.18, with Worthington 1992: 162.

20 Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.12. The demand that the Makedonians surrender Antipatros was not meant to be taken seriously (Plut. *Alex.* 11.8; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 30; Berve II, 46, though he rejects its historicity, calls it "höhnisch") and need not imply that Antipatros was present. False reports about Antipatros (Arr. 1.7.6), about Alexander's defeat (Justin 11.2.8).

21 Regent: Arr. 1.11.3; Curt. 4.1.39 (*praefectus Macedoniae*); Justin 11.7.1 (*praepositus Macedoniae erat*); Diod. 18.12.1; cf. 17.118.1: στρατηγὸς τῆς Εὐρώπης, Arr. *Succ.* 1.3; *Itiner. Al.* 17; Schol. Lucian, *nav.* 33. Numbers of troops: Diod. 17.17.5.

22 Diod. 17.16.2; see also Baynham 1998c; Ogden, *PPD* 42; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 60. I find it hard to accept O'Brien's view (1992: 57) that Alexander's failure to marry and produce an heir "raises questions concerning Alexander's attitude toward women and the nature of his sexuality."

23 In 333, Antipatros sent 3,000 Makedonian infantrymen, 300 cavalry, as well as 200 Thessalian and 150 Eleian horse to Alexander at Gordion (Arr. 1.29.4). In the winter of 332/1, he sent another

invasion of Memnon the Rhodian and, later, the prosecution of the war against Agis III of Sparta. In response to Memnon's threat, he commissioned a fleet, which he placed under the command of Proteas, a nephew of Black Kleitos. The new *nauarchos* proved his worth and defeated the Persian admiral, Datames, at Siphnos, later reaching Alexander at Tyre as the reporter of his own success.<sup>24</sup> As early as 333, Agis gathered men and ships at Tainaron and on Krete.<sup>25</sup> Despite the loss of support from the Great King, who was now locked in a life-and-death struggle with the invader, and Athens' decision to remain aloof, Agis mobilized the Peloponnesians in spring 331 and easily defeated Antipatros' general, Korrhagos.<sup>26</sup> He then besieged Megalopolis with a force of 20,000 infantry—to which we might add as many as 8,000 mercenaries who had escaped from Issos—and 2,000 cavalry.<sup>27</sup> For Antipatros, preoccupied with a rebellion in Thrake, the news could not have come at a worse time.<sup>28</sup> But the affairs of the

400 Greek mercenaries and 500 Thracian horse to Alexander (Arr. 3.5.1), and Amyntas son of Andromenes recruited 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry from Makedonia as well as 50 young men from prominent families to act as pages, along with 3,500 and 600 Thracian infantry and cavalry respectively, and over 4,000 mercenaries (Curt. 5.1.40–2; cf. 7.1.38–40; Diod. 17.65.1: Trallians, a Thracian people, Strabo 14.1.42 C649). Thus, by the time of Agis' war, Antipatros' resources had been significantly depleted. See Bosworth 1986 for the effects of Alexander's campaigns on the Makedonian homeland; cf. Adams 1985.

24 Arr. 2.2.4–5 (victory at Siphnos); Arr. 2.20.2 (Tyre).

25 Diod. 17.62.7 (on Athens); Arr. 3.13.4–6; Curt. 4.1.38–40; Diod. 17.48.2; see also Bosworth 1975.

26 The Spartan alliance now included Elis, Achaia (except for Pellene) and all the Arkadians except Megalopolis (Aes. 3.165; Din. 1.34; cf. Curt. 6.1.20; cf. also [Dem.] 17.7.10; Paus. 7.27.7; see also McQueen 1978). It is tempting to identify Korrhagos as father of Stratoniike, the wife of Antigonos the One-Eyed (Plut. *Demetr.* 2.1), but this cannot be proved (Heckel, *Who's Who* 94 "Corrhagus [1]").

27 Agis' forces: Diod. 17.62.7. Mercenaries from Issos: Curt. 6.1.39; Diod. 17.48.1–2; but cf. Brunt, *Ariani* I, 481–2. I use the term "uprising" unrepentantly; for, although Sparta itself was not officially subject to the Makedonian king, having refused to join the League of Korinth, Agis did bring other member states into rebellion (Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 203 rightly calls them "insurgent states"; see also Poddighe 2009: 114–5). For the League see Tod II, 177, with discussion; Rhodes & Osborne no. 76; Harding no. 99; the list of members is, of course, incomplete but the Spartans are singled out by the Alexander historians as exceptions in refusing to join (Justin 9.5.3: *soli Lacedaemonii et regem et leges contempserunt*; Arr. 1.1.2; cf. 1.16.7). For a thorough discussion of Agis' war see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 198–204; also Squillace 2004a: 130–8; Noethlichs 1987.

28 Diod. 17.62.4–6 (see the discussion in Prandi, *Diodoro* 103). Polyanus, *Strat.* 4.4.1 may refer to this campaign, but appears to belong to 347/6; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. Τετραχορῆται. Agis was presented with a perfect opportunity for launching his war in the Peloponnese, when the *strategos* of Thrake, Memnon, rebelled against Makedonian authority. Antipatros reached an agreement with him, and some years later, Memnon brought reinforcements to Alexander. His successor was Zopyrion. Although the sources vary on the timing of this affair, Noethlichs 1987: 411 following Iliescu 1971, argues that Zopyrion was the predecessor, and not the successor, of Memnon. Justin 12.1.4–5, 2.16–7 (cf. 2.3.4) reports these events after describing the death of Dareios, and thus appears to place the military disaster in 331/0. But Curt. 10.1.44–5 dates the death of Zopyrion towards the end of Alexander's reign, and this may explain why Lysimachos, upon assuming the satrapy, was forced to fight a dangerous war against Seuthes (Diod. 18.14.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.10, wrongly saying Lysimachos was killed in the engagement: πολεμῶν ὑπέρ τῆς ἀρχῆς παραβόλως (σὺν διάγοις γάρ) καὶ εὐδοκιμῶν ὅμως ἀνηρέθη). But Wilson, *Photios* 103 n.2 suggests reading

south were paramount, and he concluded hostilities as best he could. With an army of 40,000, which contained a large contingent of central Greek allies, he descended on Megalopolis. Here he won a decisive victory, leaving many of the enemy dead, among them Agis himself.<sup>29</sup> Order was restored to Greece in consultation with the League of Korinth.<sup>30</sup> The Spartans, for their part, were forced to send ambassadors to Alexander to beg his forgiveness,<sup>31</sup> and it is clear that Antipatros was not prepared to make a decision on their future without Alexander's approval.

### Quarrels with Olympias and the rift with Alexander

There was, however, a rift developing between Alexander and Antipatros: Alexander is said to have disparaged the victory at Megalopolis as a “battle of mice,” a sign of growing tension between the two.<sup>32</sup> There were claims that Antipatros had regal aspirations, that he had entered into secret negotiations with the Aitolians and was quarreling with Olympias, who fueled her son’s resentment.<sup>33</sup> Hence Alexander’s decision to replace him as regent of Makedon with Krateros

ἥρεθη “he was captured”). Yardley & Heckel 196–8; Atkinson & Yardley 103–4. See Berve II, 254 no. 499; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 162 “Memnon [3]”; like Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 201 n.15, I reject Badian’s suggestion (1967a: 179–80) that Memnon is a member of the family of Artabazos. Zopyrian: Berve II, 164 no. 34; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 273.

29 Plut. *Agis* 3; Diod. 17.63.4; Curt. 6.1.1–15; Justin 12.1.6–11. The battle took place at about the same time as the trial of Ktesiphon (Aes. 3.165; cf. 3.133; Plut. *Dem.* 24; Schaefer III<sup>2</sup> 202 n.1, 211 ff.). Curt. 6.1.21 dates it before the campaign of Gaugamela, which is rendered unlikely by Arr. 3.16.10, who says that Alexander sent money to Antipatros from Sousa for the prosecution of the war against Agis; if the battle had been fought in September 331, Alexander ought to have heard of it by the time he reached Sousa in early December (cf. Brunt, *Arrian I*, 492). For full discussions see Brunt, *Arrian I*, 480–5, Appendix VI; Lock 1972, confirming the view of Badian 1967a: 190–2, against Cawkwell 1969: 169–73; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 198–204, and CAH VI<sup>2</sup> 854, dates the Megalopolis campaign to early spring 330; cf. Worthington, *Man and God* 106. The size and composition of Antipatros’ army: Diod. 17.63.1. Agis’ death: Diod. 17.63.3, who give 5,300 dead on Agis’ side and 3,500 Makedonians; Curt. 6.1.16: 5,300 and 1,000. For Agis’ career see Poralla, *Lakedaimonier* 13 no. 27; Cartledge and Spawforth, *Sparta* 21–5.

30 Curt. 6.1.19–20. The settlement may have involved Sparta’s entry into the League of Korinth (Clauss 1983: 75), but it is possible that Alexander wished to keep the Lacedaemonians isolated (Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 204 suggests that Alexander may have left Sparta “to her decline, a living fossil in a changing world, obsessed by the mythology of her past”). More explicitly, Paul Cartledge remarks “on balance I am inclined to credit in this case the assertion of the Plutarchan *Instituta Laconica* that Sparta was not ever a member of any Macedon-created League” (Cartledge and Spawforth, *Sparta* 25); but Poddigie 2009: 115: “Sparta’s forcible enrollment in the League is probable . . .”

31 Aes 3.133; Diod. 17.73.5–6; Curt. 6.1.20.

32 There is considerable evidence for correspondence between the two: Plut. *Alex.* 20.9; cf. *de fort Al.* 2.9 = *Mor.* 341c (about Issos); Plut. *Alex.* 46.3 (from the Iaxartes), 47.3 (from Hyrkania), 55.7 (concerning the Hermolaos affair), 57.8 (from the Oxos; cf. Athen. 2.42f), 71.8 (from Sousa in 324, concerning the discharged veterans); Diod. 18.8.4 (concerning the Exiles’ Decree). “Battle of Mice”: Plut. *Agex.* 15.6.

33 Regal aspirations: Curt. 10.10.14; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 180e. Dealings with the Aitolians: Plut. *Alex.* 49.14–5. Quarrels with Olympias: Plut. *Alex.* 39.13, *Mor.* 180d; Diod. 17.118.1.

aroused the suspicions of both ancient and modern writers. And, not surprisingly, stories that Antipatros and his sons conspired with several of the King's *hetairoi* to murder him soon began to circulate.<sup>34</sup>

Alexander could not be certain that Antipatros would willingly relinquish the office he had exercised since 334. The old regent had in Pella what amounted to his own personal court, a throng of *hetairoi* and troops who had known only his military leadership. After his victory over Agis III, he had entrusted the government of many Peloponnesian cities to oligarchs who were personally loyal to him.<sup>35</sup> And, it may have been with this in mind, that Alexander planned the proclamation of the Exiles' Decree to coincide with Krateros' assumption of his new powers as *strategos autokrator* and guarantor of the "freedom of the Greeks."<sup>36</sup> For the return of the exiles would threaten Antipatros' power base in the south, while the homeland troops, of whose loyalty Alexander may have been uncertain, were being summoned to Asia and replaced by Krateros' 10,000 veterans.<sup>37</sup> But, if a confrontation was feared, fate decreed that it would never come about.

## After Alexander's death

With Alexander dead, there was no one to challenge Antipatros' authority—except perhaps Krateros, who had no desire to confront the regent<sup>38</sup>—and the settlement at Babylon recognized that fact. The compromise, which saw Antipatros sharing authority with Krateros, was soon abandoned and the former

34 For Antipatros' replacement by Krateros see Arr. 7.12.4; Justin 12.12.9; for the suspicion that Krateros was to murder him: Curt. 10.10.15. See also Heckel, *LDT*, with testimonia; cf. Bosworth 2000.

35 The Aitolians had remained neutral in the war against Agis, and Mendels 1984: 137 argues that Antipatros may have acquiesced in their seizure of Oiniadai. The friendship between the two was brought to an end with the declaration of the Exiles' Decree in 324. Bosworth 1977b: 174 believes that, as Antipatros' relationship with Alexander soured, he "was probably securing a refuge where he could retire with relative safety and rebuild his position."

36 Arr. 7.12.4: Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θράκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν 'Ελλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας. "Freedom of the Greeks" is clearly a political slogan and an indication that Krateros' role was to help implement Alexander's policy.

37 See Heckel 1999; cf. Waterfield 2011: 13: "In one sense, the Exiles Decree undermined Antipater, since a number of the returning exiles would be precisely men who had been sent into exile by his puppets." But see now Poddighe 2013. Many scholars have seen Krateros' lengthy delay in Kilikia as due to an unwillingness to confront Antipatros. See especially Griffith 1965a. Although Krateros delayed for other reasons, the prospect of rebellion on Antipatros' part must be taken seriously. On the other hand, Ashton 2015: 108 argues that it was Alexander's intention for Antipatros to be "overall commander-in-chief, governor and king's representative in Asia—that role to commence once the king had left for his western campaign." Alexander may have intended to make him στρατηγὸς τῆς Ασίας, but I do not understand which "governorship" Ashton is thinking of.

38 Badian 1967b believes that the cancellation of Alexander's "Final Plans" was aimed, primarily, at undermining Krateros' authority in Europe. But, if this is so, then Perdikkas was merely complicating his own situation in Asia; for Antipatros, and presumably others, regarded Krateros' *prostasia* as pertaining to Asia (cf. Diod. 18.18.7).

recognized as *strategos autokrator* of Makedonia and Greece.<sup>39</sup> He nevertheless attempted to secure the cooperation of the leading marshals through marriage alliances: Nikaia was promised to Perdikkas, Phila to Krateros and Eurydike to Ptolemy.<sup>40</sup>

In Greece, news of Alexander's death ignited the Hellenic War. Leosthenes had gathered mercenaries, ostensibly for some private undertaking, in an attempt to deceive Antipatros. But the Athenians soon declared their support for Leosthenes and, defraying his expenses with Harpalos' money, they allied themselves also with the Aitolians.<sup>41</sup> A fleet of forty quadriremes and 200 triremes was commissioned and eventually much of Greece joined the Hellenic war against Makedon.<sup>42</sup>

Antipatros urgently summoned Krateros from Kilikia and Leonnatos from his newly-awarded satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia,<sup>43</sup> promising Leonnatos the hand of one of his daughters in marriage. Leaving Sippas in charge of Makedonia, he moved into Thessaly with 13,000 Makedonians and 600 cavalry, a small force that attests to the drain of Alexander's campaigns on Makedonian manpower.<sup>44</sup>

39 Compromise: Curt. 10.7.9; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.7, unless the words Κρατερῷ καὶ have merely intruded from a marginal note, so Kanatsulis 1968: 124–5. The Babylon settlement: Justin 13.4.5; Diod. 18.3.2; cf. 18.12.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1.3. To the areas administered by Antipatros were added the lands of the Thrakians, Illyrians, Triballians and Agrianes, as well as Epeiros (Arr. *Succ.* 1.7; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §3; see Kanatsulis 1968: 121, for the view that he was *archon* of Thessaly). Lysimachos, the *strategos* of Thrake, was clearly subject to Antipatros' authority, though as Landucci, *Lisimaco* 102 notes, no more so than the satraps in Asia were under Perdikkas' authority. If the aim of transforming Thrake into a satrapy was to limit Antipatros' power (thus Lund, *Lysimachus* 20), then Perdikkas had misjudged Lysimachos.

40 Nikaia was betrothed to Perdikkas, to whose camp she was escorted by Iolaos and Archias (Arr. *Succ.* 1.21; cf. Diod. 18.23); later she married Lysimachos (Strabo 12.4.7 C565); Phila married Krateros (Diod. 18.18.7), who abandoned Amastris in her favor (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F4 §4). Eurydike may have been offered initially to Leonnatos (Diod. 18.12.1), but he died bringing aid to Antipatros. For these marriages see Seibert, *Verbindungen* 11–9; cf. Cohen 1973 for Antipatros' policy in general. The identity of Archias is uncertain. Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 50 n.26 suggested that he might be another son of Antipatros; *contra* Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.126. who identifies him with Archias of Thourioi.

41 News of Alexander's death: Diod. 18.8. Leosthenes and the mercenaries: Diod. 18.9.2–3. Aitolians: Diod. 18.9.4–5.

42 Numbers of ships: Diod. 18.10.2; cf. Justin 13.5.8. The members of the anti-Makedonian alliance were, according to Diod. 18.11.1–2: the Messenians, the inhabitants of Akte, Argos, Sikyon, a few Illyrians and Thrakians, Achaia Phthiotis except Thebae, the Melians except for Lamia, the Lokrians and Phokians, Aenianes, Alyzaeans, Dolopians, Athamanians, Leukadians, the Oitians except for Herakleia, the Molossians subject to Aryptaios, Thessalians except the Pelinnaei, and Karystos. Paus. 1.25.3–4 lists Argos, Epidavros, Sikyon, Karystos, Akarnania, and the Aitolian League; for the neutrality of the Arkadians see Paus. 8.6.2, 27.10. Greek contemporaries referred to the war as the “Hellenic War,” which emphasized their bid for freedom from Makedonian oppression. For the epigraphic evidence, and the origins of the term “Lamian War” (which endured in most literary texts), see Ashton 1984.

43 Diod. 18.12.1 reads “Philotas”; Diod. 18.16.4.

44 Diod. 18.12.2; Bosworth 1986.

Antipatros also had a fleet of 110 ships, which had conveyed moneys from Asia to Makedonia. But the desertion of the Thessalians to the Greek cause proved to be a major setback, and Antipatros soon found it necessary to take refuge in Lamia and await reinforcements from Asia.<sup>45</sup> Leosthenes invested the city, but at one point was struck by a stone or javelin and killed; Antiphilos replaced him.<sup>46</sup>

Antipatros meanwhile pinned his hopes on Leonnatos, whom he had summoned through the agency of Hekataios.<sup>47</sup> In spring 322, Leonnatos brought his satrapal army and enlisted additional troops in Makedonia, finally moving into Thessaly with over 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry (Diod. 18.14.5). Learning of his approach, the Athenians abandoned the siege of Lamia and decided to meet him before he could join forces with Antipatros.<sup>48</sup> In numbers of infantry the armies were roughly equal—the Athenians had some 22,000, for the Aitolians had left previously to deal with some local matter (18.13.4) and were still absent—but in cavalry the Greeks excelled: 2,000 of their total 3,500 were Thessalians under the command of Menon (Diod. 18.15.2, 4). Leonnatos was killed in the ensuing conflict, but his infantry retreated to higher ground, where on the following day they were joined by Antipatros. The engagement had freed Antipatros from Lamia, rid him of a dangerous rival and augmented his forces.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, Antipatros chose to avoid giving battle on the plain, owing to his inferiority in cavalry; instead he withdrew over more rugged ground towards the Peneus.<sup>50</sup>

In the meantime, Kleitos' naval victories had secured the crossing of the Hellespont for Krateros, who soon entered Thessaly with an additional 10,000 foot, 3,000 slingers and archers and 1,500 cavalry, bringing to about 48,000 the entire Makedonian force, which confronted the Greeks near Krannon on August 5, 322 (7 Metageitnion); the Greeks, in comparison, had 25,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry.<sup>51</sup> Antipatros, once the Makedonian cavalry had engaged its Greek counterpart, led the phalanx forward and drove the enemy infantry to the high ground. Seeing this, the Greek cavalry disengaged, and the victory went to

45 Ships and money: Diod. 18.12.2. Defection of the Thessalians: 18.12.3. Antipatros in Lamia: Diod. 18.12.4; Plut. *Dem.* 27.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 23.5. See also [Plut.] *Mor.* = 846d–e; Hyp. 6.12; Justin 13.5.8 has Antipatros shut up in Herakleia.

46 Siege of Lamia: Diod. 18.13.1–3. Leosthenes' death: Diod. 18.13.5; Justin 13.5.12; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 24.1; see also Hyp. 6; cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 849f. Antiphilos: Diod. 18.13.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 24.1; Develin, *AO* 411; Kirchner, *PA* 1264.

47 Diod. 18.14.4; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3.6.

48 Diod. 18.15.1. The battle appears to have been fought near Pharsalos in Thessaliotis (so Kanatsulis 1968: 137; cf. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.72 n.1).

49 Death of Leonnatos: Diod. 18.15.3. Antipatros reaps the rewards of Leonnatos' efforts: Diod. 18.15.4–5. Leonnatos as rival: Justin 13.5.15 (*Antipater tametsi auxilia sua videret victa, morte tamen Leonati laetus est; quippe et aemulum sublatum et vires eius accessisse sibi gratulabatur*); cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.9.

50 Diod. 18.15.6–7; cf. 18.16.5; less accurately Justin 13.5.16.

51 Numbers: Diod. 18.16.4–5 (Makedonians); 18.17.2 (Greeks). For the battle: Diod. 18.17; Plut. *Phoc.* 26; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1; Plut. *Cam.* 19; Paus. 10.3.4; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.12. For the date: Plut. *Cam.* 19.8; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.74 (5 August); but Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.237 (30 July). See also Landucci, *Diodoro* 98–9; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 133–4.

the Makedonian forces, with more than 500 Greek dead and 130 Makedonians killed.<sup>52</sup> Menon and Antiphilos now sued for peace, but Antipatros refused to deal with the Greeks collectively, demanding instead separate peace terms with each state. The Thessalian towns were taken by siege or storm and offered easy peace terms,<sup>53</sup> leaving the Athenians and Aitolians to face Makedon alone. In the Peloponnese, Antipatros installed pro-Makedonian oligarchies, often headed by personal friends and supported by garrisons.<sup>54</sup>

In Athens there was great consternation, and a deputation led by Phokion and Demades was sent to Antipatros, who had advanced into Boiotia; they met him at the Kadmeia in Thebes.<sup>55</sup> Mindful of Leosthenes' hard line at Lamia, Antipatros demanded the unconditional surrender of the city, terms which Athens was forced to accept (Diod. 18.18.1–3). Antipatros, however, treated the Athenians with leniency, though he demanded limitations on citizenship, the establishment of a garrison on Mounychia<sup>56</sup> and the punishment of leading anti-Makedonian politicians; the latter were hunted down by Antipatros' agent Archias and put to death.<sup>57</sup>

Having made peace with Athens, Antipatros and Krateros turned their attention to the Aitolians, only to be forced by the situation in Asia to come to terms with them.<sup>58</sup> Antipatros' decision was hastened by the arrival of Antigonos with news of Perdikkas' duplicity.<sup>59</sup> Advancing to the Thrakian Chersonese, Antipatros

52 Diod. 18.17.4–5; Paus. 7.10.5 says 200 of the Greek dead were Athenian.

53 Diod. 18.17.7; cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 846e, for the capture of Pharsalos.

54 Diod. 18.18.8, 55.2, 57.1, 69.3.

55 Diod. 18.18; Plut. *Phoc.* 26 (Antipatros encamped on the Kadmeia; here some fortifications still existed: Gullath 1982: 62); Nepos, *Phoc.* 2. Paus. 7.10.4 says that Antipatros relied on pro-Makedonian leaders in Athens (whom Pausanias calls traitors) to bring about a hasty negotiated settlement because he was eager to get on with the war in Asia (ὅτε διαβῆναι ποιούμενος σπουδὴν πρὸς τὸν Ασίᾳ πόλεμον). This is, of course, a misunderstanding on Pausanias' part, for the "war in Asia" had not yet broken out, and is perhaps due to confusion with the peace Antipatros made with the Aitolians in the following year.

56 Plut. *Phoc.* 27–8, 30; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1; Diod. 18.18.5; Plut. *Mor.* 188f; cf. Paus. 7.10.1. The *phrourarchos* was Menyllos, apparently a Makedonian, who had served Antipatros during Alexander's absence (Berve II, 259 no. 513). The reformed constitution saw two classes of citizenship, and the new "oligarchs" could claim to restoring the *patrios politeia*. Baynham 1994: 351 rightly notes that Antipatros was forced into taking a hard line "in the wake of two major upheavals with in the space of eight or nine years." For Athens between 322 and 319 see Poddighe 2002; also Ferguson, *HA* 20–8; Hackl 1987; Habicht, *AA* 44–5; Landucci, *Diodoro* 100–8; and Baynham 2003 on Antipatros' plan to transplant the disenfranchised to a colony in Thrake (Poddighe 2002: 66–7, 71–2).

57 Demosthenes, Hypereides, Himeraios (brother of Demetrios of Phaleron), and Aristonikos. See also Arr. *Succ.* 1.13; Plut. *Phoc.* 27 ff.; Plut. *Dem.* 28–9; [Plut.] *Mor.* 849b–c; Paus. 1.8.3; 1.25.5; *Suda* A 2704, D 456; Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.2; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 29–30; [Plut.] *Mor.* 846e–847b; Athen. 12.542e. For Archias of Thourioi see Heckel, *Who's Who* 43 "Archias [2]"; Ferguson, *HA* 20.

58 Aitolian campaign: Diod. 18.24–5. Peace: Diod. 18.25.5; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.24; Justin 13.6.9 wrongly speaks of peace with the Athenians. Makedonian charges against Aitolia may have included their unauthorized reconstitution of their *koinon*, their failure to abide by the Exiles' Decree and reinstate the exiles from Oiniadai, as well as their participation in Leosthenes' campaign.

59 Diod. 18.23.4–24.1; 18.25.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21, 24; cf. Justin 13.6.5–6.

sent envoys to secure the defection of White Kleitos, whose fleet had been sent to guard the Hellespont (Arr. *Succ.* 1.26); friendship with Ptolemy was renewed (Diod. 18.14.2, 25.4).

## Antipatros in Asia

Safely across the Hellespont, Antipatros and Krateros were joined by Neoptolemos, a recent defector from Eumenes' army, flush with promises of easy victory. Entrusting the struggle against Eumenes to Krateros, Antipatros pressed on in the direction of Kilikia.<sup>60</sup> But Eumenes defeated Neoptolemos and Krateros in detail, though the remnants of their armies escaped to Antipatros who continued into Kilikia.<sup>61</sup> There, it appears, he learned of Perdikkas' defeat at Kamelon Teichos and was given a favorable reception by Philoxenos.<sup>62</sup>

At Triparadeisos in Syria, Antipatros met Peithon and Arrhidaios, who had brought the remnants of the Perdikkan army. These men were embroiled in a bitter dispute with the queen, Adeia-Eurydike, who had usurped the prerogatives of her half-witted husband and was supported by the troops, who demanded their pay. Attalos son of Andromenes now heightened tensions further by journeying inland from Tyre in the hope of winning the army back to the Perdikkan cause.<sup>63</sup> Hence Antipatros was greeted, on his arrival, by an angry mob, which might have lynched him, had it not been for the efforts of Seleukos and Antigonos.<sup>64</sup>

Once order was restored, and the obstreperous Eurydike frightened into submission, Antipatros, as *prostatae*, assigned the satrapies of the empire anew and entrusted the war against the Perdikkans to Antigonos, with whom he left the Kings, Philip III and Alexander IV.<sup>65</sup> But Antipatros took steps to limit Antigonos' power

60 Neoptolemos: Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; cf. Diod. 18.29.4–5. Antipatros moves toward Kilikia: Diod. 18.29.6; Plut. *Eum.* 6.4.

61 Eumenes' victories: Diod. 18.30–2. The troops join Antipatros: Arr. *Succ.* 1.28; Diod. 18.33.1.

62 Philoxenos had been appointed by Perdikkas in place of Philotas, who was well disposed towards Krateros. The fact that Philoxenos retained his satrapy at Triparadeisos suggests that he abandoned the Perdikkan cause, probably after receiving news of the defeat in Egypt.

63 Eurydike and the disgruntled troops: Arr. *Succ.* 1.31–2; cf. Diod. 18.39.1–2. Attalos: Arr. *Succ.* 1.33, 39.

64 Arr. *Succ.* 1.33; cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.4; Diod. 18.39.3–4. Landucci 2014 notes that Diodorus omits the negative reaction to Antipatros and the less flattering aspects of his performance at Triparadeisos, and concludes that his account is not based on Hieronymos of Kardia, since it also lacks pro-Antigonid elements found in Arrian's account (Baynham 1994: 353 n.70: "Diodorus' text favours Antipater." See especially Landucci, *Diodoro* 184: "La fonte dello storico, però, non avrebbe tralasciato di inserire una notazione anti-antigonide con l'accenno al ruolo di controllo affidato a Cassandro, mentre avrebbe eliminato tutti i pesanti riferimenti di tendenza ostile ad Antipatro che caratterizzano, invece, il testo di Arr. *Succ.* 1.39–44"); see also Landucci, *Duride*. Another notable criticism of Antipatros in Arrian, but absent from Diodorus, can be found in the *Suda* passage on Krateros (quoted in the relevant chapter below), which contrasts the favorable attitude of the troops towards Krateros with their negative view of Antipatros (*Suda* K 2335 = Arr. *Succ.* frag. 19; also Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 312 T3).

65 Submission of Eurydike: Diod. 18.39.4. Distribution of satrapies: App. *Syr.* 52 [263]; Diod. 18.39.5–7; Arr. *Succ.* 1.34–8. Antigonos and the Kings: Arr. *Succ.* 1.38 (Ἀντίγονον ἴγεμόνα ἀπέφηνε, καὶ τούτῳ τοὺς βασιλέας φρουρεῖν τε καὶ θεραπεύειν προστάξας τὸν πόλεμον ἄμα τὸν

by designating his own son Kassandros “chiliarch of the cavalry,” so that Antigonos might not pursue an independent course without Antipatros’ knowledge.<sup>66</sup>

## Return to Makedonia and death

Returning to the west, Antipatros stopped at Sardis, where he and Kleopatra exchanged recriminations. Asandros was dispatched to engage the forces of Attalos and Alketas, only to be defeated, and before he could leave Asia Antipatros was met by Kassandros, who had already fallen out with Antigonos. Persuaded that Antigonos harbored designs on a grander scale, he withdrew the Kings from the latter’s custody and took them to Europe.<sup>67</sup> Removing the living symbols of authority from Antigonos, Antipatros had nevertheless tacitly recognized him as an equal partner in the empire, as the *strategos* of Asia, and he was content, for the time, to leave him preoccupied with the suppression of the outlawed party. Perhaps the burden of age explains his half-hearted approach to the survival of the unified empire. In his years of service to the Argead house, he had been the caretaker of Makedonian affairs—feared by some, respected by many, his claims to supreme power were nevertheless weak, and his interest in the affairs of Asia minimal.<sup>68</sup>

In the autumn of 319 he died of illness, leaving the conduct of European affairs in the hands of Polyperchon and designating his son Kassandros *chiliarchos*.<sup>69</sup> Aristodemos brought news of his death to Antigonos the One-Eyed in the vicinity of Kretopolis (Diod. 18.47.4), a signal to those in Asia to start working for their own ends (Diod. 18.50.1).

πρὸς Εὐμένη διαπολεμῆσαι αὐτῷ αἴρουμένῳ ἐπέτρεπεν). Diod. 18.39.7 abbreviates the story and fails to mention the assignment (temporary, as it turned out) of the Kings to Antigonos.

66 Kassandros’ chiliarchy: Arr. *Succ.* 1.38; Diod. 18.39.7. See also Heckel 2002a for κοινοπραγία and ιδιοπραγία. But see Roisman, *Veterans* 11–7 for ulterior motives in the historical work of Hieronymos of Kardia.

67 Kleopatra: Arr. *Succ.* 1.40; cf. Whitehorne, *Cleopatras* 66: “Antipater backed down and in time the pair were grudgingly reconciled. He may even have thought of taking her on himself, or giving her to one of his sons, so valuable was she as the key to the kingdom.” Defeat of Asandros: Arr. *Succ.* 1.41. Return to Europe: Arr. *Succ.* 1.42–4.

68 Baynham 1994: 356 quotes Curt. 10.5.37 on the consequences of Alexander’s death: *Huic regi duicique successor quaerebatur, sed maior moles erat quam ut unus subire eam posset*. “Such was the king and leader for whom a successor was now sought, but the burden was too great to be shouldered by one man.” If Antipatros misjudged the capabilities of Polyperchon, that cannot be held against him, for the man was clearly in the mold of Galba: *omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset*.

69 Diod. 18.48. The embassy of Demades, who requested that Antipatros remove Menyllos’ garrison from Mounchia, helps to date Antipatros’ death. The old man was mortally ill when Demades reached him, but the latter did not leave Athens before the end of June 319 (as is clear from *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 383b); cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 30.4–6; Plut. *Dem.* 31.4–6. Diod. 18.48.4–5 says that Polyperchon was made *epimeletes* and *strategos autokrator*. Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1: Polyperchon was *strategos* and Kassandros *chiliarchos*. See Appendix V. Baynham 1994: 354 claims that the appointment was “confirmed by the Macedonian Assembly.” This may be true, but Diodorus does not mention this ratification. Both Polyperchon and Kassandros relied on the support of their respective *hetairoi (phili)*.

## 4 Parmenion and Philotas

### Parmenion son of Philotas

Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.290–306, Abschn. XV: “Alexander und Parmenion”; Berve II, 298–306 no. 606; Badian 1960a; Carney 2000: 264–73; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 81–112; Heckel, *Who's Who* 190–2.

Philip said that the Athenians were lucky, if they found ten generals to elect every year. He himself had only found one general, namely Parmenion.<sup>1</sup>

Parmenion son of Philotas was Makedon’s foremost general; he was no less influential at the Court.<sup>2</sup> Together with Antipatros and Eurylochos, he negotiated the Peace of 346.<sup>3</sup> Born c.400,<sup>4</sup> he was already a dominant force in Pella in the early years of Philip II, on whose orders he put to death Euphraios, a student of Plato who had spent time at the court of Perdikkas III, arresting and executing him at Oreus.<sup>5</sup> In 356 he campaigned successfully against Grabos, the Illyrian,<sup>6</sup> and the value of his generalship is underscored by Philip’s remark that whereas the Athenians elected ten generals every year, he himself had found only one general in many years—Parmenion.

1 Plut. *Apophth. Phil.* 2 = *Mor.* 177c: Ἀθηναίους μὲν οὖν μακαρίζειν ἔλεγεν [sc. Φιλιππος], εἰ καθ’ ἔκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν αἱρέσθαι δέκα στρατηγοὺς εύρισκουσιν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ἔνα μόνον στρατηγὸν εὑρηκέναι, Παρμενίωνα.

2 Son of Philotas: Arr. 3.11.10. His prominence in the military sphere: Curt. 4.13.4; Justin 12.5.3; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 49.13; Plut. *Mor.* 177c. His influence at the Court: Plut. *Mor.* 179. See Stemma IV.

3 The Peace of Philokrates. Dem. 19.69; Aes 3.72; Din. 1.28; cf. Theopompos *FGrH* 115 F165 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*).

4 Curt. 6.11.32; cf. 7.2.33. He was seventy at the time of his death in 330.

5 Karystios *ap.* Athen. 11.508e. Dem. 9.59–62 gives a different account, in which Euphraios commits suicide. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 1.470–1 calls Euphraios “der einflussreichste Mann am makedonischen Hofe”; cf. Hammond, *Philip II* 41; Cawkwell, *Philip* 51, 54; Carney 2003a: 52 (= *King and Court* 193).

6 Plut. *Alex.* 3.8. Wilkes, *Illyrians* 120–1; Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 1.231, with n.1; Rhodes & Osbourne, no. 53; Hammond 1966: 244 believes Grabos was a “dynastic name in the house of the Grabei, a tribe mentioned by Pliny, *HN* iii.144.” Papazoglou 1965: 166 identifies Grabos, Pleuratos, and Kleitos all as sons of Bardylis. Report of the victory was said to have coincided with the news of Alexander’s birth.

Parmenion had three attested sons: Philotas, Nikanor,<sup>7</sup> and Hektor<sup>8</sup>; a daughter, whose name has not survived, is known to have married Attalos, the uncle of Kleopatra.<sup>9</sup> The family may have had estates in the highlands: Philotas commanded in the Triballian campaign the cavalry from Upper Makedonia and his friends included the sons of Andromenes from Tymphaia; Parmenion himself normally commanded the infantry, on the left, where at least four of six phalanx battalions were from Upper Makedonia; he was also associated with Polyperchon of Tymphaia and the sons of Polemokrates (Elimeia), one of whom, Koinos, married Parmenion's daughter after Attalos' death.<sup>10</sup>

Sent ahead with Attalos and Amyntas to prepare for Philip's invasion,<sup>11</sup> Parmenion enjoyed only mixed success in Asia Minor, suffering a defeat at Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros at the hands of Memnon the Rhodian.<sup>12</sup> In 335, on Alexander's orders, he eliminated Attalos.<sup>13</sup> Some time later, he captured Grynion and sold its inhabitants into slavery; Memnon, however, forced him to abandon the siege of Pitane and drove his accomplice, Kalas son of Harpalos, back to Rhoition.<sup>14</sup> The campaign had not been an overwhelming success, but Parmenion

7 Nikanor: Berve II, 275 no. 554, id. *RE* XVII.1 (1936) 266 no. 1; Heckel, *Who's Who* 176 "Nicanor [1]."

8 Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 207; Berve II, 149 no. 295; Heckel, *Who's Who* 131. The youngest of Parmenion's known sons (Curt. 4.8.7; 6.9.27). His youth (*eximio aetatis flore*: Curt. 4.8.7) doubtless accounts for his lack of military office. Berve's estimate (II, 149) that he was born c.360 is thus too high; c.350 is more likely. Hektor drowned when the overloaded boat that he was on capsized in the Nile in 332/1. Curt. 4.8.7–8cf. also Curt. 6.9.27; Plut. *Alex.* 49.13. Julian, *Epistle* 82 (446a) claims that there was a second, almost certainly incorrect, version that the accident occurred at the Euphrates. Atkinson I, 369 rightly rejects suggestions of a Hadrianic date for Curtius based on the death of Hadrian's favorite, Antinous, in the Nile (cf. SHA, *Vita Hadriani* 14.6); Hektor was buried with great honors, befitting a son of Alexander's great marshal (Curt. 4.8.9).

9 Curt. 6.9.18.

10 The suggestion that Parmenion's house came from Upper Makedonia is attributed to Charles F. Edson by Ellis, *Philip II* 253 n. 70, who cites an unpublished paper ("Who Was Parmenion?") by that scholar. He is almost certainly not the king of the Pelagonians granted *proxenia* by the Athenians in 353/2 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 190, ll. 5–6, where only the first letter (Π) of the man's name survives on the stone. Worthington, *Philip* 34 calls Parmenion "one of the Paeonian chieftains" but does not provide any supporting evidence. Philotas commanded τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ιππέας (Arr. 1.2.5). For Philotas' connections with the Tymphaians see Curt. 7.1.11 and, for Parmenion's friendship with Polyperchon of Tymphaia, Curt. 4.13.7–10. Four phalanx battalions are explicitly identified as Upper Makedonian, but all six may have been recruited there (see Heckel 2009b). Koinos' marriage to Parmenion's daughter: Curt. 6.9.30; cf. Arr. 1.24.1, 29.4.

11 Diod. 16.91.2; 17.2.4; Justin 9.5.8; cf. Trogus, *Prol.* 9. Griffith, *HMac*. II, 680 n.3, speculates that a joint-command with Attalos may have represented a demotion for Parmenion, only to dismiss the idea within the same footnote.

12 Polyaenus' account (*Strat.* 5.44.4), and the figure of 10,000 Makedonian troops (accepted by McCoy 1989: 424), must be treated with caution (cf. Niese I, 59 n.2). The bulk of Parmenion's troops must have been mercenaries (cf. Wirth, *Kampfverband* 130).

13 Diod. 17.2.4–6, 5.2. Alexander's agent Hekataios could not have secured Attalos' execution without Parmenion's agreement, and the mission must have been simultaneously a test of Parmenion's loyalty (cf. Curt. 7.1.3).

14 Diod. 17.7.9–10. The Makedonian campaign had doubtless been affected by the execution of Attalos and the recalling of Parmenion to Europe (cf. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 1.619–20).

had only limited resources with which to secure a beachhead in Asia. In the winter of 335/4, he rejoined Alexander in Europe and, in the spring, transported most of the infantry and cavalry from Sestos to Abydos; in Asia Minor, he commanded the infantry—12,000 Makedonians, 7,000 allies and 5,000 mercenaries.<sup>15</sup>

At the Granikos, Parmenion counselled Alexander not to attack late in the day, advice rejected by the King.<sup>16</sup> In the actual battle he commanded the left, including the Thessalian cavalry (Arr. 1.14.1), who acquitted themselves well in the engagement (Diod. 17.19.6). After the battle, Parmenion captured and garrisoned Daskylion (Arr. 1.17.2), the satrapal residence of Hellespontine Phrygia. Hence, he ensured that Kalas son of Harpalos, Alexander's newly appointed satrap of the region, was securely established there.<sup>17</sup> Upon his return, Parmenion secured Magnesia and Tralles (which had surrendered) with 2,500 infantry, an equal number of Makedonians and 200 of the Companions (Arr. 1.18.1). He rejoined the King at Miletos, where he advised against disbanding the fleet, only to be overruled once again by Alexander;<sup>18</sup> he continued with him into Karia. With winter approaching, Parmenion moved to Sardis, taking a hipparchy of Companions,

15 Numbers of Parmenion's troops: Arr. 1.11.6; Diod. 17.17.3. Parmenion's sons also held major commands: Philotas led the Companions, Nikanor the hypaspists. Asandros son of Philotas, who was promptly installed as satrap of Lydia, was probably not Parmenion's brother. Nevertheless, Parmenion and his sons, the taxiarchs Koinos, Polyperchon, and Amyntas son of Andromenes, along with Polydamas (perhaps commander of the Pharsalian horse), formed a powerful faction in Alexander's army. See Heckel 2003a: 202–3.

16 Arr. 1.13.2 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 16.3. Diod. 17.19.3, however, says that Alexander attacked at dawn, thus giving the impression that he was following Parmenion's advice. Diodorus may, however, be basing his account on a corrective (pro-Parmenion) version—he does not mention Parmenion's advice, or Alexander's rejection of it—or he may simply have mistakenly translated Parmenion's proposal into action. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.296–7 accepts Diodorus' version as correct; cf. also Green, *Alexander* 489–512; Bosworth I, 114–6, with full discussion of the source problem, with earlier literature on the battle at the Granikos.

17 Both Parmenion and Kalas were familiar with the region, having campaigned there in 336 and 335 (Diod. 17.7.10). It appears that Parmenion took with him to Daskylion the Thessalian horse, which he left there for the time to help Kalas recover the Troad (Arr. 1.17.8). Arrian curiously separates the appointment of Kalas and Parmenion's mission (1.17.1–2) from the instructions given to Kalas and Alexander son of Aëropos concerning "Memnon's territory" (1.17.8; did they set out from Sardis?). It would be odd if Alexander made the appointment and then took Kalas to Sardis, only to send him back into his satrapy from Ionia. Kalas replaced Arsites (Arr. 1.12.8; 1.17.1; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 55–6); for previous rulers of the satrapy see Krumbholz 1883: 93.

18 Parmenion drew attention to an omen, an eagle perched on the shore behind Alexander's ships. If the Makedonians won a naval engagement at the beginning of the campaign it would be beneficial to their cause, but a setback would not harm them, since the Persians were already dominant at sea (Arr. 1.18.6). But Alexander responded that he would not fight against a force superior in numbers—400 Persians (Arr. 1.18.5) to 160 Makedonians under Nikanor (1.18.4)—and in training, and risk good lives to an uncertain element; that a loss would harm Makedonian prestige at a crucial point in the campaign; and that the omen showed that the Makedonians should fight on land, for that was where the eagle was situated, not at sea (Arr. 1.18.7–9). Carney 2000: 264 believes that for once it is Parmenion "who advocates a risky policy," whereas Alexander exercises caution, but clearly Parmenion regarded the disbanding of the Greco-Makedonian fleet as detrimental to the success of the expedition.

the Thessalian horse, the allies, and the wagons; from there he was to march into Phrygia and await the King.<sup>19</sup> In Phrygia, Parmenion apprehended Dareios' agent, Sisines, who had been sent to induce Alexandros Lynkestes to murder the Makedonian king. Sisines was sent in chains to Alexander (now at Phaselis) and interrogated. On the basis of his testimony, Alexander sent Amphoterus back to Parmenion with orders to arrest the Lynkestian.<sup>20</sup> In the spring of 333, Parmenion was rejoined by the remainder of the army (Arr. 1.29.3–4).

When the expedition moved out of Kappadokia to Kilikia, Parmenion remained at the so-called Camp of Kyros with the heavy infantry while Alexander took the hypaspists, archers, and Agrianes in order to occupy the Kilikian Gates (Arr. 2.4.3). These had been abandoned by Arsames' guards, who were frightened by the King's approach and alarmed by Arsames' "scorched earth" policy; and Alexander, fearing lest the satrap should destroy Tarsos, sent Parmenion ahead to capture the city. This, at least, is Curtius' version; Arrian says nothing about Parmenion's contribution.<sup>21</sup> Whether this is the result of abbreviation or a deliberate omission by Arrian's source(s), we cannot be sure. The mission invites comparison with Parmenion's capture of Damaskos soon after the battle of Issos (below). But Parmenion had up to this point been placed in charge of the less mobile troops, and one suspects that Curtius' source may have written "[Philotas son of] Parmenion." It was near Tarsos that Alexander fell ill, and Justin's claim that Parmenion wrote to Alexander from Kappadokia, warning the King to beware of Philip, the Akarnanian physician, may reflect his (or rather Trogus') belief that he had remained in Kappadokia while Alexander rushed ahead to Tarsos.<sup>22</sup> Now it is precisely in this context that Diodorus relates the arrest of Alexandros Lynkestes, who, like the doctor Philip, had allegedly been bribed by the Persian King. On this occasion, as on others, Parmenion's advice was disregarded and proved to be wrong.

From Tarsos, Parmenion advanced to the "other" or Syrian Gates, which he secured before rejoining the King at Kastabalon;<sup>23</sup> thereafter he took Issos and

19 Arr. 1.24.3; cf. 1.29.3.

20 Arr. 1.25.4–10; a different version in Diod. 17.32.1–2; cf. Curt. 7.1.6, and 3.7.11–5 (for the arrest and death of Sisines). Badian 2000a: 56–60 argues that Alexandros Lynkestes was "staged" (60), thus establishing a precedent for Alexander's later framing of Philotas, but the arguments for this are even less persuasive than those regarding Philotas (Heckel 2003a: 210–3).

21 Curt. 3.4.14–5; Arr. 2.4.5–6.

22 Bosworth I, 190 points out that from the Gates to Tarsos it is only about "55 km, a manageable day's stint for the advance column." And it appears more likely that Alexander himself (or possibly Philotas) advanced with the more mobile troops and that Parmenion remained at the Gates, awaiting further instructions from the King. Parmenion had in fact passed through the Gates (Arr. 2.4.4; cf. Atkinson I, 155), but this does not rule out the possibility that he stayed behind or followed at a slower pace. A letter from him might be thought to have come from the direction of Kappadokia. Diod. 17.31.4–6 knows nothing about any warning concerning Philip and follows his account of Alexander's illness with the arrest of Alexandros Lynkestes (17.32.1–2). This was perhaps the original version given by Kleitarchos; Curtius' account is contaminated by Trogus and/or Ptolemy; I cannot agree with Hammond, *THA* 121, who thinks that Trogus and Curtius used a common source (Kleitarchos) for this episode.

23 Syrian Gates: Arr. 2.5.1; Diod. 17.32.2. Kastabalon: Curt. 3.7.5; cf. Arr. 2.6.1–2, with Bosworth I, 199.

advised Alexander to fight Dareios in the narrows where the numerical supremacy of the Persians could be negated. The advice was accepted!<sup>24</sup> At Issos, Parmenion acted as commander-in-chief of the forces on the left, and was told to extend his line to the sea; to his contingent Alexander added the Thessalian cavalry, who once more fought with distinction.<sup>25</sup>

After the battle, Parmenion was sent to secure the Persian treasure at Damaskos.<sup>26</sup> Taking the city with relative ease, Parmenion captured numerous high-ranking Persian women, 30,000 men, 7,000 pack animals and large sums of money.<sup>27</sup> He was on his way back to the camp when he received orders to send Alexander only the captive Greek envoys and to take the remaining spoils back to Damaskos and guard them there (Arr. 2.15.1–2). The captives included Barsine, the widow of both Mentor and Memnon the Rhodians and allegedly the first woman with whom Alexander was intimate.<sup>28</sup> Parmenion, it is said, urged him to take up this relationship;<sup>29</sup> she may have been brought to the King at Marathos. Parmenion himself became military overseer of Koile-Syria, a temporary command: the satrapy was soon assigned to Andromachos, whom the Samaritans later put to death.<sup>30</sup> Curtius places the appointment of Andromachos and Parmenion's reunion with Alexander after the fall of Tyre, when the army prepared to move south towards Gaza, the logical time for such an administrative change. According to Polyaenus, Parmenion was in charge of the army at Tyre, while

24 Curt. 3.7.6–10. Parmenion's activities occupied him for the better part of a month, in which he took precautions against Dareios' advance. Nevertheless, the Persian King took Parmenion and Alexander by surprise, entering Kilikia from the north (via the Bahche Pass). For a full discussion see Bosworth I, 192–3; cf. also Stark, *Alexander's Path* 4, 7; Engels, *Logistics* 42–53, esp. 44 n.97, for a comment on Alexander's alleged ignorance of the Persian position.

25 Deployment at Issos: Curt. 3.9.8–10; Arr. 2.8.4, 9–10. Thessalian cavalry: Arr. 2.8.9; Curt. 3.11.3. The positive portrayal of the Thessalians is probably due to Kallisthenes.

26 Curt. 3.12.27; Arr. 2.11.10; Plut. *Alex.* 24.1. Dareios had sent most of his baggage and the Persian women (except those of his immediate family) to Damaskos before he reached Issos (Arr. 2.11.9; Diod. 17.32.3; Curt. 3.8.12). For Parmenion's capture of the city see Arr. 2.15.1; Curt. 3.13 is heavily dramatized; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.5.1. Ath 13.607f–608a quotes from what is purportedly a letter of Parmenion to Alexander itemizing the captured spoils and also “329 royal concubines trained to play musical instruments; 46 men who weave garlands; 277 who produce fancy dishes; 29 who make soup; 13 who process milk; 17 who mix drinks; 70 who strain wine; and 40 who produce perfume” (S. Douglas Olson, tr.). This letter (if genuine) appears to have reached Alexander at Marathos.

27 Curt. 3.13.12–6; Arr. 2.11.10.

28 Curt. 3.13.14; for Alexander's intimate relations with Barsine see Justin 11.10.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 21.7–8.

29 Plut. *Alex.* 21.9. Parmenion had earlier advised Alexander to produce an heir before leaving for Asia (Diod. 17.16.2).

30 Curt. 4.1.4 (cf. Bosworth 1974: 47–8). It is tempting to see *Parmenion* as a corruption of Menon (son of Kerdimmas), on whom see Arr. 2.13.7. But Justin 11.10.4–5, seems to corroborate some kind of independent command for Parmenion, though *Parmeniona ad occupandam Persicam classem* is clearly corrupt (perhaps we should read *gazam* for *classem*), unless it implies that Parmenion was to secure the coast of Koile-Syria. See also Bosworth I, 225. Andromachos killed by the Samaritans: Curt. 4.5.9; cf. 4.8.9–11; see also Berve II, 38–9 no. 76: Heckel, *Who's Who* 28–9 “Andromachus [2].”

Alexander conducted his Arabian campaign; but Curtius claims that the siege had been entrusted to Krateros and Perdikkas.<sup>31</sup> The story that Parmenion, hard-pressed by the Tyrians, had to summon Alexander from Arabia sounds like another attempt to discredit the old general. From Gaza, Parmenion accompanied the King to Egypt. There he used his influence to restrain Hegelochos (Curt. 6.11.27–9), and his mere presence in the camp sufficed to save Philotas from charges of treason (Arr. 3.26.1). Still his sojourn in Egypt was not free of tragedy: his youngest son Hektor drowned in the Nile.

Alexander undoubtedly sought to free himself from the influence of Parmenion and the perception that he owed his military victories to the old general. But it is difficult to determine what role Alexander played in blackening Parmenion's memory or if this was even done in the King's lifetime. Certainly, we have a collection of stories that put Parmenion in a bad light: he urges Alexander to accept Dareios' peace offer,<sup>32</sup> which Alexander arrogantly rejects; the old general's advice that they attack the Persians by night at Gaugamela is dismissed as a plan to "steal victory";<sup>33</sup> Parmenion's anxiety before the battle is contrasted with Alexander's confidence in the face of danger; and, in the actual battle, Parmenion is depicted as incompetent and tarnishing the King's victory over Dareios.<sup>34</sup> A more positive tradition can be found in Curtius, who in Parmenion's obituary notice says: "he had gained many successes without the King, while the King had achieved nothing of significance without him."<sup>35</sup> Some scholars believe that Philotas was essentially speaking the truth to his mistress when "he declared that the greatest deeds were those accomplished by himself and by his father, and he called

31 Parmenion at Tyre: Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.4. Krateros and Perdikkas: Curt. 4.3.1; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.13.

32 Plut. *Alex.* 29.7–9: 10,000 talents; cf. Arr. 2.25.1, in a different chronological context; Diod. 17.54; Curt. 4.11.1–14 and Justin 11.12.1–10: 30,000 talents.

33 Curt. 4.13.4, 8–9; Arr. 3.10.1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 31.11–2.

34 Plut. *Alex.* 33.10. It is difficult to imagine that all these episodes could have been written in Parmenion's lifetime, or even in the King's, when too many influential commanders—to say nothing of the common soldiers—knew the truth of what had happened. Lysimachos rejected Onesikritos' relatively harmless fiction about the Amazon queen (Plut. *Alex.* 46.4–5 = *FGrH* 134 T8; cf. Whitby, *BNJ*); and Kleitos' outrage at the negative portrayal of Makedonian officers demonstrates the kind of hostility that could be generated by more serious falsehoods (Plut. *Alex.* 50.9). For Alexander's confidence going into battle see Diod. 17.56.2; Curt. 4.13.17–25; Plut. *Alex.* 32.1–4. Perhaps, this is the product of the same propaganda machine, but it is more likely that the hostile portrait of Parmenion was superimposed on the official version that idealized the young King. The only thing we can be certain about is that the hostile portrait of Parmenion originated with one of the early Alexander historians. Carney 2000: 273 rightly observes that the theme of Alexander's rejection of Parmenion's advice does "not increase our understanding of Parmenio or of the king, but [contributes] to the heroization of Alexander by generating a picture of the king in which he is always young, quick, daring, and successful. The . . . figure of Parmenio becomes a kind of straight man for Alexander." For the two traditions concerning Parmenion (a hostile one based on Kallisthenes and Ptolemy, and a more favorable one deriving from Kleitarchos and Medios of Larissa) see Bearzot 1987; it is, however, likely that the extant historians manipulated these passages for their own purposes.

35 Curt. 7.2.33: *multa sine rege prospere, rex sine illo nihil magnae rei gesserat.*

Alexander a stripling who reaped on their account the fame of empire.”<sup>36</sup> Passages favorable to Parmenion thus appear to be later inventions: his advice that the army fight in the narrows at Issos and that Alexander not read to his soldiers letters from Dareios urging them to murder their leader is accepted in each case; his remark that Alexander should not destroy his own property by destroying Persepolis also made good sense.<sup>37</sup> Curtius himself regards the criticism of Parmenion excessive and directs against Polyperchon Alexander’s rejection of the night-attack at Gaugamela.<sup>38</sup> Carney rightly observes that “incidents in which Parmenion offers advice may have been entirely or largely invented, simply to advance or clarify the narrative, much as many speeches are believed to have been.”<sup>39</sup>

Commanding the Makedonian left at Gaugamela, Parmenion found himself hard-pressed by the Persian cavalry under Mazaios; Skythian horsemen had knifed into a gap in the Makedonian lines, only to direct their attentions to plundering the field camp.<sup>40</sup> A detachment sent to recall Alexander failed to make contact with the King and returned with its mission unfulfilled.<sup>41</sup> Parmenion, with the Thessalian cavalry, managed to hold Mazaios until Dareios’ flight signaled the collapse of the Persian effort (Diod. 17.60.8). The old general had thus fulfilled his role in the battle by holding the enemy in check on the left while Alexander turned the tide of battle on the right. Despite later claims that Parmenion’s performance was lackluster, his contribution should not be diminished.<sup>42</sup>

Worthington suggests that “with the battle won, as it was by then, Alexander deliberately left Parmenion to his fate. The declining relations between the King and senior general would be solved by his death.”<sup>43</sup> This Badianesque interpretation ignores the probability that, if the battle had indeed already been won, the chances of the supreme commander on the left wing dying on the battlefield were “slim to none”; and, if Parmenion had died as a result of the collapse of the left, then it would have become clear that the battle had in fact not been won when the King left in pursuit of Dareios.<sup>44</sup> Alexander could hardly afford a military defeat—on the scale of that suffered by the Antigonids at Ipsos and the

36 Plut. *Alex.* 48.5. Most notable among the admirers of Parmenion is Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.295–6; see also Devine 1975: 385.

37 Issos: Curt. 3.7.8–10. Letters: Curt. 4.10.16–7. Persepolis: Arr. 3.18.11.

38 Curt. 4.13.4, 7–10; cf. also 4.12.21. Heckel 1994a: 75.

39 Carney 2000: 272. Negative passages: Arr. 1.13.2–7; Plut. *Alex.* 16.3; Curt. 3.6.4–17 and 6.10.34–5; Plut. *Alex.* 19; Arr. 2.4.9–10; Diod. 17.54.4; Arr. 2.25.2; Plut. *Alex.* 33. Favorable: Arr. 3.9.4; Diod. 17.16; Curt. 3.7.8–10, 4.10.16–7; Arr. 3.18.11.

40 Command of the left: Arr. 3.11.10; cf. 3.15; Mazaios: Diod. 17.60.5–7 (Heckel, *Who’s Who* 156–7 “Mazaeus”); Plundering of the camp: Curt. 4.15.2–5.

41 Thus Diod. 17.60.7. Arr. 15.1 claims that Alexander responded and came to the rescue. Fuller, *Generalship* 178 accepts the story; it is rejected by Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 82–3; cf. Bosworth I, 310; cf. Devine 1975: 381.

42 Criticism of Parmenion’s efforts: Plut. *Alex.* 33.10 = Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F37; cf. Bearzot 1987.

43 Worthington, *Man and God* 124.

44 The criticism of Parmenion’s performance by Kallisthenes (*FGrH* 124 F36) may have been intended to excuse and obscure Alexander’s own tactical error, which might have turned victory into defeat.

Seleukids at Raphia, both caused by premature pursuit by the cavalry—for the sake of a personal or political victory. In fact, Alexander had learned a simple truth, which the over-cautious Parmenion was reluctant to believe: namely, that the flight of the Great King drew his army along with him and turned even the expectation of victory into certain defeat. Issos had demonstrated that point. If Alexander chose to ignore Parmenion's appeal, it was because he knew that the rout had already begun.

Once the Persians had been driven from the field, and Alexander had established his camp beyond the Lykos River, Parmenion occupied the Persian camp, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants. On the march from Sousa to Persepolis, Parmenion led the slower troops and the baggage train along the wagon road into Persis, while Alexander took an unencumbered force through the Persian Gates.<sup>45</sup> At Persepolis he advised Alexander not to destroy the palace; for it was unwise to destroy one's own property.<sup>46</sup> Alexander may have wished to accept Parmenion's advice for once, but he had little choice: constrained by his own claims to be the “avenger of Greece,” he was forced to make at least a symbolic gesture at Persepolis. From Persepolis the King sent Parmenion to Ecbatana with the accumulated treasure, details of which are again provided in a letter from Parmenion to Alexander.<sup>47</sup>

When Alexander continued his pursuit of Dareios in 330, he left Parmenion in Ecbatana, presumably as *strategos* of Media and possibly as a temporary measure.<sup>48</sup> The matter is academic, since Alexander's decision to execute Philotas sealed the old man's fate.<sup>49</sup> Polydamas was sent in disguise to deliver the order that Parmenion be executed. In Media, Kleandros, Agathon, Sitalkes, and Menidas carried out the sentence as Parmenion learned of this conviction and of the charges against him.<sup>50</sup>

45 Capture of the Persian camp: Arr. 3.15.4. On elephants at Gaugamela see Charles 2008, with earlier literature. The wagon road to Persis: Arr. 3.18.1; Curt. 5.3.16 (*campestri itinere*). For the routes between Sousa and Persepolis see Velásquez Muñoz 2013: 149–59; Speck 2002; for Parmenion's route see Speck 2002: 143–4 and Moritani 2014: 142–5, rejecting the Kazerun route (proposed by Stein 1940: 20, 34): “It is unbelievable that the baggage train would have taken such a steep and long route” (Moritani 2014: 143). Alternative roads all reach an altitude of over 1,000 m, but are preferable to the Kazerun (southern) route.

46 Arr. 3.18.11.

47 Justin 12.1.3; Arr. 3.19.7. Parmenion's letter: Athen. 11.781f–782a.

48 Parmenion's instructions to invade the land of the Kadousians and Hyrkania (Arr. 3.19.7) were apparently cancelled (cf. Bosworth I, 337; Seibert, *Eroberung* 110–1; cf. Brunt *Arrian I*, 529, Appendix 13.5).

49 That he had any knowledge of the events that were unfolding in Phrada is extremely doubtful.

50 Curt. 6.9.13–24, 11.21 ff. (charges); Arr. 3.26.3–4; Plut. Alex. 49.13; Diod. 17.80.3; Justin 12.5.3; Curt. 7.2.11–32, with a eulogy at 7.2.33–4 (his death). Curt. 10.1.1 lists Herakon as one of the executioners. The choice of Polydamas was doubtless a test of that man's loyalty to Alexander. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.22: “So schlug Alexander denselben Weg ein wie einst gegen Attalos. Ein zuverlässiger Offizier wurde als Eilbote auf schnellen Dromedare nach Ecbatana gesandt mit dem Befehl an Parmenions Unterbefehlshaber Kleandros, Menidas und den Thraker Sitalkes, ihren General zu ermorden.”

## Philotas son of Parmenion

Badian 1960a; Berve II, 393–7 no. 802; Bosworth I, 359–63; Cauer 1894: 8–38; Goukowsky I, 38 ff.; II, 118–34; Hamilton, *PA* 132–8; Heckel 1977a, and *Who's Who* 216–9 “Philotas [4]”; Rubinson 1977; Adams 2003a; Reames 2008.

The brother of Nikanor the *archihypaspistes*, Hektor, and at least one unnamed sister,<sup>51</sup> Philotas son of Parmenion was born, in all likelihood, in the late 360s. He appears to have been a *syntrophos* of Amyntas son of Perdikkas; the sons of Andromenes (Curt. 7.1.10–1; cf. Arr. 1.27.1) and, perhaps, also Amyntas son of Antiochos were personal friends. The family was formidable, as were its adherents, though the latter proved to be a liability in later years.

Philotas is first attested in Plutarch’s account of the Pixodaros affair (337/6): Philip, having learned that Alexander and his *hetairoi* had interfered in his attempts to forge an alliance with the Karian dynast by marrying Arrhidaios to Pixodaros’ daughter Ada, confronted his son, “bringing along one of his friends, Philotas son of Parmenion” (*παραλαβὼν τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ καὶ συνήθων ἔνα, Φιλόταν τὸν Παρμενίωνος*).<sup>52</sup> The significance of the action is not entirely clear: for we do not know whether Philip brought Philotas with him in order to shame his son or if Philotas himself had reported the prince’s misconduct to his father. In either case, the episode will not have endeared Philotas to Alexander. When the former was implicated in the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard in the autumn of 330, Alexander was said to have been suspicious of Philotas “for more than seven years,” almost certainly a reference to the time of the Pixodaros affair.<sup>53</sup>

### *Early career*

Philotas is first attested as a commander of cavalry in the Danubian campaign, where the combined use of cavalry and infantry broke the Triballians’ formations and turned them to flight.<sup>54</sup> His contingent was that from Upper Makedonia, and it appears that Philotas was an ilarch, of roughly the same rank as Herakleides

51 Curt. 6.9.17. She was apparently the widow of Attalos and the wife of Koinos (Heckel, *Who's Who* 276 F33, 34) and thus, probably, the mother of Perdikkas (see Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 332; Hatzopoulos II, 43–5, no. 20).

52 Plut. *Alex.* 10.4. The entire passage reads: ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος αἰσθόμενος, ιὸν εἰς τὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου δωμάτιον, παραλαβὼν τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ καὶ συνήθων ἔνα, Φιλόταν τὸν Παρμενίωνος, ἐτετίμησεν ισχυρῶς, καὶ πικρῶς ἐλοιδόρησεν ὡς ἀγεννῆ καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων περὶ αὐτὸν ἀγαθῶν ἀνάξιον, εἰ Καρὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ βαρβάρῳ βασιλεῖ δουλεύοντος ἀγαπᾶ γαμβρὸς γενέσθαι.

53 Plut. *Mor.* 339f = *de Fort. Alex.* 2.7. In context, the Greek suggests that the seven-year period followed the revelation that Philotas had been speaking ill of Alexander since the Egyptian campaign. But this was scarcely three years before the incident at Phrada. Plutarch may have taken this figure from a source that indicated that Alexander’s distrust of Philotas went back to the time before his accession. Cf. Hamilton, *PA* 134: “Presumably he dated this to the beginning of Alexander’s reign, assuming that Alexander had disliked Philotas . . .”

54 Arr. 1.2.5. On this battle see Fuller, *Generalship* 221–2; Lonsdale, *Lessons* 112–4; Hammond, *Genius* 34; English, *Field Campaigns* 27–8; for the role of the cavalry, Willekes 2015: 48–9.

and Sopolis, who commanded the cavalry on the left.<sup>55</sup> In the Illyrian campaign, after surrounding Kleitos' forces in the town of Pellion, Alexander sent Philotas with sufficient horsemen to protect a foraging party. These, however, were surrounded by Kleitos' allies, Glaukias and the Taulantians, and had to be rescued by the King.<sup>56</sup> It is doubtful that Arrian's report was intended to discredit Philotas. Certainly, it had no negative effect on his career: by the beginning of the Asiatic expedition, he commanded the entire Companion Cavalry,<sup>57</sup> perhaps as a reward for his father's elimination of Attalos.

At the Granikos, Philotas' cavalry were drawn up on the right, alongside the archers and the Agrianes.<sup>58</sup> Nothing else is known of his role in the battle. When the army moved to Miletos, Philotas was sent with the cavalry and three battalions of infantry to Mykale to prevent the Persian fleet from disembarking and obtaining water and supplies. In the Halikarnassos campaign, Philotas took part in the abortive attempt on Myndos. It appears that he spent the winter of 334/3 with Alexander in Pamphylia and Lykia.<sup>59</sup>

When the reunited army moved from Gordion to Tarsos, the Companion Cavalry accompanied Alexander and were probably instrumental in capturing Tarsos before it could be put to the torch by the satrap Arsames.<sup>60</sup> After Alexander's recovery from his illness at the Kydnos, Philotas accompanied him to Soloi and via Anchiale to the Aleian plain. Here Alexander turned south to the coastal town of Magarsos, sending Philotas across the plain to Mallos, where the army was later reunited (Arr. 2.5.5–9). Of his role in the battle of Issos, nothing is recorded except his position in the battle line.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes Hegesias' account of the fall of Gaza,<sup>61</sup> in which Philotas and Leonnatos brought the eunuch Batis, whom Dareios had

55 Cf. Berve II, 393; Bosworth I, 57. The ethnic origin of his troops may suggest that Philotas himself was from Upper Makedonia.

56 Arr. 1.5.9–11 for Philotas' role. For the battle see Hammond 1974 and *Genius* 36–40; Bosworth I, 66–73; Fuller, *Generalship* 223–6; Lonsdale, *Lessons* 141–4. That Philotas was given another assignment, to the borders of Illyria, is suggested by P. British Museum 3085, on which see Hammond 1987: 340–3. The restoration of Philotas' patronymic [ $\tauὸν Παρμενίου$ ]νίονος in lines 32–3 is virtually certain.

57 Diod. 17.17.4; cf. Curt. 6.9.21.

58 Arr. 1.14.1; there is no evidence, *pace* Berve II, 393, that these other units were under Philotas' command. It is more likely that the archers and the Agrianes followed Alexander on the far right. Hammond, *Genius* 67, seems to imply this when he says: "On the right the Archers and the Agrianians, attacking the cavalry in the flank and mingling with their own cavalry, were rolling up the enemy's left wing . . .".

59 Berve II: 393 thinks Philotas accompanied his father to Gordion. Arr. 1.24.3 gives Parmenion a "hipparchy" of Companions. At best, Arrian can be referring to only a few *ilai*, though possibly the term "hipparchy" is wrongly and anachronistically used as a substitute for *ile* (cf. Bosworth I, 155; Brunt 1963: 29; Brunt, *Arrian* I, lxxv §60; Griffith 1963: 70). Philotas at Mykale: Arr. 1.19.7–8. Myndos: Arr. 1.20.5–7.

60 Curtius' claim that this was the work of Parmenion may well be a corruption of an original account which gave credit to [Philotas son of] Parmenion.

61 *de comp. verb.* 18 p. 123–6R = Hegesias, *FGrH* 142 F5.

entrusted with the defense of the city, to Alexander as a captive. Hegesias' account is similar, in its main outline, to that given by Curtius; both may derive from a common source, most likely Kleitarchos.<sup>62</sup> Despite the dramatic touches, it appears that Batis was in fact executed, probably in a brutal fashion. The details about Philotas' involvement in his arrest need not have been fabricated.<sup>63</sup>

### ***Hostility towards Alexander***

The winter of 332/1 in Egypt, and Alexander's adoption by Amun-Re, marked a turning point in the relationship between Philotas and Alexander. The "friendship," of which some writers (ancient and modern) speak, may never have been warm. In fact, Philotas was not one of Alexander's boyhood friends, but rather a friend and *syntrophos* of Amyntas son of Perdikkas III (a rival of the Crown Prince) and the brother-in-law of his bitter enemy Attalos (Curt. 6.9.17). When Philotas spoke out against Alexander in Egypt, rebuking him for his divine pretensions and claiming for himself and his father the credit for the Makedonian victories, it was clearly not for the first time. But, on this occasion, it was unfortunate for Philotas that his talk reached the King's ears.

Among the captives taken by Parmenion at Damaskos in November 333 was a Makedonian girl named Antigona. Either Pydnaian or Pellaian by birth, she had been captured, after sailing to Samothrake to celebrate the mysteries,<sup>64</sup> by the Persian admiral Autophradates.<sup>65</sup> She soon became Philotas' mistress and the sounding board for his complaints about the King. Alexander's victories in Asia, these had been the work of Parmenion; nor did Philotas make light of his own achievements. And now the King was encouraging reports that he had been sired by the god Amun. Philotas' comments were related by Antigona, innocently we may assume, to her friends, and eventually the gossip reached Krateros' ears. Others may have dismissed the comments as the grumblings of a chronic malcontent, but Krateros saw political advantage in blackening Philotas' name. He therefore suborned Antigona to report directly to him whatever Philotas said, and he took this, as evidence of treason, to the King himself. The disloyal rumblings constituted Philotas' so-called Egyptian conspiracy (Arr. 3.26.1; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48.4–49.2), and Alexander wisely took no action against him.

62 Hammond, *THA* 127–8; more cautious is Pearson, *LHA* 248.

63 Batis as eunuch: Arr. 2.25.4; *Itiner. Al.* 45. See Berse II, 104–5, no. 209; Heckel, *Who's Who* 71. For the Batis story, see Tarn II, 265–70; Bosworth I, 257–8. If he was in fact a eunuch, he was most likely the *phrourachos* of Gaza, perhaps entrusted with the city's treasure. Curt. 4.6.7–29 gives a similar version to that of Hegesias, but he mentions the treachery of the Gazans and the wounding of Alexander. See Heckel and McLeod 2015: 247–52, 261–4 for Alexander's brutality after suffering a wound. We need not believe that Alexander treated Batis as Achilleus treated Hektor, but the method of punishment was probably unpleasant and visually effective.

64 On the cult see Cole 1984; cf. also Greenwalt 2008.

65 Antigona: Berse II, 42 no. 86; Heckel, *Who's Who* 32 "Antigone". Her origin: Plut. *Alex.* 48.4 (Pydna); Plut. *Mor.* 339<sup>e</sup> (Pella). Her capture: Plut. *Mor.* 339d–f. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 65 "Autophradates [1]."

### **Further military action**

At Gaugamela, as he had done at the Granikos and Issos, Philotas commanded the Companions.<sup>66</sup> Presumably, he fought in the immediate vicinity of the King and followed him in his pursuit of the fleeing Persians, which, rumor held, was cut short by Parmenion's request for help. At Sousa, he is said to have witnessed Alexander sitting on the throne of the Great King and to have treated with disdain the laments of those Persians who saw Alexander resting his feet on the table from which Dareios used to eat.<sup>67</sup> Anecdotal and perhaps even fictitious, the story is no doubt a realistic commentary on Philotas' attitude to the conquered peoples.

At the Persian Gates, Philotas was sent with the infantry battalions of Koinos, Amyntas, and Polyperchon to circumvent the forces of Ariobarzanes and perhaps begin the bridging of the Araxes River (Rud-i Kur).<sup>68</sup> Nothing else is recorded about Philotas until the death of his brother Nikanor in the autumn of 330. He remained behind in Areia for several days to see to his brother's funeral.

### **The conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard**

Philotas rejoined the army in Phrada (modern Farah?), the capital of Drangiana, soon to be renamed Prophthasia ("Anticipation") for the events which would unfold.<sup>69</sup> It was here that the trial and execution was played out against the backdrop of—and in part on account of—a serious threat to the King's life. The importance of the *Philotasprozess* and modern theories about the true nature of his involvement in a plot against Alexander have obscured a very real conspiracy on the part of men who were not as insignificant as scholars believe. The sources are clear, and virtually unanimous, in describing the disaffection of the troops in 330. The story of Philotas' fall begins with Dimnos, a Makedonian from Chalaistra, described as one of the *hetairoi*, who attempted to enlist his lover Nikomachos in a conspiracy involving at least one other notable Makedonian, Demetrios the *somatophylax*.<sup>70</sup> The conspirators wished to rid themselves of the tyranny of their increasingly autocratic ruler. Some sources wrongly state that Dimnos himself

66 Arr. 3.11.8; Curt. 4.13.26; Diod. 17.57.1. For the battle, see especially Marsden, *Gaugamela*; also Fuller, *Generalship* 163–80; English, *Field Campaigns* 129–57; Hammond, *Genius* 103–10; Lonsdale, *Lessons* 127–35; Devine 1975, 1986a, 1989a.

67 Curt. 5.2.13–5; Diod. 17.66.3–7. Atkinson II, 65–6; Prandi, *Diodoro* 109.

68 Thus Arr. 3.18.6; Curt. 5.4.20. Curt. 5.4.30 has Philotas and the phalanx commanders participating in the attack on Ariobarzanes, with the bridging of the Araxes taking place later under Alexander's direction (5.5.3–4); Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.27 wrongly assigns command of the main camp to Philotas and Hephaestion (cf. Heckel 1980c: 169–71; but see Howe 2015b: 177–8). For the route of Philotas to the Araxes see Speck 2002: 183–4 and Moritani 2014: 124 Fig. 23.

69 Capital of Drangiana: Diod. 17.78.4. "Anticipation": cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. Φράδα.

70 Curtius 6.7.15 alone names them: Peukolaos, Aphobetus, Theoxenos, Archepolis, Nikanor, Iolaos, Amyntas, Demetrios (cf. Arr. 3.26.3, without names). Four of the names are relatively common, and it is unlikely that they were non-entities, as many scholars believe.

organized the plot, though it appears that he was merely one of the conspirators.<sup>71</sup> Nikomachos, however, revealed the details of his conversation with Dimnos to his own brother, Kebalinos, who in turn hoped to save Nikomachos by alerting the King. As he approached Alexander's tent, he encountered Philotas, who was in the habit of visiting the King twice daily, and he alerted him to the danger, divulging all the details. But Philotas neglected to inform Alexander, later claiming that he had not found the story credible. In this he was clearly culpable; for a reported conspiracy involving one of the *somatophylakes*, who had virtually unlimited access to the King, could hardly be taken lightly, unless one assumed, as many did, that Philotas was either a party to the conspiracy or content not to prevent its execution. Even on the next day, when Kebalinos addressed him a second time, he allowed Alexander to remain ignorant of the plot, although it was to be carried out on the following day (cf. Curt. 6.7.6). Kebalinos now approached Metron, one of the Royal Pages, and through him the news of the conspiracy reached the King. Philotas would excuse himself by claiming that he had not taken the matter seriously. But, in such a context, negligence implied complicity, and his inaction, at least in the eyes of Alexander's younger companions, was treasonable. Philotas' arrest was preceded by the apprehending of Dimnos. But he could not be taken alive and, in Badian's view, the old maxim that "dead men tell no tales" lends credence to the view that Alexander did not want him to testify.<sup>72</sup>

That Philotas was innocent of actively participating in the plot is virtually certain. Kebalinos would scarcely have approached Philotas had he known of his involvement, and Philotas would certainly have taken measures to prevent the conspiracy from coming to light. In fact, nothing could be asserted with confidence, by the prosecutors or the King's historians, except that Philotas had been negligent. Guy MacLean Rogers (*Alexander* 147) rightly notes:

If a minor officer in the U.S. Army reported the existence of a conspiracy to assassinate the president, a conspiracy that allegedly included a member of the presidential security detail, to one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chief

71 Plut. *Alex.* 49.3. Curt. 6.7.6 does not say that Dimnos himself planned it: cf. 6.11.37, where a certain "Calis" (unnamed by Curt. 6.7.15) confesses that he and Demetrios planned the crime.

72 Many scholars have found the view of Badian 1960, amplified by Goukowsky, that Dimnos' conspiracy was a fabrication designed to "frame" Philotas, difficult to resist. Alexander is portrayed as bent on the destruction of the house of Parmenion, using Philotas, who was "plus vulnérable que son père" (Goukowsky I, 39), as a pretext for eliminating the old man. While Philotas attended to the funeral rites of his brother, the plot was hatched: Dimnos' imaginary conspiracy would be divulged to Philotas, who, "comme prévu" (Goukowsky *ibid.*), would then incriminate himself by not bringing the matter to the King's attention. Such a conspiracy *against* Philotas, like the elaborate crimes of Agatha Christie's characters, looks impressive—in retrospect. Because Philotas did not reveal Dimnos' plot to Alexander, it is assumed that he would not have done so under any circumstances. Hamilton rightly asks (Plut. *Alex.* 134–5): "how could Alexander know that Philotas would fail to pass on the information?" Indeed, it would have been embarrassing to the King, had Philotas revealed the conspiracy, if he were then forced to admit to fabricating it in order to test him. On the Philotas affair see Cauer 1894; Badian 1960a, 2000a; Rubinsohn 1977; Heckel 1977b, 2003a: 216–9; Adams 2003a; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 81–112; cf. Gissel 1995.

did not disclose the contents of the report immediately and in full, and this fact was subsequently discovered, the chief would be removed from command and court-martialed without delay.

Philotas' motives are not far to seek. With Alexander dead, the army would almost certainly turn back, and Parmenion in Ecbatana would be the logical man to assume control of affairs until a new king could be selected. And a suitable candidate could be found in the camp, albeit in chains: Alexandros Lynkestes, who had probably the strongest claim to the kingship of those who had survived the purge that followed Philip's murder. As for Parmenion, his position should not be underestimated: the old general controlled Alexander's lifeline to Makedonia.<sup>73</sup>

### ***Prosecution and death***

Philotas himself soon found the cards stacked against him. The death of Nikanor and Parmenion's consignment to Ecbatana had left Philotas isolated. As a young man he was raised at Philip's court, a *syntrophos* of Amyntas Perdikka. The close friends of the latter, the son of Philip's brother and predecessor, were doubtless sympathetic to his claims to the kingship. Alexander's accession was thus a bitter disappointment, the execution of Amyntas a cause for anxiety. Amyntas son of Antiochos made no secret of his opposition to Alexander and fled (Arr. 1.17.9; cf. Curt. 4.1.27). Others weathered the political storm and retained offices only recently acquired. For the new King, conciliation was essential, even if it meant keeping potentially dangerous individuals in positions of power: Hegelochos, Alexandros Lynkestes, and his nephew Amyntas. The elimination of Attalos, Heromenes and Arrhabaios, and Amyntas son of Perdikkas gave Alexander some degree of security, but this could not have been accomplished without the support of Philip's two most powerful generals: Antipatros and Parmenion.

Philotas undoubtedly owed much to his father's influence, and it was for this reason that Alexander had overlooked his earlier indiscretion in Egypt. He had already incurred Alexander's distrust at the time of the Pixodaros affair, when he was taken by Philip to the prince's quarters as a witness to the secret dealings with the Karian dynast. This is surely what Plutarch alludes to when he speaks of the strained relationship over the last seven years. Furthermore, he was arrogant and outspoken (Plut. *Alex.* 48.1–3), and his prestigious command was coveted by the younger commanders, who through their connections with Alexander hoped for greater rewards. Their envy was fueled by Philotas' unyielding nature (cf. Themistius, *Or.* 19.229c–d): he had foolishly disregarded Parmenion's advice to "make less of himself" (Plut. *Alex.* 48.3), and his arrogance and general unpopularity made his ultimate deposition only a matter of time. Philotas' enemies were not about to let the opportunity pass. Deep-rooted animosities manifested

73 Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.21: "das wichtige Kommando in Ecbatana . . . , wo er die Hälfte des Heeres unter seinem alleinigen Befehl hatte und alle rückwärtigen Verbindungen Alexanders beherrschte."

themselves in vigorous prosecution and, in the face of adversity, Parmenion, through whose influence Philotas had escaped an earlier charge of treason, was not there to help him.

For Alexander's inner circle of friends, Philotas' error in judgment afforded the perfect opportunity for securing his elimination (Curt. 6.8.4). Krateros renewed his assault on an old enemy. He became the spokesman of this hostile faction, and his words must have reflected the thinking of his accomplices. Alexander ought to have consulted them on this matter, he argued. Philotas would continue to plot against him, and Alexander could not keep on excusing him forever. Nor would Philotas be mellowed by his kindness. Alexander must guard himself against the enemy within (Curt. 6.8.4). All Philotas' enemies were convinced that he was involved in the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard—or, at least, so they said—and now they advocated the use of torture (Curt. 6.8.15). When Alexander allowed himself to be persuaded that Philotas must be removed he was not acting entirely against his will. Schachermeyr is quite right to point out that the drastic steps that were taken after Philotas' arrest need not have been taken.<sup>74</sup> But, had Alexander not been strongly influenced by his group of companions, he might well have been content to take less stringent measures and allow the house of Parmenion to lapse into the state of obscurity for which it was destined. It was not the decision about Philotas that had made the King hesitate, rather the question of Parmenion. For the son's execution required the murder of the father, and Alexander had to consider the consequences of the second action.

Philotas, for his part, understood the politics of faction, pronouncing that the bitterness of his enemies had overcome Alexander's goodwill (Curt. 6.8.22). And Curtius makes it clear who these enemies (*inimici*) were: "Then, at the time of the second watch when the lights were out, some of the King's friends, namely Hephaestion, Craterus, Coenus and Erigyios, met in the royal quarters with a few men, along with Perdiccas and Leonnatus from the bodyguard."<sup>75</sup> These gained most from Philotas' execution, especially Krateros and Hephaestion, the former being most vigorous in arousing Alexander's hostility toward Philotas, the latter the most vehement of his tormentors. They had all hated Philotas for a long time (Plut. *Alex.* 49.8: τοὺς πάλαι μισοῦντας αὐτόν). But, since Hephaestion and Krateros had the most influence with Alexander, and emerged as the chief beneficiaries of the affair, we may justly assign to them the leading roles. What parts Perdikkas, Leonnatos, and Erigyios played in destroying Philotas, we cannot say; nor are the benefits to them as immediately obvious.

Krateros' opposition to Philotas can be easily understood. He was loyal and ambitious, and in both respects he proved a natural enemy of Philotas. From the

<sup>74</sup> Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 334–5: "Keineswegs wäre der König genötigt gewesen, alles zum Äußersten zu treiben."

<sup>75</sup> Curt. 6.8.17: *secunda deinde vigilia, luminibus extinctis, cum paucis in regiam coeunt Hephaestio et Craterus et Coenus et Erigyius, hi ex amicis, ex armigeris autem Perdiccas et Leonnatus* (J.C. Yardley, tr.).

time of the *epiboule* in Egypt, he appears to have actively opposed Philotas.<sup>76</sup> Hephaistion, on the other hand, made use of a more subtle power, his personal influence with Alexander. Two other individuals exemplify the opportunism of Makedonian politics, Koinos and Amyntas. Both stood to lose more than they could gain and turned a potentially disastrous situation to their advantage. In Koinos' case, we cannot be sure if he was reacting to an emergency, or if he had merely shifted his loyalties. Koinos was Philotas' brother-in-law, but he did not support him. It appears that he too plotted against Philotas. When Philotas came to trial before the Makedonian army, Koinos was his most outspoken prosecutor (Curt. 6.9.30). Koinos would gain from Philotas' ruin, but he also knew that his family connections with him could prove disastrous. Similarly, Amyntas son of Andromenes averted danger by repudiating his friendship with Philotas (Curt. 7.1.18 ff.). The assembled army concluded the process by convicting the son of their most distinguished general. He was promptly executed, by stoning or by means of javelins.<sup>77</sup>

76 Reames 2008: 170–5 sees Krateros as the most dangerous of Philotas' enemies.

77 Arr. 3.26.3 (javelins); Diod. 17.80.2 (in the traditional Makedonian way, which according to Curt. 6.11.10 was stoning; cf. 6.11.38); Curtius does not actually describe Philotas' execution (but cf. 7.1.1); see also Plut. *Alex.* 49.13 and Justin 12.5.3. Later references to his death: Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.1.33, 38, 52; 8.7.4–5; 8.8.5; Justin 12.6.14.

# 5 Black Kleitos and his relatives

## The house of Dropidas

Although we are reasonably well informed about Kleitos' family, nothing is recorded about his place of birth or residence. Lanike, his sister, had been Alexander's nurse:<sup>1</sup> born c.380, she was apparently still alive in 328 and had at least three sons who served Alexander during the Asiatic expedition. Two of them died at Miletos in 334, while a third son, Proteas—*syntrophos* and drinking-companion of Alexander—was probably identical with the admiral who defeated Datames at Siphnos. Lanike's husband, and the father of her three sons, was Andronikos, presumably the son of Agerros. Theodoros, identified merely as a “brother of Proteas” but on intimate terms with Alexander, may also have been Lanike's son.<sup>2</sup>

### Kleitos son of Dropidas

See Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 183; Berve II, 206–8 no. 427; Cauer 1894: 38–58; Schubert 1898; Carney 1981 = *King and Court* 141–54; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 113–33; Tritle 2003; Heckel, *Who's Who* 86–7 “Cleitus [2].”

Kleitos son of Dropidas was surnamed Melas (“the Black”) in order to distinguish him from his namesake, the phalanx commander and later hipparch, White Kleitos (ό λευκός).<sup>3</sup> Curtius describes Black Kleitos as one of Philip's veterans who had served with distinction in numerous campaigns,<sup>4</sup> but the Alexander

1 Arr. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.1.21 (Hellanic); cf. 8.2.8–9, and Justin 12.6.10. See Berve II, 231 no. 462; Heckel, *Who's Who* 145; Alonso 2007.

2 Unnamed sons of Lanike: Curt. 8.2.8; cf. Arr. 4.9.4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 282 M41–2. Proteas son of Andronikos: Wirth, *Kampfverband* 1–4; Berve II, 328–9 no. 664 = no. 665; Heckel, *Who's Who* 233; Carney 1981: 152–3 = *King and Court* 143. Proteas as *syntrophos* and drinking companion: Ael. *VH* 12.26; cf. Athen. 4.129a and 10.434a. Full discussion below. Andronikos as son of Agerros: Carney 1981: 153 = *King and Court* 143–4. Theodoros: Plut. *Mor.* 760c; Berve II, 176 no. 362; Heckel, *Who's Who* 263 “Theodorus [1]”; cf. Carney 1981: 152, with n.10. See Stemma V.

3 Son of Dropidas: Arr. 1.15.8; 3.11.8, 27.4; cf. 4.9.3. Nicknamed “Black”: Diod. 17.20.7, 57.1; Plut. *Alex.* 16.11. White Kleitos: Athen. 12.539c.

4 Curt. 8.1.20: *vetus Philippi miles multisque bellicis operibus clarus*. The year of Kleitos' birth is unknown, but the importance of his position and his earlier military service suggest that he was at least forty at the beginning of the campaign (cf. Justin 12.6.3: *unus e senibus*). Berve II, 206

sources first mention him as the commander of the Royal Squadron (*ile basilike*) of the Companions at the Granikos. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that he held this post since, at least, the beginning of Alexander's reign.<sup>5</sup> His personal devotion to the King was never in doubt.<sup>6</sup>

At the Granikos, he saved Alexander's life, killing a noble Persian, who was on the point of striking the King. The episode, which may have been the inspiration for the Apelles' portrait of Kleitos on horseback,<sup>7</sup> is reported by the major extant sources in dramatic fashion. Nevertheless, they differ considerably when it comes to the details of the fight.<sup>8</sup> Diodorus and Curtius maintain that Alexander killed Spithridates, the satrap of Ionia, and that Kleitos protected the King when Spithridates' brother, Rhosakes (Rhosakes) attempted to strike him. Both mention the use of shields by the Makedonian cavalrymen: according to Diodorus, Spithridates' javelin penetrated Alexander's shield and struck his breastplate on the right shoulder; Curtius says that Kleitos, at a slightly later point, protected the King with his shield.<sup>9</sup> And both mention that Alexander was fighting without his helmet.<sup>10</sup> Arrian and Plutarch agree that it was Kleitos who killed Spithridates and Alexander who slew Rhosakes, but these two authors disagree on the manner of Spithridates' death.<sup>11</sup> Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed a common source, probably Kleitarchos, although Plutarch may have used Aristoboulos as well.<sup>12</sup>

The original account of the battle must have come from the pen of Kallisthenes of Olynthos, who stressed the *aristeia* of Alexander. In Homeric fashion, he moved quickly from a general description of troop deployment and the initiation of the battle to the role of the King himself on the battlefield. Immediately, we see Alexander engaged in single combat (*monomachia*) or, more precisely,

suggests that he was born before 365. Seneca, *de Ira* 3.17.1, calls him *carissimum sibi et una educatum*, which must refer to Alexander's personal relationship with Kleitos resulting from having Lanike has his wet nurse, rather than marking him out as a *syntrophos*.

5 Berve II, 206; cf. Carney 1981: 149.

6 Seneca, *Epist.* 83.19: *carissimum sibi et fidelissimum*. Cf. Sen. *de Ira* 3.17.1: *carissimum sibi*.

7 Pliny, *HN* 35.93. Pollitt 1990: 162; cf. Berve II, 206; Bosworth I, 124. White Kleitos had also been a hippoc and the identity of Apelles' *Kleitos* is not certain.

8 Arr. 1.15.8; Plut. *Alex.* 16.11; Diod. 17.20.7; cf. Curt. 8.1.20.

9 Matthews 2008: 204 believes Diodorus (17.20.3) is the only author to mention cavalry shields. This ignores the evidence of Curt. 8.1.20 (*hic erat, qui apud Granicum amnem nudo capite regem dimicantem clipeo suo texit*) and Plut. *Alex.* 16.7, who says Alexander was conspicuous by his shield and helmet (*ὅν δὲ τῇ πέλτῃ καὶ τῷ κράνους τῇ χάιτῃ διαπρεπής*).

10 The helmet had been split by a blow from Rhosakes, who then aimed a fatal blow at Alexander, only to have his arm severed by Kleitos' sword (Diod. 17.20.7). Plut. 16.9–11 says that it was Spithridates (Spithrobates in Diodorus) who struck the King's helmet, but only sheared off the plume. Rhosakes: Berve II, 346 no. 687; Heckel, *Who's Who* 241 "Rhodesaces"; cf. Justi 262. Spithridates: Berve II, 358 no. 715; Heckel, *Who's Who* 254–5.

11 Arrian (1.15.8) agrees with Diodorus and Curtius that Kleitos cut off the barbarian's arm; Plut. *Alex.* 16.11 maintains that he ran him through with his *xyston*. See also Prandi, *Diodoro* 28.

12 Sources: Diodorus and Curtius (Bosworth I, 123; Hammond, *THA* 38, 51, 146); Plutarch and Arrian (Hammond, *Sources* 36).

in a series of *monomachiai*. Satraps and even kinsmen—both those who were called *syngeneis* and actual close relatives—of Dareios are slaughtered by the Makedonian King.<sup>13</sup> And, in the midst of these struggles, Alexander's life is saved by the timely intervention of Black Kleitos. How much of the information about the fighting at the Granikos goes back directly to Kallisthenes is difficult to say. The “official historian” of the campaign must have recognized that it would not please Alexander to be depicted as rash and inexperienced, only to be saved by the commander of his cavalry guard. And it is likely that he downplayed the role of Kleitos. Those writers who wrote after Kleitos' murder in 328, and Kallisthenes' disgrace in 327,<sup>14</sup> may have embellished the original and given Kleitos a more prominent role.

At Gaugamela he continued to command the *ile basilike*, as he must have done at Issos, although he is not named in any account of the battle.<sup>15</sup> When the King left Sousa at the end of 331, Kleitos remained behind on account of illness. In the following spring, he proceeded to Ecbatana, taking from there those Makedonians who had been responsible for protecting the treasures that had been conveyed from Persepolis to Ecbatana; he rejoined the King somewhere in Parthyaiā.<sup>16</sup>

After the fall of Philotas, the leadership of the Companions was shared by Kleitos and Hephaestion.<sup>17</sup> But how this division of command worked in practice, we cannot say, since we know nothing about Kleitos' participation in the campaigns of 330–328. Elizabeth Carney suggests that Alexander “granted Clitus the honor of his position . . . then . . . prevented him from acquiring much glory through it.”<sup>18</sup> But, in this period, and the region of Baktria and Sogdiana (famed for its horsemen), Alexander relied more heavily on the cavalry contingents, and it was probably at this time that he created more hipparchies, which were substantially bigger than the *ilai* of the restructuring in 331.<sup>19</sup> Kleitos probably retained control of the cavalry guard (formerly the *ile basilike*) and was thus overshadowed by the activities of Alexander himself. It should be noted that the activities of Hephaestion in this period are also poorly attested.

Curtius tells us that, late in the summer of 328, Kleitos had been designated satrap of Baktria and Sogdiana, an office which Artabazos had relinquished on

13 Among his victims, Mithridates, the son-in-law of the Great King, and the Ionian satrap, Spithridates (or his brother Rhoisakes), Pharnakes, Atizyes and Mithrobouzanes.

14 Kallisthenes almost certainly did not give an account of Kleitos' murder; nor was he able to retouch his original account in the light of the disaster at Marakanda.

15 Command at Gaugamela: Arr. 3.11.8; Diod. 17.57.1; Curt. 4.13.26, the cavalry *agema*.

16 Arr. 3.19.8.

17 Arr. 3.27.4. Arr. 4.8.1–9.9 and Plut. *Alex.* 50.1–52.4 record Kleitos' death out of chronological context, which may explain their failure to mention him again. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 364 suggests that Kleitos' appointment as satrap may be linked with the restructuring of the cavalry commands. Krateros, Koinos, Perdikkas and others had all joined Hephaestion as hipparchs, and they now may have contributed to Kleitos' demise.

18 Carney 1981: 151.

19 On this see Arr. 3.16.11, with Bosworth I, 320–1; English, *Army* 43–50 on the Makedonian cavalry. See also Diod. 17.65.4 and Curt. 5.2.6, with Atkinson II, 62.

account of age.<sup>20</sup> Alexander had gradually replaced Philip's officers with men of his own generation, men who very often shared his vision of the empire or, even if they did not, were content to say that they did.<sup>21</sup> Kleitos may therefore have been justifiably suspicious of Alexander's intentions: doubtless he recalled the fate of Parmenion, who had been left behind in Ecbatana three years earlier.<sup>22</sup> Compared with Baktria-Sogdiana, Media was an enviable post, but Kleitos must have been more distressed by his separation from the King and his army than by the hardships of the Upper Satrapies.<sup>23</sup>

Soon after Kleitos' designation as satrap, the tensions which had built up over the years of campaigning in Asia—and especially since Alexander's *Ammonsohnschaft* and orientalizing policies—came to a head at a drinking party in Marakanda (Samarkand). Both Kleitos and Alexander had consumed too much wine (as was bound to happen at such events); they quarreled and Alexander in a fit of rage killed Kleitos with a spear snatched from the hands of one of his guards. So much, at least, is certain. But details of the quarrel and the motives behind the actions of both parties are presented in differing ways by the sources. In Plutarch's account, Kleitos was incensed by offensive verses recited by a certain Pranichos or Pierion, mocking a Makedonian defeat (see below: Andronikos son of Agerros).<sup>24</sup> Arrian and Curtius relate that the excessive praise of Alexander by a coterie of flatterers<sup>25</sup> offended Kleitos as much as their (and Alexander's own) belittling of Philip's achievements. And, of course, there

20 Curt. 8.1.19 is the only source to record this appointment, but there is no reason to doubt the fact (cf. Berve II, 204). For the date see Bosworth II, 52 and Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.319; Curt. 8.2.13 says that after ten days in Marakanda, Alexander sent Hephaestion to gather provisions for winter, which was spent at Nautaka (328/7). I do not understand Berve's claim (II, 204, 205 n.2) that the Kleitos affair occurred in 327. Curt. 6.5.3 says that in 330 Artabazos was in his ninety-fifth year, which is unlikely. He was the son of Pharnabazos and Apame, a daughter of Artaxerxes II, and thus born no earlier than 387 (see Brunt 1975: 24 n.3; also Atkinson, *Curzio Rufo* II, 424). For his career see Heckel, *Who's Who* 55.

21 The quarrel which precipitated the murder involved the clash of generations and ideologies: Philip against Alexander (Arr. 4.8.4 ff.; Curt. 8.1.23 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 50.11; Justin 12.6.2–3); the Makedonian kingdom versus the new empire (Plut. *Alex.* 51.2–3, 5).

22 Cf. Müller, *Maßnahmen* 115.

23 As noted by Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 364: "Die Ernennung des Kleitos bedeutete daher eine recht merkwürdige Ausnahme, zumal sie den einstigen Kommandanten der Leibschwadron des Königs, somit des vornehmsten aller Truppenteile, betraf. Wohl mag das Alexander als Beweis seines Vertrauens ausgegeben haben, in Wahrheit aber bedeutete es *Entfernung aus dem königlichen Kreis*, aus der kämpfenden Truppe, bedeutete es *Isolierung und Kaltstellung*" (emphasis added). It should be noted that, since the early stages of the campaign, when prominent officers, such as Antigonos, Kalas, Menandros, Nearchos, and Balakros, were assigned satrapies, Alexander seldom appointed Makedonian satraps, employing instead Greeks and barbarians. In addition to Kleitos, only Philippos, the brother of Harpalos, and Peithon son of Agenor were left behind, both of them in India.

24 Plut. *Alex.* 50.8–9; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 141, who assumes that this is a reference to the Polymetos disaster. But see Holt, *Bactria* 78–9 n.118, who believes the poem made fun of Aristonikos the harpist. About the poet, nothing else is known: see Heckel, *Who's Who* 232, also 223 "Pierion."

25 Arr. 4.8.2–3.

was the matter of Kleitos' outspokenness—the traditional right of the *hetairoi* to express their opinions, but a practice no longer tolerated by a King who had long ceased to be *primus inter pares*—and his apparent propensity for reminding Alexander that he had once saved his life.<sup>26</sup> Certainly Kleitos objected publicly to Alexander's transformation, both personal and political. The King, though restrained by his *somatophylakes*, grabbed a spear from a guardsman in the tent and killed Kleitos in a drunken rage.<sup>27</sup>

Attempts were made immediately to exculpate the King and the entire affair was attributed to the wrath of Dionysos<sup>28</sup> or Kleitos' own belligerence. Alexander himself put on a fine show of despair and contrition—all of it cleverly staged. But was Alexander's remorse genuine?<sup>29</sup> Sabine Müller notes that what individuals do in a drunken state is, in fact, not radically different from what they wish to do. In short, alcohol provided the impetus and also the cover for an act that Alexander had doubtless contemplated in his sober moments.<sup>30</sup>

### **Andronikos Son of Agerros**

Berve II, 39 no. 78; Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 2162 no. 10; Carney 1981: 153 ff. = *King and Court* 143–7; Heckel, *Who's Who* 29 “Andronicus [1].”

A noble Makedonian, Andronikos was the father of Proteas (and perhaps also Theodoros) and in all likelihood the husband of Lanike, daughter of Dropidas and sister of Black Kleitos.<sup>31</sup> Andronikos first appears in 330 as the officer sent by Alexander, in accordance with their request, to the 1,500 Greek mercenaries who had served with Dareios III but, upon his death, were prepared to surrender to the

26 Arr. 4.8.6–9; Curt. 8.1.49 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 51.8–10. See Trito 2003 for the view that Kleitos, like Alexander, suffered from combat fatigue (PTSD). Pliny, *HN* 14.58 ascribes the murder to Alexander's excessive drinking, something that Androkydes had warned him against (Heckel, *Who's Who* 28 “Androcydes”). Kleitos' alleged remark that Alexandros of Epeiros fought against men in Italy, whereas the King did battle with women (i.e., the effeminate Persians) comes from Curtius (8.1.37: *verum est, ut opinor, quod avunculum tuum in Italia dixisse constat, ipsum in viros incidisse, te in feminas*) and is purely Roman in origin (cf. Livy 9.17.17; Braccesi 1991: 117–21). Kleitos could not have known this, and he would belittle his own achievements by disparaging Alexander's accomplishments.

27 Restrained by the *somatophylakes*: Curt. 8.1.45 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 51.6. A spear from the guards: Arr. 4.8.8–9.1; Curt. 8.1.49–52; Plut. *Alex.* 51.9–11; Justin 12.6.3.

28 Arr. 4.8.1–2, 9.5; or neglected sacrifices, Plut. *Alex.* 50.7.

29 Arr. 4.9.2 ff.; Curt. 8.2.1 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 52.1–2; Justin 12.6.7–11.

30 *Maßnahmen* 121: “Allgemein agieren Menschen unter Alkoholeinfluss enthemmter als in nüchternem Zustand und ihre Handlungsweise unterliegt zwei Grundsätzen: Im Rausch tun sie nichts, was sie grundsätzlich nicht tun wollen, und es fällt ihnen leichter, zu tun, was sie schon immer tun wollten.” Alexander's behavior cannot be attributed to alcohol alone, although this clearly fueled his anger and paranoia. See also Roisman 2003a: 318–9.

31 If this identification is correct, then Andronikos will have also have been the father of the two *anonymi* who died at Miletos in 334 (Curt. 8.2.8; cf. Arr. 4.9.4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 282 M41–2). Andronikos as father of Theodoros: Berve II, 176 no. 362; cf. Carney 1981: 152, with n.10 = *King and Court* 143, with 150 n.10.

Makedonians.<sup>32</sup> Andronikos returned with these men and interceded on their behalf with the King, who spared their lives and appointed Andronikos their commander.<sup>33</sup> Not long afterwards, Alexander sent him, along with Karanos, Erigyios, and Artabazos against the rebel Satibarzanes.<sup>34</sup> There is no record of Andronikos' death in the campaign, in which Erigyios is said to have slain Satibarzanes with his own hand (Arr. 3.28.3; cf. Curt. 7.4.32–8), and it appears that he retained his command.

Carney suggests that he may have been the leader of the 1,500 mercenaries whom Alexander sent against Spitamenes in 329, but their commander was clearly Menedemos. Andromachos led sixty Companions, Karanos the 800 mercenary cavalry; Pharnouches (a Lykian) headed the expedition.<sup>35</sup> That leaves Menedemos in charge of the infantry, a point which may explain his prominence in Curtius.<sup>36</sup> I do not see how Menedemos could be an error for Andronikos; but Curtius (7.6.24) does give Menedemos 3,000 infantry, in addition to 800 cavalry, and it is remotely possible that Andronikos served under him. Carney (1981: 157–8), however, takes matters one step further and argues that the poem (composed by Pranichos or Pierion) which angered Kleitos and provoked the quarrel with Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 50.8) dealt with this engagement and thus made light of the death of his brother-in-law. Certainly the identification of Proteas as “son of Lanike” creates the impression that his father was already dead in the final years of Alexander’s life.<sup>37</sup> That Proteas forgave Alexander for his murder of Kleitos is not unreasonable; despite the apologetic tone of most sources, Proteas may actually have thought the King’s grief to be genuine. But, it is less likely that Proteas would have remained on intimate terms with a king who condoned the ridiculing of his father; and, indeed, it was not Kleitos but other older Makedonians who first found the poem objectionable. If Andronikos son of Agerros did perish in the Polytimetus (Zeravshan) fiasco, this episode will not have been the subject of Pranichos’ (Pierion’s) composition.<sup>38</sup>

32 Arr. 3.23.9; Artabazos went with him, presumably as a guide, but as one who had been pardoned by Alexander, he may have been able to give the mercenaries the assurances they needed.

33 Arr. 3.24.5: καὶ ἐπέταξεν αὐτοῖς Ανδρόνικον, ὅπερ ἤγαγέ τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔνδηλος γεγόνει οὐ φαῦλον ποιούμενος σῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρας.

34 Curt. 7.3.2; Arrian’s failure to mention him (3.28.2–3) is not serious; Andronikos will have been subordinate to Erigyios and Karanos.

35 Carney 1981: 157. For the officers and their respective troop numbers see Arr. 4.3.7.

36 Curt. 7.6.24, 7.31 ff.; 7.7.39, 9.21; cf. *ME* 13.

37 Athen. 4.129a; Ael. *VH* 12.26. Berle rightly distinguishes him from Andronikos of Olynthos (II, 39–40 no. 79). Curt. 8.2.9 is thus wrong in stating that by killing Kleitos all of Lanike’s relatives were dead, except Alexander who considered himself a foster child (*omnibus eius unus supersum*).

38 Holt, *Bactria* 78–9 n.118, argues that the poem mocked the battle at Baktria in which the harpist Aristonikos fell (Arr. 4.16.6)—he was honored at Delphoi with a bronze statue, depicting him holding the lyre in one hand, a spear in the other. The suggestion is tantalizing, and ἔναγχος (“recent”) does suit this episode better than the more remote Polytimetus battle, but Plutarch (*Alex.* 50.8) clearly refers to τὸν στρατηγὸν . . . τὸν ἔναγχος ἡττημένον, and Aristonikos could scarcely belong to that number. Nevertheless, the reference may be to Attinas and Peithon son of Sosikles (Heckel, *Who’s Who* 64 and 195 “Peithon [2]”) and thus to the events that led to Andronikos’ death. Although the poet made light of the harpist-as-warrior, the thin-skinned Makedonians were nevertheless offended by his mocking a defeat in the presence of barbarians.

### Proteas son of Andronikos

Berve II, 328 no. 664; II, 328–9 no. 665; Carney 1981: 152; cf. Wirth, *Kampfverband* 1–4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 233.

Proteas was a prominent Makedonian, a son of Andronikos and, in all likelihood, of Lanike, Alexander's nurse;<sup>39</sup> hence also the nephew of Black Kleitos and brother of Theodoros<sup>40</sup> and of two men killed near Miletos in 334 (*Curt.* 8.2.8). A *syntrophos* of Alexander, Proteas was born in the mid-350s (*Ael. VH* 12.26). He had been sent with fifteen ships by Antipatros to protect the islands and the Greek mainland against Persian attack. Putting in at Chalkis on Euboia he advanced to Kythnos and then caught the Persian admiral Datames at Siphnos at dawn, capturing eight of his ten ships (*Arr.* 2.2.4–5); there is no mention of Makedonian losses. Proteas came with a fifty-oared ship from Makedon to join Alexander at Sidon (*Arr.* 2.20.2). Whether he came on official state business—hence the reference to the single *pentekontoros*—or if he participated in the naval action around Tyre is unclear.<sup>41</sup> Like Hegelochos, who served with the fleet, Proteas soon joined Alexander's expedition and accompanied him by land from at least Egypt (cf. Berve II, 328). Of his military actions nothing further is known. He was a notorious drinking companion of Alexander (*Hippolochos ap.* *Athen.* 4.129a; *Ael. VH* 12.26), and the King on one occasion gave him five talents to prove that he was no longer angry with him (*Plut. Alex.* 39.6). How he reacted to the death of his uncle in 328 is unknown, but Ephippos may have implied some form of poetic justice when he claimed that Alexander became ill and died as a result of a drinking contest with Proteas (*FGrH* 126 F3 = *Athen.* 10.434a–b).

39 *Athen.* 4.129a; cf. *Arr.* 4.9.3; see Carney 1981: 152.

40 See Berve II, 176 no. 362; Heckel, *Who's Who* 263 “Theodorus [1].” Theodoros is known only from Plut. *Mor.* 760c, who records correspondence between the King and Theodoros concerning a *hetaira*/musician. Berve believes he may have been Philip II's *hieromnemon* in 341–340 BC (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> I, pp. 314–5; cf. Ellis, *Philip II* 132, Table 3) but the identification is at best tentative.

41 Nor is it clear if he had anything to do with the Rhodian contingent of nine ships and the submission of that island to Alexander. Hauben 1977b: 308 n.7 rightly sees the dating of Rhodes' surrender after the siege of Tyre (thus Justin 12.11.1; *Curt.* 4.5.9) as incorrect and due to the fact that the siege of Tyre was already underway when the delegation and the ships came to Sidon. Possibly, Proteas and his *pentekontoros* stopped at Rhodes on the way to the Levant. It is difficult to argue that the ten ships represent only the pro-Makedonian faction: the inclusion in this number of the state trireme seems to weigh against this (*Arr.* 2.20.2: ἡ περιπολος καλούμενη). On the status of Rhodes at this time see Bosworth I, 242–3. For the big picture see Wirth, *Kampfverband*.

## 6 Koinos son of Polemokrates

Berve II, 215–8 no. 439; Honigmann, *RE* XI (1921) 1055–7 no. 1; Tarn II, 192–7; Hamilton 1956; Devine 1987a: esp. 102–7; Müller, *Maßnahmen* 93–4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 91–3.

When, at the Hyphasis River, Koinos espoused the cause of the common soldier, thereby calling to a halt Alexander's relentless march eastward, he had come full circle. A son-in-law of Parmenion and, in all likelihood, the husband of Attalos' widow, he betrayed his family connections in 330, repudiating his friendship with Philotas for the sake of survival and, indeed, military advancement. The acceleration of his career is unmistakable, but in the end his traditional Makedonian values placed him at odds with his King. Other officers will have shared his sentiments, but few, if any, dared express them publicly. His sudden death, so soon after the Hyphasis mutiny, makes the impact of this challenge to Alexander impossible to assess and easy to misinterpret. Ultimately, he had shown himself to be one of the King's men, though not necessarily one of Alexander's "Boys."

### Family and early career

Koinos son of Polemokrates is usually identified as a member of the Elimiot nobility, primarily on the basis of his battalion's ethnic composition.<sup>1</sup> It was customary for the regionally recruited infantry to be commanded by their own leaders. Perdikkas of Orestis led the Orestians and Lynkestians, Polyperchon his native Tymphaians.<sup>2</sup> Polemokrates had been allotted estates in the Chalkidic

<sup>1</sup> Son of Polemokrates: Arr. 1.14.2; cf. Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 332, 7–8. Composition of Koinos' battalion: Diod. 17.57.2. Griffith, *HMac.* II, 396, for example, does not hesitate to speak of "Polemocrates of Elimeia (father of Coenus) . . ." Berve II, 215 is more cautious: ". . . vielleicht aus der Landschaft Elimiotis, wie die Tatsache, daß er unter Al. eine aus diesem Bezirk sich rekrutierende τάξις der Pezhetairen führte." I do not know on what evidence Green, *Alexander* 439 bases his assertion that the sons of Polemokrates "belonged to the same family as the imperial treasurer, the royal out-kingdom House of Elimiotis." See the descendants of Polemokrates on *Stemma IV*.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 17.57.2; Curt. 4.13.28 correctly identifies Perdikkas' troops but does not understand the composition of Polyperchon's battalion. We are not told the origins of the troops under Krateros, Meleagros, and Amyntas.

peninsula, and Koinos too received additional land during Philip's reign, all of which Koinos' son Perdikkas inherited.<sup>3</sup> If this grant dates, as Dittenberger assumes,<sup>4</sup> to 348/7 or shortly thereafter, Koinos' birth should be dated no later than 367. Indeed, it is doubtful that he would have defended his right to speak out at the Hyphasis with reference to his age, had he not been at least forty in 326 (Arr. 5.27.3). Kleandros son of Polemokrates was probably his brother, though this is never explicitly stated.<sup>5</sup>

Although his battalion is first named in the surprise attack on Glaukias' Taulantians near Pellion in 335,<sup>6</sup> Koinos may have commanded the Elimioti infantry already in the final years of Philip's reign. Arrian relates that, during the first year of the Asiatic campaign Koinos led back to Makedonia the newly-weds (*neogamoi*), to which number he himself belonged, sharing the command with the phalanx commanders, Meleagros son of Neoptolemos and Ptolemaios son of Seleukos. Koinos had married Parmenion's daughter—her name has not survived—perhaps in 335.<sup>7</sup> She appears to have been none other than the widow of Attalos, to whom she was married for not much more than a year.<sup>8</sup> No later than the end of 333 she bore Koinos a son named Perdikkas.

At the Granikos River, Koinos was stationed on the right, between the battalions of Perdikkas and Amyntas son of Andromenes, that is, in the second position after the hypaspists (Arr. 1.14.2). Subsequently, at Issos and Gaugamela, he occupied the first position, replacing Perdikkas. Griffith argues that Koinos' shift towards the center indicates that this battalion had, at the Granikos or at some other time before the battle of Issos, distinguished itself and thus become known as the “best Companions.”<sup>9</sup> But we do not know why Alexander changed the order of the battalions, and the meaning of the term *asthetairoi* has been hotly debated.<sup>10</sup>

3 Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 332: ἐφ' ιερέως Κυδίᾳ· βασιλεὺς Μακεδόνων Κάσσανδρος διδώσι Περδίκκαι | Κοίνου τὸν ἄγρὸν τὸν | ἐν τῇ Σιναίᾳ καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ Τραπεζοῦντι οὓς ἐκληρούχησεν Πολεμοὶ|κράτης ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ | καὶ ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ Φιλίππου, καθάπερ καὶ Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ἐμ πατρικοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόνοις, κυρίοις οὖστι κεκτῆσθαι καὶ | ἀλλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι κτλ. See also Hatzopoulos II, 43–5 no. 20.

4 Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> p. 553 n.5, followed by Berve II, 215.

5 In addition to the shared and not exceedingly common patronymic (three individuals attested in Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad*), Koinos and Kleandros both had close ties with the house of Parmenion. For his career: Berve II, 204 no. 422, s.v. Κλέανδρος; Kroll, *RE* XI, 558 no. 6; Badian 1961: 21–3; Berve II, 205 no. 425, s.v. Κλέαρχος; Schoch, *RE Supplbd* IV (1924) 908 no. 7a; Heckel, *Who's Who* 85–6 “Cleander [1].”

6 Arr. 1.6.9. Berve II, 215, following Honigmann, *RE* XI (1921) 1055, wrongly calls it the Triballian campaign; see now Hammond, *HMac.* III, 46–7.

7 Curt. 6.9.30; cf. Heckel, *Who's Who* 276, F33. This marriage, coming soon after Alexander's accession, would appear to argue against the view that Parmenion and his family were out of favor at the Court because of their connections with Attalos.

8 Their marriage may have occurred some time after Philip's union with Kleopatra-Eurydike in the autumn (?) of 337.

9 *HMac.* II, 712.

10 See Bosworth 1973; Hammond 1978a; Griffith, *HMac.* II, 709–13; Heckel and Jones 2006: 311–2; Heckel 2009b; Anson 2010a. See the full discussion in Part II.

After the Granikos victory, we hear nothing of Koinos until he is sent home from Karia with the newly-weds. This was also a recruiting mission: in the spring of 333, he rejoined Alexander at Gordion with 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Makedonia, 200 Thessalian horse and 150 Eleian cavalry under the command of Alkias.<sup>11</sup> At Issos, later in that same year, his battalion was stationed next to Nikanor's hypaspists, but nothing else is known of his role in the battle.<sup>12</sup> In the final assault on Tyre, Koinos' battalion (or rather a portion of it) boarded a ship suitable for landing troops, and once inside the city walls distinguished itself in a particularly bloody engagement.<sup>13</sup> At Gaugamela he again held the first position on the right<sup>14</sup> and was wounded by an arrow in the heavy fighting.<sup>15</sup>

In his haste to reach Persepolis, Alexander followed the shorter route through the mountains, intending to enter Persis via the Persian or Sousian Gates. Here the satrap Ariobarzanes blocked the advance of the Makedonian army until an encircling path was revealed to the King by captives.<sup>16</sup> Once it became clear that Alexander would be able to circumvent the enemy, Koinos, Amyntas, Polyperchon, and Philotas were detached from the encircling force with orders to bridge the Araxes River (Rud-i Kur).<sup>17</sup> Following the sack of Persepolis, the removal of the treasures to Ecbatana was entrusted to Parmenion and some of the heavy infantry. Koinos, however, accompanied Alexander as far as the Caspian Gates, where he was sent on a foraging mission.<sup>18</sup> But news of Dareios' arrest by Bessos and his accomplices caused Alexander to push ahead without awaiting Koinos' return; the latter rejoined Krateros, who followed the King at a slower pace. In the Mardian and Artakoana campaigns, Koinos and Amyntas son of Andromenes were again directly under the King's command.<sup>19</sup>

### **His role in the Philotas affair**

At Phrada (mod. Farah) in 330, Koinos' career was threatened by allegations of Philotas' involvement in the conspiracy of Dimnos.<sup>20</sup> Although he was a

11 For the mission see Arr. 1.24.1–2. Their return to Gordion: Arr. 1.29.4; cf. Curt. 3.1.24; for Alkias see Berve no. 46; Heckel, *Who's Who* 9. He is otherwise unattested.

12 Arr. 2.8.3; Curt. 3.9.7.

13 Arr. 2.23.2, 24.3.

14 Arr. 3.11.9; Diod. 17.57.2; Curt. 4.13.28, who claims, incorrectly, that Koinos' troops stood in reserve (Atkinson I, 422; cf. Berve II, 216, rejecting Honigmann, *RE* XI (1921) 1056).

15 Curt. 4.16.32; Diod. 17.61.3; according to Arr. 3.15.2, he was wounded in the heavy fighting as Alexander's troops attempted to bring aid to Parmenion (cf. Honigmann, *RE* XI (1921) 1056); but see Bosworth I, 311.

16 For an identification of the Persian Gates and a discussion of the topography see Speck 2002 and Moritani 2014. See also Heckel, *Who's Who* 45 “Ariobarzanes [2].”

17 Curt. 5.4.20, 30; Arr. 3.18.6. The Philotas in this instance is, almost certainly, the son of Parmenion, as is clear from Curt. 5.4.20 (cf. Bosworth I, 327; Heckel 1980a: 171; Atkinson II, 96–7, 100).

18 Arr. 3.20.4. He accompanied Alexander from Awan-i-Kif, through the Caspian Gates—usually identified with Sar-i-Darreh (Seibert, *Eroberung* 112; cf. Bosworth I, 340, with map opposite)—and gathered provisions in the region of Choarene (mod. Khar).

19 Left behind by Alexander: Arr. 3.21.2. Mardian campaign: Arr. 3.24.1. Artakoana: 3.25.6.

20 Alexander scholars regularly refer to Dimnos' conspiracy, although it would be more precise to call it the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard.

brother-in-law of Philotas, Koinos belonged to the King's *consilium*, which met to discuss the matter (Curt. 6.8.17). Fearing that he might be tainted by his relationship, he denounced Philotas as a parricide and traitor to his country, the vehemence of his speech reflecting the accuser's own peril.<sup>21</sup> Few scholars today credit Curtius' statement that it was the law in Makedon to put to death the relatives of those who plotted against the king,<sup>22</sup> yet Koinos, by distancing himself from his wife's brother and calling for his torture, hoped to establish his own innocence;<sup>23</sup> certainly, he did not belong to the faction which had long hated Philotas ( $\tauοὺς πάλαι μισοῦντας αὐτόν$ , Plut. *Alex.* 49.8).

## From Drangiana to India

The impact of Philotas' disgrace on Koinos is hard to gauge. Little is known of his activities between 330 and 328, but this probably reflects the nature of the sources, which become confused and uneven at this point.<sup>24</sup> To seek political causes for

21 Curt. 6.9.30. Müller, *Maßnahmen* 93: "weniger von Überzeugung als von der Furcht motiviert . . ."

22 It is accepted by Hammond, *MS* 129–40, but see the comments of Atkinson II, 242. Curt. 6.11.20:

*Interim equites, nobilissimus quisque et ii maxime, qui Parmenionem propinqua cognatione contingebant, postquam Philotan torqueri fama vulgaverat, legem Macedonum verit, qua cautum erat, ut propinquoi eorum, qui regi insidiati essent, cum ipsis necarentur, alii se interficiunt, aliee in devios montes vastasque solitudines fugiunt ingenti per tota castra terrore diffuso, donec rex tumultu cognito legem se <de> supplicio coniunctorum sotibus remittere edixit* ("In the meantime word of the torture of Philotas had got around, and this spread panic among the cavalry, the men from the best families and especially those closely related to Parmenion. What they feared was the Makedonian law which provided the death penalty also for relatives of people who had plotted against the King. Some, therefore, committed suicide and others fled into remote mountains and desert wastes as sheer terror spread throughout the camp. Finally, the King learned of the consternation and proclaimed that he was suspending the law relating to the punishment of relatives of the guilty"). The story of relatives committing suicide—we do not know of anyone who actually did—is *color romanus*; for Curtius seems to have been influenced by the purges of the late Republic and early Empire. The fact that Alexander spared Alexandros Lynkestes and Amyntas son of Arrhabaios is sufficient to prove that, although conspiracies provided an opportunity for the King to rid himself of real or potential enemies, this practice can hardly be prescribed by law (*lex*) or tradition (*mos*). The choice of victims and the extent of the purge depended entirely on the concerns of the King (though tempered by the advice of his counsellors).

23 Curt. 6.9.30, 11.10–1. His dilemma and the emotional torment are perhaps brought out in Curt. 6.9.31: *saxumque quod forte ante pedes iacebat, corripuit emissurus in eum, ut plerique crediderunt, tormentis subtrahere cupiens* ("He then picked up a stone that happened to be lying before his feet to throw at Philotas—from a wish to save him from torture, as many thought"). Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 327 emphasizes his loyalty to the King ("... Koinos, der biedere Haudegen, wohl dem Bergadel entstammend. Zwar Schwiegersohn des Parmenion, jedoch von betonter Loyalität."). But Koinos did not want to be tarred by the same brush as Philotas and there was political gain in the demise of his in-laws. It is clear that Alexander did not fear him: he belonged to the group of *hetairoi* and *somatophylakes* who came to the King's tent to discuss the developing crisis (Curt. 6.8.17).

24 This appears to be due to the abrupt termination of Kallisthenes' *Praxeis Alexandrou*, the apparent destruction of the *Ephemerides* (or a portion thereof), and the difficulty of accurately reconstructing the history of this period. See Robinson 1932a; for other historical problems in this period see Bosworth 1981. The question of the authenticity of the *Ephemerides* or "Royal Journal" has

Koinos' brief disappearance from history is perhaps unwise; for we should then be hard pressed to explain the man's prominence in the years 328–326. In 328, Alexander initiated a sweep campaign in Sogdiana, dividing the mobile portion of the army into five units, one of them under Koinos' command.<sup>25</sup> Together with the satrap, Artabazos, Koinos took his detachment towards the lands of the Massagetai, where Spitamenes had reportedly taken refuge (Arr. 4.16.3). This brief campaign accomplished little, however, since Spitamenes crossed the Oxos and attacked Baktra,<sup>26</sup> only to be expelled from there by Krateros. In late summer or early autumn, Koinos rejoined Alexander at Marakanda where Artabazos relinquished his satrapy on account of old age (Arr. 4.17.3; Curt. 8.1.19). Hence Koinos undoubtedly attended the drinking-party at which Kleitos, designated to succeed Artabazos, was murdered by the King. As winter approached, Koinos remained in Sogdiana with the new satrap, Amyntas son of Nikolaos, two battalions of *pezhetairoi*, 400 Companion cavalry and the *hippakontistai* with orders to defend the territory against Spitamenes and the Massagetai.<sup>27</sup> These he defeated with heavy casualties, and they acknowledged Alexander's authority by sending him Spitamenes' head; Koinos himself rejoined the King at Nautaka before winter's end.<sup>28</sup>

He had proved himself in Sogdiana, and soon played more independent roles in the Swat campaign.<sup>29</sup> In the land of the Aspasians, Koinos remained with Alexander and so too among the Gouraians and Assakenians as far as Massaga; from Massaga, however, he was sent to Bazira (Bir-Kot),<sup>30</sup> where he inflicted heavy losses on the natives while Alexander stormed the nearby town of Ora (Ude-gram).<sup>31</sup> The natives of Bazira took refuge on Aornos (Pir-Sar), to which

become a hornet's nest of less-than-polite scholarly debate: Pearson 1954/5 regards the Diary as fabricated; but see Hammond, *MS* 187–92; see also the acrimonious remarks of Badian 1987 and Hammond 1988b. I have no wish to enter the fray, although I find it inconceivable that the Makedonian army (*viz.* Court) did not keep official records of day-to-day proceedings.

25 Arr. 4.16.2–3: Hephaestion, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, Koinos (with Artabazos), and Alexander each led one unit; Curt. 8.1.1 says there were only three divisions, led by Alexander, Hephaestion, and Koinos. The heavy infantry (at least four battalions) remained with Krateros in Baktria (Arr. 4.16.1, 17.1).

26 Spitamenes' campaign: Arr. 4.16.4–17.2. Baktra = Zariaspa: Arr. 4.1, 7, 16; Pliny, *HN* 6.17 [45]: *Bactra oppidum, quod appellant Zariasta*; cf. 6.18 [48].

27 Arr. 4.17.3. Koinos retained his own battalion (perhaps already led by Peithon son of Agenor) and that of Meleagros. The 400 Companions may represent what were to become Koinos' hiparchy (cf. Arr. 5.16.3); the *hippakontistai* were clearly Iranian troops (see Olbrycht 2007: 313; cf. Bosworth II, 119). The Massagetai straddled the Oxos in western portions of Baktria and Sogdiana, in the direction of the Merv Oasis (Margiana) and the Aral Sea; Grousset 1970: 9 places Kyros' war with Queen Tomyris in the “region east of Khiva.”

28 For the battle with the Massagetai (Arr. 4.17.5–6); they suffered over 800 casualties. Spitamenes' death: Arr. 4.17.7 (Curt. 8.3.1–15 and ME 20–3 allege that he was murdered by his own wife). Koinos rejoins Alexander: Arr. 4.18.1. Holt, *Land of Bones* 80 locates Nautaka near modern Shahrisabz.

29 For the Swat Campaign see Fuller, *Generalship* 245 ff.; Seibert, *Eroberung* 150–4.

30 Arr. 4.24.1 (Aspasians); Arr. 4.25.6 (Gouraians and Assakenians). For the identification of Bazira (Beira) see Stein 1929: 46–8; Eggermont 1975: 184.

31 Arr. 4.27.5–8; Curt. 8.10.22 (Beira); *Itiner. Al.* 107. Ora (= Ude-gram; Stein, *Alexander's Track* 58–60; cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 152, with n.40 and maps 25–6): Arr. 4.27.5 names Attalos, Alketas,

the King advanced via Embolima, taking Koinos and some more nimble troops.<sup>32</sup> On his return from Aornos, Alexander learned that Aphrikes (or Airikes?) was preparing to blockade his path and left Koinos to bring up the slower troops while he himself advanced to intercept the enemy.<sup>33</sup>

By the time the Makedonians reached the Hydaspes (Jhelum), Koinos had effectively become hipparch. His former infantry battalion continued to bear his name, though led by Peithon son of Agenor.<sup>34</sup> Before the battle with Poros, Koinos was sent back to the Indus to dismantle the ships and transport them overland to the Hydaspes.<sup>35</sup> In the actual engagement, Koinos' battalion and hipparchy crossed the river upstream along with the King and took part in the first assault on Poros:<sup>36</sup> he must have played no small part in dispersing the forces of Spitakes, whom Poros had sent ahead to guard against a crossing upstream. In the actual battle with Poros, Koinos and Demetrios son of Althaimenes attacked the cavalry (about 2,000 in number) on the Indian right, pursuing them as they transferred their position to the left, where Poros' horsemen were outnumbered by Alexander's.<sup>37</sup>

and Demetrios the hipparch as the commanders in charge of the siege of Ora; Curt. 8.11.1 names Polyperchon and credits him with the capture of the town. Arr. 4.27.7, 9 gives Alexander the honor of taking Ora.

32 Arr. 4.28.8: in addition to Koinos' battalions, Alexander took the archers, the Agrianes, select troops from the phalanx, 200 Companion cavalry, and 100 mounted archers. Stein's identification of Aornos with Pir-Sar (Stein, *Alexander's Track* 143–54; cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 153) has been challenged and several scholars favor Mt Ilam (see Badian 1987: 117 n.1 for a summary), but it poses far too many geographical difficulties (Bosworth II, 178–80; also Karttunen, *India* 49 n.168).

33 Aphrikes: Diod. 17.86.2; perhaps Αἰρίκης, Anspach I, 32 n.92; Curt. 8.12.1 (Erices); ME 42 (Ariplex). Perhaps a brother of Assakenos, the deceased dynast of the Assakenians, and of Amminais (ME 39); thus also a son of Kleophas, together with whom he is found at Massaga in the spring of 326 (ME 42). Aphrikes attempted to block one of the passes of the Buner region (near Embolima) with a force of 20,000 Indians (Curt. 8.12.1; Diod. 17.86.2, giving him also fifteen elephants) and he was killed by his own troops, who sent his head to Alexander in order to win his pardon (Diod. 17.86.2; Curt. 8.12.3 suggests that the troops may have acted out of hatred). Eggermont, *Sind* 183–4 sees Assakenos as ruler of the western Swat basin, Aphrikes as chief of the eastern Swat (or Udyana); Berve II, 26 identifies the unnamed brother of Assakenos (Arr. 4.30.5) with Amminais and distinguishes him from Aphrikes. But both are found in the city of Massaga (ME 39, 42, though only Amminais is described as *frater regis*; Ariplex belongs to the *amici*, that is, to the advisors, of Kleophas) and it seems odd (*pace* Berve II, 97–8) that we should find both opposing Alexander after the fall of Aornos. There are several possibilities: Arrian (4.30.5) may be wrong in calling the Indian leader Assakenos' brother; Diod. 17.86.2 and Curt. 8.12.1 wrongly name Aphrikes (or Erices) in place of Amminais; or, what seems most likely, the popular tradition simply failed to note that Aphrikes was a member of the royal family. See further Berve no. 191; RE Supplbd. IV (1924) 44; Eggermont, *Sind* 183–4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 40 “Aphrices.”

34 Tarn II, 190 implausibly assigns Koinos' battalion to Antigenes. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 30–1 “Antigenes [1a]”; 196–7 “Peithon [4].”

35 Arr. 5.8.4. Like Cortés, who brought ships in sections to Tenochtitlán, Alexander must have relied on native labor. The boats were to be used not only for the crossing of the Hydaspes, but for the descent of the Indus some time later.

36 Arr. 5.12.2; Curt. 8.14.15, 17; Plut. *Alex.* 60.

37 Arr. 5.16.3, 17.1. For a discussion of Koinos' role in the battle see Devine 1987: 102 ff., largely summarizing Hamilton 1956, against Tarn II, 192 ff. Curt. 8.14.15 must be emended to make sense of Koinos' activities. Koinos' force is thought to have comprised the Baktrians, Sogdianoi, and Skythians (Anspach II, 16; English, *Field Campaigns* 1990).

Their exact position on the battlefield, before hostilities began, is uncertain; but there is little doubt that they were concealed from Poros' view.

## To the Hyphasis and back

At the Akesines (Chenab) Koinos was left behind to oversee the crossing by the bulk of the army and to forage for supplies; a similar task was given also to Krateros.<sup>38</sup> He rejoined Alexander at or near the Hyphasis (Beas) after the bloody Sangala campaign. When the troops, learning of Alexander's plans to cross the Hyphasis and proceed to the Ganges, resorted to *secessio*, Koinos confronted the King and gave voice to the soldiers' concerns. The speeches put into his mouth by Arrian and Curtius are undoubtedly rhetorical creations of those same authors, but the essence of the arguments made will reflect accurately the feelings of the Makedonians, and of Koinos himself: in short, he reminded the King of the sufferings and losses of the army, of their desire to see their homeland and loved ones, of the need to find new and younger troops for Alexander's further expeditions.<sup>39</sup> Curtius adds an appeal to the poor state of the soldiers' equipment, a point which may well be true, but which contributes to the general irony of the situation. But it also suggests that Alexander had no intention of continuing eastward, that he placed the responsibility for turning back at the Hyphasis squarely on the army and its demagogic leaders.<sup>40</sup> There is sarcasm in Curtius' observation that Koinos, who spoke so passionately in favor of returning to Makedonia, died soon afterwards,<sup>41</sup> and there arrived shortly after his death 25,000 splendid suits of armor (9.3.21). Whatever suspicions his death at the Hydaspes arouses, coming as it did so soon after his opposition to Alexander, there is no good reason to assume that it was not caused by illness.<sup>42</sup>

38 Arr. 5.21.1, 4.

39 Arr. 5.27.2–9; Curt. 9.3.3–15.

40 See Heckel 2003b and Spann 1999 for the unlikelihood that Alexander planned to advance to the Ganges; cf. Howe and Müller 2012. The standard view is reasserted by Anson, *Themes and Issues* 172–4, and 2015a. I am less certain than Spann that Koinos' speech was part of Alexander's deception.

41 Curt. 9.3.20. According to Curtius, Alexander could not resist an uncharitable comment: *adiecit tamen propter paucos dies longam orationem eum exorsum, tamquam solus Macedoniam visurus esset* ("[Alexander] nonetheless added the comment that it was merely for the sake of a few days that Koinos had made his long speech, *as if he were the only one who would see Makedonia again*").

42 Arr. 6.2.1. His death occurred at the Hydaspes (cf. Arr. 5.29.5; 6.1.1), not at the Hyphasis (so Berve II, 218); Curt. 9.3.20 places his death at the Akesines (on the confusion see Hammond, *THA* 152–3) and mentions it immediately after the speech for dramatic (ironic) effect. Badian 1961: 22, however, comments on "how Coenus' rash championship of the common soldiers at the Hyphasis was at once followed by his *opportune* death" (my italics). Rightly rejected by Holt 2000; cf. Müller, *Maßnahmen* 2003: 93 n.504. Worthington, *Man and God* 161 argues that Koinos' "magnificent funeral" is to be expected "if he [Alexander] were attempting to cover up his role in Coenus' demise." But, in fact, Alexander gave magnificent funerals to all his leading commanders (e.g., Erigyios: Curt. 8.2.40; Menedemos: Curt. 7.9.21). Rather than a deception, it is in fact the general's duty to conduct the appropriate funeral rites; for it is the least that the soldier expects (for his comrades and for himself) and this is why last rites play such an import role in the accounts of

Had he survived to play a role in the struggles of the Successors, he would almost certainly have found himself eclipsed by the more dynamic figures of the age: prompt to execute the orders of his superiors, he was a soldier first and foremost, a good leader of troops but lacking the charisma and, perhaps, the desire to strive for greater personal glory.<sup>43</sup>

military historians and epic poets. On this point, see Roisman 2014: 465. Furthermore, Krateros was no less outspoken about the concerns of the men after the Mallian fiasco (*Curt.* 9.6.6–15).

43 Berve II, 218 aptly concludes: “Mit K[oinos] starb einer der echtesten Makedonen des Heeres, keine der glanzvollen Erscheinungen seiner Zeit, aber in anspruchsloser, soldatischer Pflichterfüllung, in zuverlässigen Einsetzen seiner bedeutenden militärischen Gaben und nicht zuletzt in seiner aufrechten Männlichkeit einer der wertvollsten Gehilfen Al[exander]s.”

## 7 Hephastion son of Amyntor

Plaumann, *RE* VIII (1913) 291–6 no. 3; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170–1; Berve II, 169–75 no. 357; Heckel, *Who's Who* 133–7. Cf. Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 242–3; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 511–5 and *passim*; cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 31–7; Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander* 194–5; Heckel 1991a; Reames-Zimmerman 1998, 1999; Reames 2010; Müller 2011, 2012a.

Once, during the Indian campaign, they [Krateros and Hephastion] actually drew their swords and came to blows, and as the friends of each were rushing to bring aid, Alexander rode up and openly berated Hephastion, calling him a fool and a madman if he did not know that without Alexander he was nothing.<sup>1</sup>

In October 324, Hephastion died in Ecbatana of a fever aggravated by immoderate eating and drinking.<sup>2</sup> He ended his life the dearest of Alexander's friends, the most influential man in the newly-won empire. Yet, to modern scholars, he remains an enigma. His untimely death evoked from Alexander an almost boundless display of grief, reminiscent, as he was doubtless aware, of Achilleus' sorrow at the fate of Patroklos. The King's emotional devastation was genuine. The writers who published soon after 323 lost no time in comparing Hephastion and Alexander with Patroklos and Achilleus. Alexander himself had been encouraged to emulate Achilleus, his hero ἐκ παιδός (*Arr.* 7.14.4), both by his mother, Olympias, who claimed him as her mythical ancestor, and by his Akarnanian tutor, Lysimachos, who affected to call Philip Peleus and himself Phoinix. But the parallel was less obvious before Hephastion predeceased Alexander, and it appears that only later, sensationalist writers commented on it.

1 Plut. *Alex.* 47.11: ἄπαξ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν καὶ εἰς χείρας ἥλθον σπασάμενοι τὰ ξίφη, καὶ τῶν φύλων ἑκατέρῳ παραβοηθούντων προσελάσας Ἀλέξανδρος ἐλοιδόρει τὸν Ἡφαιστίωνα φανερῶς, ἔμπληκτον καλῶν καὶ μανόμενον, εἰ μὴ συνίησιν ὡς, έάν τις αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀφέληται, μηδέν ἔστιν.

2 *Arr.* 7.14.1; Plut. *Alex.* 72; Diod. 17.110.8; cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.3.31 (wrongly placing his death in Babylon); Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.321–2, for the date of the Kossaian campaign. An account of how Hephastion “drank himself to death” was also given by Ephippus of Olynthos in a work entitled *On the Deaths of Alexander and Hephastion*: *FGrH* 126).

The accounts of Alexander's reaction to his friend's death were many and varied, as Arrian tells us, and in each case strongly prejudiced by the envy (*phthonos*) or goodwill (*eunoia*) that each author felt for Hephaistion or for Alexander himself.<sup>3</sup> The King's actions were unusual, indeed controversial: these manifestations of grief were typical of the oriental despot that he had shown increasing signs of becoming,<sup>4</sup> and they suggested that his relationship with Hephaistion was, to use one modern scholar's phrase, "not purely Platonic."<sup>5</sup>

### Alexander's dearest friend

Hephaistion son of Amyntor came from Pella<sup>6</sup> and was educated with Alexander (and other noble youths) at Mieza.<sup>7</sup> Like the sons of other noble Makedones, he was brought up at the Court, a Page (*pais basilikos*) of Philip II and a *syntrophos* of his sons.<sup>8</sup> Born c.356, he entered the ranks of the Pages no later than c.343 and heard at Mieza the lectures of Aristotle.<sup>9</sup> W.W. Tarn, however, questioned the existence of the famed boyhood friendship and drew attention to the *hetairoi* of Alexander who were exiled in the aftermath of the Pixodaros affair, from whose number Hephaistion was conspicuously absent.<sup>10</sup>

3 Arr. 7.14.2. Müller 2012a (cf. 2014a: 181–3) argues persuasively that Ptolemy's treatment of Hephaistion was favorable, since criticism of Hephaistion reflected negatively on Alexander himself, and that this included also what he did not say. "Er stellte ihn als Alexanders zuverlässigen Vertrauten dar und nahm ihn gegen Vorwürfe in Schutz, indem er ihn aus prekären Situationen ausblendete" (2012a: 87); cf. also Müller 2011: 443–4.

4 Cf. Plut. *Pel.* 34.3.

5 Hamilton, *Alexander* 31. The nature of Hephaistion's relationship with Alexander has been discussed in detail by Africa 1982a; Reames-Zimmerman 1999; Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 81–90; Konstan 1997: 108, and Ogden 2007: 75–88, 2009: 210–2, and *MGS* 155–67. The evidence for Alexander's own sexuality is ambiguous—though one would hardly suspect that this is the case, given the modern view of the King as one of the great "gay heroes" of history. His lifestyle must be considered in the light of the culture of fourth-century Makedonia (where attitudes differed even from those of the Greeks: see the comments of Heckel, Howe and Müller, forthcoming), and even then the implications of certain actions and remarks can be misunderstood. At the opposite end of the spectrum is Pliny, *HN* 5.36 [134], who alleges that Alexander deposited homosexuals on an island off Halikarnassos, which he named *Cinaedropolis*.

6 Arr. 6.28.4, *Ind.* 18.3. Amyntor son of Demetrios (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 405*) may be Hephaistion's father. *P.Oxy.* 2520, an epic poem on Philip of Makedon, frg. 1, line 15, may contain a reference to Amyntor, but the reading is far from certain. The adjective *Pellaios* need not mean, however, that Hephaistion's family was from Pella, only that he was brought up there, at the Court of Philip II (cf. the case of Leonnatos), but since we know nothing else about his origins we must classify him, tentatively, as a Lower Makedonian.

7 Curt. 3.12.15: *cum ipso* [sc. *Alexandro*] *pariter eductus*. Ps.-Kall. 1.18.5 and Jul. Valer. 1.10 depict Hephaistion and Alexander as boyhood friends, but the *Romance* is late and unreliable.

8 To what extent Arrhidaios, who was a year older than his half-brother, Alexander, participated in this educational process is uncertain. If he sat at the feet of Aristotle, he will probably have remembered little more than the color of the philosopher's sandals.

9 Diog. Laert. 5.27 mentions letters from Aristotle to Hephaistion. For the date of Aristotle's sojourn in Makedonia (343) and for a realistic view of his reputation at this time, see Guthrie 1981: 35–6; against the view that he was Alexander's chief preceptor, Chroust 1973: 125–32, with notes on 358–64.

10 Tarn II, 57. Named by Plut. *Alex.* 10.4 (Ptolemy, Harpalos, Nearchos, Erigyios); Arr. 3.6.5 adds Erigyios' brother, Laomedon. Badian 1960a: 327 regards the role of Philotas in the Pixodaros

Tarn also rejected Arrian's *logos* (1.12.1) that Hephaistion crowned the tomb of Patroklos at Ilion, often interpreted as evidence of his long-standing, intimate friendship with Alexander, which was common knowledge already at the time of the crossing into Asia.<sup>11</sup> As political propaganda, Alexander's visit to the site of Troy will have had great appeal for the Greek city-states, and it was carried out with greater finesse than Agesilaos' abortive sacrifice at Aulis.<sup>12</sup> But, if Alexander made use of the incident to promote his Panhellenic crusade, he did so through his Court historian, Kallisthenes, and the latter, it appears, did not cast Hephaistion in the role of Patroklos.<sup>13</sup>

Alexander, it is true, claimed descent from Achilleus. His mother, Olympias (known in her youth as Polyxena) belonged to the Aiakidai of Epeiros, who, from at least the late fifth century, traced their ancestry to Molossos, son of Neoptolemos and Andromache.<sup>14</sup> And Olympias may well have encouraged her son's interest in the family hero. But many of the details that link Achilleus and Alexander appear to derive from the work of hack poets such as Choirilos of Iasos, who accompanied Alexander on the expedition and recorded his exploits in the form of an epic poem in which the King appeared as Achilleus. His tribute was wasted on Alexander, who snarled: "I would much rather be Homer's Thersites than the Achilleus of Choirilos."<sup>15</sup> Whether the King was consciously imitating Achilleus when he grieved for Hephaistion cannot be known. Certainly, writers would have

affair as significant: "... he clearly placed good relations with the king above excessive loyalty to a discredited crown prince."

- 11 Ael. *VH* 12.7. Lane Fox, *Alexander* 113 serves as an excellent example: "Already the two were intimate, Patroclus and Achilles even to those around them; the comparison would remain to the end of their days and is proof of their life as lovers . . ." Cf. Luschey 1968: 121: "Er [sc. Alexander] wird den Tod Hephaistions als eine Art Omen betrachtet haben: stirbt Patroklos, so stirbt auch bald Achill." More credible is the generally overlooked work of Perrin 1895, where it is pointed out that the "romantic attachment in which the two friends were delighted to pose as Achilles and Patroclus evidently dates from the last years of this period [i.e., after Gaugamela]. But romantic tradition confidently, and in a very telling way, transposes this relation to the earlier periods" (58). Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 84 dismisses Perrin's views as "19th century opinion," as if there were a time limit on common sense. For the view that imitation of Achilleus was not part of Alexander's public (political) self-portrayal see Heckel 2015; cf. Müller 2011. Stewart, *Faces* 78–86, accepts the arguments of Ameling 1988 uncritically; cf. Billows, *Kings and Colonists* 66 n.23.
- 12 Xen. *HG* 3.4.3; Plut. *Ages.* 6.6–11. Cf. Cawkwell 1976: 66–7: "... Agesilaus sought, by sacrificing at Aulis as Agamemnon had done . . . , to give the campaign a grandiose significance, to open as it were a new chapter in the great conflict of East and West." Cf. also Rehork 1969: 257–8; Dobesch 1975: 88 n.34.
- 13 Kallisthenes: Jacoby, *FGrH* 124; Pearson, *LHA* 22–49; on the propaganda value, see Prentice 1923; Brown 1949: 233–4; Golani 1988; Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 44–58.
- 14 See Heckel 1981d: 79–86, esp. 80–2; cf. MacCurdy, *HQ* 22–4; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 39; Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 62–3, and Olympias 5–18 for her Molossian background.
- 15 Constantius Prophyrogenitus, on Hor. *AP* 357 = *FGrH* 153 F10a: *Poeta pessimus fuit Choerilus, qui Alexandrum secutus opera eius descripsit . . . cui Alexander dixisse fertur, multum malle se Thersiten iam Homeri esse quam Choerili Achillen* (cf. Jul. Valer. 1.47). Critical of him in public (or, at least, among his inner circle of friends), Alexander doubtless continued to pay the poet's wages. For Choirilos see Berve no. 829; Crusius, *RE* III (1899) 2361–3 no. 5; Tarn II, 55–62; Heckel, *Who's Who* 85.

been more inclined to make the comparison after 323, when both Alexander and his best friend had died young.<sup>16</sup>

To reject the existence of the boyhood friendship on the basis of the sources' failure to mention Hephaistion in connection with the Pixodaros affair is, however, misguided. Scholars have mistaken the *hetairoi* of Alexander for his closest boyhood friends, his *syntrophoi*, but the evidence appears to suggest that those "friends" who were exiled by Philip in the spring of 336 were not contemporaries of the Crown Prince.<sup>17</sup> In fact, during this critical period in his life, Alexander's closest boyhood friends remained with him.

## Early career

Hephaistion's activities before the battle of Gaugamela are ill attested and derive primarily from the popular tradition,<sup>18</sup> but they are consistent in depicting him as one who was close to the King and whose talents were organizational rather than military. Hence Lucian (*Pro Lapsu* 8), our first reference to Hephaistion after Arrian's *logos* and purportedly based on a letter of Eumenes of Kardia to Antipatros, claims that Hephaistion gave Alexander an embarrassing but auspicious greeting on the morning of the battle of Issos.<sup>19</sup> He next appears, on the day after that battle, in one of the most popular anecdotes about Alexander.<sup>20</sup> Among the captives taken after the Persian disaster were the wife, the mother, and

16 Cf. Bosworth I, 103–4. But see Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 85: "It is therefore verging on the incredible that the comparison of Hephaestion with Patroclus had not occurred to Alexander by the time he became king." It is not the playful romanticism of the young King that is in question but the choice of political imagery. If Alexander had been stung by Demosthenes' reference to Margites, he may have been inclined to downplay his role as Achilles in the early stages of the campaign.

17 See Heckel 1985a.

18 I have tried, as much as possible, to avoid the term Vulgate and all its academic baggage and have used instead the phrase "popular tradition." The details found in Ps.-Kall. 1.18.5 and Jul. Valer. 1.10 carry little weight, but Diogenes Laertius' evidence for a relationship between Hephaistion and Aristotle (5.27) is supported by Curt. 3.12.16. Diod. 17.114.1, 3 mentions Alexander's love for Hephaistion and Olympias' jealousy; cf. Lucian, *dial. mort.* 12.4, where Philip is said to have disapproved of Alexander's excessive devotion to Hephaistion; also Athen. 10.435a, claiming that Alexander's indifference to women prompted Philip to send the Thessalian courtesan Kallixeina to their son. Plut. *Alex.* 28.5 mentions a gift of little fishes from Alexander to Hephaistion (which Stark, *Alexander's Path* 205 compares with the younger Kyros' gifts of food to his closest friends; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.25–6); he read Olympias' letters and shared Alexander's secrets: Plut. *Alex.* 39.8; Plut. *Mor.* 180d = *apophth. Al.* 14; Plut. *Mor.* 332f–333a = *de fort. Al.* 1.11), but these may refer to the late stages of the campaign.

19 Lucian's story is basically about a breach of etiquette, which would have been totally absurd in the context of the Makedonian camp (see Müller 2011: 436 "Dabei kommt Hephaistion die Rolle des ungebildeten Tölpels und den makedonischen Offizieren der Part der überkorrekten Sophisten zu"). But it has been argued the episode suggests that Hephaistion had spent the night with Alexander (see Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 86, following Reames-Zimmerman 1998: 90). Ogden, *MGs* 240 n.38 lists Lucian's passage among "other texts implying strong affection (but not necessarily any more)."

20 Arr. 2.12.6–7; Diod. 17.37.5–6, 114.2; Curt. 3.12.15 ff.; Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2; *Itiner. Al.* 37; *Suda H* 660.

the children of Dareios III. Hearing that they mourned Dareios as already dead, Alexander sent to them Leonnatos (or possibly Laomedon<sup>21</sup>), who informed them that Dareios had, in fact, escaped from the battlefield of Issos and that Alexander would see to their own safety. On the following morning, Alexander, accordingly, went to visit the Persian women, accompanied by Hephaestion, who was both taller and more striking in appearance.<sup>22</sup> The Queen Mother, Sisygambis, began to prostrate herself at Hephaestion's feet when one of the eunuchs pointed out the true Alexander. But the King dismissed the incident, adding that "Hephaestion too is Alexander," and, with this gesture of magnanimity, acknowledged Hephaestion as his *alter ego*.<sup>23</sup>

In December 333 or January 332, Alexander bestowed upon Hephaestion the singular honor of choosing a new king for the Sidonians.<sup>24</sup> According to Curtius and Diodorus, two "hosts" of Hephaestion recommended a certain Abdalonymos, a man of exceptional character and habits, whom poverty had constrained to labor as a gardener. Indeed, he was found at his work, unperturbed by the commotions of war.<sup>25</sup> Despite the dramatic and cynic touches, the popular tradition

21 Curt. 3.12.6 reports that Alexander intended to send Mithrenes to the captive queens, because he knew the Persian language. He then changed his mind and sent Leonnatos, a non-Persian speaker—it is hard to imagine when and under what circumstances he became fluent in the language—even though he had in his entourage Laomedon the Mytilenaian, who is described (Arr. 3.6.6) as *diglossos* (bilingual). For the possibility of confusion see Heckel 1981e, though I am now less inclined to see the substitution of names as evidence of Ptolemy's malice towards Laomedon. For Ptolemy's favorable treatment of Hephaestion see Müller 2012a and *Makedonien und Persien* 86–90. There is a strong literary element to Alexander's dealings with the Persian royal women, on which see the excellent discussion of Briant, *Darius* 320–42.

22 *Et sicut aetate par erat regi, ita corporis habitu praestabat* (Curt. 3.12.16); cf. *et statura et forma praestabat* (Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2); and ὅτι μείζων ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος (Arr. 2.12.6). The scene is depicted in a painting by Veronese in the National Gallery, London. Similar references to Hephaestion's youthful appearance are made by Curtius (7.9.19) and Justin (12.12.11). According to Pliny, *HN* 34.64 (Pollitt 1990: 98), Lysippos (or, as some said, Polykleitos [the younger]) produced a statue of Hephaestion, which Gebauer 1938–9: 67–9 believes he can identify; see Rackham 1968, 174 n.b.; cf. Johnson 1927: 25, 230. See Stewart, *Faces* Plate 3 and figs. 150–3, for the Getty "Hephaestion." I see no compelling evidence for the identification. But see also Stewart, *Faces* "Appendix 6" for possible portraits. He was also identified in Aëtion's painting of the marriage of Alexander and Roxane, as the best man (*νυμφαγός*), standing to the right of Alexander and holding a torch; the description given by Lucian (*Aëtion* 5; Pollitt 1990: 175–6) is followed in the painting on the north wall of the Farnesina in Rome by "Il Sodoma." Bieber 1964: 51 identifies Hephaestion, plausibly, as the central figure in the battle scene of the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus from Sidon (cf. Pollitt 1986: 40); he may also feature in the hunting scene on the opposite side.

23 καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Ἀλέξανδρός ἔστιν. (Diod. 17.37.6; cf. Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2; Arr. 2.12.7; *Suda H* 660; Curt. 3.12.17). Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 512 sees Alexander as continually striving to bestow honors upon Hephaestion: "Alexander, der in seiner Neigung für Hephaestion niemals genug zu tun glaubte . . . ."

24 Curt. 4.1.15–26; Plut. *Mor.* 340c–d = *de fort. Al.* 2.8 (at Paphos); Diod. 17.46.6 ff. (at Tyre). See Berve II, 3 no. 1; Heckel, *Who's Who* 1 "Abdalonymus."

25 Justin 11.10.9; Diod. 17.47.1–6; Curt. 4.1.17–26; for the motif, cf. Cincinnatus in Livy 3.26. For the Near Eastern antecedents of the "king as gardener" story see Drews 1974. Bosworth 2003a believes that Abdalonymos may in fact have been a gardener, though clearly not as humble as the

gives some insight into the factional strife at Sidon, which was bound to follow the Persian defeat and the arrival of foreign troops. Abdalonymos was favored by the popular party, which may indeed have played a role in deposing Stratон; but opposition to the appointment came from the wealthy, who sought to influence Alexander's decision by lobbying his Companions.<sup>26</sup> Hephaistion's role suggests that Alexander had recognized early his best friend's administrative and organizational talents.<sup>27</sup>

Nothing is known about Hephaistion's activities during the siege of Tyre. But, late in the summer of 332, he conveyed the fleet, and the siege equipment, from Tyre to Gaza, a relatively minor task now that Alexander controlled the seas.<sup>28</sup> After this, he is not heard of again until 331, when Alexander moved out of Egypt. Marsyas of Pella, a half-brother of Antigonos the One-Eyed and a *syntrophos* of the King, records that Demosthenes tried to bring about a reconciliation with Alexander by sending to Hephaistion a young Samian named Aristion.<sup>29</sup> His presence at Alexander's court is dated by an Athenian embassy, which found him there in 331; Aeschines appears to corroborate Marsyas' testimony, but it is possible that he was in fact one of the latter's sources.<sup>30</sup> But the information about Hephaistion comes directly from Marsyas, who was well placed to assess that man's position at Court.<sup>31</sup>

A possible explanation of Hephaistion's role may be found in *IG II<sup>2</sup> 405*, a decree of Demades granting Athenian citizenship to Amyntor son of Demetrios and his descendants in 334.<sup>32</sup> It is tempting to see Amyntor son of Demetrios as the

story suggests. But see now Burstein 2007; cf. Prandi, *Diodoro* 74; Atkinson I, 281–2. Anson, *Themes and Issues* 150 makes the interesting suggestion that Abdalonymos "may have been on the wrong side of the earlier revolt from Persian authority in the late 340s and permitted to live but in straitened conditions." The generally accepted view that he was the intended or actual occupant of the Alexander Sarcophagus in Sidon is unconvincing, if one assumes that the scenes on the sarcophagus relate to the man's life (see Heckel 2006).

26 See Briant, *Alexander and His Empire* 76. Favorite of the popular party: Diod. 17.47.6. Deposing of Stratон: cf. Curt. 4.1.16. Lobbying of the wealthy class: Curt. 4.1.19, 24.

27 Cf. Plaumann, *RE VIII* (1913) 291: "Alexander übertrug ihm die Regelung der Verwaltung in Sidon."

28 Curt. 4.5.10. The Greek contingents were still in the Aegean with Hegelochos and Amphoteros. See Hauben 1976: 82 ff. Curtius must be speaking of the Phoinikian and Kypriot fleet, which defected to Alexander after the battle of Issos. But Diod. 17.22.5 says that 20 Athenian ships from the original "Hellenic fleet" remained with Alexander and these may have remained under the command of Nicanor; see Heckel, *Who's Who* 176 "Nicanor [2]." See, however, Reames 2010: 199.

29 *FGrH* 135/6 F2 = Harpocration s.v. Αριστίον. For Marsyas and his history see Heckel 1980d. For Aristion see Berve no. 120; Kirchner, *RE II* (1896) 900, no. 12; Heckel, *Who's Who* 46. Diyllos, *FGrH* 73 F2, says he was Plataian.

30 Note the close similarity between Aes. 3.160, 162 and the Marsyas fragment.

31 Goldstein 1968: 42–3 n.33 is almost certainly correct in rejecting Badian's suggestion (1961: 34) that Hephaistion was Demosthenes' "powerful protector at the Court." The eye-witness nature of Marsyas' account suggests that he had not remained behind with Antigonos in Kelainai. He may, however, have returned to Phrygia when Alexander marched north from Egypt in 331.

32 For Amyntor see Kirchner, *PA* 750. Δημάδης[ι] [Δημέου Πα]ι[α]νιεὺς εῖπε[ν] ἐπανέσαι] Αύντορα, [ἐ]πειδὴ εὗνοι[αν] ἐνδείκνυ[ατα περὶ Ἀθῆναίους, εἰ[ναι δὲ] Ἀμύντορ]α Δ[ημ]ητρί[ον οὐ Αθηναῖον α]ντὸν καὶ ἐκ[γόνους αὐτο]ῦ . . . . See Heckel 1991b.

father of Hephaistion. Amyntor may have used his influence (perhaps even through Hephaistion) to persuade Alexander to treat the Athenians with leniency in 335, or to back down on his demand for the expulsion of the prominent Athenian orators. At any rate, Hephaistion himself was thus, by extension, awarded Athenian citizenship and became the contact for Demosthenes at Alexander's Court.<sup>33</sup>

At Gaugamela Hephaistion was wounded while commanding the *somatophylakes* (τῶν σωματοφύλακών ἱγούμενος, Diod. 17.61.3), which must mean that he commanded the *agema* of the hypaspists (that is, the *hypaspistai basilikoi*).<sup>34</sup> The occasion of his appointment to the rank of *somatophylax* (i.e., one of the Seven) is not recorded. Perhaps he replaced the obscure, but not unimportant, Ptolemaios,<sup>35</sup> who died at Halikarnassos in the first year of the Asiatic campaign. If this is so, then he will have been the first of Alexander's *syntrophoi*, the first of the "New Men," to have been promoted; in hindsight (and this, of course, merely underscores how subjective the matter is) it seems odd that Alexander could have promoted Leonnatos to *somatophylax* before Hephaistion.<sup>36</sup> Ptolemaios, at the time of his death, had commanded hypaspists as well (Arr. 1.22.4: Πτολεμαῖος ὁ σωματοφύλαξ ὁ βασιλικός, τίνι τε Ἀδαίου καὶ Τιμάνδρου ἄμα οἵ τάξιν ἄγων), but it does not appear that Hephaistion replaced him both as a member of the Seven and as leader of the *agema*. In 332, we find a certain Admetos distinguishing himself in the final attack on Tyre. Tarn (II, 151) argues plausibly that he was the commander of the *agema*. In that event, Hephaistion is more likely to have been Admetos' successor.

### Philotas and the path to promotion

A review of Hephaistion's career after the battle of Gaugamela shows just how much he owed to his personal relationship with Alexander. The Philotas affair and the events that followed reveal him as not only the chief beneficiary of Alexander's

33 See Schwenk, 132–4 no. 24, though I see no good reason for doubting Amyntor's Makedonian connections.

34 He was wounded in the arm at Gaugamela: Arr. 3.15.2; Diod. 17.61.3; Curt. 4.16.32. Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 94: observes that "Heckel's suggestion . . . is curious, since, firstly, the hypaspists were an elite infantry corps, whilst Arrian speaks specifically of a cavalry engagement." This reflects the widespread misunderstanding of one of the primary roles of the *hypaspistai basilikoi*, namely that of *hamippoi* (cf. the similar misinterpretation by Reames 2010: 190). They fought as nimble foot-soldiers interspersed among the Companion Cavalry, and their commander (like the commanders of many infantry units) was probably mounted. For the Royal Hypaspist as *hamippos* see Philippus son of Agathokles (Curt. 8.2.35–9) and the fuller discussion in Heckel 2012.

35 Berse II, no. 672; Heckel, *Who's Who* 234 "Ptolemy [1]." Perhaps the father of Ptolemaios, the *somatophylax* of Philip III Arrhidaios in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 1.38). See, however, Billows, *Antigonos* 426–30 no. 100 ("Polemaios II, son of Polemaios I, Makedonian"), who thinks that the *somatophylax* of Philip III is actually Polemaios, the nephew of Antigonus Monophthalmos.

36 Leonnatos filled the next attested vacancy, when the army was in Egypt. On the date of Hephaistion's appointment, Müller (2011: 441) urges caution: "Da die traditionell sieben Träger dieses Amts wohl nicht ausgetauscht wurden, sondern die Vakanz erst im Todesfall eintrat, ist ein spätes Datum nicht ganz unwahrscheinlich."

friendship but also the skillful manipulator of the King's power of command.<sup>37</sup> Hephaestion's career had so far been undistinguished: until the death of Philotas, he held no major, independent, military command;<sup>38</sup> the majority of the tasks assigned to him thereafter were predominantly non-military, and those that did require military skill were often conducted in tandem with a more experienced commander; ultimately, he owed his promotion to favoritism rather than ability.<sup>39</sup> And, nowhere is Hephaestion's influence more evident than in the Philotas affair.

The intricacies of the affair have already been discussed: Dimnos' plot was the catalyst that allowed Alexander's younger commanders to work for the elimination of a powerful and unsympathetic rival. All would benefit from his ruin, but Hephaestion's rise was sudden and unprecedented. If he proved an easy target, Philotas had only himself to blame: he was arrogant and disparaged the achievements of Alexander, claiming for Parmenion the credit for the Makedonian victories. Like the conservative Kleitos, he could not make light of his own contribution—indeed, we should be hard pressed to find a self-effacing hero—but his overbearing and impulsive nature was inclined to arouse the hostility not so much of Alexander as of his younger Companions. These were the sons of the Makedonian aristocracy, the cadets who aspired to military and political office. Young and eager for promotion, they were jealous of another's success, and looked to Alexander for their rewards. The friends and *syntrophoi* of the prince

37 Cf. Africa 1982b: 411: "An adroit schemer, he exploited the king's love to become the second most powerful man in the empire."

38 Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.27 records that Hephaestion and Philotas (apparently the son of Parmenion) commanded the forces directly opposed to Phrasaortes (Polyaenus' mistake for Ariobarzanes; cf. Berve II, 60–1 no. 115; II, 400 no. 813), while Alexander led the encircling forces at the Persian Gates. But both Arrian (3.18.4, 7–8) and Curtius (5.4.14–5, 29) relate that Krateros commanded the main force; Diod. 17.68 does not understand the strategy; cf. Heckel 1980a. No other source names Hephaestion in this context. Philotas son of Parmenion appears not to have remained with the main force. Arr. 3.18.6 may refer to him (so Bosworth I, 327) and not to the phalanx commander (Berve, no. 803); Curt. 5.4.20, 30 is clearly thinking of the hipparch (cf. Atkinson II, 96–7, 100). But see Milns 1966c: 159–60; rejected by Bosworth 1973: 252–3. As commander of the *agema* at Gaugamela (Diad. 17.61.3), Hephaestion was supervised directly by Alexander. See, however, Howe 2015b: 177–8, who argues that Polyaenus' account is based on Kallisthenes, who sought to emphasize the roles of Alexander and his dearest friend on the two sides of the battle (that is, in the camp and in the encircling force). But this is a historiographical, rather than historical, problem. In all likelihood, Hephaestion would have accompanied Alexander. Since Philotas was also part of the encircling force—at least, in the early stages—Polyaenus may have confused the details found in his primary source.

39 So Welles 1970: 47; against Hamilton, *PA* 130; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 242; Berve II, 171. But see Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander* 194: "Hephaestion war ein tapferer Offizier, zunächst als Führer der Leibhypaspisten. Später war er der Kommandeur der ersten Hipparchie der Hetairenreiterei . . . er erscheint . . . als der bedeutendste Helfer des Königs neben Krateros . . . Als militärischer Führer zeigte er eine hohe Begabung . . ." In the original publication, I used the word "nepotism," but this was taken too literally by some, e.g., Reames 2010: 189. Reames continues by noting that "a systematic listing of his [sc. Hephaestion's] assignments" (which she provides on 192–5) "suggests he did have logistical and diplomatic savvy." More emphatically: "The evidence suggests that he was meticulously kept away from combat command" (Reames 2010: 199).

expected more from him now that he was King. But how to dislodge those who had won promotion while Philip lived?

Success came easily to the son of Philip's general, but it was not without odium. Plutarch says that Alexander's friends had long hated Philotas—long before his outspokenness in Egypt,<sup>40</sup> or even his role in the Pixodaros affair.<sup>41</sup> At the time of the Egyptian *epiboule*, Parmenion's influence was sufficient to deflect charges of treason. But the old general's power was waning, his retirement made imminent by each of Krateros' successes. At the time of Dimnos' plot, Philotas was at the mercy of his political enemies: his father in Ecbatana, his brothers dead, he himself was becoming increasingly isolated within the upper echelons of the army.<sup>42</sup> The *hipparchia* of the Companions was a coveted post, and it is not surprising that Hephaestion, who was the first among Alexander's friends, should cherish the hope of becoming his foremost officer—and no unit was used more effectively after Gaugamela than the Makedonian cavalry. The record of Hephaestion's dealings with individuals shows that he was of a particularly quarrelsome nature<sup>43</sup> and not above maligning others to Alexander, even when this afforded no obvious personal gain.<sup>44</sup> Philotas would be Hephaestion's first notable victim.

Still, neither Hephaestion's hatred of Philotas nor his influence with Alexander was sufficient in itself to dislodge Philotas from his command. He was a high-ranking officer, descended from a noble Makedonian family and a famous father, who had not failed to win a large following in the army. Yet Philotas' foolish handling of the news of Dimnos' conspiracy gave his adversaries the opportunity they needed. Philotas' guilt could not be proved: that he was negligent in not passing on Kebalinos' information was certain; perhaps he even secretly wished Dimnos success. Alexander, it appears, was still reluctant to take action against him, and he might well have shown clemency a second time had not Philotas' enemies intervened.<sup>45</sup>

40 Plut. *Alex.* 48.4–49.2, *Mor.* 339d–f = *de fort. Al.* 2.7; Arr. 3.26.1. Longstanding hatred of Philotas: Plut. *Alex.* 49.8.

41 Plut. *Alex.* 10.3. Philip II used Philotas as an example of good conduct in a manner intended to shame Alexander. Hamilton, *PA* 26 (repeating the views expressed in Hamilton 1965: 121 n.4), may be correct, however, to take παραλαβόν to mean “taking as witness” and to assume that Philotas reported Alexander's intrigues with Pixodaros to Philip. In either case, Philotas' role will not have endeared him to Alexander.

42 Parmenion sent to Ecbatana: Arr. 3.19.7; Hektor's drowning: Curt. 4.8.7–9; Nikanor's death from illness: Arr. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18–9. Here and elsewhere I use the term Dimnos' plot (which was, in fact, the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard) as shorthand for the plot that was reported by Kebalinos.

43 Plut. *Alex.* 47.11–2; Plut. *Mor.* 337a = *de fort Al.* 2.4; Plut. *Eum.* 2.1–3; Arr. 7.13.1, 14.9. Berge II, 173 aptly describes his behavior as “das Benehmen eines verzogenen Kindes.” Cf. Badian 1958b: 150: “Even the character and intrigues of the sinister Hephaestion are not illuminated by Arrian-Ptolemy.”

44 Plut. *Alex.* 55.1: Hephaestion claimed that Kallisthenes had promised to do *proskynesis* but went back on his word. Some scholars believe that Hephaestion lied “to save his own skin” (so Brown 1949: 244); cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 384; Hamilton, *PA* 153.

45 Curt. 6.7.32 suggests that Alexander was willing to forgive him, if only he could deny complicity. Philotas could not absolve himself entirely and did admit to negligence. Alexander was, to some extent, satisfied (or, at least, he was temporarily reconciled with Philotas), though Curt.

As before in Egypt, Krateros was his most vigorous opponent, and his benefit from the destruction of Philotas and Parmenion is clear; but he had already superseded Parmenion, and his success as a commander was based on his ability. What then of Hephaestion's role, which cannot be passed over lightly? How he influenced Alexander's thinking in private we cannot know; Alexander no doubt discussed the matter with him, and we may suppose that Hephaestion was not loathe to speak ill of Philotas.<sup>46</sup> Certainly Hephaestion was part of the *consilium*, which Alexander called after his initial meeting with Philotas, when he may still have been inclined towards leniency. Curtius portrays Krateros as the chief spokesman on this occasion, but Hephaestion was among those who voiced the opinion that Philotas must have been guilty of participating in Dimnos' conspiracy<sup>47</sup> and that he should be forced to reveal the names of his fellow conspirators under torture.<sup>48</sup> Once it is decided to take action against Philotas, then Hephaestion comes to the fore. His name heads the list of those who came to Alexander's tent during the second watch on the night of Philotas' arrest.<sup>49</sup>

In the actual trial before the army, Hephaestion is not mentioned; Koinos and Amyntas were outspoken, both eager to repudiate their ties with Philotas.<sup>50</sup> By now Alexander himself had been won over by Philotas' enemies.<sup>51</sup> Hephaestion's influence was on a personal level, with Alexander; his popularity with the army cannot have been great. True to his nature, he reappears as the foremost of

6.7.35 expresses doubts about Alexander's true feelings. Nevertheless, it is clear from 6.7.1 ff. that a lengthy denunciation of Philotas by the other generals played no small part in influencing Alexander's decision. The case of Alexandros Lynkestes provides a good parallel: καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς ἔταίροις μήτε πάλαι εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι τὸ κράτιστον τοῦ ιππικοῦ ἀνδρὶ οὐ πιστῷ ἐπιτρέψας, νῦν τε χρῆναι αὐτὸν κατὰ τάχος ἐκποδῶν ποιεῖσθαι . . . (Arr. 1.25.5).

46 It is hard to believe Plutarch (*Mor.* 339f = *de fort.* Al. 2.7) that Alexander did not discuss the matter of Philotas with Hephaestion.

47 Curt. 6.8.10: *nec ceteri dubitabant, quin coniurationis indicium suppressurus non fuisset nisi auctor aut particeps*. Reames 2008: 171–5 follows Curtius in regarding Krateros as the most vehement opponent of Philotas.

48 Curt. 6.8.15: *omnes igitur quaestionem de eo, ut participes sceleris indicare cogeretur, habendam esse decernunt*.

49 Curt. 6.8.17: *cum paucis in regiam coeunt Hephaestion et Craterus et Coenus et Erigyius, hi ex amicis, ex armigeris autem Perdikcas et Leonnatus*.

50 Koinos was Philotas' brother-in-law (Curt. 6.9.30), having married his sister only shortly before the Asiatic campaign (cf. Arr. 1.24.1, 29.4; cf. Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 332). Amyntas and his brothers had been friends of Philotas (Curt. 7.1.11); both were perhaps *syntropoi* of Amyntas Perdikka (cf. Heckel 1986b: 304). Amyntas himself may have been named by Dimnos as a conspirator (Curt. 6.7.15; see Badian 1960a: 334 n.30; Heckel 1975: 393–8), though his name may have been added later because of his connections with Philotas. I am now inclined to regard the Amyntas who spoke against Philotas, whom Curt. 6.9.28 calls *regius praetor*, as the hypaspist commander (cf. Atkinson II, 233). Polemon fled from the camp after Philotas' arrest (Arr. 3.27.1–3; Curt. 7.1.10 ff.). See also Granier, *Heeresversammlung* 42–6; Lock 1977a: 101–2.

51 Thus Heckel 1977b. In the same year, Rubinsohn independently reached a similar conclusion: “Even after Alexander had been informed of Philotas' strange silence, he continued to deliberate. It was not an easy decision to give up his best cavalry commander; to take action against Philotas meant that Parmenio would have to be neutralized, and Parmenio was popular with his men. . . . But now the Crateros-Hephaestion group forced his hand” (Rubinsohn 1977: 419).

Philotas' tormentors. The Makedonians demanded that Philotas be executed by stoning, but Hephaestion and his associates argued successfully that he be tortured first: *Hephaestio autem et Craterus et Coenos tormentis veritatem exprimendam esse dixerunt* (Curt. 6.11.10). From Curtius' account (6.11.10–8) we gain a picture of the deep-rooted enmity between Philotas and Krateros—one which goes back to Philotas' disaffection in Egypt—but we also see Hephaestion's darker side; Plutarch (*Alex.* 49.12) explicitly refers to Philotas' tormentors as *οἱ πέπι τὸν Ἡφαιστίωνα*.<sup>52</sup> In view of Hephaestion's later dealings with rivals, and his obvious gain from Philotas' downfall, we must regard him as a most formidable opponent and no less responsible for Philotas' demise than Krateros.

One of the blackest chapters in the history of Alexander closed with the execution of Philotas and, in fearful haste, the murder of Parmenion. The King had known all along that the father's death must follow that of the son, and it is for this reason that he had hesitated to bring Philotas to trial. Philotas' demise opened a new chapter in Hephaestion's career.

## Cavalry commander

After Philotas' execution, the command of the Companion Cavalry was divided between Hephaestion and Black Kleitos, the son of Dropidas, since Alexander no longer thought it wise to entrust this important post to any one person, even to his closest friend (Arr. 3.27.4). Fear of conspiracy will not, in itself, explain this dual appointment.<sup>53</sup> Politically, it tempered the elevation of the untried and abrasive Hephaestion with the appointment of Kleitos. As ilarch of the Royal Squadron (*ile basilike*), Kleitos had undoubtedly been second only to Philotas in the hierarchy of the Companions, but his promotion was clearly a move to conciliate the more conservative Makedonians, who did not look with favor upon the treatment of Parmenion and his son<sup>54</sup> and could be expected to regard Hephaestion's promotion as blatant nepotism.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, Alexander recognized that Hephaestion, whose loyalty could scarcely be called into question, was not equal to the task of commanding the entire unit.

<sup>52</sup> The Greek can mean “those around Hephaestion” (i.e., “Hephaestion and his supporters”) or simply “Hephaestion himself.”

<sup>53</sup> It is nevertheless true that Alexander began to institute a system of checks and balances, a practice continued into the age of the Successors (see Heckel 2002a).

<sup>54</sup> The disapproval of the common soldier could be silenced. Alexander is said to have formed a “Disciplinary Unit,” the *ataktoi* (Diod. 17.80.4; Justin 12.5.4 ff.; Curt. 7.2.35 ff., who says that their leader was named Leonidas); see Karunanithy, *War Machine* 170–1. But the opposition of the aristocracy is seen in the attitudes of Kleitos (Curt. 8.1.52) and Hermolaos (Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.7.4). Carney 1981: 151 suggests that “[i]t is just as likely that Clitus' new command was the result of the king's determination to play his leading officers off against one another, thus preventing them from uniting against him.” See also Heckel 2002a.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 363; Lane Fox, *Alexander* 311. Müller, *Maßnahmen* 115, offers a very different explanation: “Vielleicht war Hephaestion als Alexanders Vertrauter sogar dazu angehalten worden, seinen Kollegen im Hipparchenamt zu kontrollieren, damit es Kleitos nich gelang, seine neue Stellung zum Ausbau des Einflusses der altmakedonischen Fraktion zu nutzen.”

How this division of the cavalry worked in practice is unknown, owing to the lamentably vague nature of the evidence. Of Kleitos' activities as hippocarch, from his appointment to the time of his death, we know nothing.<sup>56</sup> At the time of his death, Kleitos had been offered the satrapy of Baktria, but it is unlikely that Alexander appointed him originally with the intention of replacing him by means of a further revision of the cavalry.<sup>57</sup> The sources are misleading. Two years of warfare separate Kleitos' promotion from his death, yet there is no mention of his participation in the campaigns from 330 to 328. Some scholars attribute his absence to a wound sustained in battle or to illness, though there is no hint of this in the sources.<sup>58</sup> Possibly an explanation is to be found in the structure of the extant histories of Alexander: the Kleitos episode is related out of its historical context by Plutarch and Arrian in order that the three great catastrophes (Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes) may be recorded in a sequence.<sup>59</sup> Perhaps this format can be traced to the primary sources and, if so, these sources will have begun to conceive of Kleitos as dead, hence omitting him from their accounts of events in which he must certainly have taken part.

Hephaestion's own role also requires an explanation. Never do we hear of his commanding the half of the Companions that had been assigned to him; in fact, in 329, when the cavalry was Alexander's main striking force in Sogdiana, Arrian makes no mention of Hephaestion (cf. Berve II, 171), while Curtius records only that he was one of the counsellors who came to Alexander's tent before the battle with the Skythians at the Iaxartes River (Curt. 7.7.9). During this year it appears that the cavalry was either directly under Alexander's command or, as in the case of the attempted relief of Marakanda and the battle at the Polytimetus River,<sup>60</sup> divided into small detachments under minor officers.

What we learn of Hephaestion's later career as a cavalry officer confirms our suspicions that his promotion to hippocarch was owed to his friendship with Alexander rather than to military genius. In the spring of 328, Alexander moved out of his winter quarters in Baktria, re-crossed the Oxos River and conducted a "sweep campaign" against the rebellious Sogdianoi. The forces were divided

56 The poem of Pranichos (Berve no. 657), if it refers to a historical incident (so Hamilton, *PA* 141), such as the defeat at the Polytimetus River (Arr. 4.3.7; 4.5.2–6.2; Curt. 7.6.24, 7.30 ff.), cannot mean that Kleitos took part in the affairs at Marakanda or at the Polytimetus, as is suggested by Benoist-Méchin 1966: 81–2. For a different interpretation of Pranichos' poem see Holt, *Bactria* 78–9 n.118. See Chapter 5 above.

57 See especially Brunt 1963; Griffith 1963; Berve I, 104–12; Tarn II, 154–67; cf. also Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.322–52.

58 Thus Lane Fox, *Alexander* 311. A previous illness of Kleitos was recorded by Arrian (3.19.8).

59 Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 138, assumes that "die Verkoppelung der beiden Katastrophen [i.e., Kleitos and Kallisthenes] in der Umgebung Alexanders erst von der Vulgata und ihr folgend von Arrian vollzogen worden ist." But the events of 330–328 are those most confused by the Alexander historians, as Bosworth 1981 makes clear.

60 Arr. 4.5.2–6.2; Curt. 7.7.31 ff., for a different version. This should not lead us to Welles' conclusion (1970: 40) that Alexander, fearing powerful rivals, sent "incompetents" against Spitamenes.

into five parts, with Hephaestion commanding one contingent.<sup>61</sup> But the project appears to have accomplished little more than to win back several small fortresses to which the rebellious natives had fled; the most important action was fought, in that season, by Krateros against the Massagetai.<sup>62</sup>

## Supply and logistics

When the columns reunited at Marakanda in the summer of 328, Hephaestion's functions began to be adapted to suit his talents. There is no reason to suppose that he had any extraordinary abilities as a general; his previous military record precludes this, and his later role as a "utility man" leads to the same conclusion. His first mission in Sogdiana was to synoecize the local settlements (Arr. 4.16.3), an assignment that was to guarantee the loyalty of the native population by means of the establishment of garrisons, while it provided Alexander with a network of communications in the region. Alexander now used Hephaestion regularly for non-military operations—perhaps these were activities that Hephaestion himself enjoyed. In fact, it is the founding of cities, the building of bridges, and the securing of communications that constitute his major contribution to Alexander's expedition.<sup>63</sup>

Apart from the synoecisms in Sogdiana, little else is known of his activities before the army moved into India. Curtius tells us that, ten days after Kleitos' murder, Hephaestion was responsible for acquiring provisions for the winter of 328/7. The remainder of the campaign, which saw the death of Spitamenes and the capture of the Rock of Chorienes, does not include another reference to him.<sup>64</sup>

61 Arr. 4.16.2. The other contingents were commanded by Perdikkas, Ptolemy, and Alexander, while Koinos and Artabazos held a joint command; Curt. 8.1.1 speaks of three divisions under Alexander, Hephaestion, and Koinos; Curt. 8.1.10 says Artabazos accompanied Hephaestion. Arrian speaks of *stratia*, implying that the entire force was divided into five parts, but a large portion of the army (the infantry battalions of Polyperchon, Attalos, Gorgias, Meleagros, and Krateros, who commanded them, Arr. 4.16.1, 17.1; Curt. 8.1.6) was in Baktria. The main striking force in Sogdiana was the cavalry.

62 But see Holt, *Bactria* 62–3: "It was probably during Hephaestion's mission to colonize the eastern Oxus and its tributaries that Ai Khanoum (Alexandria-Oxiana?) was founded at the strategic junction of the Oxos and Kochba Rivers." Krateros against the Massagetai: Arr. 4.17.1; Curt. 8.1.6–7.

63 Milns, *Alexander* 112 credits Hephaestion with bridging the Euphrates River (in two places) at Thapsakos, which is interesting in view of his later activities (e.g., bridging the Indus) but his role is not documented, as far as I can tell, by the ancient sources (cf. Arr. 3.7.1; Curt. 4.9.12). Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 106 objects to my dismissal of Hephaestion's military abilities, noting that "absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence." This is true, up to a point, but when one considers how much we know of Hephaestion's activities during the Asiatic campaign the lack of evidence for military leadership is striking. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that Alexander's comment to Hephaestion in India, that he would be nothing without Alexander, could have been directed towards a proven military commander. Decorations for "bravery" (Arr. 7.5.6), like promotion to high office (Arr. 3.27.4), could be signs of nepotism.

64 There is no mention in the historical sources of Hephaestion's role in the marriage of Alexander and Roxane, painted by Aëtion and described by Lucian, *Aëtion* 5. Supplies for the winter: Curt. 8.2.13.

At the end of the spring of 327, Hephaestion and Perdikkas were sent ahead into the western regions of India with a substantial force to act as an advance guard, to subdue the area around Peukelaotis, and to build a boat-bridge on the Indus.<sup>65</sup> Berve poses the question, who had the *imperium maius* in this venture?<sup>66</sup> Nominally, it appears that Hephaestion had it. Curtius' account of the dealings with Omphis, son of Taxiles, makes no mention of Perdikkas, who must certainly have been present; no details are given by Arrian.<sup>67</sup> It appears, however, that Perdikkas' presence in this, Hephaestion's first major independent command, can be attributed to the need for a competent military man,<sup>68</sup> and to their apparent compatibility. In the late stages of the campaigns, both Hephaestion and Perdikkas had developed strong personal ties with Alexander, and it is not surprising that Perdikkas replaced the dead Hephaestion as Alexander's most trusted general and friend; the two endorsed Alexander's orientalizing policies.<sup>69</sup>

Together with Perdikkas, Hephaestion advanced to the Indus along the Kabul River valley, subduing some natives who resisted but winning the majority over by negotiation and show of force. At Peukelaotis (Pushkalavati = modern Charsada), however, they found that the local ruler, Astis, had rebelled.<sup>70</sup> He had perhaps been among the Indian hyparchs who had submitted to Alexander along with Omphis (Taxiles),<sup>71</sup> and his rebellion may have been caused not by anti-Makedonian sentiment but by the fear of his rival Sangaios, who had now allied himself with Omphis. Only after thirty days of siege did Hephaestion and

65 Arr. 4.22.7–8, 23.1, 30.9; 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2–3, 12.4; ME 48. See Smith, *EHI* 53 and 63, who follows the suggestion of Foucher 1901: 46, that the crossing took place at Ohind or Und, sixteen miles north of Attock (Atak), which was formerly thought to be the location of Hephaestion's bridge; cf. Wood, *Footsteps* 182; see also Eggermont 1970: 102–10.

66 Berve II, 171; cf. II, 314, where Berve suggests "dass P. die Fußtruppen, Hephaestion die Reiter kommandierte." This is not convincing: Perdikkas no longer commanded infantry; his battalion had been given to his brother Alketas (Berve II, 22 no. 45). Perdikkas was himself a hipparch and, if one hipparchy was inferior to another (as was the case in the last years of Alexander's reign; cf. Arr. 7.14.10; Diod. 18.3.4; App. Syr. 57; Plut. *Eum.* 1.5), then Perdikkas was possibly inferior to Hephaestion in this venture.

67 Curtius, who last mentions Perdikkas at 8.10.2, leaves him in limbo, failing to mention him in connection with Omphis (Curt. 8.12.6; cf. ME 48: *magnumque commeatum ab Hephaestione compara [tum in] venit [sc. Alexander]*; Curt. 8.12.15). For Omphis (ME 49 has Mophis) see Berve no. 739; Heckel, *Who's Who* 260–1 "Taxiles"; he is in fact the Indian Ambhi (McCredie 412–3); cf. Smith, *EHI* 63 ff.; but see Karttunen, *India* 32–3.

68 Bengtson, *Philip und Alexander* 194 gives a much more positive assessment of Hephaestion: "Als militärischer Führer zeigte er eine hohe Begabung, und dies vor allem auf dem Indienzug. Hier hat er ganz im Sinn Alexanders gewirkt, und zwar nicht nur auf dem Schlachtfeld, sondern auch in der Organisation des Landes."

69 For his character see Miltner 1933b: 52; Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 16.

70 Arr. 4.22.8; cf. Berve no. 174; Heckel, *Who's Who* 59 "Astis." Rapson, *CHI*, 318 suggests that the name "is short for Ashtakaraja, king of the Ashtakas." Cf. Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 108–10. The Kabul valley leads straight to Peukelaotis; the old view that Hephaestion and Perdikkas reached Peshawar via the Khyber Pass is convincingly rejected by Eggermont 1970: 69–70; cf. Engels, *Logistics* 108. Cf. also Badian 1987: 117–28.

71 Arr. 4.22.6. So Anspach I, 13; cf. Berve II, 90.

Perdikkas take the city, handing it over to Sangaios, who later made an official surrender to Alexander; Astis himself was killed in the defense of his city. By the time that Alexander reached the Indus, Hephaestion had built the boat-bridge and acquired provisions, chiefly from Omphis, for the bulk of the army.<sup>72</sup>

In the battle with Poros at the Hydaspes (Jhelum), Hephaestion and Perdikkas both commanded cavalry and were directly under Alexander's control on the left wing.<sup>73</sup> More precise information is lacking. Hephaestion led a smaller force into the kingdom of the so-called "cowardly" Poros (Πόρος ὁ κακός), a cousin of the recently defeated king.<sup>74</sup> This man, alarmed at the friendly treatment of his namesake, left his kingdom and fled eastward to the Gandaridai.<sup>75</sup> Alexander pursued him as far as the Hydraotes (Ravi) River, whence he sent Hephaestion—with his own hipparchy and that of Demetrios son of Althaimenes, two battalions of infantry and half the archers—into the defector's kingdom in order to hand it over to the friendly Poros.<sup>76</sup> Whether "cowardly" Poros' defection was in any way connected with the uprising among the Assakenians cannot be determined.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps Alexander had already intended to give the (now) friendly Poros authority over the kingdom of his namesake, who fled for this very reason. At any rate, Hephaestion's mission was primarily organizational—to oversee the transfer of the kingdom and establish a Makedonian outpost on the Akesines (cf. Arr. 5.29.3)—and hardly a war of conquest: Diodorus' claim (17.93.1) that he returned to Alexander, "having conquered a large part of India" (πολλὴν τῆς Ἰνδικῆς καταπεπολεμηκώς), exaggerates his achievement. He rejoined the King after the Sangala campaign—a particularly bloody undertaking<sup>78</sup>—and before the expedition reached the Hyphasis (Beas).<sup>79</sup>

Thus, in India as in Baktria and Sogdiana, Hephaestion's duties continued to be primarily non-military. With Perdikkas he had founded the city of Orobatis *en route* to the Indus<sup>80</sup> (which he bridged), and gathered provisions from Omphis. After transferring the territories of "cowardly" Poros to his namesake, he established a

<sup>72</sup> Arr. 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2–3; 12.4, 6, 15; ME 48; Fuller, *Generalship* 126–7; Breloer, *Kampf gegen Poros* 22.

<sup>73</sup> Arr. 5.12.2; Curt. 8.14.15. For the battle in general see Schubert 1901; Veith 1908; Tarn II, 190–8; Hamilton 1956; Devine 1987. See also Breloer, *Kampf gegen Poros* 51; Fuller, *Generalship* 180–99; esp. 186–7.

<sup>74</sup> The son of Althaimenes: Berve no. 256; Heckel, *Who's Who* 108 "Demetrius [1]." Berve no. 684; Heckel, *Who's Who* 232 "Poros [2]"; Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 125 n.2.

<sup>75</sup> Diod. 17.91.1–2; cf. Arr. 5.21.3–4. The Gandaridai or Gangaridai (Curt.) were thought to live beyond the Ganges (Curt. 9.2.3; Diod. 17.93.2).

<sup>76</sup> Arr. 5.21.5; Diod. 17.91.2 does not give the exact composition of Hephaestion's troops (μετὰ δυνάμεως). Demetrios son of Althaimenes may have been Hephaestion's cousin (see above).

<sup>77</sup> Arr. 5.20.7; the (unnamed) hyparch there was murdered; Alexander sent Philippos son of Machatas to restore order.

<sup>78</sup> Just under 100 dead and over 1,200 wounded, among them the *somatophylax* Lysimachos (Arr. 5.24.5). The campaign will have played no small part in demoralizing the troops that advanced to the Hyphasis (Beas).

<sup>79</sup> Diod. 17.93.1; Curt. 9.1.35.

<sup>80</sup> Arr. 4.28.5.

fortified site near the Akesines (Chenab);<sup>81</sup> later he founded settlements at Patala and in the land of the Oreitai. The latter, named Alexandria, may in fact have been the synoecism of Rhambakia, which Leonnatos completed.<sup>82</sup>

### The height of Hephaistion's power

Nevertheless, in 326 Hephaistion emerged as the most powerful of Alexander's marshals. The army had mutinied at the Hyphasis, no longer willing to proceed ever eastward. And some have suggested that Alexander may have felt that Koinos, the spokesman for the war-weary troops, had betrayed him.<sup>83</sup> Koinos soon died of illness, but Alexander, retracing his steps only grudgingly, came to rely more heavily on Hephaistion.<sup>84</sup> On his return to the Hydaspes, Alexander appointed trierarchs for the fleet that would descend the Indus river system. Following the Athenian practice, the King assigned to his wealthiest and most prominent officers, among them Hephaistion,<sup>85</sup> the responsibility for meeting the expenses of the fleet. For the expedition towards the Indus delta, Alexander divided the bulk of his land forces into two parts: Hephaistion took the larger portion, including 200 elephants, down the eastern bank, while Krateros with the smaller force descended on the west.<sup>86</sup> It was Alexander's custom to divide his forces whenever possible, to expedite the subjugation of enemy territory, but at this time the separation of Hephaistion and Krateros had become a virtual necessity. Friction between Alexander's dearest friends, which had existed for some time, erupted during the Indian campaign into open hand-to-hand combat, with the troops ready to come to the aid of their respective leaders.<sup>87</sup> Now it seemed that the only way to ease the tension was to keep the two commanders apart as much as possible.

The Indus proved useful. The rivals were given instructions to proceed downstream, each on his side of the river, and to await the fleet, which would join them three days' sail from the point of departure.<sup>88</sup> Two days after Alexander's arrival at the predestined location, Hephaistion continued south toward the junction

81 Arr. 5.29.3. The transfer of inhabitants from neighboring villages and the imposing of a garrison were done by Alexander himself on his return from the Hyphasis.

82 Arr. 6.21.5. See also Hamilton 1972.

83 For Koinos' speech: Arr. 5.27.2–9; Curt. 9.3.5–15; Alexander's reaction: Arr. 5.28.1. Spann 1999: 69 speaks of "the complicity of Coenus in the Beas affair," arguing that Koinos' speech was contrived and a part of Alexander's deception. He had no intention of advancing beyond the Hyphasis (cf. Heckel 2003b and Howe and Müller 2012).

84 Koinos' death: Arr. 6.2.1; Curt. 9.3.20. Badian 1961: 22 and 1964: 200 is suspicious of his sudden death; but see Holt 2000. Carney 1975 believes that Alexander now came to regard Krateros as "potentially dangerous" (216) and that "he did not fear [Hephaestion] as he did Craterus" (220); but see my discussion of their relationship below. Hephaistion had rejoined Alexander before the Hyphasis mutiny (Diod. 17.93.1; Curt. 9.1.35).

85 Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 (cf. Whitby, *BNJ*) = Arr. *Ind* 18.3.

86 Arr. 6.2.2; Arr. *Ind*. 19.1–3; Diod. 17.96.1.

87 Plut. Alex. 47.11–2; cf. Diod. 17.114.1–2.

88 Arr. *Ind*. 19.3; Arr. 6.4.1; cf. Milns, *Alexander* 227.

of the Hydaspes and Akesines, toward the territory of the peoples allied to the Mallians, who had prepared to resist the invader (Arr. 6.4.1). By the time Hephaestion arrived, he found that Alexander (who had sailed ahead) had subdued the tribes of that region and was preparing to march directly against the Mallians; these lived between the Hydraotes and Akesines Rivers.

For this campaign, Alexander devised the following strategy. First the slower troops, Polyperchon's battalion and the elephants, were transferred to the western bank and placed under Krateros' command, as were the *hippotoxotai* and the force with which Philippos (the brother of Harpalos, the Treasurer) had followed the course of the Akesines River.<sup>89</sup> Hephaestion and the troops that remained with him were to march five days in advance toward the confluence of the Akesines and Hydraotes. Nearchos was to sail down the Akesines with the fleet, and Ptolemy was to follow Hephaestion's route after a delay of three days. Alexander meanwhile crossed the desert region between the rivers with the intention of taking the Mallians off guard. He hoped that those of the Mallians who escaped southward would be driven into the arms of Hephaestion, while Ptolemy would lie in wait for those who attempted to escape to the west (Arr. 6.5.6). The elaborate strategy proved unnecessary, for Alexander took the Mallians completely by surprise. They had not expected that the enemy would arrive from the west, through the waterless region. Those who retreated to their chief city, where Alexander was critically wounded, were slaughtered, while those of another town, if they did not find refuge in the marshes, were butchered by the forces of Perdikkas (Arr. 6.6.6).

The army continued southward, both Hephaestion and Krateros now occupying the eastern bank, since the terrain on the western side proved too difficult for Krateros' troops (Arr. 6.15.4). But before the army reached Patala news came of unrest in the west. Thus Krateros was dispatched with the elephants, such Makedonians as were unfit for service (*apomachoi*) and the battalions of Attalos, Meleagros, and Antigenes,<sup>90</sup> with instructions to police the regions of Arachosia, Drangiana, and finally Karmania, where he was to rejoin Alexander.<sup>91</sup> For Hephaestion it must have been welcome news that Krateros, his most powerful rival, had been sent to the west; for he now became Alexander's undisputed second-in-command.

At Patala Alexander made good use of Hephaestion's talents, instructing him to fortify the place while he himself sailed to the mouth of the Indus via the west arm of the river (Arr. 6.18.1). On his return, he found the task completed and he assigned to Hephaestion the work of fortifying the harbor and building the dockyards at the city, while he himself sailed to the ocean along the eastern arm of the

<sup>89</sup> Arr 6.5.5. See Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 29–56 (despite the objections of Brunt, *Arrian II*, 443); Fuller, *Generalship* 259–63; Smith, *EHI* 94 ff.

<sup>90</sup> These were probably the superannuated hypaspists (Heckel 2013a: 166). I see no support for the view (Crämer 1893: 53, rightly rejected by Berge II, 41 n.1) that Antigenes ever commanded *pezhetairoi*.

<sup>91</sup> Arr. 6.17.3; on the error at 6.15.5 see Bosworth 1976b: 127 ff.

Indus (Arr. 6.20.1). Hephaestion appears to have completed this work by the time of Alexander's return, although it is possible that Patala harbor, which became the base for Nearchos' ocean fleet, was set in final order by Nearchos himself (Arr. 6.21.3).

Hephaestion, however, accompanied Alexander to the west. At the Arabios (Hab) River, Alexander left him behind with the main force, while he, Leonnatos, and Ptolemy ravaged the land of the Oreitai in three columns (Arr. 6.21.3; Curt. 9.10.6). Hephaestion, it appears, had been instructed to lead his forces to the borders of the Oreitai, where all the contingents reunited (Arr. 6.21.5). In the land of the Oreitai, Hephaestion made preparations for the synoecism of Rhambakia, while Alexander attended to military matters on the frontiers of Gedrosia. But Hephaestion was soon replaced by Leonnatos and sent to join Alexander, who now prepared to take the army through the Gedrosian desert (Arr. 6.21.5, 22.3). Leonnatos remained behind, for a time, with the satrap Apollophanes, in order to settle affairs among the Oreitai, complete the synoecism of Rhambakia, and prepare for the needs of Nearchos, who would be stopping there *en route* to the Persian Gulf.<sup>92</sup>

Of Hephaestion's part in the Gedrosian expedition we know nothing, except that he accompanied Alexander. After the ordeal and a rest in Karmania, Hephaestion led the slower troops and the baggage train into Persia along the coastal route ( $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha \theta\acute{a}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$ ). Alexander took the lighter troops through the mountains to Persepolis and through the Persian Gates; Hephaestion must have followed, for the last portion of his march, the wagon road ( $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\xi\tau\tau\acute{o}s$ ) that bypassed the Gates, which Parmenion had used in the winter of 331/0, when he led a similar force.<sup>93</sup> On the road to Sousa, the forces were reunited. And it was at Sousa that Hephaestion reached the pinnacle of his career.

### His quarrelsome nature

Perhaps encouraged by his success against the rival Philotas, Hephaestion continued to be at odds with leading figures in Alexander's entourage;<sup>94</sup> Kallisthenes, Eumenes, Krateros. Towards the end of his career, as we have seen, there was open conflict between Hephaestion and Krateros, who was equally ambitious but more capable. Yet Krateros' hitherto meteoric rise reached a plateau in India, when Hephaestion became a powerful and dangerous rival. There had been friction, and Alexander appears to have kept them apart deliberately. But, while the King professed to love them both dearly,<sup>95</sup> some of the blame for Krateros'

92 Arr. 6.22.3; *Ind.* 23.5–8; Curt. 9.10.7; Diod. 17.104.5–6, 105.8; Pliny, *HN* 6, 97; cf. Hamilton 1972.

93 Arr. 6.28.7. Parmenion's route around the Persian Gates: Arr. 3.18.1; Curt. 5.3.16. See Moritani 2014: 87 Fig. 2; cf. also Speck 2002: 38 n.27.

94 Carney 1975: 221: "One forms a picture of Alexander's closest friend which is not attractive. Yet it is easy to see why such a man would be both useful and attractive to Alexander: he was attractive to no one else, and therefore to Alexander alone."

95 For Alexander's devotion to Hephaestion: Curt. 3.12.16; Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10; Diod. 17.114.1–3; cf. Arr. 1.12.1; Ael. *VH* 12.7 (cf. Bosworth I, 103–4); Lucian, *dial. mort.* 12.4 (397). Krateros: *erat Craterus regi carus in paucis*, Curt. 6.8.2; ὅντινα ἴσον τῇ ἐαυτῷ κεφαλῇ ἔγει, Arr. 7.12.3; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10; Plut. *Mor.* 181c = *Apophth.* Al. 29; Diod. 17.114.1–2.

less-than-spectacular career after 326 must be attached to Hephaestion's influence and to Alexander's willingness to promote the latter's interests.<sup>96</sup>

Hephaestion's dealings with individuals reveal that he was quarrelsome, deliberately incompatible. We do not know the exact nature of his quarrel with Kallisthenes, or why he maligned him. Perhaps Kallisthenes' way of life did not appeal to Hephaestion,<sup>97</sup> who showed an enthusiastic preference for Alexander's orientalisms and was himself given to the same excesses that at times afflicted the King.<sup>98</sup> Plutarch tells us that Hephaestion was sympathetic to Alexander's oriental policies—which Alexander, no doubt, explained to him and won his support for—and that he was used by Alexander in his dealings with the Persians (*Plut. Alex.* 47.9). Perhaps this attitude toward the orientals earned him the disfavor of both Makedonians and Greeks, though his rise to power through Alexander's favoritism was a major cause of hostility; there will have been a number of his contemporaries who encouraged rumors that Hephaestion was Alexander's minion.<sup>99</sup> Perhaps he organized the unpopular *proskynesis* affair, as modern scholarship likes to assume,<sup>100</sup> though Chares of Mytilene, whom Schachermeyr regards as Alexander's "Chef der Kanzlei," would be a more suitable candidate for such work.<sup>101</sup> At any rate, Kallisthenes had promised Hephaestion that he would perform *proskynesis*—or so, at least, the latter claimed—but went back on his word. Hephaestion wasted no time in maligning Kallisthenes, once the sycophant, Demetrios son of Pythonax, had brought Kallisthenes' defiance to Alexander's attention.<sup>102</sup> We cannot say to what extent he carried his hostility, but he will scarcely have done anything to enhance Kallisthenes' already-declining popularity. Kallisthenes, however, made little or no effort to redeem himself.

The accounts of Hephaestion's quarrels with Eumenes are lost from the manuscripts of Arrian and Curtius.<sup>103</sup> Plutarch speaks of two separate occasions on which they disagreed. The first instance involved the allotment of living-quarters:

96 Carney 1975: 214 suspects Alexander's motives: ". . . Alexander was careful to balance the duties and honors of Krateros with those of other top men, especially with Hephaestion"; cf. 1975: 21: "Alexander carefully monitored his activities and consciously played him off against others. Krateros was potentially dangerous . . . and had to be watched closely."

97 Arr. 4.10; Plut. Alex. 53. Hephaestion shared many of the sentiments of Alexander's flatterers, who contributed to Kallisthenes' ruin.

98 Cf. Ephippos of Olynthos and his work *On the Deaths of Alexander and Hephaestion*, *FGGrH* 126, which doubtless exaggerated their vices.

99 Ael. *VH* 12.7; Justin 12.12.11; Lucian, *dial. mort.* 12.4 (397); Diod. 17.114.3; cf. Tarn II, 319–26, Appendix 18: "Alexander's Attitude to Sex," esp. 321. See also Ogden, *MGS* 155–67.

100 Droysen I 312; Berse II, 171; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 383; Hamilton, *PA* 153 and 1973: 105; Wilcken, *Alexander* 169; Welles 1970: 41; Green, *Alexander* 375–6.

101 Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 17–8, 34.

102 Plut. *Alex.* 55.1. For Demetrios son of Pythonax, see Arr. 4.12.5; see also Berse no. 258; Heckel, *Who's Who* 109 "Demetrius [3]"; Hamilton, *PA* 153.

103 Arr. 7.12.7 breaks off with the quarrels of Antipatros and Olympias, and resumes with the reconciliation of Hephaestion and Eumenes (τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὑποπτήζαντα Ἡφαιστίωνα συναλλαγῆναι Εὐμενῆ, οὐχ ἔκόντα ἔκόντι). "Induced by this argument Hephaestion was said to have made a reluctant reconciliation with Eumenes, though Eumenes himself was willing"); the actual quarrel itself is lost. Curt. 10.4.3 breaks off at Opis and resumes with the account of Alexander's death, 10.5.1 ff.

Hephaistion gave the quarters previously assigned to Eumenes to the flute player Euios.<sup>104</sup> This was clearly an arrogant gesture on Hephaistion's part and an affront to the Greek Eumenes, a man of no mean station. This incident is presumably one that is lost from Arrian's manuscript, for it took place at Ecbatana, precisely the historical context in which the *lacuna* occurs. The second quarrel, again the result of a relatively minor issue, involved a gift or a prize ( $\piερὶ δωρεᾶς τινος$ ); Plutarch does not give the details.<sup>105</sup> The quarrels evoked Alexander's anger, first against Hephaistion (who appears to have instigated them) and later against Eumenes, and it appears that ever since the first incident the two were at odds with one another. The cause of the enmity must be sought in the struggle for power within the army, and in the unpleasant nature of Hephaistion. Fortunately for Eumenes, the animosity and his enemy were both short lived; nevertheless, Eumenes was careful to avert any suspicion that he rejoiced at Hephaistion's death by proposing that honors be granted to him posthumously.<sup>106</sup>

Most revealing, however, are the accounts of Hephaistion's stormy relations with Krateros. The two had worked together against Philotas, a common enemy; now ambition for power and Alexander's favor led inevitably to jealous rivalry. In the early stages of the campaign there had been less conflict: Krateros had been steadily proving himself the most likely man to replace Parmenion, Hephaistion was busily ingratiating himself with Alexander. Both were dear to the King, and he used them according to their abilities: Krateros for important military assignments and for dealings with Greeks and Makedonians—he was very “traditional” in his thinking—and Hephaistion for organizational work, both in conquered territory and at the Court. But, as Hephaistion's aspirations extended to higher commands in the army, jealousy erupted into open hand-to-hand fighting, with the supporters of each ready to join in the fray.<sup>107</sup> Thereafter, Hephaistion and Krateros were seldom in the same camp together—and certainly not for any length of time—after 326.

The incident in India, where Hephaistion and Krateros came to blows, is instructive. We are told by Plutarch (*Alex.* 47.11) that Alexander rode up and openly reproached Hephaistion, calling him a madman if he did not know that “without Alexander he would be nothing” ( $Αλέξανδρος ἐλοιδόρει τὸν ‘Ηφαιστίωνα φωνερῶς, ἔμπληκτον καλῶν καὶ μανύμενον, εἰ μὴ συνίησιν ώς, έάν τις αὐτοῦ τὸν Αλέξανδρον ἀφέληται, μηδέν ἔστιν$ ). This was not the case with Krateros, whom Alexander chided in private; for Krateros was not one to be dishonored before his own troops, and before the *hetairoi*. Alexander recognized the value of Krateros to the King and to the army, and, undoubtedly, he was pained by the friction

<sup>104</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 2.2; cf. Berve no. 315; Heckel, *Who's Who* 124. Euios was himself a source of trouble, for he quarreled with Kassandros over the boy Python (Berve no. 678; Heckel, *Who's Who* 240, “Python [2]”), so Plut. *Apophth. Al.* 20 = *Mor.* 180f.

<sup>105</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 2.8. Cf. Vezin, *Eumenes* 16–7; Anson, *Eumenes* 46–7. For Eumenes' career: Berve no. 317; Kaerst, *RE VI* (1909) 1083–4; Westlake 1969; Vezin, *Eumenes*; Anson, *Eumenes*; Heckel, *Who's Who* 120–1.

<sup>106</sup> Arr. 7.14.9; cf. Diod. 17.115.1.

<sup>107</sup> The episode is somewhat reminiscent of the quarrel between Klearchos and Menon: Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.11–7.

between Krateros and Hephaistion. His relationship with the latter, on the other hand, was a much more personal one; ruffled feathers could later be smoothed over in private. And probably he understood that Hephaistion's nature was largely to blame. No two individuals are more aptly characterized than are Hephaistion and Krateros by the epithets *philalexandros* and *philobasileus*.<sup>108</sup>

In view of Hephaistion's rivalry with Krateros and the previous downfalls of Philotas and Kallisthenes, the somewhat unspectacular last years of Krateros under Alexander suggest that Hephaistion's influence with Alexander had again been at work. We cannot say what would have happened had Krateros actually become Regent of Makedonia in Antipatros' place. But, for Hephaistion in Asia, the base of Alexander's integrated empire, Krateros' departure for Europe left him without a serious rival as Alexander's dearest friend and foremost general.<sup>109</sup>

### A partner in the new empire

Sousa in the spring of 324 saw not only the clearest manifestation of Alexander's orientalism in the mass marriages between the Iranian and Makedonian nobilities, but also the culmination of Hephaistion's unusual career. Already he had become the army's most important officer, for he commanded the first hipparchy (= chilarchy) of the Companions (Arr. 7.14.10). Very soon he would be crowned for his exploits on the campaign, along with the other members of the *somatophylakes* (Arr. 7.5.6). But now he received, at the mass marriages, what must be regarded as the greatest honor of his career, no less than a symbolic share in the empire.

For Alexander the marriage to Roxane, in spite of the strong romantic tradition that it had been a love match, had been the first experiment in political marriage; Philip II had exploited political marriages to their fullest, and now Alexander secured the goodwill of the stubborn Sogdianoi by marrying one of their race.<sup>110</sup>

108 Plut. *Alex.* 47.10; Plut. *Mor.* 181d = *Apophth. Al.* 29; Diod. 17.114.2.

109 For Krateros' departure see Arr. 7.12.3–4. The ambitious and somewhat unscrupulous Perdikkas, however, lurked in the shadows.

110 Alexander had given his first thoughts to political marriage in 337, at the time of the ill-advised communications with Pixodaros (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1–4). At the Iaxartes River, some two years before his marriage to Roxane, he rejected a union with the daughter of the Skythian king (Arr. 4.15.1–5). For the marriage to Roxane see Arr. 4.19.4–20.4; Plut. *Alex.* 47.7; Plut. *Mor.* 332e = *defort. Al.* 1.11; Plut. *Mor.* 338d = *defort. Al.* 2.6; Curt. 8.4.21–30; ME 28–9; Zonaras 4.12, p. 296, 6; Strabo 11, 517. For the political motives: Plut. *Alex.* 47.8; cf. Curt. 8.4.25. See Hamilton, *PA* 129–30; on the marriage Renard and Servais 1955; Tarn II, 326; but see Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 22: "man gewinnt den Eindruck, als ob sich Roxane im Liebesleben Alexanders gegenüber den neuen, aus Staatsräson geschlossenen Ehen recht wohl zu behaupten wusste." See Berve no. 688; Heckel, *Who's Who* 241–2 "Roxane"; and also Holt, *Land of Bones* 86–92. Alexander held both her father and brother in great honor, see Berve nos. 587, 392; Heckel, *Who's Who* 187–8 "Oxyartes," 144 "Itanes." Roxane was, one might add, with the exception of Alexander's mistress Barsine (whose son Herakles is now accepted by Brunt 1975, against Tarn 1921 and II, 330–7; cf. Berve nos. 206, 353, who accepts Herakles' existence; Heckel, *Who's Who* 70 "Barsine," 138 "Heracles"), the only woman to bear children by Alexander; that is to omit his fictitious children by the Indian queen Kleophas (Berve no. 435) and Thalestris the Amazon.

In 324, firmly established on the throne of the Great King, Alexander sought to legitimize his own position by marrying the Achaimenid Stateira, daughter of Dareios III.<sup>111</sup> To Krateros he gave Amastris, daughter of Dareios' brother, Oxyathres, a bride worthy of the King's most capable commander.<sup>112</sup> But to Hephaistion he wedded Drypetis, the sister of his own bride Stateira. Arrian says: "he wished his children to be the first-cousins of Hephaistion's children."<sup>113</sup> By marrying Stateira, Alexander had strengthened his claim to the rule over Asia—and clearly the marriage must have had great popular appeal for the Persians, who hoped to see the grandsons of Dareios on the throne<sup>114</sup>—, but he also conferred upon Hephaistion, who married his new sister-in-law, more than just the honor of relationship by marriage: this was a legitimate, though lesser, claim to a share in the empire.

Whatever the exact nature of Alexander's plans for Hephaistion—including his role as chiliarch in the Persian sense of *hazarapatis*<sup>115</sup>— they were never fully realized. From Sousa, Hephaistion led the bulk of the infantry to the Persian Gulf, while Alexander sailed down the Eulaios River to the coast (Arr. 7.7.1), and from here he followed the Tigris upstream where the army and fleet reunited (Arr. 7.7.6). Together they proceeded to Opis, and from Opis to Ekbatana. It was now the autumn of 324.

### The death of “Patroklos”

At Ekbatana Alexander offered sacrifice and celebrated athletic and literary contests.<sup>116</sup> There were bouts of heavy drinking, and shortly thereafter

111 Plut. *Alex.* 70. 3; Plut. *Mor.* 329e–f = *de fort. Al.* 1.7; Diod. 17.107.6; Justin 12.10.9–10; Arr. 7.4.4 (from Aristoboulos, *FGrH* 139 F52; cf. Pownall, *BNJ*) mistakenly calls her Barsine. Berve no. 722; Heckel, *Who's Who* 256–7 “Stateira [2].” Tarn II, 334 n.4, followed by Hamilton, *PA* 195, thinks Barsine was her official and correct name (against Berve); Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 22 regards Barsine as her “Mädchenname.”

112 See Arr. 7.4.5; Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F4. Berve no. 50; Wilcken, *RE I* (1894) 1750, s.v. “Amastris (7)”; Heckel, *Who's Who* 21. Berve no. 586; Heckel, *Who's Who* 188. See also Macurdy, *HQ* 60, 107; Brosius 1996: 18, 78 n.70.

113 Arr. 7.4.5. For Drypetis see also Diod. 17.107.6; cf. Curt. 10.5.20. Berve no. 290; Heckel, *Who's Who* 116; cf. Brosius 1996: 77. Her death (along with her sister's) at the hands of Roxane and Perdikkas: Plut. *Alex.* 77.6. See Stemma XI for the last Achaimenids.

114 Alexander strengthened this claim by marrying also Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochos, who had ruled Persia before Dareios III (Arr. 7.4.4). See Berve no. 607; Heckel, *Who's Who* 192; cf. Brosius 1996: 30, 77. For the family connections see Neuhaus 1902; but Bosworth I, 218, treats Neuhaus' theory with caution.

115 See Junge 1940; Benveniste, *Titres et noms* 51–71. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 31–7: “Der Unterschied zum Reichsvezierat des persischen *hazarapatis* lag also darin, daß der Chiliarch Alexanders überhaupt keine dauernden und fixen Befugnisse zu eigen hatte, daß er nichts war, solange ihm der Herrscher keinen Auftrag gab, daß er aber als vollwertiger alter ego des Herrschers auftreten konnte, sobald ihn dieser mit einem diesbezüglichen Auftrag und einer diesbezüglichen Vertretung betraute” (36).

116 Plut. *Alex.* 72.1 says that some 3,000 artists had arrived from Greece; cf. Arr. 7.14.1; Diod. 17.110.7–8 (dramatic contests only). It was probably here that Python's *Agen* was produced. See Chapter 14 below.

Hephaestion fell ill with a fever.<sup>117</sup> We do not know the precise nature of his ailment; even Plutarch, who gives the most detail, is vague (Plut. *Alex.* 72.2). Invariably, Hephaestion's death is linked with heavy drinking: Arrian implies that the drinking bouts were the cause of Hephaestion's illness, Diodorus is more explicit, but Plutarch does not specify the cause of Hephaestion's fever, only that immoderate eating and drinking were the proximate causes of his death.<sup>118</sup> Ehippos of Olynthos, in his scandalous pamphlet *On the Death of Alexander and of Hephaestion*, will have attributed it solely to barbaric drinking habits.<sup>119</sup> At any rate, it was on the seventh day of his illness that Hephaestion died (so Arr. 7.14.1). The only other details are supplied by Plutarch, according to whom, Hephaestion disregarded the strict diet imposed by his doctor Glaukos (Glaukias in Arr. 7.14.4), who had gone off to the theater.<sup>120</sup> Eating a boiled fowl and drinking a great quantity of wine, Hephaestion heightened his fever and died (Plut. *Alex.* 72.2); news of his deteriorating condition reached Alexander at the stadium, where he was watching the boys' races, but he returned too late and found Hephaestion already dead (Arr. 7.14.1).

From the accounts of what followed it is virtually impossible to separate fact from fiction. Arrian provides a catalogue of *legomena*, but his criteria for determining reliability—when indeed he does make such an attempt—amount to little more than accepting what is honorable in a king's behavior and rejecting what is not; in this respect he recalls the rather naïve basis for his trust in Ptolemy's *History*, which he related in the prooemium.<sup>121</sup> Alexander's grief was excessive, on this point all the sources concur. But there were some who

<sup>117</sup> The heavy drinking was exaggerated by Ehippos of Olynthos, *FGrH* 126, and played down by Aristoboulos, 139 F62 (cf. Pownall, *BNJ*) = Arr. 7.29.4.

<sup>118</sup> For the accounts of his death: Arr. 7.14.1 ff.; Diod. 17.110.8; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.31 (incorrectly, it happened at Babylon!); Justin 12.12.11; Arr. 7.18.2–3; Epictetus 2.22.17; Plut. *Alex.* 72; Plut. *Pelop.* 34.2; Nepos, *Eum.* 2.2; App. *BC* 2.152.

<sup>119</sup> For Ehippos of Olynthos see Jacoby, *FGrH* no. 126, and IID 437–9; Pearson, *LHA* 61–8; Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 98–105.

<sup>120</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 72.2 (Glaukos). See Berve no. 228; Heckel, *Who's Who* 126 “Glauclias [3].”

<sup>121</sup> Arr. 7.14.2–10. In the prooemium Arrian says that he based his history on the works of Aristoboulos and Ptolemy, whom he judged to be the most reliable of the historians of Alexander “because Aristoboulos had accompanied Alexander on the expedition, and Ptolemy, in addition to campaigning with him, was a king himself, and it would have been more despicable for him to lie than for anyone else” (*prooem.* 2). Arrian did not ignore Alexander's faults, it is true, but he couched his criticisms of his hero with whole-hearted (often excessive) praise not only of his virtues but of his readiness to repent of his crimes (e.g., 4.9.1, 19.6). On the whole there is a reluctance to accept stories that cast Alexander in a bad light, and the attitude prevails that, if we are to judge Alexander's character, we must base this on all the evidence, not on a portion of it: δοτις δὲ κακίζει Αλεξανδρον, μηδέ μόνον ὅσα ἄξια κακίζεσθαι ἔστι προφερόμενος κακίζετω, ἀλλὰ ἔνυπαντα τὰ Αλεξανδρον εἰς ἐν χωρίον ξυναγαγάνων . . . (7.30.1). For a useful discussion of Arrian's attitude to his subject see J.R. Hamilton's “Introduction” in Sélincourt's Penguin translation of Arrian (*Arrian 17–34*), though Hamilton's comment (*Alexander* 20) that Arrian, “a Stoic himself, . . . avoided the doctrinaire condemnation of Alexander popular in Stoic circles,” falls short of expressing Arrian's willingness to make excuses for Alexander (or, at least, to overlook what is unpleasant).

thought it noble that he should display his sorrow, others who found it unfitting for Alexander or for any other king. Those who saw in Alexander's grief an emulation of Achilleus reported that he shaved the manes of his horses and his mules, tore down city-walls, and lay upon the corpse of his Patroklos, refusing food and water; the last point is at least typical of Alexander.<sup>122</sup> Magnificent, indeed ostentatious, were the funeral arrangements, some of which were later cancelled at the instigation of Perdikkas, who conveyed Hephaistion's body to Babylon.<sup>123</sup> As the legitimate successor of the Great King, Alexander ordered that the sacred fire of Persia be extinguished until such time as Hephaistion's last rites had been taken care of.<sup>124</sup> Such were the honors accorded the dead Hephaistion. But there were stories of Alexander's rage against Glaukias the physician and even the healing-god Asklepios (or, rather, some local approximation): Glaukias was hanged, and the god's temple in Ekbatana razed.<sup>125</sup> On the Kossaians too, an unruly people to the west of Ekbatana, Alexander vented

122 For Alexander's excessive grief and the agreement of the sources see Arr. 7.14.2; for different attitudes towards the display of emotion, Arr. 7.14.3. The emulation of Achilleus: Arr. 7.14.4 (he also cut his own hair); Ael. VH 7.8; Plut. *Pelop.* 34.2 (horses' manes, demolished walls), cf. Plut. *Alex.* 72.3. For his refusal of food and drink: Arr. 7.14.8. Cf. Alexander's behavior after Kleitos' death: Arr. 4.9.1 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 51.10–52.1; Curt. 8.2.1 ff. Although the Alexander–Achilleus/Hephaistion–Patroklos parallel does not come from either Ptolemy or Aristoboulos, Müller 2014b: 92 suggests plausibly that Arrian reported the stories “because of the subject's significance for Hadrian.” Hammond, *Sources* 136–40 conveniently dismisses the negative elements of the story in Diodorus and Plutarch as deriving from Kleitarchos.

Reames-Zimmerman 2001 concludes, after a thorough study of the nature of bereavement, that “Alexander's mourning followed a typical pattern, with predictable behaviors at each phase, and resolved itself within a normal time frame. What made him unusual was having the authority and wealth to see all his wishes enacted” (141).

123 For the funeral pyre: Justin 12.12.12; Diod. 17.115.5 (both put the cost at 12,000 talents); Arr. 7.14.8 (10,000); cf. Hamilton 1984: 14. Diod. 17.115.6 speaks of the slaughter of 10,000 sacrificial victims; for the cancellation of Hephaistion's monument see Diod. 18.4.2 (who wrongly calls it the pyre, which had already been completed; see Geer 1947–54: IX, 21 n. 1); cf. Badian 1967b: 200–1. According to Plut. *Alex.* 72.5 the work was to be undertaken by Stasikrates (Deinokrates? see Berve, nos. 249, 720), who had offered to shape Mt. Athos into a giant likeness of Alexander. See Hamilton, *PA* 202. Arrian fails to mention that Perdikkas was instructed to take the body to Babylon (Diod. 17.110.8).

124 For the sacred fire see Diod. 17.114.4. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* “Das persische Königsfeuer am Hof Alexanders,” 38–48, esp. 47. For the nature of Alexander's kingship—not Persian, although it retained some of its elements, but a unique creation—see especially Fredricksmeyer 2000.

125 For Glaukias' fate see Arr. 7.14.4; Plut. *Alex.* 72.3. Arrian claims that Glaukias was executed for giving bad medicine, which may be the “official version,” so Berve II, 112 and Hamilton, *PA* 200. That Alexander did in fact execute Glaukias does not seem unlikely, for he was known to interfere in the business of physicians (cf. his advice to Pausanias the doctor of Krateros on how to treat his patient with hellebore [Plut. *Alex.* 41.7], or his letter to Peukestas' doctor, Alexippus, congratulating him on his healing talents [Plut. *Alex.* 41.6]); and it is not surprising that we know the names of several other doctors in Alexander's entourage, see Berve I, 79–80. For the temple of Asklepios see Epictetus 2.22.17; but cf. Arr. 7.14.6: οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς κέχρηται μοι ὁ Ἀσκληπιός, οὐ σώσας τὸν ἔταῖρον ὄντινα ἵσον τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ κεφαλῆῃ ἥγον.

his anger.<sup>126</sup> And, not surprisingly, history was quick to discover prophecies of Hephaistion's death.<sup>127</sup> The "Son of Amun" sent envoys of Siwah to inquire if Hephaistion should be worshipped as a god; the prudent father replied that he should be revered as a hero.<sup>128</sup>

The truth of many of these claims cannot be put to the test, and even if, as in the case of the attack on the Kossaians, actions were taken, the motives for them may nevertheless have been misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented. In contrast to literary embellishments, we know that monuments to Hephaistion were planned and in some cases executed. The lion of Hamadan—3.56 m long and of brown sandstone (remarkably similar in size and style to the lions of Chaeronea and Amphipolis)—may be his one surviving monument.<sup>129</sup> Of the smaller likenesses of the man made by the *hetairoi*, mentioned by Diodorus,

126 Arr. 7.15.1 ff.; Diod. 17.111.4 ff.; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.31. According to Strabo 11.13.6 C524 the Kossaians (the Cassites), whom Alexander attacked in the winter of 324/3, are one of four predatory tribes occupying the mountain regions that separate Persis and Sousiana from Media (cf. Pliny, *HN* 6.31 [134]. The Mardians achieved notoriety by stealing Boukephalas, and the Ouxians demanded tribute from Alexander in 331/0; the Elymaei proved least offensive to the Makedonians. The Kossaians may have been responsible for the depletion, through brigandage, of the Nesaian horse stocks (Strabo 11.12.4; Arr. 7.13.1; Diod. 17.110–6).

127 Arr. 7.18.2 = Aristoboulos, *FGrH* 139 F54 (cf. Pownall, *BNJ*). The seer Peithagoras foretold the deaths of both Alexander and Hephaistion (cf. App. *BC* 2.152). The prophecy was given to Apollodoros, his brother, who feared both Hephaistion and Alexander. Had he also found Hephaistion difficult to deal with?

128 Arr. 7.14.7: envoys are sent to Amun. Arr. 7.23.6: the response comes that he should be revered as a hero; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 72.3, but incorrectly that he should be deified Diod. 17.115.6; Justin 12.12.12: *eumque post mortem coli ut deum iussit*; Lucian, *Cal.* 17. That Alexander had him honored as θεός πάρεδρος only to be disappointed by the news from the oracle at Siwah, which stipulated a hero cult is implausible, especially since the arrival of the messengers coincided with the funeral, when a heroon for Hephaistion had already been built. Palagia 2000: 171, however, comments: "Alexander had hoped to achieve this [i.e., apotheosis] through the divine agency of Ammon but the oracle only authorized the heroization of Hephaistion. By the time Ammon's answer reached Babylon, however, the pyre was near completion transmitting the wrong message."

The establishment of the hero cult of Hephaistion is supported by dedication of a certain Diogenes in Pella (Thessaloniki Museum no. 1084; noted by Palagia 2000: 168 n.6; Stewart, *Faces* fig. 72; cf. Chugg, *Alexander's Lovers* 73) and is alluded to by Hypereides 6.21: καὶ [τ]οὺς τούτους οἰκέτας δόσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν. Cf. Treves 1939: 56–7 (the cult was in place already in April/May 323); Bickerman 1963; Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*<sup>2</sup> 28–36. But P.M. Fraser, in his review of Habicht, *CR* 8 (1958) 153–4, does not think the allusion to Hephaistion is so obvious. See Hamilton's comments (*PA* 200–1), where these views are summarized; the notion that Alexander sought to introduce his own deification by means of Hephaistion's hero cult antedates Habicht, see Kornemann 1901: 65, who makes a good case for this. Also, Anson, *Heirs* 32: "Hephaestion would receive hero cult, but Alexander wished to receive the cult associated with an Olympian . . ." Arr. 7.23.6–8 relates that Alexander was willing to forgive Kleomenes (Berve no. 431; Heckel, *Who's Who* 88–9 "Cleomenes [1]") his crimes in Egypt if he saw to a hero's shrine there.

129 For this statue, and its history, see Luschey 1968: esp. 121–2; Rice 1993: 249; Palagia 2000: 167–8. Cf. Lane Fox, *Alexander* 435: ". . . centuries later, when Hephaistion had long been forgotten, the ladies of Hamadan would smear the nose of their lion with jam, hoping for children and easy childbirth. Hephaistion ended his fame as a symbol of fertility."

none has survived.<sup>130</sup> That Alexander celebrated an elaborate state funeral for his dearest friend is certain but, as Palagia (2000: 169) has noted, Hephaestion's funeral pyre and the extravagant tomb that was planned for him are often confused. The temporary existence of the pyre is not in doubt: Diodorus (17.115.5) says that it was about 60 m high and cost more than 12,000 talents. Traces of it were unearthed by archaeologists in 1904.<sup>131</sup> The tomb itself was one of the many grandiose projects left unfinished by the King in 323 and canceled by Perdikkas with the sanction of the army. If Völcker-Janssen is right in seeing the tomb as a deliberate symbol of Alexander's decision to make Babylon the center of his new empire and to renounce any return to Makedonia, then the army's support for Perdikkas' proposal can be understood as motivated by more than financial concerns.<sup>132</sup> Even in death, Hephaestion remained inextricably identified with Alexander's orientalizing policy.

130 Diod. 17.115.1. These were perhaps similar to the carved ivory heads found in Tomb II at Vergina.

131 The results published by Koldewey 1914: 310–1 are summarized by Palagia 2000: 173, with additional literature in n.34. See also McKechnie 1995; Völcker-Janssen 100–16.

132 Völcker-Janssen 104: "Die Entscheidung Alexanders, die Grabstätte seines Gefährten in Babylon errichten zu lassen, konnte daher von den makedonischen Hetairoi und Soldaten als ein Teil der politischen Strategie des Makedonenkönigs verstanden werden, das Machtzentrum seines Reiches in Asien zu etablieren und nicht nach Makedonien zurückzukehren." This observation has a great deal of merit, but one wonders why, when the sources emphasize Hephaestion's role as chiliarch and the importance of the marriage with Drypetis, Alexander did not choose Babylon as his own final resting place, opting instead for Siwah.

## 8 Meleagros son of Neoptolemos

Berve II, 249–50 no. 494; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 146–7, 187; Geyer, *RE* XV.1 (1932) 478–9 no. 2; Heckel, *Who's Who* 159–61 “Meleager [1].”

While it put the barbarian under an obligation to him, this generosity of Alexander’s seriously offended his own friends. One such was Meleager who, having drunk too much at dinner, offered Alexander his congratulations on having at least found in India a man worth 1,000 talents. The King did not forget how remorseful he had been over killing Cleitus for his hasty tongue and so he repressed his anger, though he did comment that envious men only torment themselves.<sup>1</sup>

The regional background of Meleagros son of Neoptolemos is unknown,<sup>2</sup> and some have suggested a Lower Makedonian origin in the belief that only the phalanx battalions that were designated *asthetairoi* came from Upper Makedonia. Certainly, Meleagros had no strong connections with the members of Upper Makedonia’s aristocracy, although his battalion was often deployed along with Krateros’. Neither battalion is ever listed among the *asthetairoi*, and, according to Bosworth’s interpretation of the term, these phalangites would have been recruited from the peasant stock of Lower Makedonia. But Krateros as an Orestian probably commanded troops from his own region, possibly a combination of Orestians and Lynkestians.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the name of Meleagros’ father, Neoptolemos, suggests the western highlands, the only attested Neoptolemoi in

1 Curt. 8.12.17–8: *Quae liberalitas sicut barbarum obstrinxerat, ita amicos ipsius vehementer offendit. E quibus Meleager super cenam largiore vino usus gratulari se Alexandro dixit, quod saltem in India repperisset dignum talentis M. rex haud oblitus, quam aegre tulisset quod Clitum ob linguae temeritatem occidisset, iram quidem tenuit, sed dixit invidos homines nihil aliud quam ipsorum esse tormenta.* English translation by J.C. Yardley.

2 For the patronymic see Arr. 1.24.1, 29.4.

3 I suspect that Alexander distrusted the Lynkestians and divided their *taxis* so that each half was paired with a contingent of Orestians led by an Orestian commander (see Heckel 2009b: 107). See the discussion of the *pezhetairoi* in Part II.

Alexander's reign coming from Epeiros and Lynkestis.<sup>4</sup> Nor can we say with confidence when Meleagros was born. That he was not dismissed with the veterans in 324 suggests that he may have been one of the younger marshals. Similarly, the fact that he had only recently married in 334 may point to a birthdate in the 360s.<sup>5</sup>

Whether he was appointed phalanx commander by Philip II or by Alexander himself is also uncertain. In 335 he and Philippus (perhaps the son of Balakros or Amyntas) were ordered by Alexander to convey back to the Makedonian base the booty taken from the Getai beyond the Danube (Arr. 1.4.5). That he already commanded a *taxis* on this occasion is not explicitly stated; it may be inferred from association with Philippus. Meleagros is not mentioned again in the accounts of Alexander's European campaigns, although three other phalanx commanders are—Perdikkas, Koinos, Amyntas. Krateros too is conspicuously absent, and it may be that Alexander employed fewer, or different, battalions in Illyria and Greece.

At the Granikos River Meleagros was stationed on the left wing between the battalions of Philippus and Krateros, and at Halikarnassos he joined Perdikkas and Amyntas, as Alexander led three battalions of infantry in an unsuccessful attack on Myndos.<sup>6</sup> From Karia he was sent by Alexander as one of the leaders of the newly-weds (he too had recently married,<sup>7</sup> though his wife's name and family are unknown), along with Koinos son of Polemokrates and Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, to winter in Makedonia and bring back recruits; he rejoined the King at Gordion in the spring of 333, bringing 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Makedonia, along with 200 Thessalian horse, and 150 Eleians under the command of Alkias.<sup>8</sup> Of his participation in the battles at Issos and Gaugamela, nothing is known beyond his position in the battle line.<sup>9</sup> At the Persian Gates, at the end of 331, Meleagros and his battalion remained with Krateros, holding the attention of Ariobarzanes, while Alexander conducted the encircling maneuver (Arr. 3.18.4; Curt. 5.4.14).

We do not encounter Meleagros again until the summer of 329, when Alexander attacked Kyroupolis (Kurkath) and the fortresses along the Iaxartes River (Syr-Darya) in Sogdiana. But here we have only Curtius' testimony, which

<sup>4</sup> It was the name of Alexander's Epeiot grandfather (Justin 7.6.10; 17.3.14) and nephew (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.2 ff.), as well as that of the *archihypaspistes*, whom Plutarch (*Eum* 1.6) calls one of the Aiakidai. Neoptolemos son of Arrhabaios was Lynkestian (Arr. 1.20.10; Diod. 17.25.5). Cf. also Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 202 n.119.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Berse II, 249. Of course, marriage is not a good indicator of a man's age.

<sup>6</sup> Granikos: Arr. 1.14.3. Myndos: Arr. 1.20.5.

<sup>7</sup> Arr. 1.24.1.

<sup>8</sup> Return to Makedonia: Arr. 1.24.1. Reinforcements: Arr. 1.29.4. Alkias: Berse II, 23 no. 46; Heckel, *Who's Who* 9.

<sup>9</sup> Issos: Curt. 3.9.7; Arr. 2.8.4. Gaugamela: Diod. 17.57.2; Arr. 3.11.9; but Meleagros has dropped out of the battle order at Curt. 4.13.28, perhaps through confusion with his namesake, the ilarch mentioned at 4.13.27. He was stationed between Perdikkas and Ptolemaios at Issos, and in the same position at Gaugamela, except that Polyperchon had replaced Ptolemaios, who fell at Issos.

is not corroborated by Arrian. Meleagros and Perdikkas were entrusted with the besieging of the Memaceni, a people otherwise unknown but said to have killed some fifty Makedonian horsemen by treachery.<sup>10</sup> Their city was, however, captured by Alexander himself, despite the fact that he had sustained a serious wound to the neck in the assault on the walls (Curt. 7.6.22–3). Arrian (4.3.3), however, claims that Alexander suffered this wound at Kyroupolis,<sup>11</sup> and it cannot be determined if Arrian has conflated the sieges of Kyroupolis and the Memaceni or if Curtius has embellished and garbled a more simplified account of the Kyroupolis campaign. But Curtius gives independent, circumstantial, evidence concerning Meleagros' participation, and his account cannot be dismissed out of hand. In the spring of 328, when the main force returned to Sogdiana, Meleagros was left with Polyperchon, Attalos, and Gorgias in Baktria,<sup>12</sup> but Meleagros soon joined Koinos, with whom he spent the remainder of the campaigning season and the winter of 328/7 in Sogdiana.<sup>13</sup>

In 327, his battalion, along with those of White Kleitos and Gorgias (that is, the non-*asthetairoi*), accompanied Perdikkas and Hephaestion to the Indus, subduing the local dynast Astis *en route*.<sup>14</sup> On this mission, Meleagros will have met the son of the local dynast of Taxila, Omphis.<sup>15</sup> Some time later, when Alexander gave Omphis 1,000 talents at a banquet, Meleagros is said to have remarked to his king that “at least in India he had found a man worth one thousand talents.” Whether this reflects Meleagros’ personal dislike of Omphis, or his opposition to Alexander’s favorable treatment of orientals, or perhaps his own pettiness, we cannot say. Curtius claims that Alexander suppressed his anger, remembering Black Kleitos, but remarked that Meleagros, in his envy, was tormenting only himself.<sup>16</sup> Peter Green has seen in this episode, or perhaps in Meleagros’ personality in general, the reason for Meleagros’ failure to be promoted to hippoc.<sup>17</sup> Certainly, he was the only surviving phalanx commander, of those who held the office in 334, who had not risen above that rank. Furthermore, he appears never to have exercised an independent command.

10 For the Memaceni see Curt. 7.6.17 ff. The treacherous murder of the Makedonian horsemen: Curt. 7.6.17–8. For the roles of Meleagros and Perdikkas see 7.6.19 (with textual difficulties) and 7.6.21. The Makedonians had moved 620 Roman miles from Balkh (Baktra) to the Iaxartes (Pliny, *HN* 6.17 [45]).

11 For the effects of this wound on Alexander and his actions see Lascaratos 1997; Heckel and McLeod 2015: 250, 261–4.

12 Arr. 4.16.1; Berve II, 249 thinks that each phalanx leader had his own command in a separate part of Baktria, but there is no good evidence for this. The cavalry units were active in Sogdiana, and it seems unlikely that individual battalions would have operated in Baktria without cavalry support. See also Holt, *Land of Bones* 67–8.

13 Arr. 4.17.3.

14 Gorgias assumed command of Krateros’ battalion. Astis: Arr. 4.22.7; cf. Curt. 8.10.2; Berve II, 89–90 no. 174; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 59.

15 Ambhi. Diodorus and the *Metz Epitome* call him Mophis. When he succeeded his father, he took the official name Taxiles (see Berve no. 739; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 260–1). On Taxila see Karttunen 1990.

16 Curt. 8.12.17–8, quoted at the head of this chapter; cf. Strabo 15.1.28 C698; Plut. *Alex.* 59.5.

17 Thus Green, *Alexander* 388: “if Meleager never reached field rank this was, in a sense, just retribution for plain stupidity.”

Of his personality, little else is known, except that his conservative attitudes led him to reject the kingship of Alexander IV or of Herakles son of Barsine<sup>18</sup> and to espouse the cause of the incompetent Arrhidaios. His fondness for wrestling is attested by Pliny, who claims that he imported powdery dust from the Nile region for this very purpose.<sup>19</sup> But he was clearly not a man of learning, nor politically astute.<sup>20</sup>

At the Hydaspes, Meleagros, Attalos, and Gorgias occupied the camp at the halfway point between Krateros' position (opposite Poros) and Alexander's crossing point. These three phalanx commanders were assigned a force of mercenary cavalry and infantry, almost certainly in addition to their own battalions.<sup>21</sup> And, in accordance with their instructions, they crossed the Hydaspes, once Alexander's forces had successfully diverted Poros' attention, and helped to secure the Makedonian victory (Arr. 5.18.1). In 325 Meleagros returned from India via Arachosia and Drangiana along with Attalos and Antigenes, all under the leadership of Krateros (Arr. 6.17.3).

The pamphlet on *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great* includes Meleagros among the guests at Medios' dinner party, at which it is alleged that the King was given poison sent by Antipatros to his sons in Babylon.<sup>22</sup> According to this story, Meleagros was one of some fourteen guests who were involved in the plot against Alexander, and the forged Testament contained in the pamphlet awards the satrapy of Koile-Syria and Phoinikia to Meleagros.<sup>23</sup> The whole story of the poisoning is almost certainly a fabrication of the age of the first Successors, and it is not even certain if the Meleagros of the pamphlet is the phalanx commander or the *ilarches* and friend of Peithon son of Krateuas.<sup>24</sup> The satrapy of Koile-Syria was, in fact, awarded to Laomedon.

18 Justin 13.2.7 attributes to Meleagros Nearchos' proposal that Herakles be considered a candidate for the kingship. But this is Justin's careless summary of events and contradicted by Curt. 10.6.10–1; cf. Meeus 2008a: 47–8. For Herakles see *Stemma XII*.

19 *HN* 35.167–8; the story is told also of Krateros and Leonnatos.

20 Berve II, 250 concludes: “daß er zu den energischen Vertetern des starren und in politischen Dingen beschränkten Makedonentums gehörte, sicher ein gewissenhafter und dem König unbedingt ergebener Soldat war, aber über die engen Grenzen eines gewissen subalternen Wesens nicht hinaus konnte. Al. scheint ihn in diesem Sinne eingeschätzt und ihm deshalb niemals ein größeres selbständiges Kommando anvertraut zu haben.”

21 So Berve II, 249, following Anspach II, 7 n.134. Bosworth 1973: 247 n.2 thinks that Gorgias, Meleagros, and Attalos commanded only the mercenaries. For his position see Arr. 5.12.1.

22 For the date of the pamphlet see Ausfeld 1895, 1901 and Merkelbach 1977 (*Perdikkas*); Heckel, *LDT* (*Polyperchon*); also Bosworth 2000 (*Ptolemy*). Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 68–72, inexplicably reverts to the view of Ausfeld and Merkelbach. Bosworth 2000: 208 n.4 rightly comments: “The arguments against a dating to the era of Perdiccas are to my mind irrefutable.”

23 *LM* 117; Jul. Valer. 3.58; Leo 33; Ps-Call 3.33.15.

24 Cf. Berve II, 250 no. 495; Heckel, *Who's Who* 161 “Meleager [2].”

In the events that followed Alexander's death,<sup>25</sup> Meleagros championed the cause of the conservative phalanx and opposed the kingship of Alexander's sons by barbarian women.<sup>26</sup> He quickly became the spokesman for the common soldier and for those veteran commanders who had looked with disfavor on Alexander's orientalizing policies. In an unexpected move, which set the stage for the bitter struggles of the Diadochoi, Meleagros espoused the hereditary claims of Arrhidaios to the Makedonian kingship.<sup>27</sup> The aristocratic faction, stunned by the unexpected turn of events and cowed by the surging mob, withdrew from the phalanx, eventually leaving Babylon altogether (Curt. 10.7.10–21). But Meleagros' victory was temporary and hollow: agents sent to assassinate Perdikkas, who had remained briefly in the city in the hope of retaining some support with the infantry, were unwilling to do so, placing little confidence in the authority of Meleagros or his puppet Arrhidaios; Attalos son of Andromenes was easily detached by the prospect of alliance with Perdikkas, who offered his sister Atalante in marriage.<sup>28</sup> The phalanx in general soon repented and called for a reconciliation with the cavalry.<sup>29</sup> But the cavalry refused to cease hostilities unless the ringleaders of the uprising were handed over. The fact that the infantry made an exception of Meleagros, demanding that he should be accepted as a third leader (along with Perdikkas and Krateros), shows that at this time there was still considerable support for him.<sup>30</sup> The agreement, which ended the discord, recognized the kingship of Arrhidaios, but it also saw Krateros replace Meleagros as his guardian. This was, of course, much more to the liking of the

<sup>25</sup> The literature on the succession crisis in 323, and related problems, is immense. Only a partial list is supplied here. Endres 1917–8; Enßlin 1925; Schachermeyr 1925; Schwahn 1930; Treves 1932; Miltner 1933b; Cloché 1953; Fontana 1960; Vitucci 1963; Rosen 1967; Wirth 1967; Badian 1967b; Errington 1970; Heckel 1978c; Martin 1983; Hammond 1985; Anson 1992; Bosworth 1993b; Collins 2001; Bosworth, *Legacy* 29–63; Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 7–51; Meeus 2008a and 2009b; Romm, *Ghost* 34–56; Anson, *Heirs* 12–27. See also Landucci, *Diodoro* 6–46; Atkinson and Yardley, *Curtius* 172–203, 213–29; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 58–119.

<sup>26</sup> Meleagros and the infantry: Arr. *Succ.* 1.2. Opposition to Persian wives and their offspring: Justin 13.2.6–8; Curt. 10.6.20–1; Meeus 2008a: 48.

<sup>27</sup> Whether he took his cue from an *ignotus*, as Curtius (10.7.1–3, 6–7) says, is impossible to determine (but cf. Martin 1983: 162 ff.). Justin 13.3.2 and Diod. 18.2.2–3 (probably based on Hieronymos) say that Meleagros was sent by the cavalry to negotiate with the infantry but betrayed the former group. Geyer (*RE* XV.1 (1932) 479) prefers this version to that of Curtius, but Curtius appears to be based on Kleitarchos (who used eye-witnesses; so Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 85), and the story that Meleagros betrayed the cavalry may have been a later invention intended to justify his execution.

<sup>28</sup> Assassins sent by Meleagros and Arrhidaios: Curt. 10.8.1–3; but Justin 13.3.6–8 names Attalos as the instigator of the assassination attempt. For the marriage alliance between Perdikkas and Attalos see Diod. 18.37.2; Heckel 1978c.

<sup>29</sup> Curt. 10.8.5 ff. Meleagros appears to have bought time for himself by alleging that the order to murder Perdikkas had come from Philip Arrhidaios himself.

<sup>30</sup> For these negotiations see Curt. 10.8.14–22.

common soldier, and, Meleagros, although recognized as *tertius dux*,<sup>31</sup> was now isolated and soon abandoned by the infantry, who saw his death as beneficial, indeed essential to the well-being of the empire.<sup>32</sup> Disguising his intentions,<sup>33</sup> Perdikkas arranged with Meleagros himself a lustration of the Makedonian army, officially on the instructions of the new king. But, at the head of the cavalry and the elephants, Perdikkas suddenly called for the surrender of the authors of the discord. Some thirty were handed over for punishment and trampled beneath the feet of the elephants. Meleagros, their leader, sought refuge in a nearby temple, only to be murdered there.<sup>34</sup>

31 Curt. 10.8.22–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.3 makes Meleagros Perdikkas' hyparch; Justin 13.4.5 treats them as equals: *castrorum et exercitus et rerum* [MSS.] *cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur*.

32 Curt. 10.9.1: *nam et insociabile est regnum*.

33 Cf. Justin 13.4.7: *ignaro collega* must refer to Meleagros' ignorance of the fact that the plan was directed against him as well; cf. Curt. 10.9.20.

34 The lustration of the army, punishment of the seditious, death of Meleagros: Curt. 10.9.7–21. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.4. Justin 13.4.7–8 does not name Meleagros, but it is clear that he was among those who were executed. The number of those punished is given in the MSS. of Curt. 10.9.18 as “CCC,” but Rolfe 1946 reasons “XXX,” which may be preferable; Diod. 18.4.7 also says “thirty” (*τριάκοντα*). See Atkinson and Yardley, *Curtius* 216. The story of Meleagros' sudden rise and equally sudden fall is told succinctly by Anson, *Heirs* 17–22; see also Bosworth, *Legacy* 35–55; Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 50–2, “Die Hinrichtung des Meleagros”; Meeus 2008a: 43–59.

## 9 Leonnatos son of Anteas

Berve II, 232–5 no. 466; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 168–70; Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035–8 no. 1; Heckel, *Who's Who* 147–51 “Leonnatus [2].”

Leonnatos was a relative of Eurydike, the mother of Philip II, hence a member of the Lynkestian royal house; he was a *syntrophos* of Alexander and it is presumably because he was brought up at the Court that he was referred to as Pellaian.<sup>1</sup> Leonnatos’ father’s name appears in four different forms in different works of Arrian: Anteas (Ἀντέας: *Anab.* 6.28.4), Anthos (Ἀνθός: *Succ.* 1.2), Onasos (Ὀνάσος: *Anab.* 3.5.5) and Eunos (Εὔνος: *Ind.* 18.3). The first two are clearly variants of the same name; the other two are most likely scribal errors.<sup>2</sup>

The first historical mention of Leonnatos is on the day of Philip II’s assassination: along with his fellow *somatophylakes* Perdikkas and Attalos (probably the son of Andromenes), he pursued and killed the assassin Pausanias.<sup>3</sup> Berve

1 *Suda* Λ 247 = Arr. *Succ.* 12; cf. Curt. 10.7.8: *stirpe regia genit[us]*. His grandmother may have been a daughter of Sirrhas, and thus a sister of the queen; Arrhabaios I of Lynkestis would thus have been the maternal grandfather of Anteas. For Eurydike’s connections with the Lynkestian royal house see Macurdy, *HQ* 17; Bosworth 1971a; 99–101; Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035; cf. also Oikonomides 1983: 62–4. *Pellaeus*: Arr. 6.28.4; Arr. *Ind.* 18.3. The names Anteas and Leonnatos may have been found in the male line of Sirrhas, but perhaps they represent those of the family of Sirrhas’ son-in-law. For the Lynkestian royal house: Hammond, *HMac.* II, 16. See Stemma II and also Stemma X.

2 On the similarity of Anteas and Anthos see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170; Berve II, 232. The troublesome passages are *Indica* 18.3 and *Anabasis* 3.5.5. The former reads: τριήραρχοι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπεστάθησαν ἐκ Μακεδόνων μὲν Ἡφαιστίον τε Αμύντορος καὶ Λεόννατος ὁ Εὔνοος καὶ Λυσίμαχος ὁ Ἀγαθοκλέος καὶ Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ Τιμάνδρου . . . Jacoby (*FGrH* IIB, p. 681; cf. IID, p. 450) argues plausibly that Εὔνοος is an error for Εὖνίκοος, the patronymic of Asclepiodorus and emends the texts to read: τριήραρχοι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπεστάθησαν ἐκ Μακεδόνων μὲν Ἡφαιστίον τε Αμύντορος καὶ Λεόννατος ὁ <\*> καὶ Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ Εὔνίκοος καὶ Λυσίμαχος ὁ Ἀγαθοκλέος καὶ Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ Τιμάνδρου . . . It is more difficult to explain the corruption of the name in *Anab.* 3.5.5: σωματοφύλακα δὲ ἀντὶ Ἀρρύβα [τὸν] Λεοννάτον τὸν Ὀνάσον ἔταξεν· Αρρύβας γάρ νόσῳ ἀπέθανεν. The scribe may have been influenced by the similarity of ἀντί (which occurs also in the following sentence) and Ἀντέαν, and there could be some connection between νόσῳ and the corrupt Ὀνάσον.

3 Diod. 16.94.4. For the identity of Attalos see Welles, *Diodorus* 101 n.2; Heckel 1979a. Hammond 1978c: 346 n.37 wrongly identifies him with the uncle of Kleopatra-Eurydike.

(II, 233 n.1) is certainly correct in assuming that these men were hypaspists, for neither Leonnatos nor Perdikkas was a member of the Seven in 336, nor did that unit ever include anyone named Attalos—certainly not the son of Andromenes. That Perdikkas, Leonnatos, and Attalos were at this time Pages (*paides basilikoi*) is virtually impossible:<sup>4</sup> Perdikkas was certainly too old, as was Leonnatos himself; and it is doubtful that any one of them commanded that unit.

Whether the son of Anteas is identical with the Leonnatos named in an inscription concerning Philippii cannot be determined.<sup>5</sup> The chance appearance on the stone of the names Leonnatos and Philotas has led editors to identify the latter as Parmenion's son, and to date their mission to Philippii to “either before the Triballian campaign in 335 or before the Persian expedition in 334, when Philotas was available.”<sup>6</sup> We know another Leonnatos, the son of Antipatros of Aigai, a man of some importance (Arr. *Ind.* 18.3), who could have acted as Alexander's ambassador on this occasion; the name Philotas is far too common to allow a positive identification. The son of Anteas would have been about twenty-one or twenty-two years of age at this time, and if he is indeed the Leonnatos in question, this could perhaps be his first diplomatic mission.<sup>7</sup>

At Issos in late 333, the women of Dareios III (his mother, wife, and daughters<sup>8</sup>) were captured by the Makedonians. Misled by rumors, they believed that Dareios had fallen in battle and began to mourn him. Hence Alexander planned to free them from unnecessary sorrow by sending to them Mithrenes, the former satrap of Sardis, who spoke Persian.<sup>9</sup> According to Curtius (3.12.7–12), however, Alexander thought that the sight of a traitor might only heighten the anguish of the captive women and sent instead Leonnatos, one of his *hetairoi* (*ex purpuratis* = τῶν ἑταίρων). But it may be that Leonnatos played no part in this famous episode. That the situation required someone of linguistic skill is unlikely to be mere embellishment on Curtius' part. Why, then, would Alexander substitute for Mithrenes a man who did not know the barbarian tongue? Arrian tells us that Peukestas was the only Makedonian to acquire a speaking knowledge of the Persian language,<sup>10</sup> but he does mention that,

<sup>4</sup> Suggested by Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 70; contra Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035.

<sup>5</sup> Vatin 1984; Missitzis 1985; Hammond 1988a; Hatzopoulos II, 25–8, no. 6. Hatzopoulos I, 398 dates the embassy from Philippii to “the early months of 330,” which would rule out both Philotas son of Parmenion and Leonnatos son of Anteas as Alexander's agents in this affair.

<sup>6</sup> Missitzis 1985: 9.

<sup>7</sup> Hammond 1988a: 383 n.2 points out that “the lack of patronymics, especially with a name as common as that of Philotas, is striking.” This *may* argue in favor of identifying the Leonnatos of the inscription with the son of Anteas.

<sup>8</sup> Also his young son, Ochos. For the captive women: Arr. 2.12.4–5; Curt. 3.12.4 ff.; Diod. 17.37.3; Plut. *Alex.* 21.1–2. See Berve nos. 711, 721; Heckel, *Who's Who* 251 “Sisygambis,” 255–6 “Stateira [1]” (sister and wife of the King). The daughters were named Stateira and Drypetis. For Sisygambis' family see Neuhaus 1902; but cf. Bosworth I, 218.

<sup>9</sup> Curt. 3.12.6–7; see Berve no. 524; Heckel, *Who's Who* 168. Cf. also Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 39–40; Julien 1914: 27–8, for his later career as satrap of Armenia.

<sup>10</sup> Arr. 6.30.3: . . . μόνος τῶν ἄλλων Μακεδόνων μεταβαλὼν τὴν Μηδικὴν καὶ φωνὴν τὴν Περσικὴν ἔκμαθὼν καὶ τᾶλλα ξύμπαντα ἐς τρόπον τὸν Περσικὸν κατασκευασάμενος.

after the battle of Issos, the King placed Laomedon—a Greek from Mytilene who had been settled in Amphipolis—in charge of the Persian captives precisely because he was bilingual.<sup>11</sup> And it seems odd that Alexander should not make use of the talents of a close friend. If the story derives ultimately from Ptolemy—and this would require that Ptolemy wrote before Kleitarchos and Aristoboulos<sup>12</sup>—then it is possible that he deliberately substituted the name of Leonnatos for Laomedon; for Ptolemy fell out with Laomedon in 319 and drove him out of Koile-Syria.<sup>13</sup>

Hegesias claims that Leonnatos and Philotas son of Parmenion brought Batis, the eunuch to whom Dareios had entrusted the garrison at Gaza, in chains to Alexander.<sup>14</sup> The story of how Alexander, in imitation of Achilleus, dragged the captive commander behind his chariot has been rejected as fiction by W.W. Tarn and B. Perrin.<sup>15</sup> But Batis himself is historical, as is his surrender to Alexander. And there is no good reason for denying Leonnatos’ role in bringing the eunuch to the King.

In 332/1 Leonnatos joined the Seven, replacing Arybbas, who died of illness in Egypt.<sup>16</sup> This is the earliest recorded promotion to the office, but if the Ptolemaios who died at Halikarnassos in the first year of the campaign and is described as *somatophylax basilikos* was one of the Seven, there must have been someone appointed to that group in 334. Up to this point, Leonnatos had accompanied the King as one of his *hetairoi*, though he fought as a member of the Royal Hypaspists. The Seven, we may suppose, fought in the immediate vicinity of the King—this, at least, is implied by their name and origin—unless they were given special commands in another sector. Hence Leonnatos, who held no independent

11 Arr. 3.6.6: Λαομάδοντα . . . , ὅτι δίγλωσσος ἦν ἐς τὰ βαρβαρικὰ γράμματα, ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτοις βαρβάροις [κατέστησε]. But Bosworth I, 283 suggests that the words ἐς τὰ βαρβαρικὰ γράμματα may mean “that Laomedon’s bilingual capacities extended only to documents not to actual speech.” Even if this is so, Alexander clearly placed him in charge of the captive barbarians because he knew something of their language, and, for the same reason, Laomedon was the obvious person to attempt to communicate with the Persian queens.

12 For this theory see especially Errington 1969: 241–2. Arr. 2.12.5 comes from Ptolemy and Aristoboulos (so 2.12.6), and thus ultimately from Ptolemy; 2.12.6–7, by contrast, is a *logos*. Hammond, THA 128 traces Curtius’ account of Leonnatos’ visit to Kleitarchos. Kleitarchos may have taken the information from Ptolemy. On the new papyrus (*POxy* LXXI, 4808) and the attempts to re-date Kleitarchos see Prandi 2012.

13 Laomedon was defeated and captured by Ptolemy’s general, Nikanor (Diod. 18.43.2; App. *Syr.* 52 says he fled to Alketas). See also Heckel 1981e and 1994a: 72–3 and 77 n.15.

14 *FGrH* 142 F5 = Dion Hal *de Comp. Verb.* 18 p. 123–6R. Arr. 2.25.4 (cf. *Itiner. Al.* 45) adds the information that Batis was a eunuch; cf. also Bosworth I, 257–8.

15 Perrin 1895; Tarn II, 265–70, Appendix 11: “The Death of Batis.” Compare also Curt. 4.6.29 with Virgil, *Aen.* 2.273, as noted by Pearson, *LHA* 248 n.28; cf. Atkinson I, 342. For the full story in Curtius see 4.6.7–29.

16 Arr. 3.5.5 gives the form Ἀρρύβας. The form Ἀρύββας is supported by inscriptional evidence; see Berve no. 156; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 176–7; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 56 “Arybbas [2].” The name was popular with the Aiakidai of Epeiros, and Arybbas may have been a member of that family, hence a relative of Alexander.

command before the campaign in Sogdiana, is not mentioned by the sources except in non-military contexts.

Leonnatos accompanied Perdikkas, Krateros, Hephaistion, Koinos, and Erigyios (and some others, unnamed) to Alexander's tent shortly before Philotas' arrest in 330; for the *hetairoi* also formed the King's council.<sup>17</sup> He may have shared his colleagues' dislike for Philotas and have spoken against him, although this is not explicitly reported; nor do we know if he was involved in Philotas' torture. He did not benefit from Philotas' fall in any obvious way. But it should be noted that he disappears from the extant accounts until the Kleitos affair, two years later.

When Alexander was roused to strike Kleitos at the banquet in Marakanda, Perdikkas and Ptolemy attempted to restrain him, while Lysimachos and Leonnatos took away his spear; all appear to have been acting in their capacities as *somatophylakes*. Plutarch, apparently following Chares of Mytilene, whose version is preferred by most modern scholars,<sup>18</sup> claims that a *somatophylax* named Aristophanes disarmed Alexander, removing his dagger.<sup>19</sup> Now the identity of this *somatophylax* is disputed, for there was no known member of the Seven named Aristophanes. Palmer suggested the simple and sensible emendation of the name to "Aristonous" (cf. Arr. 6.28.4). Berve's rejection of the emendation<sup>20</sup> in favor of an actual Aristophanes, who was a member of the hypaspists (also called *somatophylakes* on occasions<sup>21</sup>), has been shown by Ziegler 1935: 379–80 to be incorrect. In the very sentence in which Aristophanes appears, Plutarch makes a clear distinction between the *somatophylax*, who removed the dagger, and the hypaspists, whom Alexander summoned; it is doubtful that Plutarch used two different terms to apply to the same unit within the same sentence. According to the "corrected" version of Plutarch, therefore, it was Aristonous the Bodyguard, and not Lysimachos and Leonnatos, who disarmed the King. But is this actually the case?

To determine who did what in such a chaotic instance is not possible. But it also is not true that Curtius' version is vitiated by that of Plutarch. Plutarch's

17 Curt. 6.8.17. Cf. Arr. 1.25.4: ξυναγαγὼν δὲ τοὺς φίλους βουλὴν προούτιθει, ὅ τι χρὴ ὑπὲρ Αλεξάνδρου γνῶναι (the case of Alexandros Lynkestes in 333).

18 Chares: Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 364. Athen. 7.277a = FGrH 125 F9 informs us that, according to Chares, Alexander was fond of apples. The throwing of apples in Plutarch's version argues for an eye-witness source. Chares gave information of this sort—from daily life at the Court—and the detail about the apples (though hardly a firm basis for evaluation) may point to Chares as the source. For Chares as the best source see Brown 1949: 237; Hamilton, PA 139; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 362 ff.; Berve II, 207–8; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 248–51. But Schubert 1898: 99 recognizes "eine Verschmelzung von zwei verschiedenen Originalberichten." In the past scholars have been insufficiently critical of Chares' motives and reliability (see Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 77: "Chares' Ruf als zuverlässiger Zeuge sollte daher überdacht werden").

19 Spear: Curt. 8.1.46. Sword: Plut. Alex. 51.5–6: Ἀλέξανδρος . . . τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον ἔζητει. τῶν δὲ σωματοφυλάκων ἐνὸς Ἀριστοφάνους φθάσαντος ὑφελέσθαι.

20 Berve II, 69 n.2: "nicht nur reine Willkür, sondern auch sachlich falsch"; cf. II, 74, no. 136.

21 Berve I, 28 n.1; Tarn II, 135–42.

version involves the removal of Alexander's own dagger, which was the first weapon that he might be expected to reach for, if he carried it on his person. The wording of the Greek in this case makes it unlikely that this was a case of Aristonous taking the dagger from Alexander; indeed, it would have been a rather comic scene. Plutarch says that Alexander searched for his dagger, but Aristonous had anticipated the events and removed it. Now, unless we are to imagine Alexander groping in vain at his waist for the weapon, which Aristonous, like some light-fingered thief, had dexterously snatched away, we must assume that the dagger lay nearby and that Aristonous, with forethought, had taken it out of harm's way. Quite different, and in no way contradictory, is the account given by Curtius, in which Alexander, in need of a weapon, snatches a spear from one of the bodyguards (*Alexander rapta lancea ex manibus armigeri*: 8.1.45). This then is the weapon that Leonnatos and Lysimachos wrested from Alexander, who was now incensed by the insolence of Kleitos. Certainly all the *somatophylakes* were present at the banquet, as Plutarch (*Alex.* 51.11) implies, and as we should expect. Very likely each one attempted, in his own way, to avert the disaster, but we are not in a position to say who did what.

In the following year, Leonnatos incurred the King's wrath for ridiculing some Persians who performed *proskynesis*.

When, however, a silence fell after these words, the senior Persians arose and did obeisance one by one. Leonnatus, one of the Companions [*hetairoi*], thinking that one of the Persians made his obeisance ungracefully, mocked his posture as abject; Alexander was angry with him at the time, though reconciled later.<sup>22</sup>

Berve believes that the man in question is not Leonnatos the *somatophylax* (Arr. 2.12.5 calls him “one of the *hetairoi*”: ἔνα τῶν ἑταίρων), since Arrian refers to him in all other instances (where he is specifically identified) as *somatophylax* (ό σωματοφύλαξ, 4.21.4, 24.10; 6.9.3, 22.3), once he has related that Leonnatos became one of the Seven (3.5.5). Therefore, Berve concludes, this Leonnatos is the son of Antipatros of Aigai, one of the trierarchs at the Hydaspes River.<sup>23</sup>

Berve demands too much consistency in his source's use of terminology.<sup>24</sup> Arrian does not designate Leonnatos as ο συματοφύλαξ until 4.21.4 (that is, after

22 For the mocking of *proskynesis* see Arr. 4.12.2: ἀλλὰ σιγῆς γάρ γενομένης ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀναστάντας Περσῶν τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους ἐφεξῆς προσκυνεῖν. Λεοννάτον δέ, ἔνα τῶν ἑταίρων, ἐπειδὴ τις ἐδόκει τῶν Περσῶν ἀτῷ οὐν ἐν κόσμῳ προσκυνήσαι, τὸν δὲ ἐπιγελάσαι τῷ σχήματι τοῦ Περσοῦ ώς ταπεινῷ· καὶ τούτῳ χαλεπήνατα τότε Αλέξανδρον ἔνυαλλαγῆναι ἀνθίς. English translation by P.A. Brunt.

23 Berve no. 467; Heckel, *Who's Who* 147 “Leonnatus [1]”; cf. Arr. *Ind.* 18.6 = Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 (cf. Whitby, *BNJ*). He is not the son of Antipatros the Regent, who was from Paliura.

24 “Dass es sich nicht um den gleichnamigen Somatophylax . . . handelt . . . , zeigt deutlich [my italics] der erklärende Zusatz Arians . . . ἔνα τῶν ἑταίρων (II, 235).”

he has related the *proskynesis* episode), nor does this designation come from the same source as the phrase “one of the *hetairoi*.” Both passages in which Leonnatos is described as a member of the *hetairoi* derive from writers other than Ptolemy, his fellow *somatophylax*.<sup>25</sup> The *somatophylakes* did not cease to be members of the *hetairoi* and it is perfectly reasonable to find Leonnatos referred to as one of the *hetairoi* (Arr. 4.12.2), long after he was appointed *somatophylax* (Arr. 3.5.5).<sup>26</sup>

More important is the historical situation. The man who laughed at the spectacle of Persians groveling before Alexander was a man of rank, to whom the act of prostration was abhorrent and who must certainly have regarded the Makedonian King as *primus inter pares* and Persians as inferiors.<sup>27</sup> This will have been true of Leonnatos the Bodyguard, who was of the highest nobility. Alexander’s anger was short-lived, as we are told; he might have dealt more severely with a lesser individual. Leonnatos son of Antipatros must be regarded as the less likely candidate. Arrian’s use of the phrase “one of the *hetairoi*,” which does not rule out Leonnatos the *somatophylax*, will more likely refer to him than to the obscure and once-attested son of Antipatros.<sup>28</sup> The latter’s temporary disfavor with Alexander would scarcely be significant.

The same story is told by Curtius about Polyperchon, though in a more sensational form; Plutarch has a similar account concerning Kassandros, which he places in Babylon.<sup>29</sup> Curtius is certainly wrong: on his own testimony, Polyperchon was not present when the *proskynesis* scene took place. Arrian tells us that Polyperchon, Attalos, and Alketas were left behind with Krateros in Sogdiana to complete the subjugation of Paraitakene, while Alexander moved south into Baktria; it was in Baktria that the conspiracy of the Pages was uncovered. Since Attalos, Alketas, and Krateros, with whom Polyperchon had left Alexander’s camp, were informed of the Pages’ conspiracy by letter and, since their departure from the main camp is dated by Curtius to before the *proskynesis* episode, it appears that Polyperchon was not present when Alexander attempted to introduce *proskynesis* and could

25 For Arr. 4.12.2 see Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 142, who thinks chapters 10 to 12 comprise “Einlagen . . . aus anderen Quellen”; cf. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 40, who categorizes chapters 10 to 12 as *legomena*.

26 The *somatophylakes* were all *hetairoi*, though only seven *hetairoi* were *somatophylakes*. Hence, Curt. 6.8.17 identifies Hephaestion (at the time of the Philotas affair in the autumn of 330) as *ex amicis*, although it is highly likely that he was already one of the *somatophylakes*.

27 The fact that Leonnatos himself was addicted to oriental extravagance and emulous of Alexander’s ostentatious behavior (*Suda* s.v. Λεοννάτος = Arr. *Succ.* 12) does not rule out his ridiculing of Persian practices. He was, at once, attracted to the luxury of Persian royalty and contemptuous of (what he regarded as) the obsequiousness of barbarian courtiers.

28 Arrian mentions no other Leonnatos in the *Anabasis*. The name is only twice attested in this period, but it is known in later times; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 168–9 n.75. See also Badian 1960a: 337 n.34, who rejects Berve’s identification with Leonnatos son of Antipatros. It is tempting, however, to assume that the story that Kassandros ridiculed *proskynesis* is a corruption of the story that a son of Antipatros (albeit a different Antipatros) did so in Baktria.

29 Polyperchon’s mockery of *proskynesis*: Curt. 8.5.22. Kassandros in Babylon: Plut. *Alex.* 74.2–5; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 206. See Berve no. 414; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 79–81 “Cassander.”

not have ridiculed it.<sup>30</sup> Plutarch's failure to mention Polyperchon among those who were informed by letter is perhaps explained by Polyperchon's separate mission to Bubacene, of which only Curtius speaks. Polyperchon, therefore, should not be connected with this incident; Curtius has confused him with Leonnatos, who certainly was present. As for Kassandros son of Antipatros, his participation in the affair must be the product of later writers, influenced by the antipathy of Kassandros and Polyperchon, and by the tradition that Alexander was hostile to Antipatros and his sons.<sup>31</sup>

Leonnatos thus incurred Alexander's displeasure, though only briefly, as Arrian implies and as we may deduce from his career.<sup>32</sup> Badian (followed by Hamilton, *PA* 54) speaks of this incident as "retard[ing] his advancement" and believes that Leonnatos "rehabilitated himself by outstanding courage," whereby Badian must refer to the heroism against the Mallians.<sup>33</sup> But Alexander's anger must have been very short-lived, for Leonnatos' military career, which had only begun in the spring of 327 (i.e., just before the experiment with *proskynesis*), suffered nothing adverse when the army set out for India at the end of the spring of that same year.<sup>34</sup>

If we are to single out any event that may have won back the King's favor for Leonnatos, we might consider his role in saving Alexander from Hermolaos' conspiracy. According to Curtius, Eurylochos, the brother of Epimenes, brought the news of the Pages' conspiracy to Alexander through the agency of Ptolemy son of Lagos and Leonnatos.<sup>35</sup> Arrian does not mention Leonnatos, only Ptolemy, who was doubtless eager to win sole credit for the disclosure.<sup>36</sup> We know nothing further of his activities in this connection.

30 Berve II, 326 believes that "die Tatsache [i.e., Polyperchon ridiculing the Persians] selbst ist nicht zu bezweifeln, zumal sie zu dem starr makedonischen Charakter des P. stimmt . . ." See further Heckel 1978d. Polyperchon's absence in the company of Attalos, Alketas, and Krateros: Arr. 4.22.1–2. Alexander's letter: Plut. *Alex.* 55.6. Bubacene: Curt. 8.5.2.

31 Plut. *Alex.* 74.2: μᾶλιστα δ' Ἀντίπατρον ἐφοβεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παιδας, ὃν Ιόλας μὲν ἀρχιονοχόος ἦν, ὁ δὲ Κάσανδρος ἀφίκτο μὲν νεωστὶ . . .

32 In the case of Polyperchon, Curt. 8.6.1 says that his disfavor lasted some time: *Polyperconti quidem postea castigato diu ignovit.*

33 Badian 1960a: 337: "Leonnatus seems to have incurred the king's displeasure by contributing to the ridicule that killed the attempt to introduce *proskynesis* among the Macedonians. This must have retarded his advancement. When he rehabilitated himself by outstanding courage and loyalty, his rise was rapid, culminating in the great honor he received at Susa."

34 The affair of the Pages, and the arrest of Kallisthenes, occurred in Baktria in 327 (Arr. 4.22.2); the *proskynesis* episode must have been shortly before this, and after the marriage of Alexander and Roxane. Cf. Berve no. 688 (Roxane); Berve 1938: 152–3; Brown 1949: 249; Lane Fox, *Alexander* 320 ff.

35 Curt. 8.6.22. Eurylochos: Berve II, 159 no. 322; Heckel, *Who's Who* 123 "Eurylochus [2]." Epimenes: Berve II, 150 no. 300; Heckel, *Who's Who* 118; cf. Brown 1949: 240 ff.; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 18–9.

36 Arr. 4.13.7. Hermolaos: Berve II, 152–3 no. 305; Heckel, *Who's Who* 138–9. Kallisthenes: Berve II, 191–9 no. 408; Heckel, *Who's Who* 76–7 "Callisthenes [1]." See Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 18–9; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 40; Bosworth II, 97; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 143.

In the spring of 327 and, therefore, chronologically before the conspiracy of the Pages, Leonnatos supervised the forces that besieged the “Rock of Chorienes” by night, a task he shared in rotation with his fellow *somatophylakes*, Perdikkas and Ptolemy.<sup>37</sup> We know nothing else about this command, but it marks (as far as we can tell) Leonnatos’ entry into the military sphere. When the army left Baktria for India, with Hephaestion and Perdikkas sent to the Indus,<sup>38</sup> Leonnatos and Ptolemy emerged as prominent commanders of that segment of the army under Alexander’s personal leadership. Both were wounded in the territory around the Choes River,<sup>39</sup> though not seriously, for each led one-third of the Makedonian forces in the campaign that drove the Aspasians into the hills; Leonnatos’ group included the phalanx battalion of Attalos son of Andromenes and the javelin men led by Balakros.<sup>40</sup> While Ptolemy relates the activities of his own division in some detail, we know little about Leonnatos’ forces other than that they were equally successful in driving the Aspasians from their positions in the hills and bringing about their defeat (Arr. 4.25.3). Leonnatos had, at least, proved himself a competent commander.

At the Hydaspes (Jhelum) River, Alexander faced Poros with his entire force and, since he had more experienced military men at his disposal, he used Leonnatos in a lesser capacity. Curtius names Leonnatos as an infantry commander, together with Antigenes and Tauron,<sup>41</sup> and says that he crossed the Hydaspes some distance upstream from the main camp that faced Poros’ army. But Berve has correctly maintained that a comparison of the texts of Arrian and Curtius reveals that Curtius has mistaken Leonnatos for Seleukos, and that the infantry in question are, in fact, the Royal Hypaspists.<sup>42</sup> Other than this, there is no mention of Leonnatos in the battle against Poros.

Presumably his activities were similar to those of Ptolemy, with whom he shared the rank of *somatophylax* and whose earlier military career was somewhat similar.<sup>43</sup> But this is of little help, for we know only that the *somatophylakes*, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, and Lysimachos, crossed the Hydaspes in the same triakontner as Alexander;<sup>44</sup> of the other *somatophylakes* Arrian says nothing, though Hephaestion, as hipparch, certainly crossed the river at the same time. Curtius, for his part, greatly exaggerates the role and importance of

37 Arr. 4.21.4. Schwarz, *Feldzüge in Turkestan* 21–3, 83 ff.; Fuller, *Generalship* 244–5. For the identification of Chorienes and Sisimithres, as recognized by Berve no. 708, see Heckel 1986a and *Who’s Who* 250 “Sisimithres”; contra Bosworth 1981: 29 ff.

38 Arr. 4.22.7, 30.9; 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2–3; ME 48; Smith, *EHI* 53, 63.

39 Arr. 4.23.3. The Choes is probably the Kunar (thus Brunt, *Arrian I*, 508); Engels, *Logistics* 108, identifies it with the Choaspes, which must be the Swat.

40 Arr. 4.24.10. Balakros: Berve II, 101 nos. 201 and 202; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 69 “Balacrus [3]”; Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1896) 2816 no. 4.

41 Curt. 8.14.15. Cf. Berve no. 83 (Antigenes); no. 741 (Tauron).

42 Arr. 5.12.1 ff. Berve II, 233.

43 Berve no. 668. Seibert, *Ptolemaios*, omits this part of Ptolemy’s career entirely. Leonnatos and Ptolemy appear together in a number of instances during these years: Curt. 8.1.45–6; Arr. 4.21.4; Curt. 8.6.22; Arr. 4.23.3, 24.10, 25.2–4; Curt. 8.14.15; Plut. *Mor.* 344d; Arr. 6.28.4.

44 Arr. 5.13.1. But cf. Berve II, 172 n.1.

Ptolemy in this battle (Curt. 8.13.17–27). We must assume that, as *somatophylax*, Leonnatos accompanied Alexander when he crossed the Hydaspes and that he fought among the troops that were directly under Alexander's control, namely, the cavalry units of Hephaestion and Perdikkas and the *ile basilike* (Arr. 5.16; Curt. 8.14.15).

On the march to the Hyphasis (Beas) and back Leonnatos did not distinguish himself in any way. His name reappears in the list of some thirty trierarchs at the Hydaspes River in late 326, about three or four months after the battle with Poros.<sup>45</sup> These men were given trierarchies of the Attic type, that is, they were responsible for meeting the expenses of fitting out a trireme.<sup>46</sup> But Leonnatos did not command a ship; this is clear from the roles of some of the other trierarchs and from Leonnatos' activities near Patala.<sup>47</sup> Since he was among the forces that habitually accompanied the King, he very likely sailed downstream with him as far as the confluence of the Hydaspes and the Akesines (Chenab) and later accompanied him by land in the campaign against the Mallians, who lived between the Akesines and Hydraotes (Ravi) Rivers.<sup>48</sup>

It was in this campaign against the Mallians that Leonnatos played one of his most noteworthy—though again disputed—roles. Alexander had taken the Mallians by surprise, crossing the desert that lay between the rivers, rather than marching north, as the Indians themselves anticipated, from the junction of the rivers.<sup>49</sup> When the Mallians withdrew to their main city, Alexander sought to inspire his war-weary Makedonians by being the first to scale the city walls. This nearly ended in disaster; for very few of the Makedonians managed to join Alexander at the top before the ladders gave way under the weight of the troops. Alexander, seeing that he was cut off, leapt from the walls inside the city, where he was wounded by an enemy missile.<sup>50</sup> Several of his followers rushed to his aid, though the sources disagree on exactly who these were. One is certain: Peukestas, who was later appointed an eighth *somatophylax* for his part in saving the

<sup>45</sup> Arr. *Ind.* 18.3–10 = Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 (cf. Whitby, *BNJ*). For a discussion of the chronology of Alexander's expedition see Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.304–22, “Die Chronologie der Feldzüge Alexanders,” esp. 320. The departure of the fleet and the land forces is dated by Strabo 15.1.17 C691 (= Aristoboulos, *FGrH* 139 F35; cf. Pownall, *BNJ*) to “a few days before the setting of the Pleiades” (*πρὸ δύσεως Πλημάδος οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις*).

<sup>46</sup> See most recently Hauben 1976: 91; Wilcken, *Alexander* 188 suggested that this had a further consideration: “to give a personal interest in the enterprise to his immediate followers.” See also Berve I, 165–6.

<sup>47</sup> E.g., Hephaestion and Krateros, who commanded the land forces in the descent of the Indus.

<sup>48</sup> Arr. 6.2.3 ff.; Curt. 9.3.24.

<sup>49</sup> Arr. 6.4, esp. 6.4.3; Curt. 9.4.15 ff. is ignorant of Alexander's strategy. See Fuller, *Generalship* 259–63; Wilcken, *Alexander* 190; Hamilton, *PA* 176; Smith, *EHI* 98 ff.; Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 29 ff.

<sup>50</sup> Arr. 6.8.4–13.5 for a full account of Alexander's activities; cf. Curt. 9.4.26–5.30; Diod. 17.98.1–100.1; Plut. *Alex.* 63; Plut. *Mor.* 327b; 341c; 343d; 344c–d; Strabo 15.1.33 C701; Justin 12.9.3–13; Oros. 3.19.6–10; *Itiner. Al.* 115–6; *ME* 76–7; cf. Ps.-Kall. 3.4.12–5; Zonaras 4.13; p. 299, 16; Julian, *conv.* 331a; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 176 ff.; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 82–5. On Alexander's wound see Lammert 1953.

King's life.<sup>51</sup> The rest are problematic. Aristonous and Ptolemy are named, the former only by Curtius; Ptolemy himself (in conflict with the testimony of Kleitarchos) said that he was not present at the battle.<sup>52</sup> Three others are mentioned by various sources: Habreas and Limnaios (= Timaeus), both killed in the skirmish,<sup>53</sup> and Leonnatos, who for his heroism was crowned at Sousa by Alexander.<sup>54</sup>

From the city of the Mallians to the junction of the Akesines and Hydraotes, and thence to Patala, Leonnatos accompanied Alexander by ship. In the first instance, this will have been on account of his wounds, in the second, because he belonged to "those who were in the habit of attending [Alexander]" (*eos . . . , qui comitari eum [sc. Alexandrum] solebant*), whom Curtius speaks of as accompanying Alexander by ship (Curt. 9.8.3). At Patala, Leonnatos, now recovered from his wounds, led a force of 1,000 cavalry and 8,000 hoplites and light-armed troops along the shore of the island (which formed the delta of the Indus) while Alexander took the fleet to the ocean via the western arm of the river (Arr. 6.18.3). With Alexander returning upstream, Leonnatos now retraced his steps to Patala. From there he accompanied the King, by land, along the eastern arm of the river as far as a great lake, where he remained in charge of his own troops and those ships with their crews that Alexander left behind as he took a smaller detachment to the ocean (Arr. 6.20.3). When Alexander returned, it seems, Leonnatos led the land forces back to Patala.

51 Berve II, 318–9, no. 634; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 177–8; A 6.28.3–4.

52 Curt. 9.5.21: *Ptolomaeum, qui postea regnavit, huic pugnae adfuisse auctor est Clitarchus et Timagenes; sed ipse, scilicet gloriae suae non refragatus a fuisse se, missum in expeditionem, memoriae tradidit.* Cf. Arr. 6.11.8; 6.5.6–7; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 82–5. See also Errington 1969: 235, 239.

53 Berve no. 6; Heckel, *Who's Who* 128 ("Habreas"; Kirchner, *RE* I.1 (1893) 110; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 222; he is named only by Arrian, whom Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 368–9, follows; cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 455; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 254. Limnaios (Plut.), Timaeus (Curt.), see Berve no. 474; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 147; Heckel, *Who's Who* 152 "Limnaeus."

54 Curt. 9.5.15, 17 (with Peukestas, Aristonous, Timaeus); Plut. *Mor.* 344d (with Ptolemy, Limnaios); not mentioned by *Mor.* 327b (only Ptolemy and Limnaios); Arr. *Ind.* 19.8 = Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 (with Peukestas); Arr. 6.9.3, 10.1–2 (with Peukestas, Habreas); 6.11.7 (his role is not attested by all sources). And cf. Arr. *Ind.* 23.6; Arr. 7.5.5, where he is crowned, in part for saving Alexander's life. See also Plut. *Alex.* 63. Both Habreas and Leonnatos are disputed, as Arrian (6.11.7) tells us. But this does not mean, as Berve II, 237 suggests, that "Limnaios is named by one part of the tradition . . . in place of Leonnatos, who is also not attested with certainty . . . in the battle for the famous city of the Mallians." ("[Limnaios] wird von einem Teil der Überlieferung . . . an Stelle des auch nicht sicher bezeugten Leonnatos . . . beim Kampf um die berühmte Mallerstadt genannt"). Plutarch does fail to mention Leonnatos, but he does not substitute Limnaios for Leonnatos (in fact, they appear together in *Mor.* 344d). Instead the Limnaios-Timaeus of Plutarch-Curtius replaces Habreas, who is known only to Arrian (Ptolemy and/or Aristoboulos). But, when Arrian says that there was no agreement on the matter of Leonnatos (*ὑπὲρ Λεοννάτου δὲ οὐκέτι ξυμφέρονται*), he must mean that Leonnatos was not named by every work that he consulted; this is indeed true of the extant authors. If the extant records reflect accurately their primary sources, then this means that Arrian's sources were not unanimous on the subject of Leonnatos among the Mallians. If there was a dispute about individuals, it involved Limnaios and Habreas, both of whom were killed in the battle. Certainly, it will have been easier to confuse the names of the obscure dead than of a wounded, but living, hero.

Having reached the ocean, Alexander now gave thought to returning to the west. Presumably his native informants had told him that the region to the west lacked water, and so he sent Leonnatos ahead to dig wells along the route that the army was to follow (Curt. 9.10.2). When he had completed this task, Leonnatos awaited Alexander on the borders of the land of the Oreitai; this was late in the summer of 325 (Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.320). Reaching the Arabios River, Alexander left the bulk of the army under the command of Hephaestion and, dividing the rest of the army into three parts (as he had done against the Aspasians two years earlier), under the command of Ptolemy, Leonnatos, and himself, he moved south of the Arabios into the territory of the Oreitai, who had not submitted to him. By means of a vigorous “sweep-program,” like the one he had employed in Sogdiana in 329, Alexander ravaged the land and subdued the Oreitai.<sup>55</sup> The columns of Ptolemy and Leonnatos reunited first with Alexander and then with Hephaestion’s troops. In one body they proceeded to Rhambakia, where Hephaestion was left to settle the city, while Alexander took a force to the Gedrosian border, where the Oreitai and the Gedrosians were preparing to resist (Arr. 6.21.5–22.2). When these had been overcome without much difficulty, Alexander sent Leonnatos, together with Apollophanes, whom he had appointed satrap of the area, to Rhambakia, presumably with instructions to send Hephaestion ahead to Gedrosia. But Leonnatos, with the Agrianes, some archers and cavalry, and a force of mercenary cavalry and infantry, was ordered to remain in the land of the Oreitai (*ἐν Ὄροις*), with instructions “to await the fleet until it sailed past this region, to synoecize the city and to settle affairs among the Oreitai.”<sup>56</sup> Hamilton has argued convincingly that not only does *ἐν Ὄροις* mean “among the Oreitai” but the use of the definite article in *τὴν πόλιν ξυνοικίζειν* refers to the city mentioned previously (i.e., Rhambakia, which Hephaestion had begun to synoecize),<sup>57</sup> and not another city, as was formerly thought.<sup>58</sup>

Some time between Alexander’s departure and the arrival of Nearchos with the fleet, Leonnatos won an impressive victory over the Oreitai, who had risen against him. According to the partisan account of Nearchos, he inflicted upon the enemy heavy casualties: “he killed six thousand of them, and all their leaders.”<sup>59</sup> And of his own forces Leonnatos lost only fifteen cavalrymen and a handful of infantry; though Apollophanes the satrap fell in the battle.<sup>60</sup> When Nearchos arrived at the shore near Rhambakia (Arr. 6.22.3; cf. Arr. *Ind.* 23 = 133 F1; cf. Whitby, *BNJ*), Leonnatos had prepared provisions for his ocean voyage. He also exchanged

55 Curt. 9.10.6–7; Diod. 17.104.5–6; cf. the similar strategy in Sogdiana, Arr. 4.16.1–3; Curt. 8.1.1 ff.

56 Arr. 6.22.3: Τό τε ναυτικὸν ὑπομένειν ἔστ’ ὃν περιπλεύσῃ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ξυνοικίζειν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ὀρείτας κοσμεῖν.

57 Hamilton 1972: 605–6. Arr. 6.21.5.

58 Wilken, *Alexander* 199; see also the literature cited by Hamilton 1972: 603 n.1; Droysen F 391 appears to agree with Hamilton that Leonnatos finished Hephaestion’s work at Rhambakia: “die Kolonisation der neuen Stadt zu vollenden.”

59 Arr. *Ind.* 23.5 = Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 (cf. Whitby, *BNJ*); cf. Curt. 9.10.19.

60 On the fate of Apollophanes see Badian 1961: 21; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 41–2.

troops with Nearchos, taking with him those men who, on account of their laziness, had caused or might cause disciplinary problems in the fleet (Arr. *Ind.* 23.8). After Nearchos' departure, Leonnatos put everything in order among the Oreitai (as he had been instructed) and set out for Gedrosia by land. The news of his exploits had already reached Alexander by letter (Curt. 9.10.19), but it is uncertain where Leonnatos himself rejoined Alexander; perhaps it was in Karmania, though possibly only at Sousa.

Sousa marked the high point of Leonnatos' career under Alexander. He was awarded a golden crown in honor of his courage in India and his victory over the Oreitai.<sup>61</sup> Presumably he took a Persian bride in the marriage ceremony at Sousa, although her name and family background are unknown. She was perhaps repudiated by Leonnatos shortly afterwards and, unlike Amastris, the Persian bride of Krateros, has no known history under the Diadochoi.<sup>62</sup>

When Alexander died suddenly in Babylon, Leonnatos emerged as one of the leading men of the succession crisis: together with Perdikkas and Ptolemy, he was one of the most powerful leaders, as opposed to the second rank of officers.<sup>63</sup> In the debate that followed, in which the supporters of Perdikkas proposed that Roxane's child (if male) should inherit the kingdom, it was suggested by Peithon, one of the bodyguards, that Leonnatos share with Perdikkas the guardianship of the child, on the ground that both were of royal stock (*stirpe regia genitos*: Curt. 10.7.8).<sup>64</sup> But when the common soldiery, incited by Meleagros, declared for the feeble Arrhidaios, whom they hailed as King under the title Philip III, Leonnatos led the cavalry, the backbone of Perdikkas' support, outside the city of Babylon, while Perdikkas himself remained within the city in the hope of winning over the infantry. Perdikkas' stay was brief, owing to the hostility of Meleagros, who induced Arrhidaios to order his assassination, and he soon rejoined Leonnatos and the cavalry (Curt. 10.7.20, 8.4). At this point our knowledge of Leonnatos' activities in the struggle for power at Babylon breaks off, for his cause was essentially that of Perdikkas, the dominant figure in the ancient sources.<sup>65</sup> Whatever Leonnatos' expectations were—and his earlier naming as a guardian together with Perdikkas (whose ambitious designs Leonnatos was intended to keep in check) suggests that he could have hoped for considerable power—he must have been disappointed by the outcome. Perdikkas, once he had overcome Meleagros, became the *de facto* ruler of the Asian empire,

61 Arr. *Ind.* 23.6; 42.9; Arr. 7.5.5. It is doubtful that he was crowned a second time when “Hephaestion and the other *somatophylakes*” were crowned (7.5.6).

62 Berve no. 50; Heckel, *Who's Who* 21 “Amastris”; cf. Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750 no. 7. On the Sousan marriages see Briant, *Alexander and His Empire* 128–9 and Heckel, *Conquests* 137–9; for Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik* see Berve 1938; Bosworth 1980; Hamilton 1988; for the alleged general repudiation of the Persian brides, Müller 2013.

63 Arr. *Succ* 1.2 speaks of οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν ἵππεων καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων and οἱ μετ' ἐκείνους.

64 Cf. Justin 13.2.13–4.

65 That Leonnatos wholeheartedly supported Perdikkas' regency is doubtful, but the high-ranking officers will have been unanimous in their opposition to Meleagros and Philip Arrhidaios.

for he had both the figurehead, Philip Arrhidaios, and the royal armies firmly under his control; there was no further talk of special authority for Leonnatos once the cavalry and infantry had been reconciled.

In the settlement at Babylon (323), Leonnatos found himself sidelined. A strong supporter of Perdikkas (at least in the struggle with Meleagros), he must have been dissatisfied with the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, despite its strategic location.<sup>66</sup> Did Perdikkas, in fact, think that Leonnatos would act in his interests? If so, he was quickly disappointed, for Leonnatos began immediately to intrigue against Perdikkas and the marshals of the empire. He had been contacted by Alexander's sister, the widow of Alexandros of Epeiros, Kleopatra, through whom he hoped to gain power; for she had offered her hand in marriage, perhaps at Olympias' instigation, and such a marriage carried with it a serious—possibly "legitimate"—claim to the throne of Makedon.<sup>67</sup>

Leonnatos certainly was not content to play second fiddle to Perdikkas. When he received orders to aid Eumenes in wresting Kappadokia from Ariarathes (Plut. *Eum.* 3.4–5), he had already formulated his plan to overthrow Perdikkas. Undoubtedly he was encouraged by the insubordination of Antigonos, satrap of Phrygia, who refused Perdikkas' instructions that he also support Eumenes; nor will he have failed to recognize that Perdikkas did not have the strong backing of the generals. Peithon, Ptolemy, Philotas, Antigonos, all were seditious.<sup>68</sup> And renewed turmoil in Greece offered Leonnatos his pretext for crossing the Hellespont and seeking the throne; for Antipatros, blockaded at Lamia in Thessaly by the allied Greek forces, sent Hekataios of Kardia to summon him to Greece.<sup>69</sup>

At this point, Leonnatos attempted to persuade Eumenes to cross into Europe with him—ostensibly in aid of Antipatros, but in reality to seize the Makedonian throne. He revealed to Eumenes the details of his correspondence with Kleopatra. But in this matter he misjudged Eumenes, who shunned the proposal, either from loyalty to Perdikkas or fear of his archrival Hekataios. While Alexander lived, Eumenes had denounced Hekataios, urging the King to depose him and restore

66 Arr. *Succ.* 1.6; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1, and 18.12.1 (where "Philotas" occurs instead of Leonnatos); Justin 13.4.16. Consider Errington's remarks (1970: 57): "Leonnatus acquired a crucial satrapy in exchange—which Perdiccas could scarcely deny him—but his subsequent career shows his thwarted ambition, and his later disloyalty to Perdiccas may have originated in this rebuff."

67 Plut. *Eum.* 3.9. For Kleopatra see Berse no. 433; Heckel, *Who's Who* 90 "Cleopatra [2]"; Stähelin, *RE* XI.1 (1921) 735–8 no. 13. See also Macurdy, *HQ* 30 ff., esp. 36–7; Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 37; Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2037; Errington 1970: 60; Carney 1988: 394–403; Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 123–4; Whitehorne, *Cleopatras* 62–3. See also Stemma X for the Argead royal house.

68 For Peithon's designs in the Upper Satrapies see Diod. 18.4.8; 18.7.1–9. Ptolemy's opposition to Perdikkas' regency can be seen in the succession debate, Curt. 10.6.13–6; Justin 13.2.11–2; for his fear of Perdikkas' intentions, Diod. 18.14.1–2. Philotas was removed from his satrapy (Justin 13.6.16) on account of his loyalty to Krateros (Arr. *Succ.* 24.2). For Antigonos' insubordination see Plut. *Eum.* 3.4–5.

69 Plut. *Eum.* 3.6; Diod. 18.12.1, 14.4–5; Justin 13.5.14.

freedom to the Kardians. Now he feared lest Antipatros should kill him in order to please Hekataios.<sup>70</sup> During the night, Eumenes and his forces slipped away from Leonnatos, bringing the news of his designs to Perdikkas.<sup>71</sup>

Disappointed by Eumenes, Leonnatos crossed into Europe. His satrapal army cannot have been very large, and he stopped in Makedonia to recruit both infantry and cavalry. With a force of more than 20,000 foot and 1,500 cavalry he pushed south towards Lamia. But the Athenian general Antiphilos decided to engage Leonnatos before he could join forces with Antipatros. The exact location of the battlefield is not given, but it could scarcely have been far north of Lamia itself.<sup>72</sup> Although the infantry were evenly matched, Leonnatos had fewer than half the enemy's number of cavalry, and he soon found himself cut off in a marshy region. There, overcome by his wounds, Leonnatos was carried dead from the battlefield by his own men.<sup>73</sup> Antipatros may indeed, as Justin claims, have welcomed the death of Leonnatos:<sup>74</sup> not only had the engagement removed a dangerous rival, but it had lifted the siege of Lamia and augmented Antipatros' forces substantially.<sup>75</sup>

The *Suda* preserves a fragment of Arrian's *History of the Successors*, which serves as a concise obituary:

Leonnatos: A Macedonian general related by birth to the mother of Philip, but brought up with Alexander, whose high reputation he shared thanks to the advantages of his upbringing and family background, and to his physical stature and good looks. Thus, even during Alexander's lifetime, his pride was overbearing and he had a Persian-like taste for extravagance in shiny

<sup>70</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.8–10. Vezin, *Eumenes* 27–8 argues that Eumenes, as a Greek, was not eager to assist in suppressing this most recent Greek uprising, and “daß Leonnats übereilte Offenheit ihn nicht als den Mann erwies, solch eine Absicht zu verwirklichen” (28). Macurdy, *HQ* 36–7, describes Leonnatos as “impetuous and easily carried away by enthusiasm,” but he did have the support of Olympias and her daughter (the family of Alexander still counted for something), and he was himself related to the royal house; thus his bid for power could not be taken lightly.

<sup>71</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.10; Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4–5, claims that Leonnatos planned to kill Eumenes when he could not persuade him (rightly rejected by Anson, *Eumenes* 72). Perhaps it was from Eumenes' report that Perdikkas first gave thought to abandoning Nikaia and marrying Kleopatra for greater political advantage. For Kleopatra as the “key to the kingdom” see Whitehorne, *Cleopatras* 66. For a colorful description of Leonnatos' return to Europe, its promise and ultimate disappointment see Romm, *Ghost* 115–21.

<sup>72</sup> Antiphilos cannot have considered abandoning Lamia until he heard that Leonnatos was nearby, for fear of placing himself between the relief force and the previously besieged army of Antipatros. Diod. 18.15.5 tells us that Antipatros joined Leonnatos' army on the day after the battle ( $\tauῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ$ ). The battle was likely to have been in the vicinity of Melitia.

<sup>73</sup> Diod. 18.15.3; Justin 13.5.14; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 25.5; Strabo 9.5.10 C434.

<sup>74</sup> Justin 13.5.15; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.9, where Λεόννατος ἐπιβοηθεῖν δοκῶν Ἀντιπάτρῳ hints at Leonnatos' duplicity. How Antipatros knew of Leonnatos' plans is another matter, and one suspects that the common source of Trogus and Arrian, probably Douris of Samos, is guilty of some fabrication.

<sup>75</sup> Antipatros had come into Thessaly in the autumn of 323 with 13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry; he now inherited what remained of Leonnatos' 20,000 foot and 1,500 horse.

weapons and in his way of life in general, which he maintained not inconspicuously on the pattern of that of his enemies. On Alexander's death he even proceeded to compete with him by making himself look like a king, with his hair loose and flowing, and in the rest of his grooming, which was not very different from the Persian style. He had Nisean horses (some say from Phasis), all with gold-studded bridles, ranged before his battle-line brilliantly ornamented. Magnificent tents and arms of outstanding beauty were also made for him, and a band of companions attended him.<sup>76</sup>

Leonnatos was a potential unfulfilled.<sup>77</sup> For the Successors of Alexander the Great his death was a timely one: there were already too many rivals for the empire. In his arrogance, his fondness for Persian luxury<sup>78</sup>—evinced by his dress and the decoration of his arms, even the gilded bridles of his horses—and in the style of his hair, Leonnatos imitated his kinsman Alexander and aspired to exercise at least some of his power. Along with the gifts that were his by birth came the expectation of military office. In the exercise of the latter, he displayed exemplary courage but also recklessness and ambition. And in the end Fortune abandoned him, just as it had Alexander. His brilliance, throughout his career, served the interests of others, even at the end, when he sought the ultimate reward for himself.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>76</sup> *Suda* Λ 249 = Arr. *Succ.* Frag. 12 (English translation by J.C. Yardley). Λεοννάτος, στρατηγός Μακεδόνων, κατὰ γένος προσήκων <τῇ> Φιλίππου μητρί, συντραφεὶς δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, κατὰ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιτήδειον καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος μέντοι καὶ κάλλος τοῦ σώματος τιμῆς μετεῖχεν. ὅθεν αὐτῷ καὶ ζῶντος Ἀλεξάνδρου τό τε φρόνημα ὑπέρογκον ἦν καὶ τις ἀβρότης Περσική κατά γε τὴν τῶν ὅπλων λαμπρότητα καὶ τὴν ὄλλην διαιταν ἐς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων οὐκ ἀφανῶς ἐπετηδεύετο. Τελευτήσαντος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ ζῆλον ἐποιεῖτο, εἰκάζον αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τῷ τε ἀφέτῳ καὶ ἀνειμένῳ τῆς κόμης καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κατασκευῇ, ἥ οὐ πρόσω τοῦ Περσικοῦ τρόπου ἤσκητο αὐτῷ.

<sup>77</sup> Thus also Waterfield 2011: 39: "He was not destined after all to become one of the pretenders."

<sup>78</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 12. He was also passionately fond of wrestling and gymnastics (Plut. *Alex.* 40.1; Pliny, *HN* 35.168); or hunting (Athen. 12.539d = Phylarchos, *FGrH* 81 F41 and/or Agatharchides of Knidos, *FGrH* 86 F3; Ael. *VH* 9.3); cf. also Hamilton, *PA* 106.

<sup>79</sup> He was, in fact, one of the few supreme commanders of his age who died in a cause that was ultimately victorious (at least, for the Makedonians), and this was due to his carelessness, which separated him from his main force. His career is aptly summed up by Berve II, 235: "Kurz, aber glänzend ist die Rolle, welche Le[onnatos] unter Al[exander] spielt, und sie stellt ihn in die Reihe der ersten Heerführer seiner Zeit."

# 10 Krateros son of Alexandros

Berve II, 220–7 no. 446; Geyer, *RE Supplbd* IV (1924) 1038–48; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 245–6; Heckel, *Who's Who* 95–9; Anson 2012; Ashton 2015.

In general, he loved the one best, and honored the other most; for he considered, and always commented, that Hephaestion was fond of Alexander, but Krateros fond of the King.<sup>1</sup>

Krateros was a soldier and a patriot, loyal to his King, faithful to his Makedonian origins.<sup>2</sup> Throughout Alexander's reign he won the respect and devotion of both the King and the army through an unusual combination of ability and loyalty. Yet he did not attain greatness even when the opportunity presented itself. As a personality he appears to have been somewhat uninspired, and his reluctance to make a bid for supreme power after Alexander's death may well betray a lack of statesmanship.<sup>3</sup> But he gained quickly a reputation as a soldier, and, among Alexander's new commanders, he was arguably the best.

## Family and early career

The son of Alexandros, Krateros came from the Upper Makedonian canton of Orestis.<sup>4</sup> Of his family background very little is known: the mother was apparently

1 Plut. *Alex.* 47.10: καὶ ὅλως τὸν μὲν ἐφίλει μάλιστα, τὸν δὲ ἐτίμα, νομίζον καὶ λέγων ἀεὶ τὸν μὲν ‘Ηφαιστίωνα φιλαλέξανδρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Κρατερὸν φιλοβασιλέα.

2 Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10.

3 Cf. Green, *Alexander to Actium* 8, who gives the following description of Krateros: “A genial bear of a man, in his broad-brimmed Macedonian slouch hat, he was popular with the troops; but he lacked that fine edge of ruthlessness necessary for supreme power.” Ashton 2015: 108 makes an important observation: “Where Craterus *has* been the subject of modern-day attention, the discussions have centred on what was done *to* him and *about* him by the decisions of others—and not so much on an examination of the events from the viewpoint of Craterus himself” (emphasis in the original).

4 His father's name: Arr. *Ind.* 18.5; Arr. 1.25.9; cf. also Perdrizet 1899: 274. His Orestian origin: Arr. *Ind.* 18.5.

named Aristopatra,<sup>5</sup> Amphoteros (later Alexander's admiral) was his brother.<sup>6</sup> Presumably, the family belonged to the high nobility of Upper Makedonia, for Krateros was one of the most influential of Alexander's *hetairoi*.<sup>7</sup> But, since we do not know the names of any other relatives, by blood or marriage, further deductions about the family's position within the Makedonian aristocracy are impossible.

Although the year of Krateros' birth is unknown, the argument that Amphoteros was the younger brother (Berve II, 32) is not compelling. Krateros' achievements outshine those of his brother, but do not impute seniority. The case of Alkimachos, generally considered the eldest of Agathokles' known sons, invites comparison: far more influential at Alexander's court was his younger brother Lysimachos; Philippos died in the early stages of his career in 328/7, while Autodikos appears to have reached manhood only shortly before 320.<sup>8</sup> But the fact that Alexander used Amphoteros for some rather delicate missions,<sup>9</sup> and appointed him navarch of the Aegean fleet, suggests that, like Alkimachos, he was a man of some experience.<sup>10</sup> Krateros himself appears to have been considerably younger than the field-marshals of Philip II: Parmenion, Antipatros, Antigonos, Attalos.<sup>11</sup> His promotion

<sup>5</sup> Strabo 15.1.35 C702 = *FGrH* 153 F2 (a letter from Krateros to his mother); the letter itself is spurious, but the mother's name may well be correct. See *Stemma VI*.

<sup>6</sup> Berve no. 68; Heckel, *Who's Who* 23; cf. Kaerst, *RE I* (1894) 1977 no. 4. It is tempting to speculate that Krateros and Amphoteros were twins. Plut. *Mor.* 177f says that Philip II commented on the intelligence of two brothers named Amphoteros and Hekateros—the names mean “both” and “each” respectively—and the wordplay may have involved the manipulation of Krateros’ name. Δυοῖν δὲ ἀδελφῶν Ἀμφοτεροῦ καὶ Ἐκατεροῦ, τὸν μὲν Ἐκατερὸν ἔμφρονα καὶ πρακτικὸν ὄρῶν, τὸν δὲ Ἀμφοτερὸν εὐήθη καὶ ἀβέλτερον ἔφη “τὸν μὲν Ἐκατερὸν ἀμφότερον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Ἀμφοτερὸν οὐδέτερον.” On the other hand, the story is hardly flattering to Amphoteros and thus probably apocryphal, unless it was invented in the camp of Krateros’ enemies.

<sup>7</sup> Curt. 6.8.2 ff.; 6.8.17, 11.10; 9.6.6. Krateros did not become one of the *somatophylakes*, however, and this might imply that his family was of lesser importance (cf. Berve I, 25–6); certainly three *somatophylakes* had connections with the Makedonian royal house (Leonnatos and Perdikkas; cf. Ptolemy's claim to be a bastard son of Philip). If there was a regional basis for recruitment of *somatophylakes*, then it might be argued that Orestis was already represented by Perdikkas. But note that in 325 there were two representatives from Eordaia: Ptolemy son of Lagos and Peithon son of Krateus.

<sup>8</sup> All three had closer ties with Alexander. For Alkimachos, see Arr. 1.18.1–2; Hyper 19.2 (Burrt) = Harpocration s.v. Αλκίμαχος; Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F16. Cf. also Berve no. 47; Heckel, *Who's Who* 9–10 “Alcimachus [1].” The death of Philippos (Curt. 8.2.35–9; Justin 15.3.12); Autodikos was *somatophylax* of Philip III Arrhidaios (Arr. *Succ.* 1.38).

<sup>9</sup> The arrest of Alexandros Lynkestes (Arr. 1.25.9–10); his mission to Krete and the Peloponnesos (Arr. 3.6.3; Curt. 4.8.15; cf. Bosworth 1975).

<sup>10</sup> Curt. 3.1.19: *Amphoterum classi ad oram Hellesponti, copiis autem praefecit Hegelochum, Lesbium et Chium Coumque praesidiis hostium liberaturos*. Hauben 1972: 57 sees Hegelochos as Amphoteros' superior: this was “a diarchic fleet command,” in which “the head of the marines also functioned as the supreme commander of the whole formation”; cf. Hauben 1976: 82–3.

<sup>11</sup> Parmenion was born c.400, Antipatros in 398 and Antigonos in 382. For Antigonos' early career see Billows, *Antigonos* 15 ff. I would put Attalos' birthdate closer to 390; cf. Heckel 1982b: 83. Ashton 2015: 109 says of Craterus “he was *circa* twenty-five years younger than Antipater”; cf. Romm, *Ghost* 94, who says that in 323 Krateros was “almost fifty.”

was quick and steady, suggesting that he was younger and able, rather than a middle-aged man whose progress had been retarded for some reason under Philip II. He was probably born sometime after 370. Later cases of illness will be ascribable to the effects of his wounds and hard campaigning rather than to old age.<sup>12</sup>

Krateros' story is predominantly military. From the start of the Persian expedition, he led his own battalion of *pezhetairoi*, perhaps like Perdikkas' battalion comprising a mixture of troops from Lynkos and Orestis.<sup>13</sup> This was stationed on the far left, along with the battalions of Philippos son of Amyntas, and Meleagros.<sup>14</sup> By the following year, he had gained in authority, commanding all the infantry on the left at Issos, though still subordinate to Parmenion, who exercised supreme command over that wing.<sup>15</sup>

Early in 332, he and Perdikkas were entrusted with the siege of Tyre in Alexander's absence;<sup>16</sup> in that time, a Tyrian sortie put Krateros' men to flight, but he soon rallied his troops and turned the "pursuers into the pursued."<sup>17</sup>

12 Wounds: Plut. *Alex.* 41.5; A 4.3.3. Illness: Plut. *Alex.* 41.6–7; Arr. 7.12.4.

13 Orestians and Lynkestians were commanded by Perdikkas (Diod. 17.57.2). Berve I, 114–5 assumed that there were three Upper Makedonian *taxeis* (those of Koinos, Polyperchon, and Perdikkas), and that the remainder were, in all likelihood, manned by "Kermakedonen" (but see the apparent contradiction at II, 220, where Krateros is described as leading "eine, vielleicht aus der Landschaft Orestis sich rekrutierende Taxis der Pezhetairen"). Cf. the term *asthetairoi*, which Bosworth I, 252, assumes referred only to the three battalions from Upper Makedonia. But the mixed phalanx of Orestians and Lynkestians suggests that perhaps there was a second battalion with similar composition—Alexander may have questioned the loyalty of the Lynkestians after the execution of the sons of Aëropos—led by Krateros.

14 Krateros' battalion appears twice in Arrian's description of the battle-order (1.14.2, 3). Bosworth 1976a: 126 is probably right in supposing that Ptolemy and Aristoboulos gave conflicting versions and that "Arrian has absorbed both versions without reconciling the contradiction." Arr. 1.14.2 places Krateros' battalion between those of Koinos and Amyntas, on the central right; 1.14.3 places him on the left, where he ought to belong (so Roos' Teubner text (Leipzig 1967) 32, and Brunt, *Arrian I*, 59 n.3; cf. Köpke, *Jahrb. f. cl. Philologie* 99 (1869) 263; Droysen 1877: 242). But Bosworth I, 118, prefers not to remove Krateros from 1.14.2, arguing that "the author of the variant, whether Aristoboulos or Ptolemy, assumed wrongly that it occupied the position at the extreme left which it was to have at Issus and Gaugamela . . ." His position as the anchor on the left was no doubt an indication of his competence. See, however, Lendon's opposite, and untenable, view (2005: 130) that proximity to the King in the battleline was an indication of quality: "every soldier was placed in rank order relative to every other, from the haughty Ajax in the royal Horse Guard on the extreme right to the Thersites, 'the worst man who came beneath Ilion', in the humble foot battalion of Krateros, forever at the left of the line."

15 Arr. 2.8.4; Curt. 3.9.8. Krateros was regularly on the left side, a point which favors Köpke's and Droysen's preference (above) for a position on the left at the Granikos (Arr. 1.14.3). He commands the left of the fleet at Tyre (Arr. 2.20.6; Curt. 4.3.11), and of the land forces at Gaugamela (Arr. 3.11.10; Curt. 4.13.29; Diod. 17.57.3).

16 Curt. 4.3.1. Arrian's (2.20.4) reticence is hardly surprising, since the command was held jointly by Krateros and Perdikkas, the latter a victim of Ptolemy's bias. See Errington 1969: 237, who thinks this may "conceivably be an omission of Arrian's." For the siege of Tyre see Fuller, *Generalship* 206–16; English, *Sieges* 56–84; Ashley, *Macedonian Empire* 237–49.

17 Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.13; cf. Berve II, 220. These need not have been the men of his own phalanx battalion.

Upon Parmenion's return to the army, Krateros was summoned to Sidon, where the Kypriot kings who had defected from Dareios had gathered with their fleets. In the naval assault on Tyre, Krateros commanded the left wing with Pnytagoras, the Salaminian king.<sup>18</sup> Of his part in the actual capture of the city, nothing is known.<sup>19</sup> In fact, there are no further references to his military activity until the battle of Gaugamela (331), where, as at Issos, he led the infantry battalions on the left wing, again under Parmenion's general command.<sup>20</sup>

His position on the left—and with the infantry—makes it more difficult for us to monitor his activities,<sup>21</sup> for the Alexander historians focused on the deeds of the King, on the right, and on the sweeping charges of the horsemen. By comparison the grappling phalanx offered little to excite the reader. From the descriptions of Gaugamela, however, we can draw certain inferences about Krateros' generalship, precisely because a second cavalry engagement took place on the left. As Alexander's forces pushed forward on the right, Parmenion found himself hard pressed on the left, and a gap developed in the infantry line between the battalions of Polyperchon and Simmias, when the latter could not keep up with the surging phalanx. Now this appears to have come about less by accident than by design, for Simmias and his men were informed that the left was in trouble.<sup>22</sup> That the young and inexperienced Simmias—he commanded the battalion in the absence of his brother Amyntas<sup>23</sup>—had the presence of mind to hold back his troops seems less likely than that the order came from Krateros, who, when he saw the Indians and Persians burst through to the baggage, also sent the infantry in reserve to fall upon the plunderers.<sup>24</sup> Schooled by Parmenion, Krateros now helped to extricate

18 Arr. 2.20.6; Curt. 4.3.11. Bosworth I, 245. The only reference to Parmenion at Tyre is Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.4, which appears to be another story of the old general's ineptitude; Alexander called back by Parmenion, whose troops are faring badly, returns to save the day. Parmenion had been assigned the military governorship of Koile-Syria. In effect, he guarded the Damaskos treasures and the prisoners-of-war; Justin 11.10.4 says *Parmeniona ad occupandam Persicum classem . . . misit*, but *classem* may be an error for *gazam* (cf. Atkinson I, 269: "Parmenion's mandate obviously included the area around Damascus"). Curt. 4.5.9 implies that Parmenion rejoined the army *after* the fall of Tyre.

19 I suspect that Krateros was not with the fleet when it anchored in the harbor facing Sidon. In this engagement Pnytagoras' quinquereme was sunk (Arr. 2.22.2).

20 Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.3; but Curt. 4.13.29 is corrupt: *in laevo Craterus Peloponnesium equites habebat Achaeorum et Locrensum et Maleion turmis sibi adjunctis*; cf. Berve II, 221 n.1: this is an error for Koiranos (no. 442).

21 Note that Marsden, *Gaugamela*, does not mention him once.

22 Arr. 3.14.4: ὅτι τὸ εὐόνυμον τῶν Μακεδόνων πονεῖσθαι ἤγγέλετο.

23 Arr. 3.11.9 says that the battalion of Amyntas "son of Philippos" was commanded by Simmias (both were sons of Andromenes); Diod. 17.57.3 and Curt. 4.13.28 assign the command to Philippos son of Balakros (otherwise unknown); cf. Bosworth I, 300–1 and 1976a: 9 ff.; Atkinson I, 423–4. Bosworth makes the appealing suggestion that Simmias may have been a subordinate of both Amyntas and Philippos. It is interesting that Arrian (3.14.4) writes of ἀμφὶ Σιμμίαν, a group which might have included Philippos son of Balakros.

24 Simmias and the gap in the phalanx: Arr. 3.14.4. Marsden, *Gaugamela* 59: "In view of the fierce fighting in progress on the left, Simmias made the wise decision." I suspect, however, that the decision was made for him by Krateros. Bosworth I, 300–1, 309, thinks that Ptolemy wrote

him from a dangerous situation, one which might have proved disastrous had the infantry on the left tried to keep pace with the right.<sup>25</sup>

After Gaugamela, Krateros' advancement was steady and rapid. On the road from Sousa to Persepolis, in the land of the Ouxians, Krateros was given his first independent command over a portion of the army other than his own battalion. He did not disappoint. The Ouxians formed two groups: those on the plain, which was agriculturally productive, offered their surrender, but the men of the hills had traditionally exacted payment from those who passed through their territory, even the Achaemenid King.<sup>26</sup> When the Ouxians refused Alexander passage through their territory, the King took a picked force along one of the lesser-known roads and fell upon them,<sup>27</sup> as they were unprepared for an attack from that quarter. He had sent Krateros ahead to occupy the heights, to which, he assumed, the Ouxians would flee. The strategy proved sound, and large numbers were butchered by Krateros' men.<sup>28</sup> From this point onward, Alexander

maliciously to discredit the family of an enemy (Perdikkas' sister, Atalante, married Attalos son of Andromenes). For the Indian and Persian cavalry: Arr. 3.14.5–6. But the problems with this episode are summarized by Bosworth I, 308–9. Cf. Devine 1975: 381 n.21: “... it is evident that its object (whether intended or not) was merely the field baggage-park, and not Alexander's fortified four-day camp . . .”

- 25 The resulting gap was, however, exploited by the Persian scythed chariots, which inflicted numerous casualties (Diod. 17.58.2–5; Curt. 4.15.14–7; with Heckel, Willekes, and Wrightson 2010: 106–9; on the origins of scythed chariots see Nefiodkin 2004, Persian origin; Rop 2013, Neo-Assyrian).
- 26 Arr. 3.17.1; Strabo 15.3.4 C728. But no distinction is made by Curt. 5.3.1–2; Diod. 17.67.2. Briant, *Persian Empire* 469, 726–32. Madates is called *praefectus regionis* [that is, of Ouxiana] by Curt. 5.3.4 (cf. Arr. 3.17.1: *satrapes*), but it appears that the Ouxians of the plain, at least, were part of the satrapy of Sousiana (Arr. 3.8.5; Briant, *Persian Empire* 728). When Curt. 5.3.16 says the Ouxians were added to the satrapy of Sousiana, he must mean that the mountain men were subjugated and that Madates, although pardoned, was removed from office.
- 27 Arr. 3.17.2 mentions 8,000 troops in addition to the *somatophylakes basilikoi* (the Royal Hypaspists; cf. Bosworth I, 323) and the regular hypaspists, and Hammond, *Genius* 113, talks of “eight Infantry Commandoes of 1,000 men each (but not taken from the Royal Guard and the Hypaspists)” and says they were “trained in the use of appropriate weapons and tactics of mountain warfare.” This is nonsense, of course, since Hammond misunderstands the nature of the chiliarichies awarded in Sittakene; and also the *pezhetairoi*, coming from Upper Makedonia, had no need of instruction on the art of mountain warfare.
- 28 See Arr. 3.17.4–5; Diod. 17.67 and Curt. 5.3.1–16 make no mention of Krateros' role and substitute a force of 1,500 archers and 1,000 Agrianes, led by Tauron son of Machatas. The omission of Krateros is inexplicable. Bosworth I, 321–4 assumes that Arrian and the popular tradition are referring to two different engagements, and this may be the case, since in the version given by Curtius Alexander was attacking a mountain fortress, from which the defenders were raining down missiles upon him (Curt. 5.3.7–9). Ashley, *Macedonian Empire* 273, appears to treat the narratives of Arrian and Curtius as if they describe two consecutive engagements, with the Ouxians guarding the pass and then withdrawing to their mountain fortress. This may in fact explain the differences but Ashley extends the role of Tauron to the exclusion of Krateros and confuses the Ouxian numbers with those of Ariobarzanes. Cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 227–8 (following Arrian's version alone); Olmstead, *HPE* 519; Stein 1938: 313 ff. Also Strabo 11.3.6 C524; 15.3.6 C729. Briant, *Persian Empire* 731, argues that the victory had the added advantage of bringing the neighboring Kossaians to heel.

regularly divided his forces, leaving the larger (and slower) portion with Krateros.<sup>29</sup> Later, as Hephaistion, Perdikkas, Ptolemy, and Leonnatos gained in importance, they also held independent commands; nevertheless, those tasks that involved the greatest risk and responsibility were, for the most part, reserved for Krateros.<sup>30</sup>

Some five days after defeating the Ouxians, the Makedonian army reached the Persian (or Sousian) Gates, where they found the road barred by the satrap of Persis, Ariobarzanes.<sup>31</sup> The position was virtually impregnable, the defending force more than adequate;<sup>32</sup> hence a frontal assault was repulsed with heavy losses.<sup>33</sup> Informants and an alternative route were sought. There was, of course, the longer but less taxing wagon road, by which Parmenion was leading the baggage train and its heavily armed escort into Persia,<sup>34</sup> but it was feared that delay

29 Krateros' independent commands: *ME* 35, 59, 60; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.13; Curt. 4.3.1; Arr. 3.17.4–5, 18.4–9; Curt. 5.4.14–6, 29, 34; 5.6.11; Arr. 3.21.2; Curt. 6.4.2, 23–4; Arr. 3.25.6, 8; Curt. 6.6.25, 33; Arr. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16, 19; 7.9.20–2; Arr. 4.17.1; Curt. 8.1.6; 8.5.2; Arr. 4.18.1; 4.22.1–2; 4.23.5; Curt. 8.10.4; Arr. 4.24.6–7; 4.28.7; 5.12.1; 5.18.1; 5.21.4; Diod. 17.96.1; Arr. 6.2.2; 6.4.1; 6.5.5, 7; Arr. *Ind.* 19.1, 3; Curt. 9.8.3; 9.10.19; Arr. 6.15.5, 7; 6.17.3; 6.27.3; 7.12.3–4.

30 Against the Ouxians: Arr. 3.17.4–5; against Ariobarzanes: Arr. 3.18.4–9; Curt. 5.4.14–34; against the Massagetai in Baktria: Curt. 8.1.6; Arr. 4.17.1; at the Hydaspes: Arr. 5.12.1 (Curtius fails to mention Krateros' important role); policing the satrapies in the west: Arr. 6.17.3; cf. Curt. 9.10.19.

31 For the chronology: Diod. 17.68.1; cf. Curt. 5.3.17 says that Alexander entered Persis on the third day but reached the Gates on the fifth; noted by Schmieder 1825: 1089; the problem is perhaps overstated and we need not question the veracity of Curtius or his source. Complete accounts of the battle: Arr. 3.18.1–9; Curt. 5.3.16–4.34; Diod. 17.68.1–69.2; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.27; Plut. *Alex.* 37.1–2 (the beginning only; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 96–7); also Strabo 15. 3. 6 C729. Modern discussions: Stein 1938: 313 ff.; Olmstead, *HPE* 519; Fuller, *Generalship* 228–34; Heckel 1980a; Atkinson II, 83–101; MacDermot and Schippmann 1999. Speck 2002 discusses the events in light of a personal study of the terrain and thus offers insights not available to armchair historians, including myself; his findings have generally been upheld or slightly modified by Moritani 2014: 111–31, with exquisite photos and maps on 152 ff. The identification of the Persian Gates with Tang-i Mohammed Reza, proposed by Stein, has now been overturned. Speck and Moritani place the Gates in the Mehrian valley (see especially Moritani 2014: 117–8). As a result of the work done by Speck and Moritani, it has become clear that Curtius' account is far more reliable than was previously thought. For the royal road from Sousa to Persepolis see now Velásquez Muñoz 2013.

Berve no. 115 identifies Ariobarzanes with the son of Artabazos; Bosworth I, 325 rightly distinguishes between them (cf. Briant, *Persian Empire* 1023). Polyaenus mistakenly has Phrasaortes (Berve no. 813), the later satrap of Persis; cf. Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 833 “Ariobarzanes (4)”; Heckel, *Who's Who* 45 “Ariobarzanes [2].” Howe 2015b attempts to explain the confusion of names by assigning the divergent accounts to different sources.

32 The figures vary: Curt. 5.3.17 gives Ariobarzanes 25,000 infantry; Diod. 17.68.1, 25,000 infantry and 300 cavalry; Arr. 3.18.2 has 40,000 foot, 700 horse.

33 Curt. 5.3.22 is over-dramatic (*tunc haesitat deprehensa felicitas, nec aliud remedium erat, quam reverti qua venerat*). But there is here a tendency to see this event as the Persian Thermopylae (Heckel 1980a; cf. Burn, *Alexander and the Middle East* 121–2).

34 Arr. 6.22.3: *Ind.* 23.5–8; Curt. 9.10.7; Diod. 17.104.5–6, 105.8; Pliny, *HN* 6. 97; cf. Hamilton 1972. For Parmenion's route see Speck 2002: 143–4 and Moritani 2014 142–5, rejecting the Kazerun route (proposed by Stein 1940: 20, 34): “It is unbelievable that the baggage train would have taken such a steep and long route” (Moritani 2014: 143). Alternative roads all reach an altitude of over 1,000 m, but are preferable to the Kazerun (southern) route.

would allow the Persians time to remove the treasures from Persepolis, which lay beyond the Gates and the Araxes River (Rud-i Kur).<sup>35</sup> Therefore, since he had learned of a difficult encircling path, Alexander led a select force to Ariobarzanes' rear, leaving the rest of the troops with Krateros at the foot of the long defile.<sup>36</sup> Alexander's strategy anticipates that used at the Hydaspes in 326: Krateros was to attack Ariobarzanes if he turned to deal with Alexander; if, however, Alexander reached the rear of Ariobarzanes' position undetected, he was to await a trumpet signal, whereupon both divisions of the army would attack the Gates simultaneously.<sup>37</sup> The latter actually happened, and Ariobarzanes' men, hemmed in by the cliffs, suffered heavy losses.<sup>38</sup> The road to Persepolis lay open for Alexander; Krateros brought up the rest of the troops with forced marches.<sup>39</sup>

Persepolis fell. It was not much later that Alexander conducted a thirty-day campaign into the interior of Persia, leaving the bulk of the army behind with Parmenion and Krateros.<sup>40</sup> Probably it was their task to arrange for the removal of the treasures, which amounted to 126,000 talents or more; these were to be conveyed to Ecbatana.<sup>41</sup> Some units of the *pezhetairoi* did remain behind to

35 Arr. 3.18.1; Curt. 5.3.16. According to Curt. 5.5.2 and Diod. 17.69.1, Alexander learned of the treasure after he had cleared the "Gates." Surely his choice of the shorter mountainous route suggests that he hastened to Persepolis for the very purpose of capturing its treasure (so Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 286; Olmstead, *HPE* 519 ff.; Fuller, *Generalship* 232). Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 227, gives equal emphasis to Alexander's pursuit of Dareios, but Alexander could have bypassed Persepolis and moved directly to Media, if that had been the case. He was, in fact, skilled at exploiting the opportunities that presented themselves and not easily drawn off course.

36 The Makedonian troops had encamped 30 stades from Ariobarzanes' force (Curt. 5.3.23). Arr. 3.18.4 says the information came from prisoners; Plut. *Alex.* 37.1–2; Diod. 17.68.5–6; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.27; Curt. 5.4.10–3 speak of a Lykian *boukolos*, a Persian Ephialtes, part of the Thermopylai-motif (on the significance of the Lykian see Zahrnt 1999). Diod. 17.68 has misunderstood the strategy completely or so greatly compressed his account as to make Alexander's purpose unintelligible. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.27 wrongly leaves the camp in the charge of Hephaestion and Philotas; the latter certainly could not have been present. See also Howe 2015b.

37 Arr. 3.18.4–5; Curt. 5.4.14–6.

38 Arr. 3.18.9 says that Ariobarzanes and a few horsemen escaped; Curt. 5.4.33–4 says that he was killed before Persepolis. The two accounts can be reconciled, if we assume that Arrian did not record the second engagement and that Ariobarzanes was not the son of Artabazos named at Arr. 3.23.7.

39 The Araxes River (Curt. 5.5.3; Strabo 15.3.6 C729) was bridged by Koinos, Amyntas, and Philotas (the hipparch), while the battle with Ariobarzanes was being fought (so Arr. 3.18.6), not later by Alexander himself (Curt. 5.5.3–4; Diod. 17.69.2). Krateros' forced marches to Persepolis: Curt. 5.4.34.

40 Curt. 5.6.11.

41 That is, 120,000 talents from Persepolis and 6,000 talents captured at Pasargadai. But there was considerable disagreement in the primary sources and this is reflected in our extant ones. Curt. 5.6.9 says that Alexander ordered pack animals and camels brought from Babylon and Sousa to help with the transport. But Diod. 17.71.2 claims that Alexander wanted to take some money with him (to Ecbatana and beyond) and deposit the rest in Sousa, but Arr. 3.19.7 has the treasure (no amount is given) conveyed to Ecbatana by Parmenion and handed over to Harpalos the Treasurer. The problem can receive only brief consideration here. It is perhaps sufficient to quote Strabo 15.3.9 C731: "They say that, apart from the treasures in Babylon and in the camp, which were not

guard the treasure,<sup>42</sup> but Krateros appears to have accompanied Alexander from Ecbatana toward the Caspian Gates, and, when Alexander pursued Dareios and his captors, Krateros led the slower forces eastward from the Gates and awaited the return of Koinos and his foraging party.<sup>43</sup> Parmenion's orders to march north into Hyrkania, through the land of the Kadousians, once he had conveyed the treasures to Ecbatana, were apparently rescinded, and the divisions of the army that had served as his escort returned to Alexander under the command of Kleitos, now recovered from an illness in Sousa.<sup>44</sup>

In the northeastern campaign, Krateros emerged as Alexander's foremost general, and for some three years he had no serious rivals. After the death of Dareios, Alexander found it necessary to secure Hyrkania, which Seibert aptly describes as the only landbridge to the east (Seibert, *Eroberung* 114: "die einzige Landbrücke nach Osten"), a 75 km strip between the Caspian and the desert to the south. For the undertaking, Krateros and Erigyios commanded one-third of the army each. But Erigyios' task was merely to lead the baggage train along the easiest path to Hyrkania, while Krateros took his own battalion and that of Amyntas son of Andromenes, the archers, and some cavalry against the Tapourians.<sup>45</sup> Curtius' claim that Krateros was left behind to guard Parthiene against invaders is misleading. His mission was clearly to patrol, round up fugitive mercenaries,<sup>46</sup> and set in order Parthiene, since Alexander had no time to deal with the natives. Thus he and Erigyios reunited with Alexander at Zadrakarta (Sari or Gorgan?) in Hyrkania, their arrival coinciding with that of the Tapourian satrap, Autophradates, who sought Alexander's mercy.<sup>47</sup>

included in the total, the value of those in Susa and Persis alone were reckoned at forty thousand talents, though some say fifty, and others have reported that all treasures from all sources were brought together at Ecbatana and that they were valued at one hundred and eighty thousand talents" (H. L. Jones, tr.). Atkinson II, 116 observes that this figure is made up of 4,000 talents from Arbela, 6,000 from Pasargadai, 50,000 from Sousa and 120,000 from Persepolis. On the other hand Diod. 17.71.2 and Strabo 15.3.9 both mention that some of the treasure was stored in Sousa.

42 Alexander had gone ahead to Ecbatana, whence he advanced against Dareios, taking with him "the Makedonian phalanx, except for those assigned to guarding the treasure" (Arr. 3.20.1: τὴν φάλαγγα τὴν Μακεδονικὴν ἔξω τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ταχθέντων).

43 Koinos' foraging-party: Arr. 3.20.4, 21.2. Krateros took the slower troops at a moderate pace: μηδ μακρὰς ὁδοὺς ἄγοντα (Arr. 3.21.2).

44 Parmenion's orders: Arr. 3.19.7; cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 295; Berve II, 304; Bosworth I, 337; Seibert, *Eroberung* 110–1. There is, at least, no evidence that Parmenion carried out these orders. For Kleitos' instructions: Arr. 3.19.8; cf. also Berve no. 427. He had rejoined Alexander by the time of the Philotas affair (Arr. 3.27.4).

45 Arr. 3.23.2; cf. Curt. 6.4.2.

46 Curt. 6.4.2: *ut ab incursione barbarorum Parthienem tueretur*. Arr. 3.23 says that he did not, however, fall in with any of Dareios' mercenaries.

47 Arr. 3.23.6; Curt. 6.4.23–4 have "Phradates"; see Berve II, 221; II, 96–7 no. 189; Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1896) 2608, s.v. "Autophradates (2)"; Heckel, *Who's Who* 65 "Autophradates [2]." Arr. 3.24.3 says that he surrendered of his own accord; this must have been a direct consequence of Krateros' activities. Alexander, nevertheless, reinstated Autophradates as satrap (Arr. 3.23.7). Clemency was becoming the hallmark of the new "King of Asia." For the identification of Zadrakarta with Sari (instead of Astarabad/Gorgan) see Engels, *Logistics* 84 n.64; but there are good arguments for Gorgan: Seibert, *Eroberung* 117, with n.66; cf. also Vogelsang 1988.

Not all proved worthy of the King's kindness: Satibarzanes, the reinstated satrap of Areia, defected to Bessos, who assumed the upright tiara and the title of Artaxerxes. Alexander hastened to deal with him. Arrian and Curtius give divergent accounts of Krateros' role. According to the latter, Krateros was left behind at the foot of a rocky outcrop,<sup>48</sup> on the plateau of which (some thirty-two stades or 3.5 miles in circumference) 13,000 Areians had taken refuge. Alexander, broke off his pursuit of Satibarzanes and returned to conduct the siege in person; for he learned that Satibarzanes had outdistanced him. Alexander's reconnaissance may have informed him that Satibarzanes had moved to Artakoana (usually identified as Herat and equated with Alexandria-in-Areia).<sup>49</sup> A new pattern was emerging: Krateros advanced to Artakoana and commenced the siege, reserving for Alexander the honor of taking it.<sup>50</sup> In Arrian's version, Alexander breaks off his march to Baktra, leaving Krateros with the rest of the army, and rushes to Artakoana; no satisfactory account of the town's surrender is given. Sometime later, when Alexander had already made administrative changes in the satrapy, Krateros and the remainder of the army joined him.<sup>51</sup> Arrian's version is, in all probability, more reliable, since Artakoana lay a considerable distance east of Zadrakarta, and Alexander's more mobile troops will have reached the city before Krateros and the rest of the army arrived.<sup>52</sup>

## Krateros and Philotas

At the beginning of Alexander's reign, the house of Parmenion had exercised unrivalled influence at court, power that manifested itself in the command structure of the army: Parmenion himself was the undisputed military second-in-command, especially after his elimination of Attalos. Two of his sons, Philotas and Nikanor, commanded the Companion Cavalry and the hypaspists respectively. But by 330 that power had eroded: Nikanor had died of illness in Areia;<sup>53</sup> the father had been left behind in Ecbatana, though it was not

48 Curt. 6.6.23–5. That this was Kalat-i-Nadiri, as Engels, *Logistics* 87–8 suggests, is unlikely. Thirty-two stades: Curt. 6.6.23.

49 Pliny, *HN* 6.21 [61] says that the distance from Hekatompylos to Alexandria in Areia (Herat) was 575 Roman miles, and from that city to Prophthasia in the land of the Drangae another 199 miles. The latter distance would surely cause some problems for the relocation of Artakoana (which must have been in the vicinity of Herat) northward to a position some 70 miles from Kalat-i-Nadiri. Vogelsang 2002: 120 identifies Artakoana with Alexandria-in-Areia (cf. Pliny, *HN* 6.24 [93]).

50 Curt. 6.6.33.

51 Arr. 3.25.6–8. Another Persian, Arsakes, was appointed satrap (Berve II, 80–1 no. 146; Heckel, *Who's Who* 53 “Arsaces [1]”); he proved no more reliable.

52 Berve II, 221–2 prefers Arrian, as does Geyer, *RE Supplbd* IV (1924) 1039. Cf. Droysen I, 262; Niese I, 110; Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 313; Hamilton, *Alexander* 93; but see Bosworth I, 357: “Arrian's source has misrepresented the progress of the campaign, erroneously placing Craterus in command of the reserves . . .”

53 Arr. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18–9; Berve no. 554; Heckel, *Who's Who* 176 “Nicanor [1].” The other son, Hektor, had drowned in the Nile in 332/1 (Curt. 4.8.7–9; 6.9.27; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 49.13; Berve II,

immediately clear whether he would rejoin the King or control the army's lifeline to the west. Even when it had been decided to leave him behind, he was weakened by distance but remained a force to be reckoned with. Then, in October 330, whether through negligence or with malicious intent, Philotas failed to tell the King what he had learned about a dangerous conspiracy. The conspirators were not, as is generally believed, non-entities. Even the elusive Dimnos, the man who divulged the details of the plot to his lover, Nikomachos, proves, upon examination, to be a man of some importance<sup>54</sup>—not an officer, as far as we know, but certainly a member of the *hetairoi*. Often wrongly identified as the author of the plot, he was rather in league with others of note, particularly Demetrios, one of the seven *somatophylakes*.<sup>55</sup> Krateros, learning of Philotas' cavalier treatment of the entire affair, saw and seized the opportunity to bring him down. He had been monitoring Philotas' behavior since Egypt.<sup>56</sup> Protecting the King from treason—for this is how he regarded Philotas' crime—had its personal advantages, even for one who was already the King's strong right hand.

In Egypt, Philotas had voiced his opinions carelessly, especially his disgust at Alexander's recent adoption by Amun. He was not alone. His views were shared by many prominent Makedonians, including Hegelochos, who may in fact have influenced Philotas.<sup>57</sup> Arrian mentions Philotas' indiscretion in Egypt, calling it a plot (*epiboule*), which of course it was not.<sup>58</sup> And, while his conversation with Hegelochos went undetected at the time, it formed part of the

149 no. 295; Heckel, *Who's Who* 131). In neither case, can the responsibility for their deaths be attributed to Alexander. Badian 1960a: 329 asserts that “Alexander, in addition to undermining Parmenio’s reputation, had also made considerable progress in extricating himself from the stranglehold of Parmenio’s family and adherents.” In a court of law this is the kind of comment that the judge tells the jury to disregard but sticks in their minds nevertheless. It contributes to a bigger picture that Badian attempts to paint but has no basis in fact (especially when one eliminates Asandros, who is identified as Parmenion’s brother on the flimsiest of evidence).

54 Dimnos: *Hetairos* (Diod. 17.79.1), from Chalaistra (Plut. *Alex.* 49.3). See Berve II, 142–3, no. 269; Heckel, *Who's Who* 112. Curtius (6.7.6; cf. 6.11.37) makes it clear that significant people were involved. Adams 2003a, straddles the two positions, calling the conspirators “a small group of people, mostly of minor reputation and consequence,” but adding in a footnote the credentials of both Dimnos and Demetrios (2003a: 114, with n.1).

55 Curt. 6.7.15, 11.35; cf. Arr. 3.27.5. Demetrios’ involvement is far too important to be ignored (either by Philotas or by modern scholars), and yet it rarely receives the attention it deserves. See Heckel, “The Conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard: Its Causes and Aims” (forthcoming).

56 Kebalinos the informant (Berve II, 203, no. 418; Heckel, *Who's Who* 82); his brother Nikomachos was Dimnos’ lover (II, 279–80 no. 569; Heckel, *Who's Who* 180).

57 Arr. 3.26.1; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48.4–49.2. For Hegelochos’ conspiracy see Curt. 6.11.22–9. There is no good reason to regard Hegelochos’ treason as a fabrication (*pace* Badian 1960a: 332; Fears 1975: 133 n.77); so Heckel 1982b. For Philotas’ “conspiracy” in Egypt see also Cauer 1894: 8 ff.

58 Arr. 3.26.1. Arrian also calls the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard and Dimnos Philotas’ *epiboule* (3.26.1: τὴν Φιλώτα ἐπιβουλήν) and speaks of Philotas’ accomplices (3.26.2: Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄμφι αὐτόν). But this is the official party line. It might be thought treasonous to speak against the King or, at least, to disparage his achievements (Krateros certainly thought so), but it was not a conspiracy, when only one person was involved.

“treasonous activity” to which Krateros and those loyal to Alexander objected. Arrian gives no details of the Egyptian “conspiracy,” but it appears to be identical with the affair described at some length by Plutarch.<sup>59</sup> Among the captives taken by Parmenion at Damaskos in 333 was Antigona, a young Makedonian girl.<sup>60</sup> She became the mistress of Philotas, who confided in her, claiming that Alexander’s victories had been won through his efforts and those of Parmenion, that the King’s pretensions about Amun were an insult to the Makedonian nobility.<sup>61</sup> But what Philotas told her, Antigona repeated to a friend and, ultimately, the words reached Krateros’ ears.<sup>62</sup> He wasted no time in bringing the matter, and Antigona, to the King’s attention. Alexander, we are told, forgave Philotas his outspokenness, but Krateros remained suspicious and kept him under surveillance, using the girl as his informant.<sup>63</sup> How long this “prolonged espionage”<sup>64</sup> lasted is unknown, though it undoubtedly did not span all the years between the disaffection in Egypt and the Dimnos affair; indeed, Antigona’s information, which cannot have revealed much that was not already known about Philotas, may well have disappointed Krateros’ hopes of building a case against his rival. But, when the opportunity presented itself, Krateros and his associates were quick to press their advantage.

Nikomachos gave the details of the plot to his brother, Kebalinos, who exposed Dimnos. But the latter died resisting arrest and gave no testimony against Philotas.<sup>65</sup> Alexander, it appears, had not made a firm decision on how he would deal with this case of negligence—the only charge the evidence allowed.<sup>66</sup> But suppressing the news was tantamount to complicity, and, for Alexander, it was a small step from suspicion to belief. The actual decision on Philotas’ fate must have been the one

59 Plut. *Alex.* 48.4–49.2; Plut. *Mor.* 339d–f = *de fort.* *Al.* 2.7.

60 Antigona’s capture at Damaskos: Plut. *Alex.* 48. 4 (where it is stated that she came originally from Pydna); Plut. *Mor.* 339d (from Pella). According to the latter version, she had crossed from Pella to Samothrake (for the worship of the Kabeiroi? Cf. Hamilton, *PA* 2; Kern, *RE* X.2 (1919) 1399 ff., esp. 1423–37, s.vv. “Kabeiros und Kabeiroi”; Cole 1984; cf. also Greenwalt 2008), where she was captured by Autophradates (Berve no. 188; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 65 “Autophradates [1]”). Antigona: the name occurs among the Makedonian nobility (cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 216)—it was the name of Pyrrhos’ wife, a daughter of Berenike (Sandberger, *Prosopographie* no. 14)—see Berve II, 42 no. 86 (*Mor.* 339d–f); Wilcken, *RE* I (1894) 2404, s.v. “Antigone (7)”; Hamilton, *PA* 133; Hofstetter, *Griechen in Persien* 16–7 no. 19a.

61 Plut. *Alex.* 48.5; Plut. *Mor.* 339d. But, in support of Philotas’ arguments, see Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2. 290–306.

62 Plut. *Alex.* 48.6; Plut. *Mor.* 339e–f.

63 Plut. *Alex.* 48.7–49.1. For this conspiracy *against* Philotas (οἱ μὲν οὖν Φιλότος ἐπιβουλεύμενος οὗτος ἤγνοει καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ, 49. 1), in which Badian 1960a: 326 attempts to find support for his arguments concerning Dimnos’ conspiracy, see Hamilton, *PA* 135.

64 Badian’s phrase 1960a: 331, but he regards this as part of Alexander’s own conspiracy against Philotas.

65 Cf. Badian 1960a: 331: “Dimnus conveniently killed himself (or was killed while resisting arrest) . . .”

66 In fact, Philotas himself admitted to the charge: *culpam, silentii tamen, non facti ullius . . .* (Curt. 6.7.34).

advocated by Alexander's friends in council. Krateros spoke first and most effectively, for he was dear to Alexander and exceedingly hostile to Philotas.<sup>67</sup> Whether or not Krateros was attempting to disguise his ill will towards Philotas with a show of piety, as Curtius claims, is debatable; for Krateros had already gained in power and importance as a result of Parmenion's relegation to Ecbatana.<sup>68</sup> He was, most likely, sincere in both motives: he earnestly desired to protect Alexander, and he sought to ruin Philotas for personal reasons. Perhaps friction had developed between the two when it became clear that Krateros was being groomed as Parmenion's successor, but, by the time of the Philotas affair, Krateros had little to fear from either Philotas or Parmenion. In this respect, his role in the affair is much less complicated and less sinister than that of the unaccomplished Hephaestion.

Krateros' speech was to the point and, from the standpoint of the younger commanders, who owed so much to Alexander's favor, perfectly reasonable. In some respects it was strongly reminiscent of the advice given concerning Alexandros Lynkestes, who, as it turned out, was the most likely beneficiary if Demetrios' plot had succeeded. Alexander could not go on excusing Philotas forever, nor would Philotas cease to plot against the King. Beware the enemy within, warned Krateros. And he had not forgotten the threat of Parmenion: the father would not endure the son's execution.<sup>69</sup> Clearly, Krateros understood what was at stake, what could be gained from Philotas' removal. But his condemnation of Philotas served better the wishes of his accomplices in the conspiracy *against* Philotas.<sup>70</sup> All were hostile and unyielding. By the time Philotas' enemies met, during the second watch on the night of his arrest, Alexander had been strongly influenced—by Hephaestion in private, openly by Krateros.<sup>71</sup> Unanimity prevailed among Alexander's young commanders, united in a common purpose against a common enemy. To Alexander and before the army they denounced Philotas, until even his relatives and friends saw fit to abandon him. Koinos and Amyntas repudiated their earlier ties: it was as much a personal defense as a prosecution of Philotas. All that remained was for the army to pronounce the verdict that was never in doubt. The cabal of younger officers had won the day. "My King," Philotas declared, "the bitterness of my enemies has overcome your kindness" (*vicit . . . bonitatem tuam, rex, inimicorum meorum acerbitas*).<sup>72</sup>

67 His relationship with Alexander: Arr. 7.12.3; Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10; Diod. 17.114.1–2; and in this instance, Curt. 6.8.2.

68 *Erat Craterus regi carus in paucis, et eo Philotae ob aemulationem dignitatis adversus* (Curt. 6.8.2). *Non aliam premendi inimici occasionem aptiorem futuram ratus odio suo pietatis praeferebat speciem* (Curt. 6.8.4).

69 Curt. 6.8.7.

70 Heckel 1977a. It seems likely that Krateros, Hephaestion, and others discussed the matter and agreed to exploit Philotas' vulnerability. But this is not to deny Philotas' culpability.

71 On the roles of Hephaestion and Krateros see Reames, who singles out Krateros as Philotas' primary enemy. "If anyone was 'gunning for' Philotas, it was Krateros, who could also have anticipated benefitting most . . ." (2008: 175). Reames is certainly correct in seeing opportunism as the driving motive in the whole affair.

72 Curt. 6.8.22; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 49.8.

## The Upper Satrapies and Alexander's orientalism

For the next two years Krateros was unchallenged as the foremost of Alexander's generals: Hephaestion had only begun his rise to power with his promotion to hipparch; Parmenion, who had already ceased to be an obstacle before his death, was eliminated as a consequence of the Philotas affair.<sup>73</sup> In Baktria-Sogdiana, as earlier in Hyrkania and Areia, Krateros had supreme authority over the army while Alexander led detachments on special missions. Thus, while Alexander subdued the rebellious outposts along the Iaxartes River (Syr-Darya), Krateros supervised the siege work at the largest of these, Kyroupolis (Kurkath),<sup>74</sup> which was then taken under the King's leadership—though both Alexander and Krateros were wounded.<sup>75</sup> We know nothing of his role in the brief skirmish with the Skythians who lived beyond the Iaxartes. Curtius (7.7.9–10) says that he, along with Erygiros and Hephaestion, attended the council held in Alexander's tent before the battle, but no source records his participation in the actual fighting.<sup>76</sup> It seems likely that he retained the bulk of the army on the south bank of the river when Alexander crossed with a select force.

In the meantime, the contingent sent to relieve Marakanda (Samarkand), where Spitamenes had appeared unexpectedly, was ambushed and massacred at the Polytimetus River (Zeravshan).<sup>77</sup> Alexander, learning the news, hurried south, leaving Krateros to follow with the main body at a more restrained pace.<sup>78</sup> The pattern had been set: it was not a glorious role, but Alexander was not one to grant his officers many opportunities for glory.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, when the occasion presented itself, Krateros proved his worth.

In the spring of 328, Alexander moved from winter quarters at Baktra (Balkh) and re-crossed the Oxos (Amu-Darya), leaving behind the battalions of Polyperchon, Attalos, Gorgias, and Meleagros, all under Krateros' command.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Hephaestion's promotion: Arr. 3.27.4. Parmenion's death: Arr. 3.26.4; Curt. 7.2.11 ff.; Diod. 17.80.1, 3; Plut. *Alex.* 49.13; Justin 12.5.3; Strabo 15.2.10 C724; cf. Justin 12.6.14; Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.1.33, 52; 8.7.4.

<sup>74</sup> So Engels, *Logistics* 103, following Benveniste 1943–5.

<sup>75</sup> Kyroupolis: Arr. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16 (Krateros' siege); Arr. 4.3.1; Curt. 7.6.20 (founded by Kyros the Great); Arr. 4.3.1–4; Curt. 7.6.19–21 (captured by Alexander). Krateros was wounded by an arrow (Arr. 4.3.3); Alexander's wound was more serious (Arr. 4.3.3; Plut. *Mor.* 341b, incorrectly placing it in Hyrkania; Curt. 7.6.22, saying it happened at the town of the Memaceni, after the fall of Kyroupolis). On Alexander's wound see also Lascaris 1997; for its effects on Alexander's behavior, Heckel and McLeod 2015: 250, 261–4. For the campaign see Fuller, *Generalship* 234–6.

<sup>76</sup> Arr. 4.4.1–9; Curt. 7.8.6–9.17 is quite different; cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 237–41, for an analysis.

<sup>77</sup> Arr. 4.3.6–7; 4.5.2–6.2; Curt. 7.7.30–9; cf. 7.6.24. See now Hammond 1991a.

<sup>78</sup> Curt. 7.9.20. Alexander's relief of Marakanda: Arr. 4.5.3–6.5; Curt. 7.9.20–1; IA 39; ME 13. Krateros' arrival: Curt. 7.9.22.

<sup>79</sup> I would, however, stop short of Carney's view (1975: 216) that "Alexander carefully monitored [Craterus'] activities" because Krateros was "a potentially dangerous leader of opposition and had to be watched closely."

<sup>80</sup> Arr. 4.16.1 does not mention Krateros, though his position is clear from Arr. 4.17.1 and corroborated by Curt. 8.1.6; cf. Holt, *Land of Bones* 67. There is some difficulty with Meleagros' role:

Their instructions were to prevent further defection in Baktria and to crush the insurrection.<sup>81</sup> But, while Alexander and the mobile troops conducted a sweep campaign in Sogdiana, the rebel Spitamenes and the allied horsemen of the Massagetai, attacked the smaller Makedonian garrisons in Baktria.<sup>82</sup> Krateros drove the Massagetai to the edge of the desert, defeating them in a bitter struggle and killing 150 of 1,000 horsemen; the remainder found temporary safety in the expanses of the desert.<sup>83</sup> But, by driving Spitamenes out of Baktria, Krateros inadvertently took some of the luster off his own deeds; for Koinos, who had been left in Sogdiana at the beginning of the winter of 328/7, won a decisive victory, inducing the Massagetai to bring Alexander Spitamenes' head.<sup>84</sup> Both Koinos and Krateros rejoined the main force at Nautaka for the remainder of that winter.<sup>85</sup>

Krateros was not present in Marakanda during the summer or early autumn when Alexander murdered Kleitos. The King may have given his version in a letter (just as in the following year the Hermolaos conspiracy was so reported) or through a messenger, perhaps at the same time as Krateros was instructed to send Meleagros' battalion to join Koinos in Sogdiana. What the official version was, and how Krateros reacted to the news, we cannot say. Koinos and Krateros maintained the traditional values of Makedon, and, to a point, they shared Kleitos' sentiments. Koinos later became the spokesman of the Makedonian soldiery at the Hyphasis.<sup>86</sup> Of Krateros, Plutarch writes:

It is true that Craterus' name really did stand high with the Macedonian soldiers, and after Alexander's death the majority longed for him; they remembered that he had often incurred Alexander's enmity on their behalf by

if he was, in fact, left with Krateros in Baktria he was soon summoned to Sogdiana, where he was left with Koinos late in 328 (Arr. 4.17.3). Possibly, Meleagros' name was added in 4.16.1 by mistake.

- 81 Arr. 4.16.1: τούτοις μὲν παρήγγειλεν [sc. Αλέξανδρος] τὴν τε χώραν ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν, ὃς μῆτι νεωτερίσωσιν οἱ τάτη βάρβαροι, καὶ τοὺς ἔτι ἀφεστηκότας αὐτὸν ἔξαρεῖν.  
82 For the fate of the phourarch Attinas: Curt. 8.1.3–5; cf. Arr. 4.16.4–5, who does not mention his name; Berve II, 95 writes of Attinas: "Sein weiteres Schicksal ist nicht bekannt." But Curt. 8.1.5 says he was killed in the engagement, Arr. 4.16.5 that he was taken prisoner; if Arrian is correct, Attinas was probably executed afterwards. For Zariaspa-Baktra, where the sick were left behind, and for Peithon son of Sosikles and the harpist Aristonikos, both of whom met noble deaths: see Arr. 4.16.6–7.

83 Thus Arr. 4.17.1–2; Curt. 8.1.6 claims that the Massagetai fled but that Krateros slew 1,000 Dahai, perhaps confusing this battle with the one fought by Koinos (Arr. 4.17.6–7).

84 Arr. 4.17.3–7. Curt. 8.3.1–15 and ME 20–3 give a more sensational, but less plausible, account of Spitamenes' decapitation. For the similarities between Spitamenes' wife and the Biblical Judith see Burstein 1999.

85 Arr. 4.18.1–2; Curt. 8.4.1 says that when Alexander moved out of winter quarters in the spring of 327 (cf. Arr. 4.18.4) he had stayed there only a little more than two months: *tertio mense ex hibernis movit exercitum*. Cf. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.319.

86 Kleitos was "altmakedonisch gesinnt" (so Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 363; cf. Arr. 4.8.4 ff.; Curt. 8.1.22 ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 50–1. Badian 1964: 200 is suspicious of Koinos' death, coming so soon after his opposition to Alexander. Similar cases of ill-advised opposition to the King: Arr. 4.12.2 (Leonnatos); Curt. 8.12.17 (Meleagros). Krateros' traditional attitudes: Plut. *Alex.* 47.9; cf. Carney 1975: 216. But *Suda* K 2235 shows us a very different side of Krateros.

opposing him in his rush to imitate Persian manners and by defending the Macedonians' ancestral customs, when they were being treated with contempt owing to the spread of luxury and pride.<sup>87</sup>

Certainly, before the Indian campaign, he voiced his objections tactfully and with restraint; for he retained the love and respect of Alexander. Furthermore, a fragment from Arrian's *Events after Alexander* suggests that he too was corrupted by certain elements of Persian luxury.<sup>88</sup>

In early 327, Krateros remained in Sogdiana, witnessing the wedding of Alexander and the Sogdianian Roxane, doubtless with silent disapproval.<sup>89</sup> This followed the capture of the Rock of Chorienes (Koh-i-nor), where Krateros may have directed affairs under Alexander's leadership during the day; Perdikkas, Ptolemy, and Leonnatos supervised the operations during the night.<sup>90</sup> But, when Alexander moved south into Baktria, Krateros remained in Sogdiana with the battalions of Polyperchon, Attalos, and Alketas in order to deal with Haustanes and Katanes, who continued the resistance in Paraitakene. Haustanes was captured, Katanes killed.<sup>91</sup> Polyperchon went on to subdue the region which Curtius calls Bubacene.<sup>92</sup> It was perhaps no coincidence that Alexander's attempt to introduce the Persian practice of *proskynesis* at his own Court was made during Krateros'

87 Plut. *Eum.* 6.3: Καὶ γὰρ ἦν ὅντως ὄνομα τοῦ Κρατεροῦ μέγα, καὶ μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν τοῦτον ἐπόθησαν οἱ πολλοί, μνημονεύοντες ὅτι καὶ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀνεδέξατο πολλάκις ἀπεχθείας πολλάς, ὑποφερομένου πρὸς τὸν Περσικὸν ζῆλον ἀντιλαμβανόμενος καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις ἀμύνων διὰ τρυφὴν καὶ ὅγχον ἥδη περιωβριζόμενοι. English translation by Tim Duff.

88 Arr. *Succ.* Frag. 19 = *Suda K* 2335, quoted near the end of this chapter. The ascendancy of Hephaestion soon after the Hydaspes battle may have embittered Krateros somewhat and, if there is any truth to Plutarch's statement that he "incurred Alexander's enmity" for speaking out, it was surely in the last years of the King's life.

89 His later repudiation of Amastris (see below), which has been regarded by many scholars as typical of the behavior of Alexander's marshals after the King's death, may perhaps be taken as a sign of his conservatism. The only explicit example to support the claim that the Makedonian *hetairoi* repudiated their Persian wives immediately after Alexander's death is that of Krateros and Amastris, and this may have been done for political rather than personal reasons (or both: Romm, *Ghost* 95)—by this time Krateros had probably already accepted Antipatros' offer of marriage to Phila—and Krateros took care to find a suitable husband for her (Dionysios of Herakleia Pontica). Arrian (7.6.2) notes that there were *some* bridegrooms who objected to the marriages in Sousa and it appears that main objections came from the common soldiers; nor is it clear whether they objected to the unions themselves or the fact that they were conducted according to Persian custom. "the marriages celebrated in Persian style did not correspond to the desires of most of them, *including even some of the bridegrooms*, despite the great honour of being raised to equality with the King" (P.A. Brunt tr.: τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν γημάντων ἔστιν οἷς, καίτοι τῇ ισότητι τῇ ἐς τὸν βασιλέα μεγάλως τετιμμένοις). See also Meeus 2009a: 236; and for a different view Müller 2013.

90 Arr. 4.21.4.

91 Arr. 4.22.2 (120 cavalry and 1,500 infantry were killed); Curt. 8.5.2. Katanes had, along with Spitamenes and Dataphernes, arrested Bessos. See Berse II, 202 no. 415; Heckel, *Who's Who* 81–2.

92 Curt. 8.5.2. Otherwise unattested.

absence. But, even without him, there was considerable resistance to the oriental custom among the Makedonians;<sup>93</sup> soon there occurred the conspiracy of the Pages, the details of which were reported to Krateros by letter.<sup>94</sup> And some time later, Krateros and his troops rejoined Alexander in Baktria, whence the army set out for India.

## The Indian campaign

Early in the summer of 327, the Makedonians moved to Alexandria-of-the-Caucasus (Kunduz<sup>95</sup>); thence to Nikaia and the Cophen River (Kabul).<sup>96</sup> When Perdikkas and Hephaestion led the advance force to the Indus, Krateros at first remained with Alexander, following the course of the Choes (Kunar). But the heavy infantry and siege equipment crossed the river with great difficulty and made slow progress through the mountains. Alexander left them to follow at their own speed, presumably under Krateros' command.<sup>97</sup> They did not reunite with Alexander until they reached Andaka, where Krateros was ordered to subdue those neighboring cities that had not submitted voluntarily. We are not told about the composition of his force, but it included not more than two battalions of *pezhetairoi* (Polyperchon, Alketas); Alexander had taken Attalos and Koinos, while White Kleitos, Meleagros, and Gorgias (leading Krateros' former battalion) had accompanied Hephaestion and Perdikkas to the Indus.<sup>98</sup> From Andaka, Krateros led his division to Arigaion, where Alexander again left him behind, this time with instructions to fortify the main wall, to settle in the city those of the

93 As in the case of the Sousan marriages, the objections of the Makedonian *hetairoi* to *proskynesis* are perhaps exaggerated. Lane Fox (*Alexander* 320–5), in a balanced account of the *proskynesis* episode, shows that the closest friends of Alexander were not as aggrieved as the Roman sources and modern scholars have made out. “This unassuming little ceremony went the round of all the guests, each drinking, kissing his hand and being kissed in return by the king, until it came to Callisthenes” (323); “The issue was not an absolute division, and only if it had been mishandled could it have become very awkward” (325).

94 Plut. *Alex.* 55.6. *Proskynesis*: Arrian 4.12.2 says that it was Leonnatos who mocked the ceremony (Berve no. 467, identifies him as Leonnatos of Aegae, which is almost certainly incorrect); see Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035; Badian 1960a: 337; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 54, 206. Curt. 8.5.22 names Polyperchon, who on Curtius' own evidence was not present (8.5.2); see Heckel 1978d.

95 See Holt, *Bactria* 20 n.35, for the identification.

96 Arr. 4.22.3: ἐξήκοντος ἥδη τοῦ ἡρός. Cf. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.319. They reached Alexandria in ten days (Arr. 4.22.4); Nikaia and the Cophen (4.22.6).

97 Alexander's route along the Choes and through the mountains: Arr. 4.23.2. For the division of the forces cf. Curt. 8.10.4 (*Cratero cum phalange iusso sequi*), which refers to a time before Alexander's arrival at Andaka.

98 Andaka: Arr. 4.23.5; Curt. 8.10.5: *Iam supervenerat Craterus. Itaque, ut principio terrorem incutiret genti nondum arma Makedonum expertae, praecipit ne cui parceretur, munimentis urbis quam obsidebat incensis.* The description appears to suit Andaka. The town is probably also the one mentioned in *ME* 35 (Bosworth II, 158; for other possibilities see McCrindle 194 n.2). Koinos and Attalos: Arr. 4.24.1; Kleitos, Meleagros, Gorgias: Arr. 4.22.7. For the Swat Campaign see Fuller, *Generalship* 245 ff.; Stein, *Alexander's Track* 41 ff.

neighboring peoples who so wished, and to leave behind such Makedonians as were unfit for service (*apomachoi*).<sup>99</sup> Having done this, Krateros, with his troops and the siege equipment, rejoined the King in the land of the Assakenians.<sup>100</sup> From here he appears to have remained with the main army until it reached Embolima, which lay near Aornos (Pir-sar). Krateros was ordered to gather provisions at Embolima, the base of operations against Aornos.<sup>101</sup>

From Aornos, where Krateros is unattested, the main force advanced to the Indus bridge, the work of Hephaestion and Perdikkas, and thence to the Hydaspes (Jhelum). Here Poros awaited the Makedonians with a sizeable force. In the ensuing battle—Alexander’s last major engagement—Krateros’ role was similar to that at the Persian Gates. He was to hold the attention of the enemy while Alexander attempted an encircling maneuver: if Poros turned to deal with Alexander, Krateros was to cross the river and attack him from the rear; if he remained in place, Krateros was instructed not to attempt the crossing until Alexander had joined battle.<sup>102</sup> In these simplified terms, Krateros played an unspectacular but vital role.

To see in this battle the beginnings of Krateros’ decline is to deny the importance of Krateros’ division to the success of Alexander’s battle plan.<sup>103</sup> But Krateros may have advanced militarily as far as Alexander was to allow. After the Hydaspes battle we hear of the fortification of Nikaia and Boukephala, of a foraging expedition conducted with Koinos near the Hydraotes (Ravi).<sup>104</sup> And there was open conflict between Krateros and Hephaestion.<sup>105</sup> The struggle for power and Alexander’s affection had led inevitably to rivalry, and this manifested itself in hand-to-hand combat sometime after the battle at the Hydaspes. The King himself was forced to intervene, and soon he found it necessary to keep them on opposite banks of the Indus. But the advantage was beginning to shift to Hephaestion, who commanded, at least temporarily, the larger force.<sup>106</sup> Separated by the river, they descended the Indus in stages, but it was Hephaestion who figured in Alexander’s elaborate strategy against the Mallians;<sup>107</sup> a year earlier, the task might have been entrusted to Krateros. Only Curtius mentions him in this context at all: when Alexander returned critically wounded to the junction of the Akesines (Chenab) and the Hydraotes Rivers, it was Krateros who acted as the

99 Arr. 4.24.6–7.

100 Arr. 4.25.5.

101 Arr. 4.28.7.

102 Arr. 5.12.1, 18.1. Curtius does not mention Krateros, but his account is highly unsatisfactory. For analysis of Krateros’ position see Fuller, *Generalship* 189.

103 Cf. Carney 1975: 214: “. . . we see that Alexander never gave him a prominent role to play in battle once Krateros had distinguished himself . . . against Spitamenes’ rebels . . .”

104 Nikaia and Boukephala: Arr. 5.20.2. Foraging: Arr. 5.21.4. These were tasks that had been hitherto assigned to Hephaestion.

105 Plut. *Alex.* 47.11–2. Cf. also Plut. *Mor.* 337a.

106 Arr. 6.2.2; Arr. *Ind.* 19.1.

107 Descent of the Indus river system: Arr. 6.2.2, 4.1, 5.5, 5.7; Arr. *Ind.* 19.1, 3; Diod. 17.96.1. See also Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 29–56, for the Mallian campaign; cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 259–63.

spokesman of the *hetairoi*, begging him not to risk his life unnecessarily.<sup>108</sup> But Krateros never regained his pre-eminence in the army.

From the junction of the Indus and Akesines Rivers, he led the greater part of the army and the elephants along the left (i.e., east) bank of the Indus, arriving at Mousikanos' capital (near Rohri and ancient Alor<sup>109</sup>) after Alexander's fleet. It was now the end of the spring of 325. Mousikanos argued that Alexander had arrived in his kingdom before he was able to send envoys to him, and he was pardoned, but Krateros was ordered to garrison and fortify his capital nonetheless. It was his last major operation—and one that he completed while Alexander himself was present<sup>110</sup>—before he was sent westward through Arachosia and Drangiana with instructions to rejoin Alexander in Karmania.<sup>111</sup> Arrian, however, records Krateros' departure twice (6.15.5, 17.3), first from Mousikanos' kingdom, then from Sind. In the first passage, the words διὰ τῆς Αραχωτῶν καὶ Δραγγῶν γῆς are correctly excised by editors as a gloss.<sup>112</sup> Krateros had continued south with his troops, not much beyond Pardabathra,<sup>113</sup> where he appears to have remained with the main force while Alexander dealt with Sambos, the defecting satrap of the hill country west of the Indus.<sup>114</sup> But Mousikanos also rebelled, perhaps massacring the Makedonian garrison and inviting reprisals. In due course, Peithon son of Agenor (the new satrap of the region) brought Mousikanos prisoner to

<sup>108</sup> Curt. 9.6.6–14; he continued downstream (9.8.3).

<sup>109</sup> Although the Indus riverbed lay further to the east (both above and below Alor) in ancient times, Alor (Rohri) and Attock (near modern Und), where Alexander first crossed the Indus, represent two fixed spots past which the river flowed throughout history (see Eggermont, *Sind* 8). Thus Alor was located in Alexander's time, as it is today, on the east bank of the Indus. Arr. 6.15.4 says that Alexander transferred Krateros and his forces to the left side of the river because the route was easier than that on the right side, and because there were tribes living there who were as yet unsubdued. This coincides with the view of Eggermont, *Sind* 16–22 that Sambos ruled the hill country between Alor and the Bolan Pass and that he had been made satrap of this region by Alexander (cf. Arr. 6.16.3).

<sup>110</sup> Arr. 6.15.7.

<sup>111</sup> Arr. 6.15.5 records Krateros' departure for the west before his activities in Mousikanos' kingdom (6.15.7). His departure is then recorded a second time at 6.17.3.

<sup>112</sup> For the textual problem see Bosworth 1976b: 127–9.

<sup>113</sup> He appears to have taken no part in the campaigns against Oxikanos (Arr. 6.16.1–2; I can see no evidence for the form “Oxykanos” found in much modern scholarship; cf. Berve no. 589) and Portikanos (Curt. 9.8.11–2; Diod. 17.102.5; Strabo 15.1.33 C701). Eggermont, *Sind* 9–15 is probably right to see them as separate rulers, one of Azeika (Axika), the other of Pardabathra. Lassen II<sup>2</sup> 186 identifies them but prefers the name Portikanos; most modern scholars equate them under the name “Oxykanos.”

<sup>114</sup> Arr. 6.16.3–5; Curt. 9.8.13 ff.; Diod. 17.102.6–7, Sambos himself escaped beyond the Indus with thirty elephants. Eggermont, *Sind* 16–22 plausibly identifies him with the “Samaxus” of Curt. 8.13.14, who delivered the regicide Barsaentes to Alexander near Taxila (cf. Karttunen, *India* 38). He had earlier been reinstated as satrap (cf. Arr. 6.16.3: τὸν ὄπειον Ἰνδῶν σατράπην ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατασταθέντα), and his territory extended along the western bank of the Indus. Since Krateros was transferred to the eastern shore, because the terrain was unsuitable for his forces, it is doubtful that he and his contingent took part in the campaign against Sambos.

Sind, where he was executed.<sup>115</sup> At this point, Krateros was sent back to Rohri-Alor to restore order there, in the absence of Peithon, who continued south with Alexander. It was the end of his campaigning in India.

## Return to the West

Leading the battalions of Attalos, Meleagros, Antigenes, and Polyperchon,<sup>116</sup> some of the archers, all the elephants, and the *apomachoi*, Krateros moved westward, policing Arachosia and Drangiana, which were reported to be in a state of unrest.<sup>117</sup> The ringleaders of the uprising—Arrian names Ordanes, Curtius has Ozines and Zariaspes<sup>118</sup>—were arrested and eventually brought in chains to Alexander in Karmania.<sup>119</sup> Stasanor, satrap of Areia and Drangiana, may very well have been summoned to Karmania by Krateros on the march.<sup>120</sup>

After Karmania there were further honors, but Krateros never fulfilled the promise of his early career. At Sousa he wedded Amastris, daughter of Dareios' brother Oxyathres.<sup>121</sup> She was indeed a worthy bride, but of lesser importance than

<sup>115</sup> Arr. 6.17.2; Curt. 9.8.16 has him executed before Alexander returned to his camp and the fleet. I would identify the son of Agenor with Peithon the taxiarch (Arr. 6.6.1, 7.2–3), who (significantly?) is not named again as a battalion-commander after Alexander's departure from India (Heckel, *Who's Who* 196–7 “Peithon [4]”). Berve no. 620, identifies the taxiarch with the son of Antigenes (Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 = Arr. *Ind.* 15.10).

<sup>116</sup> Arr. 6.17.3 omits Polyperchon, but Justin 12.10.1 reads: *Itaque ex magna desperatione tandem saluti redditus Polyperconta cum exercitu Babyloniā mittit, ipse cum lectissima manu navibus conscientis Oceani litora peragrat*. Despite the inaccuracy concerning Babylonia, Justin appears to be speaking of Krateros' mission to Karmania, on which Polyperchon may also have gone. Polyperchon had accompanied Krateros in the past (Arr. 4.16.1, 17.1; cf. Curt. 8.5.2) and was to do so again in 324 (Arr. 7.12.4; Justin 12.12.8–9, cf. Bosworth 1976b: 129 n.65). For Polyperchon with Attalos (his relative, so Berve II, 325 and Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 156 n.59) see Arr. 4.16.1, where Meleagros is also named; with Amyntas, brother of Attalos, Curt. 5.4.20, 30; with Antigenes, Justin 12.12.8–9. On the other hand, Justin substitutes the name Polyperchon for Krateros on a number of occasions (13.8.5, 7; 15.1.1). I am not persuaded by the view of Olbrycht 2015: 200 that Krateros' contingent included the Persian *epigonoi*.

<sup>117</sup> News of the revolt was probably brought to Alexander by his father-in-law (Arr. 6.15.3; cf. Berve no. 587).

<sup>118</sup> Arr. 6.27.3; cf. Berve no. 590. Curt. 9.10.19; Berve no. 579 does not believe that Ozines and Ordanes are identical; Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 377, prefers Arrian's testimony; Badian 1961: 19, wonders if they were in fact different people. For Zariaspes see Berve no. 335. Alexander had them executed (Curt. 10.1.9).

<sup>119</sup> Arr. 6.27.3; cf. Strabo 15.2.11 C725, who says that Krateros followed the quickest route to Karmania, where both forces arrived at about the same time.

<sup>120</sup> Arr. 6.27.3. Stasanor of Soloi: Berve no. 719; Badian 1961: 18 incorrectly maintains that he was detained at Alexander's Court. Arr. 6.29.1 says that he was sent home shortly afterward; cf. Bosworth 1971b: 123 n.3.

<sup>121</sup> Arr. 7.4.5. Ἀμαστρίν (cf. Steph. Byz. s.v.); Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.12 has Ἀμαστρίς. Her life: Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750 no. 7; Macurdy, *HQ* 107 ff.; Berve no. 50 (Ἀμαστρίς); Heckel, *Who's Who* 21 “Amastris”; cf. also Berve no. 586 for Oxyathres (Oxathres). See O’Neil 2002: 172–6 for her life after her divorce from Krateros; also Müller 2013: 209–10. See also Stemma XI.

Drypetis, Alexander's new sister-in-law, bride of Krateros' rival Hephaistion. From the list of those awarded crowns at Sousa Krateros' name is conspicuously absent.<sup>122</sup>

Then, from Opis, Alexander sent home the veterans, 10,000 in number, under the leadership of Krateros,<sup>123</sup> whom he instructed to assume the regency of Makedon in place of Antipatros; the latter was to report to Alexander in Babylon with reinforcements. This move has vexed historians, who suspect a sinister motive on Alexander's part and are troubled by the slow-progress of Krateros' march: by the time of Alexander's death, some nine months later, Krateros' forces had not advanced beyond Kilikia. Was he simply disobeying Alexander's orders?<sup>124</sup> Or was he waiting until the new recruits had left Makedonia?<sup>125</sup> Had he made a secret "deal" with Kassandros, who met him in Kilikia on his way to Babylon?<sup>126</sup> Was he involved in a conspiracy against the King?

We need not look for sensational explanations. A reasonable solution may be found in the conditions that prevailed in Kilikia and in Arrian's own description of Krateros' departure:

Craterus was not only appointed to be their leader but, after conducting them back, he was to take charge of Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly and the freedom of the Greeks, while Antipater was to bring drafts of Macedonians of full age

- 122 Golden crowns were given to Peukestas and Leonnatos for their heroism in India, to Nearchos and Onesikritos, and to Hephaistion and the other *somatophylakes*. If the failure to mention Krateros is not due to an oversight by the extant or lost sources, this does not coincide well with Geyer's conclusion: "Der beste Beweis für das unbedingte Vertrauen, das der grosse König zu K. gehabt hat, ist wohl der Befehl, eine bedeutende Truppenmacht mit den Kampfunfähigen und die Elefanten vom Indos . . . nach Karmanien zu führen, und glänzend hat K. dieses Vertrauen gerechtfertigt" (*RE Supplbd IV* (1924) 1046).
- 123 Cf. Justin 12.12.8–9 (he was accompanied by Kleitos, Gorgias, Polydamas, and Antigenes; Amadas is almost certainly dittography after Polydamas, though Berve no. 49 gives him a separate entry). See Curt. 10.10.15: *credebat etiam Craterum cum veterum militum manu ad interficiendum eum missum*, where *eum* refers to Antipatros (wrongly "Alexander" in J.C. Rolfe's Loeb translation, II, 557; see Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 238–9). According to Plut. *Phoc.* 18.7, Krateros was to offer Phokion the revenues from one of four Asian towns.
- 124 Badian 1961: 34 ff. thinks that Alexander feared the power of Antipatros and sought to depose him. Krateros lingered in Kilikia because he was unwilling to challenge Antipatros. Worthington, *Man and God* 184 regards Krateros as a threat to Alexander ("Craterus's selection, as before, may have been to get rid of him since he was one of the old guard"). See Müller, *Maßnahmen* 214 n.1269: "Möglicherweise sah Alexander in ihm [Krateros] einen zweiten Parmenion, dessen enge Bindung zum Heer für ihn gefährlich war" (similarly on p. 215: "eine wachsende Bedrohung, die es zu beseitigen galt"). I am inclined to regard the King's love of Krateros as genuine and his selection as Antipatros' replacement as a sign of trust rather than suspicion; for it would be counterproductive to install a potential rival as ruler of the Makedonian homeland. Ashton 1993 and 2015: 109–10 argues that Krateros' delay was due to his need to make preparations for Alexander's North Africa campaign. He rightly notes that "[i]n considering Alexander's intentions, it is all-too-seldom that the all-too-obvious observation is made: namely that in 323 Alexander was not aware (as we are) that he was to die in 323 . . ."
- 125 Thus Griffith 1965a: 12–7, concludes that Krateros had orders not to enter Makedonia until Antipatros had left; for the disgruntled veterans might have an adverse effect on the new recruits.
- 126 So Green, *Alexander* 460.

to replace the men being sent home. He also despatched Polyperchon with Craterus, as the officer next in seniority to Craterus, so that in case of harm coming to Craterus on the way, since he was an invalid when sent off, they should not want a general on their route.<sup>127</sup>

When Krateros left Opis, his condition was so serious that Alexander could not be sure that he would survive the journey home; for that reason, he had named Polyperchon as Krateros' second-in-command and possible successor. Age and ill health will have taken their toll on many of the veterans as well, and the expedition, which proceeded at a leisurely pace, was further encumbered by baggage and camp followers. Illness alone will not explain Krateros' delay, nor was Kilikia an ideal place to convalesce.<sup>128</sup> Whatever it was that threatened his life, it was not a disease that impaired Krateros for the rest of his life: certainly he was well enough to take an active part in the Lamian War and the first war of the Successors. Thus, we may assume that he regained his health by the time he reached Kilikia, or at least before he left it.

But Harpalos had been there not long before, residing at Tarsos with his harlot-queen, Glykera, and plundering the treasury before seeking refuge in Athens. The satrap, Balakros son of Nikanor (a son-in-law of Antipatros), had been killed in a skirmish with the Pisidians.<sup>129</sup> Krateros spent the winter and the following spring (323) restoring order to the satrapy, intending to hand it over to the taxiarχ Philotas, who was probably appointed by Alexander but had not yet set out for the province in the late spring of 323.<sup>130</sup> When Alexander died suddenly in early June 323, Krateros and his veterans remained in Kilikia in virtual limbo.

127 Arr. 7.12.4: Κρατερῷ δὲ τούτους τε ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ ἀπαγαγόντι Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θράκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἔχηγεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας· Αντίτατρον δὲ διαδόχους τοῖς ἀποτεμπομένοις ἄγειν Μακεδόνας τῶν ἀκμαζόντων ἐκέλευσεν. ἔστειλε δὲ καὶ Πολυπέρχοντα δόμοῦ τῷ Κρατερῷ, δεύτερον δὲ ἀπὸ Κρατεροῦ ἡγεμόνα, ὃς εἰ τι κατὰ πορείαν Κρατερῷ συμπίπτοι, ὅτι καὶ μαλακῶς τὸ σῶμα ἔχοντα ἀπέπεμπεν αὐτὸν, μὴ ποθῆσαι στρατηγὸν τοὺς ιόντας. English translation by P.A. Brunt.

128 Kilikia is described as “the most virulent malarial location in Anatolia”: Engels 1978: 226.

129 Diod. 18.22.1: ἀνταῖ [the Pisidians] γάρ ἔτι ζῶντος Ἀλεξάνδρου Βάλακρον τὸν Νικάνορος ἀπέκτειναν, ἀποδεδειγμένον στρατηγὸν ἄμα καὶ σατράπην. Cf. Arr. 2.12.2: Balakros ceased to be a *somatophylax* and was appointed satrap of Kilikia. He married Phila, the daughter of Antipatros (Antonius Diogenes *ap. Phot. Bibl. cod.* 166, p. 111b); Antipatros son of Balagros (*IG XI.2 161b*, line 85; 287b, line 57), who dedicated a golden laurel wreath at Delos in the late fourth or early third century, may have been their son (Heckel 1987a; cf. Badian 1988: 116–8). For Krateros in Kilikia, see Higgins 1980: 150; Heckel 1982a: 61.

130 Identification with the infantry commander, first mentioned at Arrian 3.29.7 seems likely; the “Philotas Augaeus” (or “Aegaeus”?) of Curtius 5.2.5, appears to be a different individual. His loyalty to the party of Krateros, which resulted in his being deposed by Perdikkas in 321/0 (Φυλάτων μὲν τὸν σατράπην τῆς χώρας ἐπιτήδειον τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατερὸν γιγνόσκων παρέλυσεν τῆς ἀρχῆς: Arr. *Succ.* 24.2; Justin 13.6.16), will go back to this time or even much earlier. He reappears as a supporter of Antigonos in 318 (Diod. 18.62.4 ff.), when he tries to win the loyalty of the argyrapids away from Eumenes. For his career see Billows, *Antigonos* 423–4 no. 95; Heckel, *Who's Who* 219 “Philotas [6].”

## Krateros after Alexander's death

To replace Antipatros, whether it was prompted by Alexander's fear of his growing power in Europe or by the man's age, was a delicate matter even while the King lived. With Alexander dead, Krateros was trapped between *Staatsrecht* and *Faustrecht*.<sup>131</sup> Antipatros, if anyone, was secure in his position; Krateros knew that. For the moment, there was some hope in Babylon, but this was quickly dispelled.

Modern interpretations of Krateros' *prostasia* cover the whole spectrum of possibilities, from the view that it was the highest honor in the empire to utter disbelief in its existence. As an academic exercise, the succession problem holds a certain fascination, and it does not want for innovative solutions.<sup>132</sup> But there has been a tendency to overlook one fundamental point: Krateros' *prostasia* was never realized, nor did Perdikkas intend it to be.<sup>133</sup> The army in Babylon demanded an immediate resolution of the succession question. They were not prepared to await the birth of Roxane's child; indeed, they had no desire to see a continuation of Alexander's oriental policies, which Hephaestion and then Perdikkas embraced. Hence they demanded that the half-witted son of Philip II, Arrhidaios, be proclaimed King, designating also as his guardian a man who shared their sentiments: Krateros. Perdikkas remained in control of Hephaestion's chiliarchy. The *prostasis* of King Philip III was his superior *de iure*. But Krateros' office turned out to be nothing more than a temporary concession to the phalanx.

It would be rash, however, to suggest that the *prostasia* was a fiction, that it was not part of the compromise at Babylon. The evidence points to an office, created to placate the phalanx but never actually held by Krateros himself. Quite naturally the position was associated with Arrhidaios, whom the conservative infantry revered as the last male descendant of Philip II. Nor is it surprising that Perdikkas agreed to the arrangement, at least for the moment: Krateros was absent in Kilikia, Arrhidaios in Perdikkas' control. *Faustrecht* prevailed in Babylon. The chiliarch was supreme commander of the army, and he used his position to crush the insidious. Arrhidaios proved a convenient pawn in Perdikkas' hands, and Krateros' *prostasia* was a dead letter.

For the time, there was nothing for Krateros to do but wait in Kilikia. He had already recognized the futility of attempting to wrest Makedonia from Antipatros now that Alexander was dead. Perdikkas, meanwhile, had made himself *de facto* ruler of the east, and Krateros' veterans, we may be sure, were in no mood to return to Babylon in order to decide the issue.<sup>134</sup> Even now Perdikkas dealt the

131 Schachermeyr's terms (*Babylon* 149 ff.).

132 For earlier literature see Seibert 1983: 84 ff.

133 Thus Errington 1970: 55: ". . . we can readily assume that the Perdiccans did not intend Craterus ever to adopt this newly created post, for in the final settlement after Meleager's death they reverted to their original arrangement of making him share Europe with Antipater: and there is no doubt that the Perdiccans were responsible for that arrangement."

134 It is likely that Krateros heard the details of the settlement at Babylon from Philotas, who had been sent out as satrap of Kilikia. His arrival there (perhaps in the company of the other satraps bound for the west) occurred shortly before Antipatros' appeal for help. From Philotas

crippling blow by revoking, with the assent of the army, Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros in Makedonia.<sup>135</sup>

### Krateros and Antipatros: the Lamian War

Antipatros' troubles in Greece drew Krateros back into the game. Even before he was blockaded in Lamia, the old regent appealed to Krateros and Leonnatos for aid against the rebellious Greeks.<sup>136</sup> In all probability, his appeal included an offer of marriage. Antipatros' eldest daughter Phila, a woman now in her early thirties but of exceptional qualities,<sup>137</sup> had an appeal of her own. There was no need of an introduction: Krateros probably found Balakros' widow in Tarsos in 324 and later escorted her to Makedonia. The promise of a political alliance sealed the deal. It would increase his odds when the time came to return to Asia and assert his claim to the *prostasia*.<sup>138</sup> That a marriage alliance was included in Antipatros' appeal is suggested too by the fact that Krateros took pains to find a suitable husband for his Sousan bride, the Persian Amastris. From what we know of Krateros' character, it is not surprising that he should willingly repudiate Amastris, but he did arrange an honorable marriage for her, to Dionysios, tyrant of Herakleia Pontica.<sup>139</sup>

he learned not only of the phalanx's wish that he assume the guardianship of Arrihdaios, but also that Alexander's orders that he should replace Antipatros in Makedonia had been rescinded by Perdikkas with the approval of the army. Given the situation in Europe and the condition of his troops, it is perhaps unfair to speak of the "Kleinmut" of Krateros (so Schur 1934: 145). Different is the view of Romm, *Ghost* 54: "Probably he [sc. Perdikkas] encouraged Craterus as gently as he could to proceed to Europe and share power with Antipater. He did not want such a talented general lurking in Asia with an army of ten thousand." See also the discussion in Romm, *Ghost* 96–7.

135 Demonstrated convincingly by Badian 1967b: 201–4.

136 Diod. 18.12.1, where Philotas is incorrectly named as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (18.14.4 says the message is brought by Hekataios of Kardia to Leonnatos; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3.6); Diodorus, who was speaking of Kilikia earlier, wrote Philotas by mistake.

137 Diod. 18.12.1 (cf. Seibert, *Verbindungen* 12 n.6) mentions the offer of a bride to Leonnatos: πρὸς δὲ Φιλόταν [an error for Λεοννάτου] τὸν εἰληφότα σατραπείαν τὴν ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίᾳ, ὅμοιώς ἀξιῶν καὶ τοῦτον βοηθῆσαι καὶ μίαν τῶν ἔαντοῦ θυγατέρων συνοικεῖν ἐπαγγελλόμενος. The word ὅμοιώς shows that the offer was the same as that one made to Krateros. See Berve no. 772; Heckel, *Who's Who* 207–8 "Phila [3]." Phila will have been born shortly before 350; she married Balakros no later than 334 (cf. Heckel 1987a and 1989: 32–3). See further Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 221; Macurdy, *HQ* 58–69, esp. 60; and also Tarn's eulogy (*AG* 17–8, based on Diod. 19.59.3–6); Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 51; Kaerst II<sup>2</sup> 19; also Wehrli 1964. See Stemma III for Phila's family.

138 We may infer from Diod. 18.18.7 that Krateros' return to Asia was always the intention (cf. Bosworth 1993b: 427). I am not convinced by Anson's view (2012: 56) that Krateros would have been content with a satrapy, perhaps Hellespontine Phrygia. Bosworth, *Legacy* 276, argues that Krateros had "regal pretensions" (and this is supported by the lion hunt monument in Delphi, *Suda* K 2335, and Demetr. *Eloc.* 289) he might, had he lived to mount a challenge to Perdikkas, have come to regret abandoning Amastris. Antipatros' cooperation with Perdikkas does not mean that he accepted that man's usurpation of Krateros' powers as a *fait accompli*. He was doubtless hedging his bets; for it mattered little to him which man emerged for the struggle. But that was to change when Antipatros learned of Perdikkas' duplicity.

139 Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F1 §4. 4 = Phot. *Bibl.* 224. For the date of this union see Seibert, *Verbindungen* 12–3; Macurdy, *HQ* 60; Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism* 75; O'Neil 2002: 172–6; Müller 2013: 209–10; Harders 2014: 376 n.104.

Some scholars claim that Krateros was deliberately slow in heeding Antipatros' call.<sup>140</sup> It must have taken a considerable time for the message to reach Krateros in Kilikia, and winter was approaching. Over the winter he supplemented his forces; for he had decided to leave Antigenes and the 3,000 argyaspids in Kilikia for security, other troops were given to Kleitos, who was preparing a fleet with which to sail to the Hellespont.<sup>141</sup> Krateros therefore recruited fresh troops, probably from the satrapies of Asia Minor. Diodorus' description (18.16.4) is instructive: "The infantry force he led comprised six thousand of those who had crossed into Asia with Alexander and another four thousand whom he had acquired in addition on the march."<sup>142</sup> This has been taken to mean that Krateros' infantrymen were divided into two units: 6,000 who had campaigned with Alexander since 334 (who had crossed the Hellespont with him at that time), and another 4,000 who had joined Alexander in the course of his campaigns.<sup>143</sup> But this is a curious distinction for the historian to make, and *ἐν παρόδῳ* probably refers to Krateros' own march.<sup>144</sup> The 1,000 Persian archers and slingers, as well as the 1,500 horse,<sup>145</sup> were part of the original force that left Opis.<sup>145</sup>

Despite these extensive preparations, Krateros awaited the outcome of Leonnatos' relief efforts. Plutarch (*Phoc.* 26.1) says that the battle of Krannon was fought a short time afterwards (οὐλίγῳ δὲ ὕστερον χρόνῳ), but, since it is dated to 7 Metageitnion (probably 5 August; cf. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.74), Krateros will not have reached the Hellespont until late June or early July. Upon joining Antipatros, Krateros may have been formally engaged to Phila, as Niese suggests.<sup>146</sup> Krateros' arrival augmented the Makedonian fighting force, but he willingly yielded the

140 Badian 1967b: 202 ("for a time Craterus refused to come to the aid of the hard-pressed Antipater in Thessaly") and Badian 1961: 41 ("Yet Craterus hesitated. For several months, even after the outbreak of the Lamian War and the desperate plight to which it soon reduced Antipater, he did nothing to help him, leaving Leonnatus to go to his death"). Völcker-Janssen 1993: 118 explains Krateros' delay in similar terms: "vermutlich um dem Konflikt mit Antipater aus dem Wege zu gehen und die Entwicklung der Dinge in Asien abzuwarten." Schwahn 1931: 331–2 thinks that it was Perdikkas' campaign in Kappadokia that induced Krateros to leave Kilikia; in this he is followed by Errington 1970: 61. But Diod. 18.16.4 synchronized Krateros' arrival in Makedonia with Perdikkas' war on Ariarathes: ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς καὶ Κρατερὸς ἐκ Κιλικίας ἀναζεύχας ἤκεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ("at the same time, Craterus . . . arrived in Makedonia").

141 Kleitos' activities: Diod. 18.15.8; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.4; Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 39–40; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.74; cf. Berve no. 428. Troops to guard Kilikia: Anson, *Heirs* 39. Antigenes was with Perdikkas in Egypt, where he murdered him (Arr. *Succ.* 1.35); the only way to explain his presence in Egypt is to assume that he joined Perdikkas in 321/0 in Kilikia (cf. Heckel 1982a: 60–2). I see no evidence to support the view of Bosworth, *Legacy* 33, that "Antigenes . . . acted as an emissary of Craterus, but was tempted to remain in Babylon, assuming command of the most prestigious infantry group in the Macedonian army." Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 489, estimates that Krateros' veterans included 6,000 heavy infantry and 3,000 hypaspists. See Appendix VIII.

142 ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς Ασίαν Αλεξανδρῷ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἔξακισχιλίους, τῶν δὲ ἐν παρόδῳ προσελημμένων τετρακισχιλίους . . .

143 E.g. Brunt, *Arrian* II, 489; Bosworth, *Legacy* 73 n.31.

144 Niese I, 207; Heckel 1982a: 61–2.

145 Diod. 18.16.4.

146 Niese I, 207.

supreme command to Antipatros.<sup>147</sup> Together with the remnants of Leonnatos' army, the Makedonians numbered 40,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 3,000 archers and slingers.<sup>148</sup> With these forces, Krateros and Antipatros won a decisive victory at Krannon, and thereafter broke the Greek alliance by taking the Thessalian cities one by one. There followed widespread defection from the Hellenic cause; peace treaties were made with individual cities ( $\tauὰς κατὰ πόλιν διαλύσεις$ ).<sup>149</sup> The army moved as far south as Boiotia, where negotiations took place between Antipatros and the Athenians. Plutarch (*Phoc.* 26.6) says that Krateros favored invading Attika on the ground that Makedonian forces were being maintained at the expense of their Boiotian allies, while Attika remained unscathed. Antipatros, for Phokion's sake, overruled him. Mounychia was, nevertheless, garrisoned on the twentieth day of Boëdromion.<sup>150</sup>

Antipatros and Krateros now returned to Makedonia, where they celebrated the latter's wedding to Phila; the bride's father heaped honors and gifts upon the groom and prepared for his "return to Asia."<sup>151</sup> But this was delayed by the necessity of dealing with the Aitolians, the unfinished business of the Lamian War.<sup>152</sup> The campaign against them does not appear to have been a reaction to an unexpected emergency, but rather a deliberate act of policy. As it turned out, the Aitolian campaign bought enough time for the secrets of Asia to reveal themselves. Although he believed he had secured an alliance with Perdikkas by offering his daughter, Nikaia, in marriage,<sup>153</sup> Antipatros was clearly content to watch his sons-in-law contend for supremacy in Asia.<sup>154</sup> For the complicated arrangements

147 καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου παραχωρήσας ἐκουσίως Ἀντιπάτρῳ (Diod. 18.16.5). This shows once again that suspicions about Krateros' ambitions, such as those voiced by Worthington, *Man and God* 183, are misguided ("It does not seem a wise move to send him home to replace Antipater, for Craterus would assume deputy leadership of the League of Corinth and hence control Greece").

148 Krateros' forces: Diod. 18.4.1 (cf. 17.109.1; A 7.12.3); Diod. 18.12.1, 16.4; more generally, Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1; Leonnatos' troops: Diod. 18.14.4–5 (20,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry); for all forces combined see Diod. 18.16.5.

149 Diod. 18.17.7; for the victory at Krannon: Arr. *Succ.* 1.12; Plut. *Dem.* 28.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1; Diod. 18.17. Lamian war in general: Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 26–52; Kaerst II<sup>2</sup> 14–9; Niese I, 200–12; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.68–78; Tarn, *CAH* VI, 454–60; and, for its background: Ashton 1983: 47 ff.

150 September 17, 322; cf. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.76. Plut. *Phoc.* 28.2–3; *Dem.* 28.1; *Cam.* 19.10. Cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* III<sup>3</sup> 391 (September 16); for Menyllos see Berve no. 513; Heckel, *Who's Who* 292 n.85. Cf. Diod. 18.18.5.

151 Diod. 18.18.7: τὴν εἰς τὴν Ασίαν ἐπάνοδον συγκατεσκέψασεν.

152 Diod. 18.24–5. For the Aitolians see also Mendels 1984: 149–57, but it is not clear at which point the agreement with Perdikkas (Diod. 18.38.1) was made or went into effect. It was certainly not the reason for the resumption of hostilities by Antipatros and Krateros, who learned of it only when Antigonos fled from Asia. But Mendels 1984: 153–4 suggests "spring 322" and adds that "Antipater may have known about her connections with Perdiccas."

153 Berve no. 552; Heckel, *Who's Who* 175.

154 It appears that Antipatros had come to regard the authority of the Kings as pertaining specifically to Asia or, at least, that they were to reside there while he himself retained the position of *strategos autokrator* of Europe. For this is how we may interpret his decision after Triparadeisos, when he ordered Antigonos to guard and care for the Kings (Arr. *Succ.* 1.38: Αὐτίγονον ἡγεμόνα ἀπέφηνε, καὶ τούτῳ τοὺς βασιλέας φρουρεῖν τε καὶ θεραπεύειν προστάξας). Anson, *Heirs* 52–3

that followed Alexander's death had been overtaken by events in both Europe and Asia, and, if Krateros' claim to power was based on the *prostasia* of Philip III, it was clear that Perdikkas, as *de facto* regent, would be reluctant to abide by the original agreement. It was not long before the news of Perdikkas' duplicity was brought to Europe by one of his intended victims.

### Krateros and the lion monument at Delphoi

It is probably at this point that Krateros commissioned the sculptures dedicated to Apollo at Delphoi,<sup>155</sup> commemorating a lion hunt in Syria, in which Krateros saved the King's life. Plutarch says the hunting scene was made up of "bronze figures of the lion, the dogs, the King engaged with the lion, and Krateros himself coming to the King's assistance," and he adds that "some of the figures were moulded by Lysippos, and some by Leochares."<sup>156</sup> The epigram that accompanied the statue group implies that the completed work was set up by the son (also named Krateros) in memory of his father. It has been argued that this action was overseen by Phila on behalf of her infant son; others have proposed a later date for the bronzes themselves. But the names of the artists suggest an early date, whereas the letter-forms point to the period 300–270.<sup>157</sup> The dedication reads:

Υἱὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου Κρατερὸς τάδε τὸ πόλλων[ι]  
 ηὗξατο τιμάεις καὶ πολύδοξος ἀνὴρ·  
 στᾶσε, δ' ὃν ἐμ μεγάροις ἐτεκνώσατο καὶ λίπε παιδα,  
 πᾶσαν ὑποσχεσίαν πατρὶ τελῶν, Κρατερός,  
 ὅφρα οἱ ἀΐδιον τε καὶ ἀρπαλέον κλέος ἄγρα,  
 ὃ ξένε, ταυροφόνου τοῦδε λέοντος ἔχοι  
 ὅμ ποτε, Αλ[εξά]δρῳ τότε ὅθ' εἴπετο καὶ συνεπόρθει  
 τῷ πολυναν[ήτῳ τ]ῷδε Άσιας βασιλεῖ,  
 ὃδε συνεξαλάπαξε καὶ εἰς χέρας ἀντιάσαντα  
 ἔκτανεν οἰονόμων ἐν περάτεσσι Σύρων.

(*Fouilles de Delphes* 3.4.2, no. 137)

does not believe that Krateros' return involved the *prostasia* and a power struggle with Perdikkas (cf. Anson, *Eunenes* 63 and 2012: 56) but that Krateros would have a negotiated supervisory role in Asia Minor. Anson sees this as a sign of Krateros' patriotism, but one wonders whether he was quite so willing to renounce his personal ambitions (see the discussion of Krateros' lion hunt monument below). For Krateros' apparent lack of ambition see Anson, *Heirs* 24.

155 See Perdrizet 1899: 273–9; cf. Stewart, *Faces* 270–1; Palagia 2000: 184–5. For the statue group at Delphoi see Plut. *Alex.* 40.4–5 = Stewart, *Faces* T110; cf. also Borza and Palagia 2007: 97. For the possible parallels between the hunting mosaic from Pella (thought to depict Alexander and Krateros) see Cohen 2010: 76, with references to modern scholarship 314 n.39.

156 Plut. *Alex.* 40.5 (the translation follows that of Perrin). Pliny, *HN* 34.19.63–4 notes that Lysippos was responsible for "Alexander's hunt, which is dedicated at Delphoi." Leochares: Berge II, 237 no. 472; Heckel, *Who's Who* 146; Pollitt 1990: 90–1. Lysippos: Berge II, 241–3 no. 482; Heckel, *Who's Who* 155; Pollitt 1990: 98–104.

157 The arguments are conveniently laid out by Dunn and Wheatley 2012: 41–3. For the dating by letter-forms see Moretti 1975.

Alexander's son, Krateros, offered these to Apollo,  
 A man exalted, honored, and far-famed  
 But he who placed them here was Krateros his orphaned child  
 Fulfilling every promise for his sire.  
 To bring him glory, sweet and everlasting, O stranger.  
 As hunter of that bull-devouring lion.  
 Along with Alexander, Asia's much-praised monarch,  
 Companion to his King in victory,  
 He destroyed it as it grappled with them, killed it thus,  
 At sheep-rearing Syria's farthest bounds.

(Translated by Stewart, *Faces* 391)

Whatever the chronological relationship between the dedicatory inscription and the sculptures themselves, it is clear that the impetus came originally from the father, who as Völcker-Janssen rightly conjectures, sought to proclaim his credentials and support his bid for power at a time when his ambitions clashed with the political aspirations of both Antipatros and Perdikkas. His was thus the first attempt to use Alexander and regal imagery (i.e., the lion hunt) for his own political purposes, particularly with respect to his position in Asia.<sup>158</sup>

### **Krateros and Antipatros**

A fragment of Arrian's *Events after Alexander* suggests that Antipatros may have found it convenient to rid himself of so powerful and popular a colleague:

158 Völcker-Janssen 123. "Das delphische Weihgeschenk, das den Ruhm des Stifters kundtun sollte, ist daher als der Versuch des Krateros zu deuten, seinen Anspruch auf eine politische Führungsstellung unter den einstigen Hetairoi Alexanders zu bekräftigen. Die politische Ohnmacht, in der sich Krateros nach seiner Rückkehr aus Asien befand, machte eine solche Zuwortmeldung offenbar dringend nötig." Cf. Dunn and Wheatley 2012: 40, and 42–5 for the date of the younger Krateros' dedication. They believe the statue group was completed by 321/0 but that the dedicatory inscription by Krateros the son may be much later—in the very late 300s, the 290s or even in the time of Antigonos Gonatas. Völcker-Janssen 123–4 also connects the lion hunt, with its oriental character as evidence of Krateros' claims to power in Asia, an argument that has been expanded by Paspalas 2000: esp. 215–6; cf. Alonso Troncoso 2014: 59 n.44; also Bosworth, *Legacy* 276. But, if the significance for Krateros is the nature of the lion itself (the *taurophonos leon* or "bull-killing lion") and its associations with Persia, then this must be deduced from the accompanying epigram and not from sculptures, as Paspalas 2000: 211 notes: "The epigram is a laconic—and public—medium in which careful consideration must be given to every word". Hence, in order to have immediate significance, the epigram would have to belong to Krateros' own lifetime (c.321/0), which, given the fact that it was dedicated by the son, is unlikely. Voutiras 1984: 61, notes the importance of the inscription's reference to Alexander as King of Asia and adds: "Aus diesen Überlegungen wird deutlich, warum Krateros mit seinem Weihgeschenk auf jene bestimmte Löwenjagd anspielte: Die Hervorhebung seiner aktiven Teilnahme an der Seite Alexanders sollte den Zeitgenossen vor Augen führen, daß er in ähnlicher Weise prädestiniert war, Herrscher Asiens zu werden. Zugleich betonte er dadurch seine Treue gegenüber Alexander." Cf. Bosworth, *Legacy* 276; Willers 1979; Meeus 2008b: 227–9; see also Carney 2002: 64, 67.

Krateros was very large in appearance, had the pride of a King, and stood out for his splendid clothing—he followed Alexander in all the finery of his attire, apart from the diadem. To his comrades he was the sort who appeared very affable, but possessed of good sense and also a dignified manner, as well as being very persuasive, with an appealing way of talking. So his comrades made comparisons between him and Antipatros, who had a puny physique and mean spirit, and also an aloofness and heartlessness towards those under him. As a result they respected Krateros like a king, and sang his praises—quite naturally, inasmuch as he was the most courageous of the officers and the one with best grasp of military matters—and without any question they held him second in regard after Alexander. The whole army was astir over this matter, all respecting Krateros like a king and every one of them thinking it unfair that the two men had been assigned equal shares.<sup>159</sup>

Diodorus (18.25) gives the impression that Krateros was the chief prosecutor of the war against the Aitolians; he put into practice military lessons learned in the East with Alexander. It was now the height of winter, and Krateros built shelters for his troops, forcing the Aitolians, who had forsaken their cities for the highlands, to hold out against the elements and a shortage of food; for it seems that Krateros controlled the lines of communication.<sup>160</sup> But events in Asia were to extricate the Aitolians from this grave situation and lead Krateros to his doom.

Antigonos the One-Eyed, satrap of Phrygia, alarmed by the ambitions of Perdikkas, contrived the latter's ruin by bringing allegations of political duplicity. For Perdikkas, who had earlier secured Antipatros' friendship by marrying (or at least summoning to Asia for the purpose of marriage) the regent's daughter, Nikaia, now aspired to the throne of Makedon itself. And he hoped to achieve his purpose by marrying Alexander's sister, Kleopatra.<sup>161</sup> Antigonos' suspicions were not confirmed until his return to Asia (Arr. *Succ.* 1.26), but the report given to Krateros and Antipatros in Aitolia was seasoned by a vivid account of the

<sup>159</sup> *Suda K* 2335 = Arr. *Succ.* Frag. 19: Κρατερὸς ὁ Μακεδών· ὃς ἦν μέγιστος τε ὄφθηναι καὶ οὐ πρόσω ὅγκου βασιλικοῦ τῆς τε σκευῆς τῇ λαμπρότητι διαφέρων, καὶ παντὶ τῷ κοσμῷ κατὰ τὸν Αλέξανδρον ἐστάλτο πλὴν τοῦ διαδήματος· καὶ τοῖς συγγινομένοις οἷος σὺν ἐπιεικείᾳ, καὶ τοῦ σεμνοῦ προσόντος, φιλοφρονέστατος δόξαι καὶ πιθανώτατος τῷ ἐπαγωγῷ τῶν λόγων, ὡς συμβαλεῖν τῇ τε σμικρότητι τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου σώματος καὶ τῇ φωλότητι, ἐπὶ τούτοις τῷ ἀπροσμίκτῳ καὶ ἀνημέρῳ εἰς τοὺς ὑπηκόους <ὅτε> θεραπεύειν τὸν Κρατερὸν κατὰ βασιλέα, καὶ ἐπαίνοις ἔγοντας κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, οἷα δὴ στρατηγῶν τὸν εύτολμότατον καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων συνετώτατον, δεύτερον τῇ προτιμήσει μετὰ Αλέξανδρον ἀναμφιλόγως ἄγειν. Κίνησίς, τε δὴ οὖν ἦν ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῆς στρατιᾶς συμπάσης, Κρατερὸν μὲν οἷα βασιλέα ἐς τὸ ἐπιφανές θεραπευούσης, καὶ ἔκαστον ἀπαξιούντων ἐν ἵση μοίρᾳ ἄμφω τετάχθαι, Αντιπάτρῳ δὲ κατ' οὐδὲν ἔθελόντων πείθεσθαι. For the translation of this and related passages see also Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, Appendix II, 312–8.

<sup>160</sup> Diod. 18.25.1.

<sup>161</sup> Diod. 18.23.1–3.

senseless murder of Kynnane by Perdikkas' brother, Alketas.<sup>162</sup> Events in Asia took precedence. Peace was made with the Aitolians and attention redirected towards the East.<sup>163</sup>

## Return to Asia

Together with Antipatros, Krateros left Makedonia for the last time in the spring of 320, leaving behind Phila and an infant son.<sup>164</sup> Perdikkas had ordered White Kleitos to guard the Hellespont, but he abandoned the Perdikkans, perhaps on account of his longtime association with Krateros. Without a fleet, there was little hope of preventing the crossing of the troops from Europe, and Nepos' claim (*Eum.* 5.1) that the decisive battle against Eumenes was fought near the Hellespont (*apud Hellespontum*) is refuted by the other sources.<sup>165</sup> Attempts were made to lure Eumenes and Neoptolemos away from Perdikkas, but Eumenes declined the offer, in part out of distrust of Antipatros. Ten days before the decisive battle, Eumenes defeated Neoptolemos, who escaped from the battlefield with 300 horsemen to Krateros' camp.<sup>166</sup> But, while Neoptolemos may have judged rightly

162 Arr. *Succ.* 1.24: ἀνεδίδαξέ τε καὶ τὸ τῆς Κυνάνης ἐκτραγῳδήσας πάθος. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.22–3; the incident is not mentioned by Diodorus. For the source-question, see Heckel 1983–4. The fate of Kynnane will not have saddened Antipatros, who had attempted to bar her crossing of the Strymon some time earlier (*Polyaenus, Strat.* 8.60). For Kynnane see Berve II, 229 no. 456; Heckel, *Who's Who* 100–1; Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 69–70. Mayor 2014: 474 n.16 claims that her name “is thought to derive from Macedonian for ‘little she-dog’.” This etymology was debunked over a century ago by Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 220, who notes that the name was like Κυνέας and Κύνης “deren Stamm κυν- mit κύων, κυνός ‘Hund’ nichts zu tun hat, sondern ‘leuchten, glänzen’ zu bedeuten scheint.” Bartels 2015 argues that the name is Greek, noting examples from Makedonia (Beroia; cf. Palagia 2008; Heckel 2013b) and northern Greece. Nevertheless the name itself does not disprove the Illyrian ancestry of Philip’s daughter. See also Stemma X.

163 Peace with the Aitolians: Diod. 18.25.5; Justin 13.6.9 wrongly speaks of peace with the Athenians, adding that Polyperchon was left in charge of Europe; he dealt effectively with the Aitolians, Diod. 18.38. For the decision to go to war with Perdikkas see Arr. *Succ.* 1.24; also an alliance was made with Ptolemy (Diod. 18.25.4; cf. 18.14.2). Cf. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 96 ff.

164 He was also called Krateros. Seibert, *Verbindungen* 13 n.17, thinks he was born after his father’s death; but this is based on the assumption that Krateros left for Asia in the spring of 321. The son’s own evidence shows that he was born before his father’s death. In the dedication of the younger Krateros to Delphoi (lines 3–4) he describes himself as ὁν ἐμ μεγάροις ἐτεκνώσατο καὶ λίπε παῖδα.

165 Noted by Anson, *Eumenes* 105, with n.102. Plut. *Eum.* 5.1 says that “Krateros and Antipatros, having overcome the Greeks, were crossing into Asia in order to end Perdikkas’ rule and were reportedly intending to invade Kappadokia (μέλλοντες ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς Καππαδοκίαν). Perdikkas thus appointed Eumenes *strategos autokrator* of Armenia and Kappadokia. Billows, *Antigonos* 65 n.25, rightly observes: “An ancient army could not guard a strait dozens of miles long, and hence could only prevent an enemy landing if it had advance notice of where the landing would occur.” Perdikkas’ forces were clearly not the *sole* objective and it appears that Antipatros and Krateros moved eastward to confront Eumenes, rather than that Eumenes marched west.

166 Diod. 18.29.1–30.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.26 says that Neoptolemos was lured away; Plut. *Eum.* 5. It may have been his arrival that prompted Krateros and Antipatros to divide their forces. Anson,

the mood of Eumenes' troops and their devotion to Krateros, he sadly underestimated the generalship and psychology of the Greek; for Eumenes had no intention of revealing to his forces with whom the issue was to be decided.<sup>167</sup> Plutarch observes:

Neoptolemus came to them [Craterus and Antipater] after his flight, told them about the battle he had lost, and urged them to come to his aid, both of them if possible, but at any rate Craterus; for the Macedonians longed for him exceedingly (*ποθεῖσθαι γὰρ ὑπερφυῶς ἐκεῖνον ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων*), and if they should only see his cap (*kausia*) and hear his voice, they would come to him with a rush, arms and all. And indeed the name of Craterus was really great among those among them, and after the death of Alexander most of them had longed for him as their commander.<sup>168</sup>

Eumenes stationed his Kappadokian cavalry, under Pharnabazos and Phoinix, on the left wing opposite Krateros, who fell in the first stages of the battle, the victim of a nameless Thracian or of his own horse's hoofs.<sup>169</sup> That the much- glorified Eumenes found him semi-anxious defies credulity, and it conjures up the image of Alexander's tender, but utterly fictitious, moments with the dying

*Eumenes* 106–7 n.104 believes that it was the first victory over Neoptolemos that was reported to Perdikkas (Diod. 18.33.1), thus explaining the apparent contradiction in Diod. 18.18.37.1. Neoptolemos: Berve no. 548; he was a member of the Epeirot royal house; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 202 n.119; Heckel, *Who's Who* 174–5 “Neoptolemus [2].”

167 Nepos, *Eum.* 3.5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 6.7 (Eumenes had told his troops that they would be fighting against Neoptolemos and a certain Pigres, perhaps a local dynast); Arr. *Succ.* 1.27. See Vezin, *Eumenes* 43 ff. Schubert, *Quellen* 139 ff., following the account of Diod. 18. 29–32 (from Hieronymos), disbelieves the version that Eumenes was afraid that his troops would desert if they learned that they were fighting Krateros, ascribing it to Douris. Schubert goes to great lengths to disprove the claims of Krateros' popularity. But Krateros could not have failed to develop a reputation, through his own successes and his connections with Alexander. Certainly both Neoptolemos and Alketas were reluctant to aid Eumenes—Alketas not even joining the army of Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 5.3)—and both were, significantly, commanders of Makedonian infantry. For Plutarch's version (*Eum.* 6.8–11) of Eumenes' dream about the aid of Demeter see Vezin, *Eumenes* 130, who thinks it is a late element, and Schubert, *Quellen* 167–70, who traces it to Hieronymos. See Anson, *Eumenes* 102–10 and Schäfer, *Eumenes* 81–94, for Eumenes' actions against Krateros, Antipatros, and Neoptolemos.

168 Plut. *Eum.* 6.1–3. English translation by B. Perrin.

169 Plut. *Eum.* 7.5–6 claims that he was wounded in the side by a Thracian and fell from his horse; Arr. *Succ.* 1.27 says a Paphlagonian; Nepos, *Eum.* 4.3–4, does not specify. Diod. 18.30.5 alone dissents, saying that he was thrown from his horse and trampled. Nevertheless he perished unrecognized ( $\acute{α}γνοθεὶς \ddot{\sigma}s \,\dot{\eta}\, \tau\acute{o}n \, \sigma u n e p a t i \acute{t} h \eta \, k a i \, t o v \, \beta i o v \, \acute{a} l \acute{o} y o \acute{w} s \, k a t \acute{e} s t r e p e v \eta$ ); perhaps Hieronymos attempted to make Krateros responsible for his own death, absolving Eumenes of blame. Plutarch (*Eum.* 7.6) relates that a certain Gorgias, one of Eumenes' generals (Berve no. 235), recognized the fallen Krateros. A man named Gorgias had accompanied Krateros to Kilikia in 324 (Justin 12.18.2), and it is possible that Plutarch or his source wrongly placed him in Eumenes' camp; only two men of that name are attested during Alexander's lifetime (Heckel, *Who's Who* 127).

Persian King.<sup>170</sup> One can see the hand of Douris of Samos at work, and what makes the scene more unlikely is that Eumenes had only shortly before overcome his archrival Neoptolemos in a duel, from which he himself did not escape unscathed.<sup>171</sup> Nevertheless, he was remorseful and treated Krateros' body with respect.<sup>172</sup>

- 170 Recognized by Köhler 1890: 594; Schubert, *Quellen* 142; cf. Anson, *Eumenes* 109 n.113. According to Nepos, *Eum.* 4.4, Krateros was taken from the battlefield still alive and Eumenes tried in vain to cure him (*Eumenes Craterum ex acie semivivum elatum recreare studuit*).
- 171 Nepos, *Eum.* 4.2: *ab hoc aliquot plagis Eumenes vulneratur*; cf. Justin 13.8.8: *mutuis vulneribus acceptis*; Plut. *Eum* 7.7–12; Diod. 18.31. Justin 13.8.5, 7 writes Polyperchon where Krateros is clearly meant (cf. Trogus, *Prol.* 13).
- 172 Plut. *Eum.* 7.13; *Suda* s.v. Κράτερος = Arr. *Succ.* 26; Nepos, *Eum.* 4.4: *amplo funere extulit ossaque in Macedoniam uxori eius ac liberis remisit*. Thus Macurdy, *HQ* 61 comments: “[Phila] was then hurried . . . into another marriage so speedily that when the body of Craterus, sent to her by Eumenes for burial, arrived, she was already married to a youth of barely eighteen years.” Diod. 19.9.3 says that Krateros’ remains were returned to his widow, Phila (now the wife of Demetrios) by Ariston in 314, and Billows assumes that this man was perhaps a relative and had been in possession of the ashes all along. Why a kinsman of Krateros would have been serving with Eumenes is unclear, nor why the ashes were not given to Antigonos at the time of Eumenes’ capture as a gesture of good faith. For Ariston: see Heckel, *Who’s Who* 48 “Ariston [1]”; Berke II, 74 no. 137; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 375 no. 17.

# 11 Perdikkas son of Orontes

Berve II, 313–6 no. 627; Geyer, *RE* XIX.1 (1937) 604–14 no. 4; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 153, 168; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 247; Rathmann, *Perdikkas*; Heckel, *Who's Who* 197–202; Roisman 2014.

es könnte gewiß mit Recht gesagt werden, daß nur in Alexander die Einheit des Reiches gewesen, daß sie ohne ihn oder einen größeren als ihn unmöglich sei . . . .

(Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 6)

Perdikkas deserves to be considered the first of the Diadochoi.<sup>1</sup> To him Alexander had given his signet ring and, with it, all the uncompleted projects, all the unresolved and festering problems of an empire too quickly subdued and ruled, primarily, by force. For the King's own reputation, it was a good thing, dying young. Posterity knew only his youthful brilliance, lamenting that time alone had defeated him. But his death was the signal for rebellion—to the Greeks in Europe and the Upper Satrapies, to the conservative Makedones who wished to return to the state of Philip II. While the King lived, they dared not oppose him; but now they rejected his policies when they were carried on by other men. In order to continue Alexander's work Perdikkas would have to be another Alexander, and this he was not. Hesitant in situations that required decisive action, he lost ground to his political foes who cast him in the role of usurper. Thereafter, he moved too quickly, desired too much, and risked all on a single throw of the dice. Confounded in every undertaking by the jealousy of his colleagues and maligned

<sup>1</sup> Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 16: "In Perdikkas hat Alexander eine Persönlichkeit erkannt, die ihm an Temperament, Begabung und Ehrgeiz, wie überhaupt an Format, irgendwie noch am nächsten zu stehen schien." Miltner 1933b: 52: "Perdikkas, dessen besondere Vertrauensstellung bei Alexander uns Gewähr sein darf, daß er Alexanders Absichten verstand und teilte, hatte zuerst in Babylon versucht, die völlige Reichseinheit . . . zu gewährleisten . . ." Tarn, *CAH* VI, 462: "Perdiccas, of the princely line of Orestis, was brave and a good soldier; he was probably loyal to Alexander's house, and meant to keep the empire together; but he saw that someone must exercise the actual power, and he meant it to be himself. He was, however, unconciliatory and inordinately proud, and probably difficult to work with."

after his death in the memoirs of an enemy, Perdikkas is remembered as a man of far-reaching ambition, ruined by his own incompetence and abrasive personality.<sup>2</sup>

## Family and early career

Perdikkas son of Orontes, like his later rival Krateros, came from Orestis,<sup>3</sup> a member of that canton's royal house.<sup>4</sup> Two other members of his immediate family are known: a brother, Alketas, who attained the rank of phalanx commander (probably of Perdikkas' former battalion),<sup>5</sup> and a sister, Atalante, who married Attalos son of Andromenes.<sup>6</sup> It was a corner stone of Philip's Makedonian policy that the sons of his *hetairoi*—especially the highland aristocracy—should be brought to the Court at Pella to begin their training as Pages of the King and *syntrophoi* of his sons.<sup>7</sup> Perdikkas first enters our historical records as a *somatophylax* on the day of the assassination of Philip II (summer 336): together with Leonnatos and Attalos he pursues and kills Pausanias, Philip's assassin.<sup>8</sup> But, as we have seen in the case of Leonnatos, these *somatophylakes* were most likely Royal Hypaspists and not the Seven; Welles' suggestion that they were Alexander's personal Bodyguard, and not Philip's, is unconvincing.<sup>9</sup> The proponents of the theory that Alexander himself instigated his father's assassination have attempted to see in Perdikkas, Leonnatos, and Attalos agents of the Crown Prince, who killed Pausanias in order to ensure his silence; but we do not know the exact nature of their

2 Justin 13.8.2: *Sed Perdiccae plus odium adrogantiae quam vires hostium nocebat . . .* Cf. Diod. 18.33.3: καὶ γὰρ φονικὸς ἦν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων περιαιρούμενος τάξ ἐξουσίας καὶ καθόλου πάντων βουλόμενος ἄρχειν βιαίος . . . Both passages go back to a pro-Ptolemaic source (cf. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 64–76).

3 Son of Orontes: Arr. 3.11.9; 6 28.4; Ind. 18.5. For his Orestian origin: Arr. 6.28.4; Diod. 17.57.2 (implied by τὴν τῶν Ὀρεστίων καὶ Λυγκηστῶν τάξιν . . ., Περδίκκου τὴν στρατιγίαν ἔχοντος); Krateros was also from Orestis (Arr. Ind. 18.5).

4 Curt. 10.7.8: *stirpe regia genit[us]*. See Geyer 1930: 82–3; Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 62. Meleagros' remark about Perdikkas (Curt. 10.6.20) can only be intended as an insult: *Nihil dico de nobilioribus quam hic est.* Hammond (*HMac.* II, 17–8) believes Perdikkas' father, Orontes, married a Temenid princess. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.80, in contrast, accepts his Argead connections but questions whether he belonged to the Orestian ruling house: “Dass er auch dem orestischen Königshause angehört hat, ist möglich aber durch nichts zu beweisen.” See *Stemma VII*.

5 Berve no. 45; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 153; Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 1514–5 no. 5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 8–9. For his command of Perdikkas' battalion see Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 62 (cf. Berve II, 22); but Berve II, 209 n.2, holds Anspach's view (II, 11 n.141), that White Kleitos commanded Perdikkas' battalion, as “möglich, aber nicht zu erweisen.”

6 Berve no. 177; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 1894–5 no. 5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 60 “Atalante”; cf. Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 2158, s.v. “Attalos (5).”

7 See also Heckel 1986c; cf. Hammond 1990b.

8 Diod. 16.94.4. See most recently Fears 1975. Cf. Berve II, 308–9, no. 614.

9 For the view that these *somatophylakes* were hypaspists see Berve II, 92 n.3; II, 233 n.1; II, 308, 313; confused by Errington 1969: 236. That they were Alexander's Bodyguard: Welles, *Diodorus* 101 n.2. But cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 100 n.81.

relationships with Alexander,<sup>10</sup> nor is it certain that Pausanias was actually killed while attempting to escape.<sup>11</sup> One is tempted to draw inferences: Perdikkas was a young man, presumably in his early twenties,<sup>12</sup> at the time of Philip's death; he appears in the next year leading the battalion from Orestis and Lynkestis in the Illyrian campaign against Kleitos and Glaukias.<sup>13</sup> Was this a reward for service to Alexander? But rapid promotion need not always be cause for suspicion—only when it appears unwarranted. And Perdikkas evinces a high degree of military competence, a fact obscured, but not concealed, by Ptolemy's *History*.

## Bias in the sources

Modern scholarship has become increasingly skeptical of Arrian's faith in Ptolemy's *History*. In the 1930s W. Schwahn and H. Strasburger adumbrated the matter of Ptolemy's bias,<sup>14</sup> but the era of W.W. Tarn and C.A. Robinson Jr took comfort in the apologetic tone of the “official” version, and Arrian-Ptolemy continued to be used uncritically until R.M. Errington produced a systematic analysis of Ptolemy's tendency to denigrate the achievements of Perdikkas and his followers (notably Aristonous).<sup>15</sup> But it was not just Ptolemy's own *History* that

10 Hamilton 1965: 122: Pausanias was killed, “significantly, by three close friends of Alexander. The prince was taking no chances; Pausanias knew too much.” Cf. Welles, *Diodorus* 101; Green, *Alexander* 108: “The three young noblemen who pursued and killed Pausanias . . . were all close and trusted friends of Alexander.” We cannot be sure of this. Pausanias, Leonnatos, Perdikkas were not *all* from Orestis, as is often repeated, most recently by Green, *Alexander* 108; Leonnatos was Lynkestian (so Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035; wrongly called Orestian by Berse II, 232; recognized by Lane Fox, *Alexander* 505), a *syntrophos* of Alexander (*Suda* Λ 274) and related to Philip II. We do not know when Perdikkas became a close friend (but cf. Plut. *Alex.* 15. 3–4); I do not see why Lane Fox, *Alexander* 505 supposes that Perdikkas may have been “middle-aged”; as for Attalos, it is fairly safe to assume that he was the son of Andromenes (not the uncle of Kleopatra-Eurydike, as is suggested by Hammond 1978c: 346 n.37 and reiterated in *MS* 139); see further, Heckel 1979a. His marriage to Atalante belongs in all likelihood to 323/2.

11 *POxy.* 1798 = *FGrH* 148 appears to say that Pausanias (?) was arrested and executed, so Wilcken 1923: 151–7. Rejected by Welles, *Diodorus* 101 n.2. The idea has been revived by Bosworth 1971a: 94: “The papyrus then is unreliable evidence, but that does not mean that Diodorus' account of Pausanias' death should be taken without question.” Against Bosworth see Green, *Alexander* 524 n.65: “He [Pausanias] is not in fact named in this text, and the person referred to could equally well be a brother of Alexander the Lyncestian.” See also the highly speculative reconstruction of Kapetanopoulos 1996.

12 Cf. Berse II, 313: “unter Al. erscheint er in seiner frischesten Manneskraft.” Kraft 1971: 35. His position as Royal Hypaspist in 336 would rule out Hammond's suggestion that he was born c.366 (*HMac.* II, 18). His birth year cannot have been earlier than 360.

13 Arr. 1.6.9; for the composition of the battalion, Diod. 17.57.2. I see support for the view of Berse II, 313 n.3 that Perdikkas' activities in the north might explain Plutarch's comment (*Comp. Nicias and Crassus* 2.4 [Loeb]) that Perdikkas was feared by the Thracians. This man was most likely Perdikkas II.

14 Schwahn 1930: 228–9; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 47, observing “die wohlüberlegte Verschweigung dieser Tatsache [i.e., Perdikkas' assumption of Hephaestion's chiliarchy] . . .”

15 Errington 1969. The most obvious bias can be seen in Arrian's failure to mention that Alexander gave Perdikkas his signet ring, and in the claim that Hephaestion's chiliarchy remained vacant.

treated Perdikkas unfairly. Diodorus' eighteenth book is based on a source that was unmistakably hostile to him and, at the same time, favorable to Ptolemy. It has long been axiomatic that Diodorus' account of the Successors was based on Hieronymos of Kardia—although some have argued for additional material drawn from a pro-Ptolemaic source—but recent scholarship has attempted to explain the favorable or unfavorable treatment of other individuals (notably Antipatros and Antigonos) as coming from the pen of Douris of Samos.<sup>16</sup> Whichever source Diodorus used, it is clear that the interpretation of Perdikkas' actions and motives was colored by hindsight, and that the generally negative picture cannot be taken at face value.

To determine the truth about Perdikkas' career is, therefore, no easy task. But the reader who has guarded himself against Ptolemy's distortions recognizes in Perdikkas an active and capable leader. In his account of the capture of Thebes, Arrian claims that Perdikkas' troops acted without orders from the King. Diodorus says otherwise.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless Perdikkas' role, even as described by Arrian, appears to have been somewhat heroic, and Amyntas son of Andromenes was not reluctant to bring up his Tymphaian battalion in support of the Orestians and their leader, who was critically wounded in the battle.<sup>18</sup> Whatever the truth concerning the action taken by Perdikkas' troops, it is clear that Alexander took no disciplinary measures against him, for Perdikkas continued to command his battalion when the army crossed into Asia. At the Granikos River he was stationed between the hypaspists of Nikanor and Koinos' battalion,<sup>19</sup> roughly the same position that he occupied at Issos and Gaugamela.<sup>20</sup> After a relatively easy victory at the Granikos, Alexander encountered stubborn defenders at Halikarnassos. In an

On the other hand, Arrian-Ptolemy is our only source for some of Perdikkas' activities: 3.18.5 against Ariobarzanes; 4.16.2, he commanded one of five divisions of the army (*Curt.* 8.1.1 mentions only three units, led by Koinos, Hephaestion, and Alexander himself); 4.21.4 at the Rock of Chorienes; and, most notably, Perdikkas' independent mission against the Mallians, 6.6.4–6. See, however, Roisman 1984; cf. also Bosworth 1988, for a synthesis of his important views on Arrian.

16 See particularly Landucci, *Duride*, and *Diodoro*; also Landucci 2014. The view that Hieronymos is the underlying source of Diodorus is the starting point for Hornblower (*Hieronymus*), who bases her arguments about Hieronymos almost entirely on the evidence of Diodorus. See also Reuss 1876; Brown 1947. For the negative portrayal of Perdikkas in Diodorus see 18.4.2–3 (his cancellation of Alexander's final plans: ἵνα δὲ μὴ δόξῃ διὰ τῆς ιδίας γνώμης καθαιρεῖν τι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου δόξης); 18.4.7–8; 18.7.5, 8–9; 18.14.2; 18.16.2–3; 18.22; 18.25.3; 18.29.1; 18.33.3; 18.36. By contrast, the treatment of Ptolemy is consistently positive: 18.14.1; 18.28.3–6; 18.33.2–3; 18.34.4; 18.36.1–2, 6; 18.39.5. Seibert rightly speaks of “eine aufdringliche Schwarz-Weiß Malerei” (*Ptolemaios* 67; cf. 69). See Landucci 1987, again identifying Douris of Samos as “la fonte filo-tolemaica di Diodoro” (42); Rathmann 2014.

17 Thebes: *Arr.* 1.8.1–3; *Diod.* 17.12.3.

18 For Amyntas' support see *Arr.* 1.8.2; Perdikkas' wound (1.8.3).

19 *Arr.* 1.14.2.

20 *Arr.* 2.8.3; *Curt.* 3.9.7 (Issos); *Arr.* 3.11.9; *Curt.* 4.13.28: *post eum* [sc. *Coenon*] *Orestae Lyncestaeque sunt positi* (Gaugamela). The battalions of Koinos and Perdikkas have changed position. If this change reflects performance, it may be a result of Perdikkas' lack of discipline at Halikarnassos.

abortive attempt on Myndos he took with him the infantry battalions of Perdikkas, Amyntas, and Meleagros; but the place could not be taken in the initial assault and Alexander, having brought no siege engines or ladders, was forced to withdraw.<sup>21</sup> Perdikkas is mentioned a second time in connection with Halikarnassos: two of Perdikkas' men, motivated by drunkenness and *philotimia*, led an unauthorized assault on the city walls. Soon the Makedonian forces became embroiled in the struggle but, unlike Thebes, Halikarnassos did not fall as a consequence. The ancient historians explained the failure in part by the drunkenness of the Orestian-Lynkestian battalion, thus assigning blame to Perdikkas, not Alexander.<sup>22</sup> Curtius tells us that, during the siege of Tyre, Alexander conducted a raid on some neighboring Arabs, leaving the siege operations under the joint command of Krateros and Perdikkas. Krateros' role is corroborated by Polyaenus, and Arrian's failure to mention the joint command may again indicate that he did not find the information in Ptolemy's *History*.<sup>23</sup>

Whether acting on Alexander's orders or on his own initiative, Perdikkas had a tendency to come to the fore. It was Perdikkas, according to Plutarch (*Alex.* 15.4–5; cf. *Mor.* 342d–e), who declined Alexander's gifts, as the army departed for Asia, preferring to share the King's fortune; this he did, in some respects perhaps more than any man. Thus, in success as in adversity, he is conspicuous, in spite of Ptolemy's calculated omissions. At Gaugamela he threw himself wholeheartedly into the fray and was wounded.<sup>24</sup> Then, at the beginning of 330, his unit alone accompanied Alexander as he circumvented the Persian Gates.<sup>25</sup>

### The growth of Perdikkas' power

What part Perdikkas played in the controversial Philotas affair must be deduced from Curtius, the only author to mention him. Perdikkas came to Alexander's tent on the night of Philotas' arrest, in the company of Hephaestion, Krateros,

21 Arr. 1.20.5; Fuller, *Generalship* 202.

22 Arr. 1.21.1–3; but the poor discipline of Perdikkas' troops is corroborated by Diod. 17.25.5; Fuller, *Generalship* 200–6; cf. Welles, *Diodorus* 189 n.2. English, *Sieges* 47–55.

23 Curt. 4.3.1; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.13. Cf. Errington 1969: 237. See also Fuller, *Generalship* 206–16.

24 Curt. 4.16.32 (along with Koinos and Menidas); Diod. 17.61.3 (with Hephaestion and Koinos); Arrian 3.15.2 mentions Hephaestion, Menidas and Koinos, but does not name Perdikkas. See Errington 1969: 237.

25 Arr. 3.18.5. Ptolemy is certainly the source of this passage, as the emphasis given to his role (3.18.9) in capturing the wall (found only in Arrian) indicates. But Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 8–10, debates the issue and argues that there is no good reason to identify the Ptolemy of this passage with the son of Lagos (against Berse II, 330). Ptolemy is not identified by patronymic, but Seibert's conclusion must be regarded as short-sighted, especially in view of the fact that Arrian alone gives a version in which a certain Ptolemy distinguishes himself. That Perdikkas had not yet given up his battalion is clear; cf. Milns 1966c: 159, against Tarn II, 143. Of the other phalanx commanders, Krateros and Meleagros had remained at the foot of the Gates (Arr. 3.18.4), while Polyperchon (Curt. 5.4.20, 30), Amyntas, and Koinos were bridging the Araxes River, along with Philotas son of Parmenion (so Bosworth 1973: 252–3).

Koinos, Erigyios, and Leonnatos, in order to discuss the crisis.<sup>26</sup> Very likely, he was part of the council of Friends (*consilium amicorum*), which had met with Alexander earlier that day and urged that Philotas be punished: in short, he was party to the conspiracy *against* Philotas.<sup>27</sup> The advantages that Philotas' downfall brought to Hephaestion can be gauged by his sudden rise from obscurity; Krateros' activities and benefits are clearly documented, as is Koinos' hostility toward his brother-in-law. But what of Perdikkas? Unlike Ptolemy, he did not become *somatophylax* as a result of the affair, for Curtius makes it clear that he was already a member of the Seven at the time of Philotas' arrest.<sup>28</sup> He did not become hipparch, as did Kleitos and Hephaestion (Arr. 3.27.4), but continued as a phalanx commander for a time;<sup>29</sup> nor did he enjoy the great influence exercised by Krateros for almost three years after the deaths of Philotas and Parmenion. But Perdikkas must have gained in power just as the others who opposed Philotas did, for, when Hephaestion died, Perdikkas emerged as the most powerful of Alexander's marshals. He had gained steadily in authority but his development has been obscured by the pre-eminence of Hephaestion and Krateros, and by Ptolemy's sinister *History*.

Although Perdikkas replaced Menes (who had been appointed *hyparchos* of Kilikia and Phoinikia) as *somatophylax* shortly after Gaugamela, he continued, for a time, to command his battalion. Thus he was both taxiarch and *somatophylax* from the end of 331 until at least the campaigning season of 329. In Sogdiana, Meleagros and Perdikkas, functioning as battalion leaders, besieged one of seven fortresses that had been established along the Iaxartes River (Syr-Darya) by Kyros the Great; Krateros undertook a similar task at Kyroupolis (Kurkath).<sup>30</sup> But, in the following season, Perdikkas was promoted to hipparch and led one of five divisions that swept Sogdiana; the *pezhetairoi* of Orestis and Lynkestis were now entrusted to his younger brother, Alketas.<sup>31</sup> As *somatophylax*, on the other hand, he occupied a seat near the King at the fateful banquet in Marakanda (late summer 328). Together with Ptolemy he attempted to restrain the King, who was incensed by Kleitos' frankness; they were aided, in vain, by Lysimachos and Leonnatos.<sup>32</sup> Three of these *somatophylakes* (Ptolemy, Leonnatos, Perdikkas) conducted the night operations against the Rock of Chorienes (Koh-i-nor) early in the following spring.<sup>33</sup>

26 Curt. 6.8.17.

27 Curt. 6.8.1 ff. See also Heckel 1977a.

28 For Ptolemy's promotion to *somatophylax* see Arr. 3.27.5; for Perdikkas, who appears to have replaced Menes (Arr. 3.16.9), Curt. 6.8.17: *ex armigeris autem Perdiccas et Leonnatus*.

29 This appears to be his rank at Curt. 7.6.19, 21.

30 Curt. 7.6.19, 21 (Perdikkas, Meleagros); Arr. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16 (Krateros.); cf. Holt, *Bactria* 54–5.

31 Arr. 4.16.2 (the other four divisions were commanded by Alexander, Hephaestion, Ptolemy, and Koinos-Artabazos); Alketas first appears as phalanx commander at Arr. 4.22.1.

32 Curt. 8.1.45, 48; for Lysimachos and Leonnatos see 8.1.46.

33 Arr. 4.21.4; cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 243–5. For the identification of Chorienes and Sisimithres see Heckel 1986a.

As the army set out for India, Perdikkas was overshadowed by Hephaestion, who had experienced a meteoric rise since Philotas' demise. With Hephaestion, Perdikkas led an advance force to the Indus, which they were to bridge.<sup>34</sup> Hephaestion was, as it seems, the nominal commander, Perdikkas the more experienced military man. Alexander's selection of Perdikkas as Hephaestion's successor and the lack of friction between the two suggest that they shared Alexander's attitudes and were generally compatible. For this reason, and because Hephaestion needed the support of a competent commander, Perdikkas accompanied him to the Indus. En route they subdued Peukelaotis, whose ruler Astis offered stubborn resistance.<sup>35</sup> By the time the King arrived at the Indus, Perdikkas and Hephaestion had brought the natives under Alexander's sway, gathered provisions from Omphis (Taxiles),<sup>36</sup> and bridged the river by lashing boats together.<sup>37</sup> On their way they had also fortified a city called Orobatis, in which they left an armed guard (Arr. 4.28.5).

From the Indus, Perdikkas appears to have accompanied Alexander and the main force to the Hydaspes (Jhelum), where, when the battle with Poros took place, he crossed the river in the same triakonter as Alexander, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, and Seleukos (Arr. 5.13.1). In the actual battle he commanded one of the hipparchies directly under Alexander's control, the main striking force against Poros.<sup>38</sup>

After his victory over Poros, Alexander turned his attention to the Kathaians at Sangala, entrusting the left wing to Perdikkas, who commanded his own hipparchy and the infantry battalions; but Arrian, who reports Perdikkas' battle position, tells us only what Alexander did on the right and says nothing further about the left.<sup>39</sup> The Sangala campaign was a particularly bloody one, and the numbers of Alexander's wounded were high, among them the *somatophylax* Lysimachos (Arr. 5.24.5). The morale of the troops who had found Poros a more formidable enemy than Dareios was approaching its low ebb. Perdikkas himself escaped being wounded and was dispatched to ravage the region around Sangala with a light-armed force (Curt. 9.1.19).

34 They led half the Companion Cavalry and the battalions of Gorgias, Meleagros, and Kleitos (Arr. 4.22.7; cf. Curt. 8.10.2 without specifics).

35 Arr. 4.22.8. See Berve no. 174, s.v. Ἀστης (the MSS. of Arrian: Ἀστις).

36 Curt. 8.12.6, 15; ME 48. Only Hephaestion is named, but Perdikkas must have been present. For details on Omphis (= Ambhi; Diod. and ME call him "Mophis"; see Karttunen, *India* 33 n.67) see Berve no. 739; Heckel, *Who's Who* 260–1 "Taxiles"; Smith, *EHI* 63 ff.; on Taxila see now Karttunen 1990.

37 See Curt. 8.10.2 for a description. Arr. 5.7.1–2 relates that Aristoboulos and Ptolemy did not explain in what manner the river was bridged, but Arrian supposes that boats were tied together to form a bridge.

38 Arr. 5.12.2 (cf. 5.13.1); Curt. 8.14.15. See Fuller, *Generalship* 180–99, esp. 186–7; Breloer, *Kampf gegen Poros*.

39 Arr. 5.22.6. The command of the left had been Parmenion's responsibility in most engagements, then Krateros', but the latter was not present at Sangala (cf. Arr. 5.21.4: Krateros was on a foraging expedition with Koinos; both appear to have rejoined Alexander at the Hyphasis). For an analysis of the Sangala campaign see Fuller, *Generalship* 255–8; cf. Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 75 ff. and 223.

To the hardships of the campaign and the terrors of India were added rumors of an impending expedition to the Ganges. The army refused to advance beyond the Hyphasis (Beas).<sup>40</sup> Shortly thereafter Koinos, who had been the spokesman for the disgruntled soldiery, died of illness at the Hydaspes.<sup>41</sup> By this time, many of the Old Guard were gone, and the careers of more conservative officers began to decline, as Alexander turned to his most trusted friend Hephaestion. No doubt it was through Hephaestion's urging that Alexander gave less authority to Krateros, to whom he joined Polyperchon, Gorgias, White Kleitos, and Attalos, the mainstays of the phalanx.<sup>42</sup> New leaders emerged, notably Ptolemy, Leonnatos, and to a lesser extent Lysimachos.<sup>43</sup> But quite clearly Alexander placed greater faith than before in the steady and loyal Perdikkas.

In the Mallian campaign, Perdikkas accompanied Alexander through the waterless region between the Akesines (Chenab) and Hydraotes (Ravi) and then took a special force against one of the Mallian towns. This town he captured, killing those inhabitants who did not manage to escape into the marshes (Arr. 6.6.4, 6). Reunited with Alexander for the assault on the main Mallian stronghold, he commanded a portion of the army, which Arrian (Ptolemy) implies was, through its sluggishness, responsible for Alexander's critical wounding there (Arr. 6.9.1–2). The near-fatal wounding of Alexander in the Mallian town can scarcely have been Perdikkas' fault, though it may well reflect the increasing reluctance of Alexander's troops to emulate his daring and recklessness; and, if this is a case of Ptolemy detracting from Perdikkas' reputation, it does not deserve serious consideration, for Ptolemy, by his own admission, was not present at the battle.<sup>44</sup> According to one branch of the tradition—Arrian does not name his sources in this case—it was Perdikkas who cut the arrow from Alexander's body; others attribute the surgery to Kritoboulos, a doctor from Kos.<sup>45</sup> The truth of this matter eludes us. But, after Alexander was taken downstream by ship to the junction of the rivers, Perdikkas completed the subjugation of the region before rejoining the main force.<sup>46</sup>

40 For the view that this mutiny may have been contrived, and that Alexander never seriously contemplated an advance to the Ganges, see Spann 1999 and Heckel 2003b; *contra* Anson 2015a.

41 Arr. 6.2.1; Curt. 9.3.20 says that he died near the Akesines.

42 This group will also have included Meleagros, later the spokesman of the phalanx in the succession debate.

43 For Leonnatos' and Ptolemy's commands in India see Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 220–1. See also Heckel 1982b: 379.

44 Curt. 9.5.21; Arr. 6.5.6–7, 11.8. Errington 1969: 239; Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 85; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 82–5; and Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 29–56.

45 Arr. 6.11.1, the sources are not named (οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ). For Kritoboulos see Curt. 9. 5. 25; Arrian has Kritodemos, which is surely an error. Both are said to have come from Kos, but Kritodemos is unattested, while Kritoboulos is known from Pliny, *HN* 7.124 as the physician who extracted the arrow from Philip's eye at Methone. According to Arrian, *Ind.* 18.7, he was a triarch of the Hydaspes-fleet. See Berge nos. 452, 453 though Berge regards Arrian's version as correct. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 100 "Critobulus"; also Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*. For a full discussion see Heckel 1981d.

46 Arr. 6.15.1; he subdued the Abastanoi. See Smith, *EHI* 104; Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* 48, 223–4.

Curiously, this is where our information for Perdikkas' military career under Alexander breaks off. Although he became, with the departure of Krateros, Polyperchon, Attalos, and Meleagros for the West, the second most influential man after Hephaestion, there is no further record of his activities. Smaller operations were entrusted to Ptolemy and Leonnatos, larger ones to Hephaestion. Yet, when Hephaestion died and Alexander soon afterward, there was no one more powerful in Asia than Perdikkas himself.

### Perdikkas as Alexander's second-in-command

At Sousa in 324 Perdikkas wedded the daughter of Atropates, satrap of Media, as part of Alexander's mass-marriage between the Makedonian and Iranian nobilities.<sup>47</sup> Here too he was crowned, along with the other *somatophylakes*.<sup>48</sup> But his greatest honors came later in the year, when Hephaestion drank himself to death in Ecbatana. Hephaestion indeed was irreplaceable, owing to the personal nature of his relationship with Alexander, but the King found in Perdikkas at least some of those qualities that he valued in Hephaestion:<sup>49</sup> undoubtedly there was a strong personal bond, but Perdikkas' later striving to maintain the unity of the empire suggests that he also understood Alexander's policies.<sup>50</sup> Thus, it was to Perdikkas that Alexander entrusted Hephaestion's corpse, which he was instructed to convey to Babylon and prepare for burial.<sup>51</sup> It is significant, though hardly surprising, that Arrian, who mentions Hephaestion's pyre, says nothing about Perdikkas.<sup>52</sup> And there was more than just this honor. Perdikkas now assumed Hephaestion's command, the first hipparchy or chiliarchy of the Companion Cavalry—though the unit, out of respect for the dead Hephaestion, retained the name of its original commander.<sup>53</sup> More than a mere hipparchy, it implied a position as Alexander's second-in-command; hence, when the office

47 Arr. 7.4.5. Her name is not given, but see Berve no. 180 and Heckel, *Who's Who* 61–2 “Atropates.” Cf. Justin 13.4.13. Against generally accepted belief that the Persian wives were automatically repudiated after Alexander's death, see Heckel, *Conquests* 139; Meeus 2009a; Harders 2014: 376 n.104. Atropates retained control over a portion of Media in the Babylonian settlement, probably so that he could keep an eye on Peithon in the interests of his son-in-law.

48 Arr. 7.5.6.

49 Ael. *VH* 3.23, taking his information from the *Ephemerides* (*FGrH* 117 F2a, whether genuine or not: Bosworth 1971b, 1988: 171), mentions Alexander dining with Perdikkas in Media. Perdikkas appears to have shared a love of exercise and other “luxurious” pursuits with Krateros, Leonnatos, and Menelaos (presumably Ptolemy's brother): Ael. *VH* 9.3. But the claim that Alexander hated Perdikkas because he was warlike was clearly invented after Alexander's death: ἀπίγθετο Περδίκκας Ἀλέξανδρος ὅτι ἦν πολεμικός (Ael. *VH* 12.16; cf. 14.47a).

50 See Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 16; Miltner 1933b: 52. For Hephaestion's attitude toward the Persians see Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10.

51 Diod. 17.110.8.

52 Arr. 7.14.8 speaks of the pyre at Babylon. For the suppression of this information see Errington 1969: 239.

53 Arr. 7.14.10. It was called “Hephaestion's chiliarchy” in order to “distinguish it from other chiliar-chies,” so Griffith 1963: 74 n.17.

was later conferred upon Seleukos by Perdikkas, Justin describes it as *summus castrorum tribunatus*.<sup>54</sup>

Then Alexander died. The army in general was not prepared for this disaster; witness the confusion of the subsequent years.<sup>55</sup> Perdikkas himself could scarcely have hoped for a better position: since Hephaestion's death he had become Alexander's closest personal friend; he was by far the most influential of the generals<sup>56</sup> and of the *somatophylakes*, who had by this time developed into a powerful *clique*;<sup>57</sup> supreme military power was his by virtue of his chiliarchy. His prestige was further enhanced by the significant gesture of Alexander, who on his deathbed and in the presence of the other generals handed to Perdikkas his signet ring, a fact that Ptolemy the historian took pains to suppress.<sup>58</sup> According to the *Liber de Morte*, Alexander also entrusted to Perdikkas his wife, Roxane, with instructions that he should marry her.<sup>59</sup> Roxane's role at the time of Alexander's death is heavily romanticized by the *Liber de Morte*,<sup>60</sup> but the suggestion that she marry Perdikkas is in itself not entirely implausible. It was only when the conservative phalanx violently opposed Roxane's child in particular and Alexander's policy of fusion in general that a union with her ceased to be a viable means of gaining power.

54 Justin 13.4.17; cf. earlier where Perdikkas as chiliarch and Meleagros as hyparch are described as follows: *castrorum et exercitus et rerum [MSS.] cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur* (13.4.5).

55 Against Bosworth 1971b: 112–36, esp. 134–6.

56 Nepos, *Eum.* 2.2, draws attention to the reason for Perdikkas' ascendancy: *aberat enim Crateros et Antipater, qui antecedere hunc videbantur; mortuus erat Hephaestio . . .*

57 For the composition and development of the *somatophylakes* see Heckel 1978a, 1986c. Note that the most powerful men among the cavalry after Alexander's death were reported by Arrian (*Succ.* 1.2) as Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Ptolemy, Lysimachos, Aristonous, Peithon, Seleukos, Eumenes. Only the last two were not *somatophylakes*, though Seleukos had commanded the foot-guard (the Royal Hypaspists), while Eumenes was the chief secretary. By calling them a *clique*, I do not mean to imply that there was no disagreement among them; but at the time of the King's death only Ptolemy advocates a different policy, and this may reflect his opposition to Perdikkas in the months to come.

58 Curt. 10.5.4; cf. 10.6.4–5; Justin 12.15.12; Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4; Nepos, *Eum.* 2.1; LM 112; Heidelberg Epit. 3.2, with Wheatley 2013: 24. Ptolemy fails to mention not only the ring, but also the care of Hephaestion's body, which was entrusted to Perdikkas, and Perdikkas' elevation to Hephaestion's chiliarchy, which Ptolemy underhandedly denies, Arr. 7.14.10. Cf. Schwahn 1930: 223; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 47; Errington 1969: 239–40; Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 9–10. Rathmann 18–22 is surely correct in regarding the ring as the one that was used for transactions with Greeks and Makedonians, and not the one with the Persian seal, mentioned by Curt. 6.6.6. (for conflicting views see Baldus 1987; Hammond 1995c).

59 LM 112, 118.

60 LM 101–2, 110 and especially 112: *at Roxane magno cum clamore capillos sibi ipsa scindens conata est ad Perdiccae pedes se advolvere. hanc Holcias exceptit et eam ad Alexandrum adduxit. ille dentibus frendens cum se iam in extremo spiritu videret, eam complexus osculari coepit dexteramque eius tenens in dexteram Perdiccae indidit nutuque commendationem fecit. deinde cum morte oppimeretur, oculos eius Roxane oppressit animamque eius ore suo exceptit.* For Roxane's life see Berse no. 688; Heckel, *Who's Who* 241–2. For the “historical” significance of the *Liber de Morte* see Heckel, *LDT*.

Still she remained a valuable asset; though it was the unborn child that mattered, not the woman.<sup>61</sup>

Droysen rightly observed that the empire could be maintained only by an Alexander or by a greater man yet.<sup>62</sup> And perhaps it was Perdikkas' fatal error that he attempted to preserve the integrity of the new empire under Argead rule. In this respect, Ptolemy was more pragmatic and less an idealist. He was also less to be admired. But Perdikkas had not taken full account of the conservative Makedonian phalanx and their longing for the state of Philip II. They could not endure a second Alexander, if indeed such a man was to be found, and they showed their determination to return to the traditional ways by demanding as their king a man whom no rational thinker could have considered: Arrhidaios, a mentally deficient son of Philip II by the Thessalian Philine. That his mother was a dancing-girl, or a harlot, from Larissa is, almost certainly, a fabrication; Arrhidaios' mental state was not.<sup>63</sup> Fontana's doubts are ill advised: Arrhidaios was present in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death, and dismissed as a candidate for the throne on account of his affliction.<sup>64</sup>

Things went wrong for Perdikkas from the beginning, though everything appeared to be in his favor. He was publicly supported by at least one *somatophylax*, Aristonous;<sup>65</sup> Peithon may also have been an ally to begin with.<sup>66</sup> But

61 For her pregnancy: Curt. 10.6.9; Justin 13.2.5; cf. 12.15.9; Arr. *Succ.* 1.1; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §1. ME 70 mentions an earlier son of Alexander and Roxane, who died at the Akesines (sc. Hydaspes) River. As a symbol of legitimate rule she could hardly compete with Dareios' daughter Stateira or Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III.

62 Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 6, quoted at the head of this chapter.

63 For Philine (Philinna) see Satyrus' account of Philip's wives, *FHG* III (Müller) 161 = Athen. 13.557b-d; for her alleged low birth see Justin 9.8.2 (*saltatrix*); 13.2.11 (*scortum*); Athen. 13. 578a; Plut. *Alex.* 77. 7 (ἐκ γνωτικὸς ἀδόξου καὶ κονῆς Φύλινης). Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.69, followed by Griffith 1970: 70–1 and Ellis, *Philip II* 61, thinks she was clearly of a good family (Ogden, *PPD* 25), probably the Aleuadae (but see Green 1982: 143; Westlake, *Thessaly* 168; and Simonetti Agostinetti 1993: 33 accept the claim that she was of low birth). See also Ehrhardt 1967: 297; Schwahn 1931: 312; Niese I, 191 n.5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 208. For Arrhidaios' ailment see App. *Syr.* 52 (οὐκ ἔμφρονα); Justin 13.2.11; 14.5.2; Diod. 18.2.2 (ψυχικοῖς δὲ πάθεσι συνεχόμενον ἀνίάτος); Plut. *Alex.* 10.2; 77.7–8; Plut. *Mor.* 337d = *de fort.* Al. 2.5; *Heidelberg Epitome* (έπιληπτικός); Porphy. Tyr., *FGrH* 260 F2. According to Plut. *Alex.* 77. 8 his mental condition was brought on by drugs given to him, while he was still a child, by Olympias. Curt. 10.7.4–6; the manner in which Peithon speaks of Arrhidaios suggests that he was a pathetic character. See further Hamilton, *PA* 216–7; Berve no. 781; Heckel, *Who's Who* 52–3 “Arrhidaeus [1]”; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 134; also Greenwalt 1984; Carney 2001. See Stemma X for the Argead Royal House.

64 Fontana 1960: 128 ff. and 128 n.20; Errington 1970: 51 n.23.

65 Berve no. 133; Heckel, *Who's Who* 50. For his support of Perdikkas see Curt. 10.6.16–8. Like Perdikkas he was loyal to the house of Alexander and, faithful to the end, he perished in 316/5 (Diod. 19.50.3–51.1). Predictably, he too was the victim of Ptolemy's bias: see Errington 1969: 235.

66 Berve no. 621; Heckel, *Who's Who* 50. Although he was soon among those who worked to undermine Perdikkas, he appears to have supported him immediately after Alexander's death, though perhaps only on the condition that his power be limited by attaching Leonnatos to him as his colleague. See Curt. 10.7.4–8; cf. Schur 1934: 133, 139–40.

Perdikkas faced an unusual problem: he could not be acclaimed king and rule securely as long as Roxane carried the potential heir; he could not act as regent for a child as yet unborn;<sup>67</sup> and an *interregnum* was out of the question, owing to the mood of the army.<sup>68</sup> Whatever title Perdikkas was to take as ruler, he was anxious that it should be sanctioned by the army. At the urging of Aristonous, he was offered the kingship. Who could deny that Alexander had marked him out as his successor? But Perdikkas unwisely put the army to the test, hoping that, by feigning reluctance, he would have the crown virtually forced upon him. Thus Curtius, drawing heavily on Roman precedent.<sup>69</sup>

Again Perdikkas had miscalculated: the hesitation encouraged only further dissension. His opponents were quick to point out that Perdikkas sought the crown through Roxane's son, that he would follow the example of the great Philip, who usurped the kingdom from the legitimate heir, Amyntas Perdikka, his nephew.<sup>70</sup> An illegitimate son of Alexander, Barsine's child Herakles, was scorned by the army, as was Nearchos, who suggested him;<sup>71</sup> Roxane's potential son was unpopular with the army, whether Perdikkas alone or a college of guardians acted in his interests.<sup>72</sup>

67 For Perdikkas' dilemma see Errington 1970: 50, who comments on the "possibility of the child's exploitation by anyone unscrupulous enough among Perdiccas' opponents who was prepared to depict Perdiccas as a usurper." In fact, according to Curtius 10.6.21, Perdikkas was accused by Meleagros of planning to usurp power through the regency of Roxane's child.

68 The army had two main objections to Perdikkas' proposal that the Makedonians should await the birth of Roxane's child: their more immediate concern was for pay and discharge from duty (so Schwahn 1931: 308; Errington 1970: 51), but they were, at the same time, opposed not to Perdikkas' personal ambition (Badian 1964: 263, rightly refuting Fontana 1960: 121: "Causa principale fu l'opposizione a Perdicca, ritenuto colpevole di aspirare al trono; concasse evidentemente le gelosie personali e il desiderio di dominio degli altri generali") but to Perdikkas' enthusiasm for Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik*. To deny this fact is to make light of the inner resentment of the troops, who mutinied at the Hyphasis River and at Opis, towards their King's orientalisms and those who supported him in his designs. For the supporters of the leading men in Babylon see Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 32–50.

69 Curt. 10.6.18: *haerebat inter cupiditatem pudoremque et, quo modestius quod spectabat appeteret, pervicacius oblatus esse credebat*. For the Roman elements in Curtius' history see Sumner 1961; Devine 1979.

70 Curt. 10.6.21. See Berge no. 61. For Philip's usurpation see Ellis, *Philip II* 45 ff. and 250 n.10; Ellis 1971. Against this interpretation: Griffith, *HMac II*, 208 ff.; Borza, *Shadow of Olympus* 200–1; more cautiously, Errington, *Hist. Mac.* 37, with 271 n.9.

71 Curt. 10.6.10–2; he is mentioned as a possible candidate by Justin 12.15.9. Justin 13.2.7 makes Meleagros bring Herakles into the discussion; Nearchos is more likely, for he was a relative, having married the daughter of Barsine and Mentor (Arr. 7.4.6); cf. Meeus 2008a: 47. See also Badian 1975: 168–9: "The army, reluctant to wait for the legitimate offspring of Alexander's marriage to an Oriental princess, was by no means willing to consider the succession of a semi-Oriental bastard." For Barsine see Berge no. 206; Heckel, *Who's Who* 70; cf. also Berge no. 353: Heckel, *Who's Who* 138 "Heracles." In favor of Herakles' existence, see Brunt 1975 and Badian 1975: 167 n.51, against Tarn 1921: 18 ff., and II, 330–7. For the family of Barsine see Stemma XII.

72 The joint guardianship of Roxane's child was suggested by Peithon, who realized that the army was now suspicious of Perdikkas' designs and hoped to win the phalanx back to Perdikkas' policy by limiting his power. Thus Leonnatos was proposed as co-guardian, with a similar arrangement

Then the unexpected happened: the common soldier called out for Arrhidaios, for the family of Philip II.<sup>73</sup> And it was at this juncture that Perdikkas lost control of the situation completely; for Meleagros, a phalanx commander who had little hope of advancement in Alexander's lifetime, saw in the advocacy of the inept Arrhidaios a means of acquiring power for himself.<sup>74</sup> Undoubtedly, Perdikkas recognized Arrhidaios as a useful pawn, but the initiative had unexpectedly been taken from him. Encouraged by the phalanx, Meleagros had the support of its leaders, with the exception of Perdikkas' brother, Alketas.<sup>75</sup> A wave of irrationality carried Meleagros to the fore, and he acted decisively, challenging Perdikkas' supremacy with a show of arms. Perdikkas withdrew to the chamber that housed Alexander's body, supported by a mere 600 men, but Meleagros had incited the mob, who burst through the barricades and forced the Perdikkan party to quit the city.<sup>76</sup> The cavalry thus hastened from Babylon under the leadership of Leonnatos; Perdikkas remained within the city, hoping to re-assert his authority over the infantry.<sup>77</sup> He had been a phalanx commander himself, and his battalion was now led by Alketas, and he had some followers among the upper ranks of the phalanx. But Meleagros instigated his assassination, acting in the name of King Philip Arrhidaios, and Perdikkas, who foiled the attempt, now thought it wise to abandon the city and rejoin Leonnatos.<sup>78</sup>

For the moment it looked as if Meleagros had conducted a successful *coup*. But the army soon came to regard him as an opportunist and a demagogue, and they regretted having risen against the marshals of the empire; doubtless their enthusiasm for Arrhidaios waned as they recognized in him a front for

for Antipatros and Krateros in Europe; Curt. 10.7.8–9; cf. Justin 13.2.14, who has Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Krateros, and Antipatros all acting as guardians for the unborn child. See the comments of Schur 1934: 133, who sees Leonnatos as “ein wirksames Gegengewicht.”

<sup>73</sup> Curt. 10.7.1: *quidam plerisque Macedonum ignotus ex infima plebe.*

<sup>74</sup> In Curtius' version, Meleagros seems to be acting on his own when he incites the army, but the accounts of Diod. 18.2.2–3 and Justin 13.3.1–2 (both drawing on Hieronymos) suggest that Meleagros—Justin includes Attalos—was sent to the phalanx by the cavalry and that he betrayed the latter. This might be an attempt to justify Meleagros' punishment, who, according to Diod. 18.4.7, was charged with plotting against Perdikkas: ὃς ἐπιβουλὴν κατ' αὐτοῦ πεποιημένον ἔκόλασε. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 113, 125; also Wirth 1967: 291.

<sup>75</sup> Attalos son of Andromenes; Philotas the commander of *pezoi* and later satrap of Kilikia, Berve nos. 181 and 803 (= 804?).

<sup>76</sup> Curt. 10.7.14: Meleagros assumes the initiative by becoming self-appointed guardian of Arrhidaios; Curt. 10.7.16: Perdikkas withdraws with 600 followers; Curt. 10.7.17–20: the cavalry are driven from the city and encamp on the plains under the leadership of Leonnatos. This is followed closely, but in abbreviated form, by Justin 13.3.3–6; cf. Diod. 18.2.3–4.

<sup>77</sup> Curt. 10.7.21; implied by Justin 13.3.7–8.

<sup>78</sup> Curt. 10.8.1–4. Justin 13.3.7–8 mentions the assassination bid, ascribing it to Attalos, but he does not mention Perdikkas' flight from Babylon; instead Perdikkas appears to win the phalanx over with a passionate appeal and a denunciation of civil war (13.3.9–10); cf. 13.4.1: *haec cum pro singulari facundia sua Perdicca perorasset, adeo movit pedites, ut probato consilio eius dux ab omnibus legeretur.* See Wirth 1967: 291, without critical comment; but cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 125–6: “So haben wir bei Justin mit gewaltigen Kürzungen zu rechnen.”

the ambitions of Meleagros.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the cavalry now intended to force the issue, cutting off the food supply. Curtius' description of the resulting confusion among the townspeople, the deterioration of conditions in Babylon, and the prospect of starvation conjures up images of Damascus in 1917.<sup>80</sup> Morale suffered. Disillusioned with Meleagros and the pathetic Arrhidaios, the phalanx began to negotiate with the Perdikkans. Eumenes was particularly effective in reconciling the factions, and, as a Greek, he may have acted as a mediator; though it is clear from Arrian's *Events after Alexander* and what happened later that he was far from a disinterested party.<sup>81</sup> The actual liaison between factions was conducted by Pasas the Thessalian, Perilaos, and Damis the Megalopolitan.<sup>82</sup> To them Perdikkas responded that he would accept the demands of the infantry—that is, the recognition of Philip Arrhidaios—only on the condition that the phalanx surrender the authors of the discord.<sup>83</sup> That Perdikkas sought the sanction of the phalanx for the elimination of Meleagros is clear,<sup>84</sup> but Meleagros was himself actively involved in the negotiations and understandably concerned for his own well-being. By this time, Perdikkas (perhaps through the agency of Eumenes, if we may assume co-operation between the two at this early time)<sup>85</sup> had secured the goodwill of the infantry commanders,

79 For their regrets and anger at Meleagros: Curt. 10.8.5–8; for the disillusionment with Arrhidaios see Curt. 10.8.9: *et ex comparatione regis novi desiderium excitabatur amissi.* Cf. Curt. 10.7.5, where the army is said to favor Arrhidaios out of pity. Appian's description (Syr. 52 [261]) also shows that Arrhidaios' acclamation was an irrational and emotional act: *οι μὲν Μακεδόνες πόθῳ τοῦ Φιλιππείου γένους εἴλοντο σφῶν βασιλεύεντι Ἀρριδάτον, τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου, καίτερον οὐκ ἔμφρονα νομίζομενον εἶναι.*

80 Curt. 10.8.12. The description of the conditions in Babylon (*itaque inopia primum, deinde fames esse coepit*), after only one week's siege (cf. 10.10.9), may strike the reader as exaggerated, but compare T.E. Lawrence's comments on the plight of Damascus: "The destitute had been half-starved for days. A distribution of the damaged food from the Army storehouses was arranged. After that food must be provided for the general. The city might be starving in two days: there were no stocks in Damascus" (Lawrence 1935: 650).

81 Plut. *Eum.* 3.1 says that he favored the cavalry but remained impartial, arguing that, as a Greek, he should stay out of Makedonian disputes. Arr. *Succ.* 1.2 names him among the leading cavalry officers. See also Droyßen II<sup>3</sup> 8; Niese I, 94; Vezin, *Eumenes* 20–1; Anson, *Eumenes* 55; also Cloché 1959: 12.

82 Berve nos. 608, 630; Curt. 10.8.15 reads *Amissus*, which Hedicke emended to *Damyllus* in his Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1908); he is followed by Rolfe, in the Loeb, II, 542. *Amissus* is otherwise unknown (though Berve no. 53, accepts him as genuine); *Damyllus* is unattested; but *Damis* is a more common name, and a known Megalopolitan. See Berve no. 240; Heckel, *Who's Who* 102 "Damis [2]." Perhaps *Damis* has been corrupted to *Amissus* here; cf. Niese I, 245 n.3; see also Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 172; Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 199.

83 Curt. 10.8.15.

84 Niese I, 194 n.2: "die Auslieferung der Empörer, also auch des Meleagros."

85 Droyßen II<sup>3</sup> 8: "Er [sc. Eumenes] begann mit dem und jenem von den Führern anzuknüpfen und zum Frieden zu reden," by which he certainly means the phalanx commanders, since the hipparchs had abandoned the city. Cf. Cloché 1959: 12: Eumenes shared Perdikkas' loyalty to the Royal House. See also Anson, *Heirs* 20: "subsequent evidence would suggest that he was likely acting as an agent for Perdiccas . . ." (cf. Anson, *Eumenes* 55).

most notably Attalos son of Andromenes.<sup>86</sup> Their own distrust of Meleagros' ambitions will have played no small part in their defection to the Perdikkans. But Meleagros, sensing their opposition, indicated a willingness to relinquish his control over Arrhidaios to the more popular and respected Krateros, who was designated *prostasis* of Arrhidaios' kingdom,<sup>87</sup> although he demanded to be accepted as *tertius dux*.<sup>88</sup>

For the moment, Perdikkas was willing to concede: there was no difficulty in accepting Arrhidaios, who would easily be manipulated. As for Krateros, his absence would give Perdikkas sufficient time to secure his own position. More troublesome was the presence of Meleagros, now Perdikkas' lieutenant (*hyparchos*).<sup>89</sup> It is no accident that the final settlement at Babylon resembled in no way the conditions of the compromise; for Perdikkas had no intention of acceding to the wishes of the phalanx, beyond the recognition of Arrhidaios.<sup>90</sup> He would indeed be king, but Perdikkas meant to rule through him. The decisive act would be the elimination of Meleagros, and in this matter he must have the support of the infantry. Meleagros had been a bitter enemy in the days that preceded the reconciliation, and he continued to be a threat; it is not unlikely that Perdikkas encouraged rumors that Meleagros was plotting against him.<sup>91</sup> Careful to attach a show of legality to Meleagros' elimination, he called for a lustration of the army in the name of Philip Arrhidaios and on the pretext of punishing the seditious.<sup>92</sup> With the King and the army firmly in his grip, Perdikkas crushed the ringleaders of the uprising;<sup>93</sup> the phalanx leaders acquiesced in the liquidation of Meleagros; the army, thunderstruck by the show of power and, to an extent, satisfied with the recognition of Philip Arrhidaios, accepted Meleagros'

86 For details see Heckel 1978c.

87 Schubert, *Quellen* 139–49, traces the accounts of Krateros' overwhelming popularity to Douris. Arrian's account of Krateros' death is certainly from Douris (*Succ.* 1.27; fr. 26 = *Suda* s.v. Κράτερος), and the mention of the *prostasia* (which is echoed by Justin 13.4.5: *regiae pecuniae custodia Cratero traditur*) may also derive from Douris; see Schwahn 1930: 229–30; also 235: “Auffällig ist bei Justin die vielfache Übereinstimmung mit Arrian . . . Sie sind allein durch eine gemeinsame Quelle zu erklären; diese kann nur der vielgelesene und oft zitierte Duris sein, auf den Arrian direkt . . . zurückgeht.” There is, however, no good reason for rejecting Arrian's evidence: the *prostasia* was earmarked for Krateros as part of the compromise but withdrawn in the final settlement, when Perdikkas took the office for himself (Anson 1992).

88 Curt. 10.8.22; Justin 13.4.5; Arr. *Succ.* 13. Support for Meleagros among the infantrymen was clearly based on the belief that he represented the interests of Krateros (cf. Anson, *Heirs* 21).

89 Arr. *Succ.* 1.3.

90 Cf. Errington 1970: 56; Anson, *Heirs* 21.

91 Curt. 10.9.7: *Perdicca unicam spem salutis suae in Meleagri morte reponebat*. Anson, *Heirs* 21, considers this statement “an exaggeration,” but it is clear that, as long as Meleagros lived and acted as *hyparchos* (in effect, Krateros' agent at the court), Perdikkas could not pursue his ambitions. For rumors of Meleagros' plotting: Diod. 18.4.7; cf. Curt. 10.9.8 ff. For the system of checks and balances see also Heckel 2002a.

92 Curt. 10.9.11 ff.; Justin 13.4.7; cf. Diod. 18.4.7.

93 The pun is irresistible: the leaders of the sedition were trampled by elephants: Curt. 10.9.18.

death as necessary for the welfare of the state: *nam et insociabile est regnum.*<sup>94</sup> Perdikkas had taken the first step in recouping his losses. Power was now once again securely in his hands.

### From chiliarch to regent

In the name of the King, though doubtless in consultation with the marshals, Perdikkas allotted the satrapies.<sup>95</sup> The most important regions went, not surprisingly, to the most powerful of Perdikkas' supporters. But there was another consideration: Perdikkas found it desirable to remove from Babylon those officers with the greatest influence. It proved to be a futile exercise; for, while Perdikkas worked to establish a strong central government, the new satraps made use of their regional resources to plot a course of separatism—few more vigorously than Ptolemy in Egypt.<sup>96</sup>

At the Court, Perdikkas retained those men whom he felt he could trust: his brother Alketas, Attalos son of Andromenes, to whom he had betrothed his sister Atalante, Seleukos son of Antiochos, whom he now advanced to the command of Hephaistion's chiliarchy, and Aristonous, the only *somatophylax* not awarded a satrapy. Nor had he forgotten Roxane, whose child (if male) was to be recognized as *symbasileus* with Arrhidaios.<sup>97</sup> Allegedly in Roxane's interests, he arranged the murder of the Achaemenid Stateira and her sister Drypetis (Plut. *Alex.* 77.6). Plutarch depicts it as an act of jealousy, but Roxane was educated in the ways of court intrigue and she meant to secure her own position and that of her unborn child: as long as Perdikkas chose to pursue Alexander's policies of unity and fusion, she could not allow Stateira or her sister to remain as potential rivals.<sup>98</sup> That Perdikkas acted as her accomplice in this affair suggests,

94 Curt. 10.9.1. For Meleagros' end see Curt. 10.9.20–1; Arr. *Succ.* 1.4–5; Justin 13.4.7–8 does not mention Meleagros' death, but it is clear that his description of Perdikkas' acting *ignaro collega* suggests that Meleagros' elimination was part and parcel of the lustration of the army. Diod. 18.4.7 places his death after the allotment of the satrapies and the cancellation of Krateros' orders, surely an error.

95 Diod. 18.3.1–3; Justin 13.4.10–23; Curt. 10.10.1–4; Arr. *Succ.* 1.5–7; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §2–7. See also Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 142, 144.

96 Ptolemy appears from the outset to have favored a wide distribution of power, a policy that would lead inevitably to the disintegration of the empire; cf. Curt. 10.6.15; Justin 13.2.12 (cf. Ellis, *Ptolemy* 33: “he seems to have been the first of the Successors to have realized that the future lay with the development of smaller kingdoms”). Meeus 2014b, after a thorough review of the evidence, concludes “that it is much more likely that Ptolemy was not a separatist and that he coveted the entire territory Alexander had conquered” (306); see also Strootman 2014. Paus. 1.6.2 portrays Ptolemy as the instigator of the division of the satrapies, which suits both Ptolemy's character and his policies as satrap; cf. Droysen's appraisal (II<sup>3</sup> 13). See also Wirth 1967: 316 ff., and Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 38, based on a rigid analysis of the sources.

97 Badian 1964: 264 suggests that it was intended that Arrhidaios rule until Alexander IV came of age; cf. Fontana 1960: 124–7; Schwahn 1931: 313; Rosen 1967: 99.

98 For Drypetis and Stateira see Berve nos. 290, 722; Heckel, *Who's Who* 116 “Drypetis”; 256–7 “Stateira [2].” The time of the incident is fixed by the fact that Roxane had not yet given birth;

however, that he had not considered the Achaemenid women as political tools, probably because he had already pinned his hopes on the effective manipulation of Arrhidaios. Roxane's child might prove useful—chiefly because of his paternity—and Perdikkas meant to keep him firmly in his control. But, like Roxane, he was content to eliminate any potential rivals, or persons whom contenders for the throne might exploit in the future.

Perdikkas' career is an unfortunate tale of lofty ideals combined with excessive ambition and political myopia. He showed a determination to keep the empire intact, and for this idealism—though it was motivated by a quest for personal glory—he is to be admired. Yet his own ambitions blinded him to the political reality and he failed largely through his mismanagement of vital issues. He had recovered his position as the guiding force in Babylon, but only by compromising his ideals; had Alexander's son been acceptable to the Makedonians, he might have ruled as Roxane's husband, as the “King’s” adoptive father. He had reasserted his power by wresting from Meleagros control of Arrhidaios, only to incur the suspicion of his colleagues (Arr. *Succ.* 1.5). These men he attempted to appease by means of the satrapal allotments, in part a concession, but also a plan to remove any threat from the Court.<sup>99</sup> Here too he undermined his cause, for the division of the satrapies led only to the disintegration of the empire; Alexander had been careful to keep the provinces in the hands of lesser men.<sup>100</sup> For the time, at least, Perdikkas will have been happy to see the departure of the generals from Babylon. He now turned his attention to the consolidation of his own position.

As a last act of the Makedonian assembly before the dispersal to the satrapies, Perdikkas freed himself of the burden of Alexander's plans, as they were set out in the *Hypomnemata*.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, he called the army together in order to cancel, with a show of legality, Alexander's instructions. This had a two-fold purpose: firstly, it freed Perdikkas of any possible future charge of having failed to carry out Alexander's final instructions and, secondly (what is more important), it cancelled Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros as regent of Makedonia, orders that,

she was seven months pregnant at the time of Alexander's death (see Hamilton, *PA* 216). According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 77.6), who attributes the act solely to Roxane's jealousy, Stateira and Drypetis were summoned by means of a forged letter (ἔξηπάτησεν αὐτὴν ἐπιστολὴ τίνι πεπλασμένῃ παραγενέσθαι), whereafter they were murdered and their bodies thrown into a well and covered over (see also Briant, *Darius* 325–31 for the traditional view of Persian princesses). Cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 22 n.33. There is no mention of the fate of Parysatis, Alexander's other royal bride. For a full discussion of Alexander's widows see Harders 2014. For the last Achaemenids see Stemma XI.

99 See Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 28.

100 Badian 1961: 24: “It is worth noting that, having dealt with his excessively formidable subordinates, the king took care to see that their places were taken by unimportant men.”

101 For the authenticity of the *Hypomnemata* and the plans contained therein see Badian 1967b: 183 ff., against Tarn II, 378–98, who believes they are a late forgery. See also Schachermeyr 1954, with pertinent bibliography, 118–9, who argues that the plans are genuine; against this view Hampel 1953.

according to Diodorus (18.4.1), were recorded in the *Hypomnemata*.<sup>102</sup> Again there is a strong indication that Eumenes had already allied himself with Perdikkas, for it was Eumenes, as Royal Secretary, who had prepared the *Hypomnemata*, and he may well have revealed to Perdikkas the possibility of negating Krateros' instructions by asking the army to reject the "future plans" as a whole; certainly the army was openly opposed to these extravagances.<sup>103</sup> Thus, in one vote, the army set aside the grandiose plans for further conquest, extravagant buildings, and Hephaestion's pyre,<sup>104</sup> and, with these, Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros (Diod. 18.4.6). Perdikkas was now ready to seek an alliance with the ruler of Makedonia.

### The attempt to gain greater power

Having robbed Krateros of his legal designation as Antipatros' successor, Perdikkas now gave his attention to securing the goodwill and support of the old Regent. These negotiations are not recorded in their historical context, but Diodorus gives us an insight into the circumstances surrounding Antipatros' betrothal of his daughter Nikaia to Perdikkas. He writes:

Perdiccas had formerly planned to work in harmony with Antipater, and for this reason he had pressed his suit when his position was not yet firmly established; but when he had gained control of the royal armies and the guardianship of the Kings, he changed his calculations.<sup>105</sup>

From this passage it is quite clear that Perdikkas entered into negotiations with Antipatros when his own position was not yet secure, before he had taken control of the "Royal Armies and the guardianship (*prostasia*) of the Kings." Now the reference to the "Royal Armies" cannot be accurate, for it is certain that Perdikkas commanded them from the start by virtue of his

<sup>102</sup> So Badian 1967b: 201–4. This negation of Krateros' power suggests that from the beginning Perdikkas had either decided to march on Makedonia or hoped to keep Makedonia and Greece, as Alexander had done, as an annex of the empire under Antipatros as *strategos*.

<sup>103</sup> For Eumenes' role see also Badian 1967b: 204.

<sup>104</sup> That is, the funeral monument to Hephaestion. For the confusion of Hephaestion's tomb with the actual pyre see Palagia 2000: 169. The pyre had been built and set alight in Babylon before Alexander's own death. See also Chapter 7.

<sup>105</sup> Diod. 18.23.2: ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας πρότερον μὲν ἦν κεκρικὸς κονοπραγίαν Ἀντιπάτρῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μνηστείαν ἐπεποίητο μήπω τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν πραγμάτων βεβαίως ἐστερεωμέον· ὡς δὲ παρέλαβε τάς τε βασιλικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν, μετέπειτε τοῖς λογισμοῖς. English translation by R.M. Geer. The story that Perdikkas entered the lair of a lioness and emerged with her cubs has been seen as Perdikkas' claim to have dealt with lions (just as Krateros and Lysimachos boasted of their lion hunts), but I believe that the story is an allegory for Perdikkas' taking possession of the regal "cubs," Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV (Ael. VH 12.39). Carney 2002: 65 = *King and Court* 271: "Simply to compete, Perdiccas had to invent a story about stealing a lion cub . . .".

*chiliarchia*.<sup>106</sup> But the *prostasia* may well—and very likely does—refer to the time of the birth of Alexander IV, Roxane's son; for Diodorus speaks of the *prostasia* of the Kings (τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν), not just of Arrhidaios, with whom alone the enigmatic *prostasia* of Krateros is linked. At that point in time Perdikkas was formidable: he was *epimeletes* for Philip Arrhidaios, *prostatae* (or guardian) for Alexander IV, and *strategos* of the imperial forces in Asia.<sup>107</sup> But Krateros' position had become weak indeed.<sup>108</sup> Before the birth of Alexander's son, however, Perdikkas had isolated Krateros in Kilikia and was himself in a precarious state, having incurred the suspicion of the Makedonians in Babylon through his treacherous elimination of Meleagros (Arr. *Succ.* 1.5). But Antipatros too was prepared to deal: there was the matter of the Lamian War, and he wanted Krateros in Europe. Thus he recognized Perdikkas' claim to a share of the supremacy in Asia and bound him to a political alliance by promising his daughter Nikaia. In return Perdikkas acknowledged Antipatros' sole authority in Europe.

Perdikkas' negotiations with Antipatros must belong, therefore, to the period of instability at Babylon. One of those who brought Nikaia to Perdikkas in the following year was Iolaos, the girl's brother, who had been present at Alexander's death.<sup>109</sup> It is quite possible that Perdikkas, after the allotment of the satrapies and the cancellation of Krateros' orders, sent Iolaos to his father to report the developments in Babylon and to convey his wish for a marriage alliance.

Now there were additional problems in the empire. The Upper Satrapies, where Alexander had settled the Greek mercenaries, were in a state of revolt, a direct consequence of Alexander's death.<sup>110</sup> Accordingly, Perdikkas sent out Peithon, formerly one of the *somatophylakes*, who had been allotted Media and now showed the first signs of seditious intent. His army, augmented by contributions from the other satraps (in accordance with Perdikkas' instructions), overcame the Greek force partly by deceit.<sup>111</sup> Whether the ensuing slaughter of

<sup>106</sup> Curt. 10.10.4; Justin 13.4.5; Diod. 18.3.1 (παραλαβὼν τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἡγεμονίαν). As chief commander he conducted the lustration of the army: Justin 13.4.7 ff.; Arr. *Succ.* 1.4; Curt. 10.9.11 ff. Anson, *Heirs* 42 claims that Diod. 18.23.2 "clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached."

<sup>107</sup> Völcker-Janssen 1993: 119 n.9.

<sup>108</sup> See Errington 1970: 61; cf. Schur 1934: 144 ff.

<sup>109</sup> See Berve no. 386; Heckel, *Who's Who* 143 "Iolaus [1]"; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21 has the form Iollas, for which see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 207–8.

<sup>110</sup> Diod. 18.4.8; 18.7.1: ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπέμενον διὰ τὸ φόβον, τελευτήσαντος δὲ ἀπέστησαν. Tarn's attempt (*CAH VI*, 455–6) to link the disturbances in the east with the Lamian War can be no more than speculation. See also Walsh 2009 on the chronology of events and Diodorus' methodology. The rebels, who numbered 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse, were led by Philon the Ainianian (Diod. 18.7.2; cf. Berve no. 798). See also Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.67; Niese I, 199–200; Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 24–6; Kaerst II<sup>2</sup> 12–3.

<sup>111</sup> Diod. 18.7.3. Perdikkas gave Peithon 3,800 troops and sent instructions to the eastern satraps to supply a further 10,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. Peithon persuaded a certain Letodoros to desert, thereby throwing the Greeks into confusion (Diod. 18.7.5–7). See Berve no. 473; Heckel, *Who's Who* 151 "Letodoros"; see also Berve no. 621; Heckel, *Who's Who* 195–6 "Peithon [1]."

the Greeks who had surrendered was indeed ordered by Perdikkas at the outset of the campaign is difficult to determine.<sup>112</sup> In view of Perdikkas' growing dependence on Eumenes, the annihilation of the Greek force was scarcely good politics. It is possible, however, that Peithon's troops got out of control and that the blame for the slaughter devolved upon Perdikkas.<sup>113</sup>

In the west, Antigonos and Leonnatos had been instructed to aid Eumenes in conquering his satrapy of Kappadokia, which had been bypassed by Alexander.<sup>114</sup> Antigonos, hostile and suspicious from the start, defected from the Perdikkan cause and refused aid to Eumenes. Leonnatos, on the other hand, bolstered his army over the winter of 323/2 and joined Eumenes in the spring.<sup>115</sup> At that point, however, Hekataios, tyrant of Kardia, arrived with an urgent appeal from Antipatros, asking Leonnatos to come with all haste to Europe; for he was besieged in Lamia by the Hellenic forces under Leosthenes.<sup>116</sup> Leonnatos seized the opportunity to fulfill his own aspirations. He had already communicated with Olympias, the unyielding foe of Antipatros, and had received an offer of marriage from her daughter Kleopatra, Alexander's sister.<sup>117</sup> So much he confided to Eumenes, with whose support he hoped to gain the throne. But Eumenes, whether wary of Leonnatos' impetuosity or sincerely devoted to the Perdikkan cause, rejected the appeal on the ground that he feared that Antipatros would betray him to his archenemy Hekataios.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, he slipped away

<sup>112</sup> Diod. 18.7.5, 8–9. See also Cloché 1959: 19–20. Holt, *Land of Bones* 117 rightly questions the wholesale massacre: "Surely these veterans were not all annihilated, since it remained necessary for someone to garrison the region."

<sup>113</sup> Holt, *Bactria* 90 suggests that the source (Hieronymos) was hostile to Peithon (cf. Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 54: "Folglich ist insgesamt davon auszugehen, dass die Diodor zugrundeliegende Quelle eindeutig perdikkasfeindlich ausgerichtet war"). This is likely to be true, but the slaughter of the Greek mercenaries was carried out, allegedly, on Perdikkas' orders. In truth, the soldiers were motivated by the prospect of plunder (according to Diod. 18.7.5, Perdikkas' instructions were: ἄπαντας ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὰ λάφυρα διαδοῦναι τοῖς στρατιώταις. Cf. 18.7.9: ἄπαντας κατηκόντισαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα δύντασαν).

<sup>114</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.4. Ariarathes maintained his independence in Kappadokia during Alexander's lifetime (Diod. 18.16.1). See Berve no. 113; Heckel, *Who's Who* 44; Vezin, *Eumenes* 26 ff.; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 146 ff.; Anson, *Eumenes* 77–81. What happened to Sabikta, whom Alexander installed as satrap of Kappadokia (Arr. 3.4.2, with Bosworth I, 189; Berve II, 348 no. 690; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 59 n.2; Justi 269; Heckel, *Who's Who* 243), is unknown. See also Anson 1990; Hammond 1996a.

<sup>115</sup> For Antigonos' refusal to give aid see Plut. *Eum.* 3.5; for Leonnatos' dealings with Eumenes, Plut. *Eum.* 3.5 ff.

<sup>116</sup> Hekataios' appeal: Diod. 18.14.4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 3.6. See Berve no. 294; Heckel, *Who's Who* 131 "Hecataeus [2]."

<sup>117</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.9; cf. Macurdy, *HQ* 30 ff.; Seibert, *Verbindungen* 20.

<sup>118</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.8. If this was in fact the reason given by Eumenes to Leonnatos, it is surprising that Leonnatos did not offer him support against Hekataios in order to win his help against Antipatros. The knowledge of Leonnatos' dealings with Kleopatra can only have come down to us through Eumenes himself (via Hieronymos); Diodorus, however, says nothing of this, adding further fuel to the opinion of a minority of scholars that his source was Douris and not Hieronymos.

from Leonnatos' camp during the night, leaving Leonnatos to take his chances in Europe.<sup>119</sup>

The episode had great significance for Perdikkas, for it was surely through Eumenes that he first came to regard Kleopatra as a means of gaining supreme power. Eumenes, deserted by Antigonos and Leonnatos, appealed to Perdikkas for help and divulged the details of Leonnatos' intrigues. For the moment, there was nothing to be done about him; but events in Greece brought the matter to a speedy conclusion. Perdikkas moved to join Eumenes for an invasion of Kappadokia. It was the late spring or early summer of 322.<sup>120</sup>

The Kappadokian campaign gave Perdikkas an opportunity to gain prestige: he would complete the conquest of Alexander's Empire<sup>121</sup> and punish Ariarathes for his refusal to submit. As he moved westward, Krateros now also abandoned Kilikia in answer to Antipatros' call; whether the two actions were in fact related cannot be determined.<sup>122</sup> In Kappadokia, Perdikkas made short work of Ariarathes, whom he defeated in two decisive engagements.<sup>123</sup> In a single campaigning season, he had extended the boundaries of Alexander's Empire and taken a barbarian king captive. But the victory was tarnished by his cruel treatment of Ariarathes, who was impaled along with his relatives.<sup>124</sup> Thereafter, he instructed Eumenes to settle affairs in Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemos,<sup>125</sup> while he himself directed his attention to Pisidia.<sup>126</sup>

119 Plut. *Eum.* 3.10; cf. Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4–5, who claims that Leonnatos planned to kill Eumenes when he failed to win his support.

120 Not long after Leonnatos' departure for Greece; cf. Anson 1986: 214, who dates the campaign to "August or September 322" or, perhaps, late July/August (thus Anson, *Eumenes* 73 n.91 and *Heirs* 79 n.3), depending on march-rates.

121 Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 55, rightly speaks of "Eroberungslücken" in Alexander's campaign.

122 Diod. 18.16.4. Errington 1970: 61: "It is therefore difficult to believe that Perdikkas' approach to Cilicia on his way against Ariarathes in Cappadocia was not the final stimulus which drove Krateros into supporting Antipater." Cf. Schwahn 1931: 331–2; Badian 1961: 41.

123 Arr. *Succ.* 1.11 (δύστιν κυρίσας μάχαις); Diod. 18.16.1–3 gives Ariarathes 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry; cf. 18.22.1; App. *Mithr.* 8 = Hieronymos, *FGrH* 154 F3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.11; Justin 13.6.1–3, who conflates the Kappadokian and Pisidian campaigns; Diod. 18.16.2 says that 4,000 of Ariarathes' men were killed, more than 5,000 captured. Cf. [Lucian], *Macrob.* 13 = *FGrH* 154 F4; and Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 239–43.

124 See Cary 1951: 11. Arr. *Succ.* 1.11; Plut. *Eum.* 3.13 says only that he was captured; Vezin, *Eumenes* 29. Diod. 31, frag. 19.3–5, from a different source, says Ariarathes fell in battle. The cruel treatment of his relatives (Diod. 18.16.3) contributes to a negative portrayal of Perdikkas (cf. Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 56). Perdikkas was clearly anxious to eradicate the ruling family. Nevertheless, a homonymous nephew of Ariarathes survived to regain power around 301/0 (Diod. 31.19.3–5; McGing, *OCD*<sup>3</sup> 156; Niese, RE II, 816 no. 2).

125 Plut. *Eum.* 4.1. Perhaps Perdikkas was already distrustful of Neoptolemos; cf. Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 58. For Neoptolemos' career see Berve II, 273, no. 548; id., RE XVI (1935) 2464 no. 7; Heckel, *Who's Who* 174–5 "Neoptolemus [2]."

126 Diod. 18.22.1. Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 57 places this campaign in the summer of 322, immediately after the Kappadokian affair, and regards it as a move on Perdikkas' part towards Antigonos, who had been guilty of insubordination. Errington 1970: 77, more plausibly, dates the Pisidian campaign to 321; but cf. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 216 ff.

Here the Isaurians and Larandians had risen against and killed Alexander's satrap Balakros son of Nikanor.<sup>127</sup> These cities Perdikkas took without great difficulty, and they proved a source of plunder for his men. Victorious in the field and offering lucrative rewards to his soldiers, Perdikkas now enjoyed his greatest success.<sup>128</sup>

### Perdikkas, Nikaia, and Kleopatra

It was at this time that Antipatros' daughter Nikaia was brought to Asia by Iolaos and Archias.<sup>129</sup> But Perdikkas, who had found a marriage alliance with Antipatros' family desirable in 323, now had second thoughts. To make matters worse, Kleopatra, Alexander's sister, was now in Sardis, having been sent out (no doubt) at the instigation of Olympias.<sup>130</sup> Eumenes may have had a hand in the affair: Leonnatos had opened his eyes to Kleopatra's potential, and Eumenes, who urged Perdikkas to marry her in place of Nikaia, may have corresponded with the scheming Olympias, encouraging her to send out her daughter.<sup>131</sup>

Kleopatra would tempt Perdikkas to ruin. Already he had begun to formulate a new policy, one that he hoped would win for him the throne. With the Kings securely in his possession and the army favorably disposed towards him on account of his recent successes in Kappadokia and Pisidia, Perdikkas was prepared to take two final steps to the kingship: union with Kleopatra and the ceremonious return of Alexander's body to Makedonia. What army would oppose the man returning to Makedonia with the son of Philip II, the wife, son, and sister—indeed, the very body—of Alexander himself?<sup>132</sup>

But it was Perdikkas' fate that things should go drastically wrong at the critical moment: he was not destined to rule. The almost contemporaneous arrivals of Nikaia and Kleopatra proved to be an embarrassment. In fact, Nikaia's very presence was an indication of changing events: the Makedonians had been

<sup>127</sup> Diod. 18.22.1. This occurred shortly before Alexander's death; cf. Berve II, 100; Julien 1914: 20; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 45, 65, 69. Berve no. 200; Heckel, *Who's Who* 68–9 “Balacrus [2]”; he had been one of the *somatophylakes* of Alexander.

<sup>128</sup> Laranda was taken without difficulty (Diod. 18.22.2), though Isaura held out for three days (18.22.4). For the self-immolation of the Isaurians see Diod. 18.22.4–5; Justin 13.6.2–3. For the booty see Diod. 18.22.8, disagreeing with Justin 13.6.1: *victor nihil praemii praeter vulnera et pericula rettulit*.

<sup>129</sup> Diod. 18.23.1; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21; Justin 13.6.4–6. Iolaos had perhaps been sent to Makedonia for the purpose of bringing Nikaia to Asia. The identity of Archias is uncertain.

<sup>130</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.21: ἀλλά γέ καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς ἡ Ἀλεξάνδρου μῆτηρ ἔπειπε παρ' αὐτὸν κατεγγυωμένη τὴν θυγατέρα Κλεοπάτραν. Cf. Justin 13.6.4.

<sup>131</sup> On the basis of Arr. *Succ.* 1.21, the initiative is always given to Olympias, acting out of hatred towards Antipatros. See Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 123–8, and *Olympias* 65–7.

<sup>132</sup> For the importance of Kleopatra, see Anson, *Eumenes* 86: “The other faction, headed by Eumenes . . . , wished to make Perdiccas master of Alexander's entire empire: a marriage to Cleopatra would lay the groundwork for Perdiccas eventually to move from regent to king in his own right.” At this time Arrhidaios (Berve no. 145; Heckel, *Who's Who* 53 “Arrhidaeus [2]”) was still preparing the funeral wagon with the intention of taking the body to Egypt. See details below.

victorious in the Lamian War, Antipatros' power restored. And he meant to achieve stability by wedding Phila to Krateros, Nikaia to Perdikkas.<sup>133</sup> By rejecting Nikaia now, Perdikkas would certainly invite civil war.<sup>134</sup> But there was also the matter of the rebellious Antigonos, satrap of Phrygia and friend of Antipatros.<sup>135</sup> What Perdikkas needed was time enough to settle affairs in Asia to his satisfaction.<sup>136</sup>

Against Antigonos he resorted to tactics similar to those employed with great success against Meleagros, hoping to remove him under the guise of legality.<sup>137</sup> But Antigonos, who knew well the designs of Perdikkas, made no attempt to clear himself of the charges brought against him—for clearly he was guilty of insubordination in the Kappadokian affair—and fled from his satrapy.<sup>138</sup> He had seen enough of Perdikkas' dealings with the Makedonian women to know that the marriage to Nikaia was a sham, intended to keep Antipatros satisfied for the time. Whatever Antigonos suspected about Perdikkas' designs he presented to Antipatros and Krateros as fact, and he spiced the information with a highly dramatized account of the fate of Kynnane, about which he had learned before his departure for Europe.<sup>139</sup>

Kynnane indeed represented the unexpected, but Perdikkas lost control of affairs when he failed to act decisively on the matter of Nikaia and Kleopatra. After a brief hesitation, which could not have failed to attract attention, he married Nikaia, hoping to forestall a confrontation with Antipatros.<sup>140</sup> As for Antigonos,

133 It does not follow, however, as Errington 1970: 61–2 wishes to conclude, that “by being brought into a family connection with Antipater (and indirectly with Craterus) Perdiccas might peacefully be made to accept a more equitable arrangement (in Asia) for Craterus.” Cohen 1973: 355 is rightly skeptical of the power of such alliances; cf. Heckel 1986b: 294: “political marriages appear to have served interests of the bridegrooms more often than those of their fathers-in-law.”

134 Diod. 18.23.3; the sentiment at least is expressed by Justin 13.6.5; see also Macurdy, *HQ* 37–8; Vezin, *Eumenes* 39; cf. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1. 83.

135 For Antigonos see Berve no. 87; cf. Kaerst, *RE I* (1894) 2406 no. 3; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*; Billows, *Antigonos*; Heckel, *Who's Who* 32–4 “Antigonos [1].”

136 To this time belongs the restoration of the Samian exiles, a matter referred by Antipatros to the Kings and carried out by Perdikkas in the name of Philip Arrhidaios; Diod. 18.18.6, 9. Perhaps Perdikkas received news of this from Iolaos and Archias, when they brought out Nikaia. See also Habicht 1957: 152 ff.; Habicht 1974; Errington 1975b; Badian 1976b.

137 Diod. 18.23.3–4. As Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 57, notes, the charges against Antigonos are not specified, and Diodorus calls them διαβολάς ψευδεῖς καὶ κατηγορίας ἀδίκους (“false slanders and unjust accusations”), which certainly reflects a pro-Antigonid source. Even if we allow for the bias of the source(s), there must have been charges (real or fabricated), over and above that of insubordination, brought against him in order to strengthen Perdikkas’ case. Antigonos was to use similar tactics later against Seleukos.

138 Diod. 18.23.4; 18.25.3; Justin 13.6.7–9; Arr. *Succ.* 1.24.

139 For Perdikkas’ designs see Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 59: “seine Absicht war, den Satrapen von Phrygien, dem aus dem fernen Aegypten nicht so bald Hilfe kommen konnte, zu überrennen, sich dann durch Vermählung mit Kleopatra offen als Gegner der Antipatros zu erklären . . .” See Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 145 ff., esp. 153 ff. For Antigonos’ dramatization of the Kynnane episode see Arr. *Succ.* 1.24 (ἐκτραγῳδῆσας).

140 Justin 13.6.6; Diod. 18.23.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21 says that Eumenes urged him to marry Kleopatra, Alketas advocated Nikaia; Perdikkas chose Nikaia for the time.

it proved difficult to mete out punishment, which he clearly deserved, without earning the suspicion and resentment of the other satraps; on this matter the fate of Meleagros had proved instructive.

The year 322/1 witnessed an exodus of prominent Makedonian ladies from their homeland to the vicinity of Perdikkas and the Royal Army. Atalante, Perdikkas' sister, we may assume was the first, perhaps joining her brother and her intended husband, Attalos, in Pisidia.<sup>141</sup> Then Nikaia's departure was followed closely by that of Kleopatra.<sup>142</sup> Nor did the plans of Antipatros and Olympias go unnoticed by another Makedonian princess, the daughter of Philip II and the Illyrian Audata-Eurydike, Kynnane, a woman of indomitable spirit.<sup>143</sup> She had been married by her father to the innocuous Amyntas Perdikka, rightful heir to the Makedonian throne; but he had lived like an exile in his own land, deprived of his title and bound to allegiance by Kynnane, who proved more than his match in character and deed. After Philip's death, Amyntas was executed on charges of conspiracy; perhaps he had been incited by Kynnane, who, though loyal to her father, will have preferred that her husband rule in place of her half-brother Alexander (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.22). Now, over the winter of 322/1, as she saw Antipatros and Olympias intriguing with Perdikkas, Kynnane was determined to exert her influence and secure for herself and for her daughter Adea a share of the power.

Once more Philip Arrhidaios proved to be Perdikkas' undoing. Kynnane saw the futility of vying for a union with Perdikkas: Antipatros could offer political advantages, and Kleopatra had more prestige than her half-sister.<sup>144</sup> Therefore, she resolved to bypass the negotiating parties and to subvert their plans by wedding her daughter Adea to Arrhidaios. Antipatros was not eager to see Kynnane leave Makedonia—doubtless he was already troubled by the recent departure of Kleopatra—and he left a force to turn her back at the Strymon. But the

141 For the marriage of Attalos and Atalante see Heckel 1978c.

142 For Nikaia and Kleopatra see Berve no. 552 (cf. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.127) and no. 433. For Perdikkas' dealings with these women see Macurdy, *HQ* 37–8; Cloché 1959: 51–3; Seibert, *Verbindungen* 13–6 and 19ff.; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 174–5; Errington 1970: 63 ff., who accepts the date given by the *Babylonian Chronicle* for Perdikkas' death (320) and postpones Nikaia's arrival in Asia to the summer of 321.

143 Droysen's description is worth quoting: "Sie hatte das wilde illyrische Blut ihrer Mutter; sie zog mit in die Kriege; Abenteuer und Kriegsfahrten waren ihre Lust, und mehr als einmal nahm sie am Kampf persönlich teil; in einem Kriege gegen die Illyrer erschlug sie mit eigener Hand deren Königin und trug durch ihr wildes Eindringen in die Feinde nicht wenig zur Entscheidung des Tages" (II<sup>3</sup> 60). Despite the inherent improbability of a duel between the princess and an Illyrian in the course of one of Philip II's battles (see Heckel 2013b: 53 n.7), the story is universally accepted. The assertion that the Illyrian queen's name was Kairia (Mayor 2014: 269) is based on a mistranslation of Polyaenus (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: II, 839). See Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.60, s.v. Κύννα (emended by Wesseling; the MSS reading is Κυνάνη). Cf. also Heckel 1983–4; Carney 1988: 392–4 and *Women and Monarchy* 129–32.

144 Like Alexander, Kleopatra was the child of both Philip and Olympias. There is no indication that any of the leading men in Asia considered marrying Kynnane, who at this time was about 37 years old. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 100–1 "Cynnane."

warrior princess had surrounded herself with a small but efficient mercenary force with which she broke through Antipatros' guard. When the word of her coming reached Perdikkas, he sent Alketas with orders to dissuade her, by force if necessary. Kynnane was not one to be dissuaded; defiant, she was cut down by Alketas' men in full view of the Makedonian army. Surely this was not how Perdikkas had envisioned Alketas' mission.<sup>145</sup> The army mutinied and demanded that Kynnane's purpose be fulfilled, that Adeia be taken to Arrhidaios.<sup>146</sup> What support Perdikkas had gained in the past year was quickly eroding. His officers grew increasingly suspicious of his aspirations, the common soldier was alienated by his acts of barbarity.<sup>147</sup>

### The coalition against Perdikkas

Things began to deteriorate rapidly. Antigonos sought refuge with Antipatros and Krateros, warning them of Perdikkas' intention to march on Makedonia.<sup>148</sup> Ptolemy, who had long feared Perdikkan intervention in Egypt, made an alliance with the *strategoi* in Europe, who now abandoned their Aitolian war in mid-winter 321/0 and prepared to cross into Asia. Polyperchon held Europe.<sup>149</sup>

Perdikkas, meanwhile, abandoned Nikaia and openly courted Kleopatra, sending Eumenes with gifts to Sardis, where she had taken up residence.<sup>150</sup>

145 It is generally held that Perdikkas instigated Kynnane's murder: so Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 61; Niese I, 214; Vezin, *Eumenes* 36; Cloché 1959: 55. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.83 has her murdered by Perdikkas himself; Mayor 2014: 68 claims she "died in 323 BC [sic] in battle against Alexander's successors" (cf. Pomeroy 1984: 6); Welles 1970: 53, thinks Perdikkas was incited by Kleopatra. I prefer Macurdy's suggestion (*HQ* 50) that "Perdiccas saw the fatal stupidity of his brother's act . . . ."

146 Kynnane: Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.60; Arr. *Succ.* 1.22–4; cf. Heckel 1983–4.

147 Meleagros, the Greek mercenaries, Ariarathes, now Kynnane.

148 Diod. 18.23.4, 25.3–4; Justin 13.6.7–9; Arr. *Succ.* 1.24. Cf. Vezin, *Eumenes* 37; Kaerst II<sup>2</sup> 21, for Perdikkas' intention to march on Makedonia.

149 Ptolemy's fear of Perdikkas' designs: Diod. 18.14.2, 25.4. Abandonment of the Aitolian war: Diod. 18.25.5; Justin 13.6.9. Polyperchon: Justin 13.6.9.

150 Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; Eumenes' visit to Kleopatra follows Polemon's attempt to retrieve Alexander's body (1.25), but the phrase ἐν τούτῳ shows the events were contemporaneous. Perdikkas was still hoping to recover the body and to march on Makedonia with both the funeral car and Kleopatra. See Engel 1972a. Erskine 2002: 171 states that for Perdikkas, Alexander's body was part of his claim to control the entire empire, and he notes the time, money, and effort put into the preparation of the funeral cortege. I would add that for someone seeking the kingship (or even the regency) the funeral rites (and probably also the staging of funeral games) were essential to his prestige and legitimacy (thus Landucci 2010: 114–6 for similar concerns by Kassandros in 315; cf. Carney 2015a: 149, for the importance of royal funerals). The "gifts" to Kleopatra appear to have included turning over to her the satrapy of Lydia, for Meandros is described as δι' ὄργης ἔχον Περδίκκαν ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἔστρατείαν ἦν εἰχεν αὐτὸς Κλεοπάτρα ἐπιτετρόφει (Arr. *Succ.* 25.2). Seibert, *Verbindungen* 21, is too brief to be useful; see, however, Vezin, *Eumenes* 40–1. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.86 n.6, thinks the marriage did not take place on account of Kleopatra's unwillingness; cf. Cary 1951: 12: ". . . she was as good a wrecker as her mother, and preferred, like Queen Elizabeth, to have many lovers so that she might disappoint them all." Droysen, II<sup>3</sup> 62,

Antigonos' defection had been followed by that of Asandros, the Karian satrap, and now Menandros of Lydia also took flight.<sup>151</sup> Perdikkas knew that a confrontation with Antipatros and his allies was inevitable, and he sought to strengthen his position by marrying Kleopatra before marching on Makedonia. But at this point the bottom fell out of Perdikkas' carefully conceived scheme: Arrhidaios (not to be confused with the new king) had completed the funeral car in Babylon and had begun to transport the King's body to Egypt. Arrhidaios, who spent almost two years overseeing the funeral arrangements, was surely instructed by Perdikkas that there would be a change in plans: Alexander's body would be taken to Makedonia, not Egypt.<sup>152</sup> We can only assume, as Perdikkas himself did, that there had been collusion between Ptolemy and the satrap of Babylonia, Archon; it was symptomatic of widespread disaffection among the officials of the empire.<sup>153</sup> News came to Perdikkas that Arrhidaios had turned southward and was making for Egypt. But a contingent headed by the sons of Andromenes, sent out to retrieve Alexander's body, proved inadequate; for Ptolemy had marched out in full force to meet Arrhidaios' procession and escort it to Egypt.<sup>154</sup> Significantly, none of the satraps between Babylonia and Egypt made an effort to intercede.

Robbed of his most valuable tool, Perdikkas abandoned all thoughts of marching against Antipatros. The haste of Antipatros' preparations had caught Perdikkas off guard: he had not yet completed the prerequisites for his march on Europe and neither Kleopatra nor the King's body was in his possession. Thus he called a meeting of his *phili* and his generals, who confirmed his decision to march against Egypt,<sup>155</sup> where Ptolemy had been increasing steadily in power

is probably right in saying that she accepted Perdikkas' proposition ("die Königin gab sofort ihre Zustimmung"); but there was not sufficient time for the marriage to take place. She was favorably disposed toward the Perdikkans (Arr. *Succ.* 25.6), though she repudiated her *philia*—for this remained the extent of her relationship with Perdikkas—once her intended husband had died in Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1.40).

151 Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; 25.2; cf. Engel 1972a.

152 For Arrhidaios see Berve II, 80, no. 145; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 1249, s.v. "Arridaio (5)"; Heckel, *Who's Who* 53 "Arrhidaeus [2]." He is not, as Justin 13.4.6 wrongly states, to be identified with Philip Arrhidaios, but one of the later guardians of the Kings (Arr. *Succ.* 1.31; Diod. 18.39.1–2); for the funeral car see Diod. 18.3.5; 18.26–8; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.25; Stewart, *Faces* 206–9; Rice 1993: 229–33; Erskine 2002: 168–9.

153 See Arr. *Succ.* 24.3. One would like to know where the chiliarch Seleukos and Peithon, satrap of Media, were at this time and how they reacted to the incident.

154 Diod. 18.28.2 ff.; Arr. *Succ.* 1.25; Paus. 1.6.4; cf. Curt. 10.10.20. For the sons of Andromenes see Arr. *Succ.* 1.25 (Polemon only) and 24.1 (both Attalos and Polemon). Cf. Badian 1967b: 189 n.34. Whatever the source of Aelian, *VH* 12.64, that Perdikkas was tricked into stealing an *eidolon* of Alexander, it was clearly pro-Ptolemaic and unadulterated rubbish (cf. Erskine 2002: 170). Even the most gullible reader would know that the reference to Aristandros was proof of its inauthenticity.

155 On timing of Perdikkas' decision to attack Ptolemy see the discussion in Engel 1972a. That he had intended to deal with Ptolemy's challenge to his authority even before the hijacking of the funeral cortege is clear from Arr. *Succ.* 24.1: ὁ δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦθελησεν ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴγυ]πτον στρατ[εύ]ειν.

and had entered into an alliance with Antipatros and Krateros. The hijacking of Alexander's funeral car further emphasized Perdikkas' need to secure Asia first, but that in itself did not justify the campaign. It was indeed Alexander's wish to be buried at the oasis of Siwah. On this point the sources concur.<sup>156</sup> Instead, Ptolemy was charged with the unlawful execution of the *hyparchos* of Egypt, Kleomenes of Naukratis. His expansionist war against Kyrene was equally unauthorized and contributed to the view that Ptolemy harbored dangerous aspirations.<sup>157</sup>

Some realignments were made for the sake of security: Philotas, a known supporter of Krateros, was deposed from the satrapy of Kilikia as Perdikkas entered that territory; there too provisions were made for the fleet, and Dokimos was dispatched to Babylon with orders to replace Archon, suspected of collusion with Arrhidaios in the hijacking of Alexander's corpse.<sup>158</sup> Eumenes held the western front: his domain was enlarged to include Lykia, Karia, and Phrygia, which had been abandoned by Nearchos,<sup>159</sup> Asandros, and Antigonos respectively, and

156 Diod. 18.3.5; Justin 12.15.7; 13.4.6; Curt. 10.5.4. Paus. 1.6.3 does say that the body was destined for Aigai, but this was in accordance with Perdikkas' change of policy (Μακεδόνων τοὺς ταχθέντας τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου νεκρὸν ἐς Αἰγάς κομίζειν); there is no mention of Alexander's wishes here. Strabo 17.1.8 C794 (ἔφθη γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἀφελόμενος Περδίκκαν ὁ τοῦ Λάγου Πτολεμαῖος, κατακομίζοντα ἐκ τῆς Βαβυλῶνος καὶ ἐκτρεπόμενον ταύτῃ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ εξιδιασμὸν τῆς Αιγύπτου) makes little sense to me. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.25, where Arrhidaios acts against Perdikkas' wishes (παρὰ γνώμην . . . Περδίκκου); the matter is completely misinterpreted by Geer 1947–54: IX, 19 n.4. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 110–1 also supposes that there is a contradiction between Pausanias' account and the version given by Diodorus, Justin, and Curtius. For Perdikkas' change of policy see Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 67 n.2, placing Pausanias' testimony in the proper light. The most thorough discussion is that of Schubert, *Quellen* chap. 13: "Der Streit um Alexanders Leiche," 180–9; see also Badian 1967b: 185–9; Errington 1970: 64–5; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.86–7. Tarn II, 355–6, predictably, disbelieves Alexander's wish to be buried at Siwah, ascribing these reports to Ptolemy's propaganda; less dogmatic is the account given in *CAH* VI, 467.

157 Diod. 18.25.6; Justin 13.6.10–3; Arr. *Succ.* 24.1. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 110 ff. Cf. Anson, *Eumenes* 87, with n.37. I do not understand Ellis' comment that "Perdiccas could not attack Ptolemy publicly for killing Cleomenes, his agent and probable spy" (*Ptolemy* 36); cf. Green, *Alexander to Actium* 14, who argues that Kleomenes was eliminated because he was *secretly* spying on Ptolemy. Paus. 1.6.3: Περδίκκας νομίζον εὑνοούν καὶ δὴ αὐτὸν οὐ πιστὸν αὐτῷ. But Kleomenes' role as *hyparchos* was, like Meleagros' role vis-à-vis Perdikkas, to act as a check on Ptolemy's ambitions, and the latter should have no illusions about this. Romm, *Ghost* 101, describes Kleomenes appointment as *hyparchos* as "a patent attempt to trim Ptolemy's sails and keep a close watch on his behavior." This must have been clear to Ptolemy from the beginning. For such checks and balances see Heckel 2002a. Lianou 2014: 410 rightly calls Kleomenes "not only a sympathizer of the central government, . . . but also an experienced financial decision-maker." Baynham 2015b: 132–3 believes that Ptolemy may have punished Kleomenes for some criminal activity ("perhaps involving intended embezzlement and flight").

158 For Philotas see Berve nos. 803 and 804; id., *RE* XX.1 (1939) 177–8 no. 2; 179, nos. 7–9; P. Schöch, *RE* XX (1950) 179–80 no. 10 and 180 no. 11; Billows, *Antigonos* 423–4 no. 95; Arr. *Succ.* 24.2. Philotas' replacement was Philoxenos (cf. Justin 13.6.16). For Dokimos and Archon see Arr. *Succ.* 24.3–5; cf. Berve no. 165; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 564 no. 5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 43 "Archon"; Berve no. 285; Kaerst, *RE* V (1905) 1274 no. 4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 115 "Docimus."

159 Lykia was joined by Greater Phrygia after 330 and is usually given to Antigonos in the satrapy lists: Arr. *Succ.* 1.6, Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; App. Syr. 53;

doubtless he kept a watchful eye on Kleopatra in Lydia. Under his command were placed also Neoptolemos and Alketas.<sup>160</sup> To White Kleitos, Perdikkas entrusted the defense of the Hellespont,<sup>161</sup> while another fleet was dispatched to Kypros, under the command of Sosigenes the Rhodian and Aristonous, his most faithful supporter throughout the war, in order to deal with Ptolemy's allies there.<sup>162</sup> At the same time, Attalos, who had now married Atalante, was ordered to accompany the army to Egypt with a third fleet; in the present turbulence, Perdikkas thought it best to keep his sister in the camp.<sup>163</sup>

Dokimos secured Babylon without difficulty, defeating in battle Archon, who soon died of his wounds (Arr. *Succ.* 24.5). Meanwhile, Perdikkas marched to Damaskos, where he probably replaced the satrap of Syria, Laomedon, an old friend of Alexander who had gone over to Ptolemy, and awaited reinforcements (likely headed by Peithon, satrap of Media). From here he made his assault on Egypt. It is at this point that Arrian claims that the army made a judgment concerning the charges that Perdikkas had brought against Ptolemy. "He denounced Ptolemy, who rebutted the charges in public. The accusations were judged to be unfair, but despite opposition from his men he continued the campaign."<sup>164</sup>

But the story, which clearly comes from a pro-Ptolemaic source, does not ring true. It is unlikely that Ptolemy would have exposed himself to danger by appearing in the Perdikkan camp or that Perdikkas himself would risk undermining his campaign by giving him a chance to clear his name. Furthermore, had Ptolemy been able to persuade the army of his innocence, it would have been unnecessary for him to justify his behavior in an address to the Perdikkan army after their leader's murder (Diod. 18.36.6). Nor is it plausible that Ptolemy's case was presented

though Justin 13.4.15 gives Lykia and Pamphylia to Nearchos, who had ruled it from 333 to 330. See Berve I, 276 opp.; Baumbach, *Kleinasiens* 57, with n.2, who believes that Justin is wrong concerning the satrapy in 323; Nearchos was later a supporter of Antigonos (Diod. 19.19; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.35), and he may have controlled Lykia under Antigonos' direction; cf. Droysen, II<sup>3</sup> 16; Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 144 n.91. See also Julien 1914: 17; Berve no. 544, esp. p.271; Capelle, *RE XVI.2* (1935) 2134; Niese I, 197 n.2; Badian 1975: 169 n.58; Lehmann-Haupt in Papastavru, *Amphipolis* 137.

For Eumenes' territory see Justin 13.6.14–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5.1–2; Nepos, *Eum.* 3.2; cf. Diod. 18.25.6; 18.29.1.

160 Justin 13.6.15; Diod. 18.29.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2–3.

161 Justin 13.6.16; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; corroborated by Keil 1913: 235, IIIn.

162 Arr. *Succ.* 24.6. Aristonous was to be *strategos*; Sosigenes *nauarchos* (Berve no. 737; Heckel, *Who's Who* 253); Medios the Thessalian *xenagos* (Berve no. 521; Heckel, *Who's Who* 158); and Amyntas, brother of Peuketas, *hipparchos* (Berve II, 26 no. 56; cf. Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 2007 no. 20; Heckel, *Who's Who* 26 "Amyntas [11]"). The Kyprian allies of Ptolemy were Androkles, Nikokles, Nikokreon, and Pasikrates (Berve nos. 73, 567, 568, 610; Heckel, *Who's Who* 28, 179 "Nicocles [2]"; 179–80 "Nicocreon"; 193 "Pasikrates [2]"). See Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 205; Niese I, 219.

163 The women in camp included also Roxane and Adea-Eurydike.

164 Arr. *Succ.* 1.28: Κατηγορήσας δὲ Πτολεμαίου κάκεινον ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπολυμένου τὰς αἰτίας, καὶ δόξας μὴ δίκαια ἐπικαλεῖν, ὅμως καὶ τοῦ πλήθους οὐχ ἐκόντος πολεμεῖ. English translation by Nigel G. Wilson.

*in absentia* by his agents; for this too would not have served Perdikkas' purpose. That Perdikkas called Ptolemy to account seems likely—it was, after all, his *modus operandi*—but Antigonos was not taken in earlier, and it is doubtful that Ptolemy would have exposed himself to this danger. The example of Meleagros was fresh in his mind. It is more likely that Ptolemy defended himself in front of the Royal Army *after* Perdikkas' death and that a pro-Ptolemaic source altered the historical record in his favor. If the story is true, in all its details, then it merely emphasizes Perdikkas' ineptitude and his failure to win the hearts of his own troops.<sup>165</sup>

Meanwhile, in the west, Perdikkas suffered another setback. Neoptolemos, an enemy of Eumenes,<sup>166</sup> abandoned the Perdikan forces and joined Krateros' army; Alketas, perhaps stinging from a reproach over the manner in which he handled the affair of Kynnane, refused to serve under Eumenes, protesting that his Makedonians would not go into battle with the illustrious Krateros.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, Eumenes and his troops were victorious, though Perdikkas was never to learn the news.<sup>168</sup>

### The Egyptian campaign and the death of Perdikkas<sup>169</sup>

The Egypt against which Perdikkas led his forces had been carefully prepared for the confrontation by Ptolemy, who realized from the start that war with Perdikkas was a strong possibility; he had spent the two years after the settlement at Babylon fortifying his satrapy and winning the loyalty of his followers.<sup>170</sup> But it was a combination of nature and inept leadership that contributed to Perdikkas' failure. Encamping at the Pelousiac mouth of the Nile, he ordered his troops to clear an old canal.<sup>171</sup> The river, however, broke the dam, negating the efforts of

165 Anson, *Heirs* 69: "If Perdiccas was responsible for the assembly, . . . it was a mistake." See Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 118–20 on the versions of Arr. *Succ.* 1.28 and Diod. 18.36.6. Arrian's account is accepted as historical by Roisman, 2014: 458–61 and *Veterans* 96–7; similarly, Anson 1991: 243 and *Heirs* 68–9; also Hammond, *HMac.* III, 121 n.5, with his unique faith in so-called good sources, ascribes Arrian's account to Hieronymos and thus accepts the story. The pro-Ptolemaic source may have been Douris of Samos (Schwahn 1930: 231).

166 Plut. *Eum.* 1.6; 7.7.

167 Plut. *Eum.* 5.3; but see Schubert, *Quellen* 139–49, chap. 11: "Die Berichte über Krateros."

168 Diod. 18.33.1 says that Perdikkas heard and was encouraged by the news of Eumenes' victory. But this is contradicted by Diod. 18.37.1 (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.2–3), who says the news arrived in Egypt two days after Perdikkas' murder.

169 See now Roisman 2014 and *Veterans* 93–110; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 96–128; Ellis, *Ptolemy* 37–8.

170 Diod. 18.33.3–4. For the Ptolemy's financial management of Egypt during his reign see Lianou 2014, who concludes: "Hidden beneath Curtius' characterisation, *modico culto*, Ptolemy I has escaped for centuries the unbounded praise that generations of historians have reserved for other heads of states" (410). But even if Ptolemy found it necessary (and politically expedient) to remove Kleomenes, there must have been no shortage of economic and financial advisors.

171 The purpose of this work is not entirely clear. Roisman, *Veterans* 97, suggests that "he [Perdikkas] may have wished to allow his fleet, anchored in Pelusium under Attalus' command, to join him." It is more likely, as Romm (*Ghost* 164) observes, that the aim was to get his troops across the eastern side of the Nile by lowering the water levels.

Perdikkas' troops, and prompting those of his officers, who had entered the campaign half-heartedly, to defect. Over the past months, there had been defections everywhere—Kleitos had brought the fleet to Antipatros' aid; the western satraps had also abandoned Perdikkas; Leonnatos and Peithon both secretly sought to strengthen their own positions; Neoptolemos and Alketas had disobeyed orders to support Eumenes—and now the support of the Royal Army was half-hearted at best.<sup>172</sup> Perdikkas tried to win the support of his remaining officers through gifts and promises,<sup>173</sup> but this met with limited success. He was no Alexander or Krateros, natural leaders of men. Beloch rightly remarks: “Perdikkas hatte nie die Gabe besessen, sich bei seinen Untergebenen beliebt zu machen.”<sup>174</sup>

Immediately, he made a daring assault on Kamelon Teichos (“Fort of the Camels”), but failed to take it by storm. Ptolemy had anticipated the move and entered the city with reinforcements. His propaganda depicted him as personally leading the fight from the walls, driving back the Perdikkans who advanced up the ladders and thrusting his sarissa into the eyes of an elephant as it approached the walls.<sup>175</sup> Rebuffed by the defenders, Perdikkas planned to march on Memphis, which had been stripped of many of its defenders. The following night, he broke camp and marched upstream from Kamelon Teichos to an island that lay opposite the city. But here Perdikkas made a grave error: in attempting to reach the island, his troops were subjected to great hardships and danger owing to the unexpected swiftness and depth of the Nile at that point.<sup>176</sup> Only a small number crossed to the island successfully, and the bulk of the army found it an impossible feat; many were drowned in the attempt. What made matters worse was that Perdikkas, who had reached the opposite bank, had too few men for an assault on Memphis and was forced to re-cross the treacherous, crocodile-infested river.<sup>177</sup> In all, according to Diodorus (18.36.1), some 2,000 men were lost, including

172 Roisman, *Veterans* 96, notes the importance the men attached to the idea of returning to Makedonia.

Whether they felt it necessary to do so with Alexander's body is debatable. For Perdikkas it mattered a great deal; for his entire political strategy hinged on his role as Alexander's successor. The men simply wanted to go home.

173 Diod. 18.33.5.

174 Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.88; cf. Justin 13.8.2.

175 Diod. 18.34.2: ὁ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ἔχων περὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ βουλόμενος προτρέψασθαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἡγεμόνας καὶ φίλους προσιέναι τοῖς δεινοῖς αὐτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν σάρισαν καὶ στὰς ἐπ' ἄκρου τοῦ προτειχίσματος τὸν μὲν ἡγούμενον τῶν ἑλεφάντων ἐξετύφλωσεν . . . . The action is thought to imitate Alexander's battle with Poros (Landucci, *Diodoro* 152). See also Eppel 2007: 217; Kistler, *War Elephants* 45.

176 For the disruption of the riverbed see Landucci, *Diodoro* 155, noting Strabo's reference to pits (*barathra*) formed by the river in the Pelousiac branch of the Nile (Strabo 16.2.33 C760; 17.1.21 C803; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. βαραθρον); but see Roisman 2014: 464 n.25. Many of the men were not good swimmers: Landucci notes Diod. 18.35.6; cf. 19.18.7, to which we may add Plut. *Alex.* 58.6. See also Bichler 2013.

177 This is probably the historical context of the stratagem described by Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.19 and Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.7.20: Ptolemy used horses to drive all sorts of domestic animals in the direction of the enemy and thereby create a large dust cloud; seeing this Perdikkas' forces thought a large army was coming against them and fled.

some prominent officers (ἐν οῖς καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν τινες ἡγεμόνων ὑπῆρχον), though none of these is named. It was as much as the army was willing to endure from Perdikkas, whom they held responsible for their present miseries. He had failed for the last time. About 100 of his officers revolted, angered by the ineptitude of their commander but also influenced by the promises of Ptolemy. The foremost of Perdikkas' generals, including Peithon, Antigenes, and Seleukos, conspired against him during the night and murdered him in his tent.<sup>178</sup> The news of Eumenes' victory over Krateros, which might have lifted the spirits of the army and its officers, arrived too late to save him.<sup>179</sup> With Perdikkas died the last hope for the empire as Alexander had envisioned it.<sup>180</sup>

Once again, a fragment of Arrian's *Events after Alexander* serves as an epitaph for a great but flawed man, a victim of his own success and the envy of others.

Perdiccas, the Macedonian whom the Macedonians treacherously put to death, a man who was outstanding on the battlefield and so became extremely arrogant. As a result, his massive overconfidence in his intelligence exposed

<sup>178</sup> For Perdikkas' campaign against Ptolemy see Diod. 18.33–7 (the only extensive account); also Arr. *Succ.* 1.28; Plut. *Eum.* 8.2–3; Justin 13.8.1–2; see Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 118–28 for an analysis of the accounts. One hundred officers revolt: Diod. 18.36.5. For his death: Arr. 7.18.5 (it was prophesied by the seer Peithagoras); Nepos, *Eum.* 5.1; Justin 13.8.10; 14.1.1, 4.11; 15.1.1; Diod. 18.36.5; Paus. 1.6.3 (he was killed ὑπὸ τῶν σωματοφυλάκων); *Suda* s.v. Περδίκκας; Heidelberg *Epit.* 1; cf. Bauer 1914: 34–6; Wheatley 2013. There is all but unanimous support for the view that Perdikkas' murder is depicted on the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus (see, among others, Stewart, *Faces* 301–4; Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 76–7), but this has very little to commend it. Instead it is one of several rather circular arguments that have been used to support the unlikely view that the sarcophagus was intended for Abdalonymos of Sidon (see Heckel 2006). Once such ideas have taken root, it is virtually impossible to eradicate them. For the murderers see Berve II, 311 no. 621; Heckel, *Who's Who* 195–6 “Peithon [3]”; Berve II, 351–2 no. 700; Heckel, *Who's Who* 246–8 “Seleucus.” For Antigenes see Appendix VIII.

<sup>179</sup> Diodorus gives two apparently contradictory versions of when the news of Eumenes' victory reached the Perdikan army in Egypt. Diod. 18.33.1 says Περδίκκας δὲ πυθόμενος τὴν κατὰ τὸν Εὐμενῆ νίκην πολλῷ θρασύτερος ἔγένετο πρὸς τὴν εἰς Αἴγυπτον στρατείαν (“And Perdiccas, on learning of the victory of Eumenes, became much more confident with regard to the Egyptian campaign”). But at 18.37.1 he reports: μετὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου τελευτὴν εὐθὺς ἤκον τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι παρατάξεως γενομένης περὶ Καππαδοκίαν Εὐμενῆς νενίκηκε, Κρατερός δὲ καὶ Νεοπτόλεμος ἤτηθέντες ἀνήροινται. τοῦτο δ' εἰ δυσὶ πρότερον ἡμέραις ἔγένετο τῆς Περδίκκου τελευτῆς, ὃνδεις ἄν ἐτόλμησε τὰς χεῖρας Περδίκκα προσενεγκεῖν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς εὐημερίας (“Immediately after the death of Perdiccas there came men announcing that, in a battle fought near Cappadocia, Eumenes had been victorious and Craterus and Neoptolemos had been defeated and killed. If this had become known two days before the death of Perdiccas, no one would have dared raise a hand against him because of his great good fortune”). It is generally assumed that Diodorus used two different sources uncritically. Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 51: “Diodorus’ inconsistency shows that he was here unsuccessfully trying to combine Hieronymus with his second source” (see also Errington 1970: 66, with n.127). Anson, *Eumenes* 106–7 n.104, suggests that Diod. 18.33.1 refers only to Eumenes' victory over Neoptolemos. This could explain the discrepancy, but Diod. 18.37.1 says that the victories over both Krateros and Neoptolemos were reported after Perdikkas' death.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Schäfer, *Eumenes* 94. About Antigonos Monophthalmos, Wirth 1988: 243–4, rightly observes: “daß er je im Sinne des Perdikkas eine Art von Reichseinheit anstrebe, ist zu bezweifeln und auch aus den Quellen mit ihrer Argumentation nicht zu beweisen . . .”

him to all manner of danger, and his excessive boastfulness—which made him seem to be looking down on all Macedonians—earned him only resentment for his successes. In the wake of resentment came hatred, and the Macedonians’ inability to bear his authority over them, in fact and even nominally. So it was that, angry over his earlier arrogance rather than making a rational judgment of the case, they made the change in his situation—his failures—into the basis of the plot against him.<sup>181</sup>

### **Alketas: brother of Perdikkas**

Berve II, 22–3, no. 45; Kaerst, *RE I* (1894) 1514–5 no. 5; Kleiner 1963: 70 ff.; Heckel, *Who's Who* 8–9.

#### *Early career*

Born no later than the mid-350s,<sup>182</sup> Alketas was the younger brother of Perdikkas, his successor as phalanx commander and partial heir to his war with Antipatros and Antigonos. Although the sources do not give a patronymic, his father was undoubtedly Orontes.<sup>183</sup> He was thus from the canton of Orestis and related in some way to the Argead royal house.<sup>184</sup> Alketas succeeded his brother as commander of the battalion of Lynkestians and Orestians, perhaps as early as 331/0,<sup>185</sup> but is not named until 327, when he campaigned with Krateros, Polyperchon, and Attalos in Paraitakene.<sup>186</sup> In his absence there occurred both the failed attempt to introduce *proskynesis* and the Hermolaos conspiracy, which was reported by Alexander in a letter.<sup>187</sup>

181 *Suda* II 1040 = Arr. *Succ.* Frag. 27: Περδίκκας, ὁ Μακεδόν. ὃν ἔκτειναν ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς οἱ Μακεδόνες, ἄνδρα τά τε πολέμια κράτιστον γενόμενον καὶ μεγαλονίᾳ χρησάμενον διαιφερόντως. ἐξ οὗ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὑπέρογκον αὐτῷ τοῦ φρονήματος εὐθαρσές πρὸς πάντα κίνδυνον ἦν, τὸ τε ἄγαν μεγαλήγορον, σὺν ᾧ πάντας Μακεδόνας ὑπερφρονεῖν ἔδοξε, τάς [τε] εὐπραγίας αὐτῷ φθόνου ἐπαξίας ἐποίει. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φθόνῳ μῖσος ἐπεγίνετο, καὶ τὸ μὴ φέρειν ὑπέρ σφᾶς ὄντα τε καὶ ὄνομαζόμενον. θῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πταισμασι μεταβολὴν σὺν ὄργῃ τῆς πρόσθεν ὑπερογίας μᾶλλον ἡ κρίσεως ἀληθεστάτης δικαιώσει ἐξ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιβούλευμα ἐποιοῦντο. English translation by J.C. Yardley.

182 Although we have no record of when he joined the expedition, there is nothing to suggest that he did not accompany Alexander, and his brother Perdikkas, from the very beginning.

183 Justin 13.6.15; Diod. 18.29.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21 all identify him as Perdikkas’ brother. Orontes the father of Perdikkas: Arr. 3.11.9; 6.28.4; *Ind.* 18.5. See Stemma VII.

184 Cf. Curt. 10.7.8, unless the reference is to the royal house of Orestis. It is interesting to note that the sons of Alexander I Philhellene were named Perdikkas and Alketas.

185 Perdikkas appears to have replaced Menes as *somatophylax* (Arr. 3.16.9); at the Persian Gates (Arr. 3.18.5), Perdikkas’ battalion is mentioned, but it is not certain if he commanded it in person or if it was already being led by Alketas. In 330, at the time of the Philotas affair, Perdikkas is referred to as *armiger* (Curt. 6.8.17).

186 Arr. 4.22.1; cf. Curt. 8.5.2, naming only Krateros and Polyperchon, with a separate mission for the latter.

187 Plut. *Alex.* 55.6. For the authenticity of the letter see Hamilton, *PA* 155; cf. Heckel 1978d.

During the Swat campaign of 327, Alketas, Attalos, and Demetrios the hiparch attacked the town of Ora (Ude-gram), while Koinos besieged Bazira (Bir-Kot);<sup>188</sup> Arrian speaks of οἱ ὄμιρὶ Ἀλκέταν (4.27.6), as if to suggest that Alketas was the commander-in-chief on this mission. The actual capture of the city was, in Arrian's account, the work of Alexander himself (4.27.9). But Curtius has a different version, in which the taking of Ora is assigned to Polyperchon (8.11.1), and it is possible that Polyperchon was in fact the leader of the forces named by Arrian.<sup>189</sup> Alketas appears only once more in the Alexander historians: at the Hydaspes (Jhelum) his battalion and that of Polyperchon were assigned to Krateros and stationed in the main camp directly opposite Poros' army.<sup>190</sup> Thus, Alketas participated in only the second stage of the battle, crossing with Krateros after Alexander had engaged Poros.

### *Alketas in the age of the Successors*

Between 323 and 320, Alketas served, as we might expect, as an officer of his brother Perdikkas. Initially, it seems, he remained with his brother in Babylon, along with Attalos, Polemon, Dokimos, and Aristonous, Perdikkas' chief supporters. But the failure of both Leonnatos and Antigonos to aid Eumenes in securing Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, forced Perdikkas to mobilize the Royal Army. Leonnatos already aspired to the throne of Makedon, tempted by letters from Olympias, who urged him to depose Antipatros and marry her daughter Kleopatra. To this end, he had tried to enlist Eumenes as an ally, but in vain.<sup>191</sup> Antigonos' refusal is likewise ascribed to arrogance and personal ambition,<sup>192</sup> but the unwillingness of Makedonian officers to take orders from a Greek was clearly a factor, as the conduct of Neoptolemos and Alketas shows.<sup>193</sup> In 321, while Perdikkas was in Pisidia, Nikaia the daughter of Antipatros was brought by her brother Iolaos and a certain Archias. Since suing for her hand in 323, Perdikkas had, however, entered into negotiations with Kleopatra, whom he planned to marry instead. In this matter he was supported by Eumenes, while Alketas urged him to marry Nikaia and remain on friendly terms with Antipatros.<sup>194</sup> Alketas' advice prevailed—at least, for the moment. For Perdikkas

188 Arr. 4.27.5. For the identifications of Bazira and Ora see Stein, *Alexander's Track* 46–8, 58–60; cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 152.

189 Whether Arrian's failure to name Polyperchon was intentional or not is impossible to determine. At 4.16.1, he fails to mention that Krateros had supreme command of the forces in Baktria: he names Gorgias, who commanded Krateros' battalion, as becomes clear from Arr. 4.17.1.

190 Arr. 5.11.3. I see nothing significant in his failure to be named as a triarch of the Hydaspes fleet (Arr. *Ind.* 18); these triarchies appear to have been restricted to one member of each family, in this case to Perdikkas (18.5).

191 Plut. *Eum.* 3.9–10; cf. Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4–5, who adds that Leonnatos planned to kill Eumenes when he could not persuade him to share in his enterprise.

192 Plut. *Eum.* 3.5: μετέωρος ὃν ἦδη καὶ περιφρονῶν ἀπάντων.

193 See also Anson 1980.

194 Arr. *Succ.* 1.21.

sought to cloak his grand scheme by openly marrying Nikaia while Kleopatra played a waiting-game in Sardis. These intrigues came to the attention of Antigonos the One-Eyed, whom Perdikkas had summoned from Greater Phrygia to answer charges that he had failed to support Eumenes in Paphlagonia and Kappadokia as he had been ordered.<sup>195</sup> When word reached the Perdikkan camp that Kynnane had forced a crossing of the Hellespont and was bringing her daughter Adea to marry Philip Arrhidaios, Alketas was sent north to prevent her from reaching Pisidia.

Alketas' troops must have included many of his own (formerly Perdikkas') Orestians and Lynkestians and perhaps also Attalos' battalion, now under Polemon's command; these were supplemented by a substantial force of Pisidians, whose friendship and loyalty he began to cultivate through military honors.<sup>196</sup> It is tempting to speculate that Alketas was to take up a position in Hellespontine Phrygia, which had now become vacant with the departure and death of Leonnatos, but this seems unlikely since Alketas made no effort to draw on the resources of that province and used as his base instead Karia and Pisidia.<sup>197</sup> Alketas' approach may have hastened Antigonos' move from Kelainai to Ephesos, whence he would be able to sail to Makedonia. Alketas took the extreme measure of putting Kynnane to death, whereupon the army, mindful of its heritage, insisted that Adea be taken to Perdikkas and that the mother's death should not be in vain.<sup>198</sup> This news too reached Ephesos before the departure of Antigonos, who now brought a variety of charges against Perdikkas and persuaded Antipatros and Krateros to declare war on him.

Preparations were made for war on two fronts: Alketas was instructed to take orders from Eumenes,<sup>199</sup> now overseer of western Asia Minor and entrusted with its defense against Antipatros and Krateros. Perdikkas directed his attention towards Egypt, and Ptolemy. Alketas, perhaps in a fit of pique because the conduct of the war (which he desired for himself) had been given to Eumenes, refused to cooperate, saying that his Makedonian troops would not fight against Antipatros and were favorably disposed towards Krateros.<sup>200</sup> Thus he held himself and his troops aloof, though we cannot say where.

News of disaster at the Nile came swiftly. Perdikkas and his sister Atalante had been killed near Memphis; later, at Triparadeisos, Alketas and some fifty of his

195 The original orders: Plut. *Eum.* 3.4. Arr. *Succ.* 1.20 has Perdikkas call Antigonos to account before the arrival of Nikaia and Kleopatra in Asia Minor; Diod. 18.23.3–4 says that Antigonos was aware of Perdikkas' intrigues and that it was for this reason, and because Antigonos was a friend of Antipatros and a capable commander, that Perdikkas brought unjust charges against him. The full extent of Perdikkas' duplicity, in the Nikaia affair, did not become known to Antigonos until his return to Asia, where he received up-to-date information from Meandros of Lydia (Arr. *Succ.* 1.26).

196 Diod. 18.46.2.

197 Anson, *Heirs* 51 believes Alketas was made “general or satrap” of Pisidia.

198 Arr. *Succ.* 1.22–3; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 8.60; cf. Diod. 19.52.5. See Heckel 1983–4; Macurdy, *HQ* 48–52; Carney 1988: 385–404, esp. 392–4; cf. Carney 1987a: 496–502, esp. 497–8.

199 Diod. 18.29.2; Justin 13.6.15; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2. Neoptolemos was also ordered to support Eumenes.

200 Plut. *Eum.* 5.3.

brother's officers were outlawed by the Makedonian assembly and condemned to death.<sup>201</sup> At this time, Alketas was in contact with Eumenes in Phrygia,<sup>202</sup> but the two would not reconcile their differences and Alketas, supported by Dokimos and Polemon son of Andromenes, moved to Karia, where he was soon joined by Attalos.<sup>203</sup> There, Alketas and Attalos defeated the local satrap Asandros, whom Antipatros had sent against them,<sup>204</sup> whereafter they withdrew into Pisidia, which had only recently been subdued by Perdikkas.

Late in 319, Antigonos—to whom the task of dealing with the outlaws had been entrusted<sup>205</sup>—hurried south from Kappadokia with an army of 40,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry and an unspecified number of elephants,<sup>206</sup> covering 2,500 stades in seven days.<sup>207</sup> Alketas and his followers knew of Antigonos' approach, for they had taken up a position in the so-called Pisidic Aulon, through which an enemy coming from Kappadokia would have to pass,<sup>208</sup> and were surprised only by the speed of his march. Antigonos, however, was betrayed by the noise of his elephants, and Alketas rushed to seize the foothills overlooking the Aulon with his cavalry. From here, it would have been possible to attack the enemy's flank, had not Alketas' forces been vastly inferior in numbers—16,000 infantry and 900 horse. But Antigonos, engaging him with his right wing, managed to cut off the retreat to the phalanx with 6,000 cavalrymen. Meanwhile the center and left of the

201 Diod. 18.37.2; cf. 18.39.7; Justin 13.8.10 (with textual problems); Arr. *Succ.* 1.30, 39.

202 Plut. *Eum.* 8.7–8 implies that they were both at Kelainai: [Ἐνμένης] ἐξῆλασεν εἰς τὴν ἄνω Φρυγίαν καὶ διαχείμαζεν ἐν Κελαιναῖς, ὅπου τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀλκέταν καὶ Πολέμιον καὶ Δόκιμον ὑπέρ ἡγεμονίας διαφιλοτιμούμενον πρός αὐτὸν . . . .

203 For the rift between Alketas and Eumenes see Arr. *Succ.* 1.41; Plut. *Eum.* 8.8. Plutarch's failure to mention Attalos suggests that the latter was not with Alketas at this time but that he joined him and his brother Polemon in Karia after his unsuccessful naval battle with the Rhodians (Arr. *Succ.* 1.39). At this time too Laomedon son of Larichos, the satrap of Koile-Syria who had been deposed by Ptolemy's general Nikanor, escaped his captors and joined Alketas in Karia (App. Syr. 52 [265]).

204 Arr. *Succ.* 1.41.

205 Diod. 18.39.7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.43 (naming only Eumenes). Battle of “Kretopolis” or the Pisidic Aulon: Diod. 18.41.7 (Antigonos turns his attention to Alketas); 18.44–5 (the actual battle); 18.50.1; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.7; cf. Engel 1972b; Billows, *Antigonos* 77–80; Champion, *Antigonus* 31–2; Anson, *Heirs* 78.

206 Troop figures: Diod. 18.45.1.

207 Diod. 18.44.2. At 582.5 feet per stade, this would work out to 275 miles, or an average of 39.4 miles per day (Geer 1947–54: IX, p. 135 n.3, says “about 287 miles, or 41 miles in each 24 hours”). Kistler, *War Elephants* 48 calls it the “swiftest march ever made by elephants” and adds that Antigonos lost five of his seventy elephants en route. He does not give a source for this figure.

208 See Ramsay 1923: 1–10, esp. 2–5. Just how well informed Alketas was about Antigonos' movements is difficult to say. Ramsay stresses that “Alketas and the associated generals were on their march against Antigonus” (5), quoting Diod. 18.41.7: ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐπιτορευομένους ἡγεμόνας τῶν πολεμίον. But the mss. reading here is πορευομένους and Geer (1947–54: IX) reads περιγενομένους (cf. Reiske ὑπολειπομένους). Furthermore, Diod. 18.44 seems to suggest that Alketas had taken no precautions against Antigonos, for he would surely have occupied the foothills before settling down for the night in the plain, if he had suspected that Antigonos might arrive at any time. But cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 78 n.50.

Antigonid army made short work of the infantry, still in disarray. Hemmed in by the advancing elephants and the cavalry in all sides, Alketas made a daring escape from the battlefield with his hypaspists and the Pisidians, reaching Termessos in safety.<sup>209</sup> There, despite the loyalty of the younger Pisidians, Alketas fell victim to the treachery of the city's elders. Though he eluded capture by suicide, his body was handed over to Antigonos, who, in a not entirely uncharacteristic display of barbarity, maltreated it for three days and then left it unburied.<sup>210</sup> The younger Pisidians, however, recovered the body and buried it with splendid honors (Diod. 18.47.3: λαμπτρῶς ἐκήδευσαν).

These honors included an impressive tomb at Termessos,<sup>211</sup> on the wall of which a rider is pictured in relief. The cavalryman's armor is similar to that found on the Alexander Mosaic; but there are also depictions of infantry-style arms, probably a tribute to Alketas' long service as a commander of *pezhetairoi*.<sup>212</sup> Fedak (1990: 95) comments that the rider's head was "deliberately smashed in antiquity," although it is unclear exactly when. If the defacing of the image occurred relatively soon after its creation, this may support Diodorus' evidence that the Pisidians' loyalties to Alketas were divided.

209 Diod. 18.45.2–3. Diod. 18.45.5 says that the Pisidians numbered 6,000 but this creates some problems. Arr. *Succ.* 1.39 says that 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry fled with Attalos after the death of Perdikkas (cf. Diod. 18.37.4, no figures given). These troops, minus those who were lost in the battle with the Rhodians, joined Alketas in Karia. Now 10,000 deserters from Memphis and 6,000 Pisidians would indeed give us a figure of 16,000 infantry, and Attalos' 800 horse are only 100 short of the total cavalry at Kretopolis. But Alketas had an army of his own, which Attalos joined and which could not have been composed of Pisidians alone. Plut. *Eum.* 5.3 speaks of the Makedonians in Alketas' service, and I take these to have been at the very least Alketas' own battalion and the one formerly led by Amyntas and Attalos, now under the command of their youngest brother Polemon. Hence Alketas' army in 321/0 would have included not fewer than 3,000 Makedonians. We may, of course, assume that the casualties in Attalos' *naumachia* against the Rhodians were significant (Arr. 1.39 does say ὑπὸ Ροδίων καρτερῶς ἀπεκρούσθησαν) and that further losses were incurred in the battle with Asandros.

210 Diod. 18.47.3. Antigonos was perhaps venting his anger against Perdikkas. Compare Antigonos' treatment of Eumenes (though Nepos seeks to exculpate him by saying that Eumenes was killed without Antigonos' knowledge—an absurd suggestion. How could one kill the captive leader of the enemy without the permission of one's own commander-in-chief?). Antigenes was burned alive (Diod. 19.44.1); cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 215.

211 Kleiner, *Diadochen-Gräber* 71 ff.; Picard 1964: 298 ff.; Pekridou 1986; Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 119–20, 206, with earlier literature on 119 n.51; also Fedak 1990: 94–6; Rice 1993; Cohen 1997: 33–4.

212 Rice 1993: 234–5; Fedak 1990: 95–6. The short sword in his hand appears to be of the Illyrian sort—"was gerade zu dem Orestier Alketas und der orestischen 'Taxis' paßt." A larger shield to the right of the rider (Alketas) exhibits "erst nachträglich eingeritzte Buchstaben" (these are not reproduced and difficult to read from Kleiner's photograph ["Tafel V"]), but a contemporary inscription between the rider and the shield appears to have been erased (Kleiner, *Diadochen-Gräber* 78).

## 12 The sons of Andromenes

Four sons of the Tymphaian Andromenes are known—Amyntas, Simmias, Attalos, and Polemon—all of whom appear as commanders in the years 335–320, three of them as taxiarchs. The eldest, Amyntas, commanded his own battalion from at least 335; Simmias replaced him briefly at Gaugamela, but after Amyntas' death in 330 the battalion was entrusted to Attalos and not Simmias. Polemon, hurt by connections with Philotas and his own disgraceful flight in 330, never attained military office in Alexander's lifetime; in 321/0, he shared a command with Attalos.

### Amyntas son of Andromenes

Berve II, 26–8 no. 57; Kirchner, *RE* I.2 (1894) 2007 no. 17; Heckel 1975 and *Who's Who* 24–5 “Amyntas [4].”

Presumably the eldest son of Andromenes<sup>1</sup> and one of Alexander's *hetairoi* (Diod. 17.45.7), Amyntas was a close friend of Philotas son of Parmenion. He was perhaps born soon after 365 and brought up at the court of Philip II as a *syntrophos* of Amyntas son of Perdikkas.<sup>2</sup> This accords well with the view that Attalos, his (second) younger brother, appears to have been a contemporary and *syntrophos* of Alexander the Great. Amyntas commanded a battalion of *pezhetairoi* as early as the Theban campaign of 335, where his unit was teamed with that of Perdikkas, which it followed in the assault on the city.<sup>3</sup> At the Granikos he was stationed to the right of center;<sup>4</sup> nothing else is known about his role in the battle. He was sent to Sardis to secure the city, which Mithrenes had surrendered to Alexander, but he remained there only until Pausanias had been placed in charge of the citadel.<sup>5</sup>

1 Arr. 1.8.2, 14.2; Diod. 17.45.7. For the family see Stemma VII.

2 Curt. 7.1.11.

3 Arr. 1.8.2.

4 Arr. 1.14.2.

5 Arr. 1.17.4. Pausanias' appointment: Arr. 1.17.7. See Berve no. 613; Heckel, *Who's Who* 193 “Pausanias [1].” Nothing else is known about him. For Mithrenes see Justi, p. 214; Berve no. 524; Heckel, *Who's Who* 168.

Whether his was one of the three battalions assigned to Philotas at Miletos, we cannot say; he reappears in the attack on Myndos, together with the Companion Cavalry and the battalions of Perdikkas and Koinos.<sup>6</sup>

At Issos, Amyntas' battalion is found next to that of Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, the successor of Philippos son of Amyntas (or Balakros?), but again his participation in the battle is not otherwise documented.<sup>7</sup> In the final stages of the siege of Tyre, Alexander was determined not to break off the siege of Tyre and received steadfast support from Amyntas alone;<sup>8</sup> perhaps his recruiting mission in Makedonia was a reward for this support. Soon after the capture of Gaza (late 332), Alexander dispatched Amyntas to Makedonia with ten triremes for the purpose of enlisting reinforcements.<sup>9</sup> There he appears to have been overzealous in his recruitment: Gorgias, Gorgatas, and Hekataios, young men who had found favor with Olympias in Pella, were coerced against the queen mother's wishes, to serve in Asia, perhaps among the fifty Pages who accompanied Amyntas to Sousiana.<sup>10</sup> He rejoined the King near Sittakene in late 331, bringing 6,000 Makedonian infantry and 500 cavalry, along with 3,500 Thrakian foot and 600 horse, 4000 Peloponnesian mercenary foot and 380 cavalry, in addition to the fifty aforementioned Pages.<sup>11</sup>

Upon his return, Amyntas resumed the command of his battalion, which was sent with Koinos and Polyperchon, and some cavalry under Philotas, to bridge the Araxes River (Rud-i Kur) while Alexander dealt with Ariobarzanes at the Persian Gates.<sup>12</sup> In the Mardian campaign, his battalion and Koinos' accompanied the King; the same force was led by Alexander against Satibarzanes at Artakoana.<sup>13</sup>

But Amyntas and his brothers soon fell into disgrace on account of their friendship with Philotas, a connection which threatened their careers and lives. Arrian (3.27.1) says that the sons of Andromenes were charged with joining Philotas in a conspiracy against the King. But no one could prove that Philotas was actually involved in Dimnos' conspiracy, only that he had not passed on to Alexander information concerning the plot. Curtius (6.7.15) includes a certain Amyntas in the list of conspirators. The others were little known, like Dimnos himself, and only Demetrios the *somatophylax* stands out as a man of note. Hence Amyntas the conspirator may be an otherwise unknown individual with a common

6 Miletos Arr. 1.19.8; Myndos: Arr. 1.20.5–7.

7 Arr. 2.8.4; Curt. 3.9.7.

8 Diodorus 17.45.7; cf. Curt. 4.4.1–2, without naming Amyntas. Cf. Berve's claim (II, 27) that the scene "einem beliebten Effekt des Kleitarchos ihre Entstehung verdankt."

9 Diod. 17.49.1.

10 Curt. 7.1.38.

11 Curt. 5.1.41–2; Diod. 17.65.1 gives the same figures but makes the 3,500 Thrakian infantry "Trallians" and gives the number of Peloponnesian cavalry as "a little under a thousand"; cf. also Arr. 3.16.10.

12 Arr. 3.18.6; Curt. 5.4.20, 30 adds Polyperchon. Philotas is clearly Parmenion's son and not the infantry commander: see Bosworth I, 327 and Atkinson II, 97, against Berve II, 397 no. 803; Milns 1966c: 160.

13 Mardian campaign: Arr. 3.24.1. Artakoana: Arr. 3.25.6.

Makedonian name.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, it is possible that the charges brought against the son of Andromenes afterwards caused his name to be included (mis-takenly) in Curtius' list.<sup>15</sup>

The case against Amyntas did not amount to much: he had been arrogant in his dealings with Antiphanes, the *scriba equitum* (Curt. 7.1.15); during a recruiting mission to Makedonia, he had pressed into service some young men from Olympias' court (7.1.37–8), and indeed Olympias had written damaging letters about him and his brothers to her son (7.1.12); but, most of all, he had close ties of friendship with Philotas (7.1.11; cf. Arr. 3.27.1). Amyntas seems to have been coeval with Philotas, thus also a *syntrophos* of Amyntas son of Perdikkas and presumably a friend of Amyntas son of Antiochos: of the last two, one had been executed, the other fled to the Persian King and, after the battle of Issos, to Egypt, where he met his end. The charges against Philotas were more serious: culpable negligence on this occasion, treasonous conduct in Egypt in 331. And even now Philotas had to be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. Convicting Amyntas would be more difficult. Fully one-third of the Makedonian infantry could be expected to stand by him—his own battalion and that of Polyperchon; his brother Attalos had been raised at the Court with the Crown Prince, Alexander. The Philotas affair stopped short of a full-scale purge. But, before it was over, the casualties included Alexandros Lynkestes, Demetrios, Parmenion, and Philotas himself.<sup>16</sup>

After their acquittal in the trial that followed Philotas' arrest, there is no further mention of the sons of Andromenes in the accounts of the next two years, apart from Arrian's brief notice (3.27.3) that Amyntas was killed during the siege of a small town shortly after his exoneration. Suspicions that he was deliberately exposed to danger can be neither disproved nor proved. Amyntas may have exposed himself to unnecessary risk in an attempt to vindicate himself. Of Polemon and Simmias we hear nothing further during Alexander's lifetime, though the former reappears in the history of the Successors.<sup>17</sup> Simmias vanishes from our records completely.

### Simmias son of Andromenes

Berve II, 353–4 no. 704; Bosworth 1976a: 125, 1976b: 9–14; Bosworth I, 300–1; Heckel, *Who's Who* 249 “Simmias [1].”

14 Bosworth I, 360.

15 Cf. Badian 1960a: 334 n.30; Heckel 1975: 394–5. I no longer believe, as I argued in Heckel 1975 and 1994a: 69–70, that the Amyntas who attacked Philotas at this trial (Curt. 6.9.28) was the son of Andromenes. Curtius calls him *regius praetor*, which probably refers to one of the two hypaspist commanders of that name: Amyntas (patronymic unknown) or Amyntas Lynkestes (see Curt. 5.2.5); cf. Atkinson II, 233.

16 Alexander: Curt. 7.1.5–10. Demetrios: Arr. 3.27.5; Curt. 6.11.35 ff. Parmenion: Arr. 3.26.3–4; Curt. 7.2.11 ff.

17 Arr. *Succ.* 1.25; 24.1 ff.

Born c.360, Simmias appears to have been the second oldest of Andromenes' sons and the logical choice to command Amyntas' battalion in his absence.<sup>18</sup> Since Amyntas did not rejoin the expedition until after Gaugamela, his battalion was commanded on that occasion by Simmias. Thus Arrian (3.11.9). But the Vulgate names, in this context, Philippos son of Balakros (Diod. 17.57.3; Curt. 4.13.28, *phaligrus*). Until recently, it has been fashionable to reject the testimony of the popular tradition in favor of Arrian, but Bosworth argues that the former is more likely to be correct, that Arrian (Ptolemy) claimed that Simmias commanded his brother's unit "so that he could lay at his door, by implication at least, the break of the Makedonian line and the attack upon the base camp."<sup>19</sup> It may be, therefore, that because of Simmias' inexperience and the importance of the battle, Amyntas' battalion was commanded by Philippos son of Balakros, with Simmias in a subordinate role.<sup>20</sup>

Upon his return in late 331, Amyntas reclaimed the command of his battalion. The absence of Simmias from our records and the appointment of Attalos as Amyntas' successor as phalanx commander suggest that Simmias was deliberately passed over in favor of his younger brother because of his earlier associations with Philotas and Amyntas son of Perdikkas. The charge that Simmias was, indirectly, responsible for the attack on the Makedonian camp, may have been used to justify Alexander's decision to give Amyntas' command to Attalos, one of his own *syntrophoi*. On the other hand, Simmias may have left the army in 331/0 or died of illness. It is remotely possible that Sippas, whom Antipatros left in charge of Makedonia, when he moved south into Thessaly in 323 (Diod. 18.12.2), was in fact correctly named Simmias.<sup>21</sup> Identification with the son of Andromenes is made less likely by this man's limited military experience.

## Attalos son of Andromenes

Berve II, 92–3 no. 181; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 2158 no. 5; Schubert 1901: 547–8; Simpson 1957b; Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 125; Heckel 1979a and *Who's Who* 63–4 "Attalus [2]."

### *Early career*

A *somatophylax* (Royal Hypaspist) of Philip II in 336,<sup>22</sup> Attalos had undoubtedly been one of that King's Pages and a *syntrophos* of the Crown Prince, Alexander. Hence a birthdate c.356 is consistent with the evidence for Attalos' career before and after Alexander's reign. Nothing is known of his career

18 I suspect that Simmias was the name of his maternal grandfather, who was likewise the father of Polyperchon.

19 Bosworth 1976a: 14.

20 Bosworth 1976a: 14.

21 Cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 214, who suggests that Σίππας is also possible, perhaps even more likely. Sippas is otherwise unattested.

22 Diod. 16.94.4; cf. Heckel 1979a.

between 336 and 330, but two years after the family's brief disgrace at Phrada, Attalos is found at the head of Amyntas' battalion (Arr. 4.16.1). The curious fact that Attalos alone attained high office after 330 is ascribed by some scholars to the influence of Perdikkas. But the argument depends upon whether Attalos and Perdikkas were already brothers-in-law at this time.<sup>23</sup> Perdikkas is certainly not the only individual who could have intervened on behalf of the sons of Andromenes, if, in fact, anyone did. Berve (following Hoffmann)<sup>24</sup> assumed that Polyperchon, son of a certain Simmias, and Andromenes (both of Tymphaian origin) were related; I would suggest that a daughter of Simmias (hence a sister of Polyperchon) married Andromenes. If this is so, then Polyperchon may have supported the latter's sons at the time of the Philotas affair. The younger Simmias may have died, or perhaps left the army, while Polemon's youth and disgraceful flight from Alexander's camp will account for his failure to attain higher office before 323.

Attalos first appears as a phalanx commander in Baktria in 328; here he campaigns with Krateros, Gorgias, Polyperchon, and Meleagros (Arr. 4.16.1). In the following spring, he moved into Sogdiana with Krateros, Polyperchon, and Alketas (Arr. 4.22.1), where he received by letter the news of the Pages' conspiracy in Baktria (Plut. *Alex.* 55.6). During the Swat campaign, Attalos and his battalion served with Koinos, against the Aspasians (Arr. 4.24.1), and Alketas, in the siege of Ora (Arr. 4.27.5).

Curtius (8.13.21), in his account of the Hydaspes campaign, describes a certain Attalos as *aequalem sibi [sc. Alexandro] et haud disparem habitu oris et corporis*, which appears to suit the son of Andromenes. This man remained in the main camp, opposite Poros' forces, disguised as Alexander, who, in the meantime, took a portion of the army upstream in an effort to cross the river undetected. But the identification must be resisted.<sup>25</sup> Arrian (5.12.1) tells us that Attalos, Gorgias, and Meleagros were stationed halfway between the main camp and Alexander's crossing-point (cf. Schubert 1901: 547–8). Furthermore, the description of him in the *Metz Epitome* (58) as *Attalus quidam* suggests that we are not dealing with the well-known taxiarch. In 325 the son of Andromenes accompanied Krateros, Meleagros, and Antigenes—as well as Polyperchon?—westward to Karmania via Arachosia and Drangiana.<sup>26</sup>

In the eastern satrapies, Attalos had served with Alketas, the brother of Perdikkas, on two attested missions, but more often he is associated with the

23 For the view that they were related by marriage already in 336 see Welles, *Diodorus* 101 n.2: “Pausanias was from Orestis, and so were two of his slayers, while Attalus was Perdiccas' brother-in-law”; cf. Green, *Alexander* 108. Badian 1960a: 335 suspects that the relationship between Perdikkas and Attalos may have influenced the trial of the sons of Andromenes, after the Philotas affair; I myself echoed these suspicions in Heckel 1975: 393 n.5.

24 Berve no. 654; Heckel, *Who's Who* 226–31 “Polyperchon”; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 156 n.59.

25 Berve II, 93 thinks that the Attalos in question is the son of Andromenes but recognizes that the role assigned to him must be wrong.

26 Arr. 6.17.3. For Polyperchon see Justin 12.10.1.

more conservative leaders of the phalanx: Krateros, Koinos, Polyperchon, Meleagros.<sup>27</sup> Hence it is not surprising to find him closely linked with Meleagros in the days that followed Alexander's death. Koinos had died at the Hydaspes in 326; Krateros and Polyperchon were in Kilikia, bound for Makedonia. That left Attalos and Meleagros as natural allies, and the spokesmen of the infantry (cf. Justin 13.3.2, 7–8).

### *After Alexander's death*

Shortly after Alexander's death, dissension arose between the leaders of the cavalry and the phalanx over the matter of the succession: the cavalry officers, notably Perdikkas, favored the as-yet-unborn son of Roxane. He would, of course, require a regent, and the phalanx, impatient of any uncertainty, opted for the mentally deficient Arrhidaios, whom they elevated to the kingship against the wishes of the aristocratic leadership, solemnizing their decision by renaming him Philip. Meleagros son of Neoptolemos, a phalanx commander throughout Alexander's reign and the most distinguished of the infantry commanders who remained in Babylon, masterminded the *coup*. Justin, however, adds an interesting detail, claiming that the Perdikkan party sent Meleagros and Attalos to the infantry in order to win them over. These two men neglected their duties and chose instead to champion the cause of the phalanx (*legatos ad mitigandos eorum animos duos ex proceribus, Attalum et Meleagrum mittunt, qui potentiam ex vulgi adulazione quaerentes omissa legatione militibus consentiunt*).<sup>28</sup> Justin goes on to say that this Attalos sent men to murder Perdikkas (*Attalus ad interficiendum Perdiccam, ducem partis alterius, mittit . . . percussores*) but that the assassins lacked the resolve to carry out their mission (13.3.7–8).

Justin's Attalos (apparently unknown to Berve, who seldom discusses events after Alexander's death) is clearly the son of Andromenes, as the phrase *ex proceribus* implies; also, as a phalanx commander like Meleagros himself, he would have been a suitable candidate for such an embassy. But his role in these events has, unfortunately, been colored by the preconception that Attalos was already Perdikkas' relative and staunch supporter. Thus G. Wirth (1967: 291 n.37) supposes that Attalos' name was included in this passage for dramatic effect. Schachermeyr (*Babylon* 125) believes that Attalos son of Andromenes was in fact sent to the phalanx, but that Justin suffered a *lapsus memoriae* and ascribed to him actions taken by Meleagros alone. Attalos, he argues, would not have instigated the murder of his own brother-in-law; Justin must be in error.

27 Attalos' commands (328–325): with Alketas, Arr. 4.27.5; with Koinos, Arr. 4.24.1; Meleagros, Arr. 4.16.1; 5.12.1; 6.17.3; Krateros, Arr. 4.16.1 (implied by 4.17.1); 4.22.1; 5.12.1; 6.17.3; Polyperchon, Arr. 4.16.1, 22.1; implied by Justin 12.10.1 (to be taken with Arr. 6.17.3; cf. Bosworth 1976b: 129 n.65).

28 “[T]hey sent two of their officers, Attalos and Meleagros, as envoys to soothe the infantry's feelings; but, seeking to gain power by courting the mob, they abandoned their mission and threw in their lot with the soldiers” (Justin 13.3.2, J.C. Yardley, tr.). See Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 77–8.

Schachermeyr concludes that Justin made the mistake “da [er] bei Trogus wohl kaum vermerkt fand, dass Attalos ein Schwager des Perdikkas gewesen sei . . .” (*Babylon* 125). Meleagros is singled out by all the sources because he was the most important of the legates sent to the infantry (Justin names only two, but Diod. 18.2.2 implies that there were more), and because he was liquidated by Perdikkas on account of his intrigues and his “treason.” Attalos was thus overshadowed by Meleagros, and his role can only be understood if his relationship with Perdikkas is placed in the proper historical context.

Now, as it happens, it makes little difference whether Attalos or Meleagros instigated the attempted murder, though if it was the former, we should have virtual proof that he was not yet married to Perdikkas’ sister. What does matter is that both Attalos and Meleagros were actively supporting the cause of the conservative infantry, which is exactly what we should expect. And it is totally wrong to argue that relationship by marriage prevented Attalos from opposing Perdikkas. We know only as much as Diodorus tells us: that at the time of her death in 320, Perdikkas’ sister, Atalante, was Attalos’ wife (18.37.2). Knowledge of this union has prejudiced our interpretation of Attalos’ role in the events of 323.

Atalante’s presence in her brother’s camp in Egypt demands an explanation. Unlike the Persian aristocracy, the Makedonians were not in the habit of bringing their womenfolk along on campaigns. We have the unequivocal example of the “newly-weds”—who included Meleagros, Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, and Koinos—who returned to their wives over the winter of 334/3; Koinos’ wife, the daughter of Parmenion, remained in Makedonia raising their son, Perdikkas.<sup>29</sup> It is hard to imagine that Attalos would summon to Asia the wife he had not seen for ten to fourteen years only to subject her to the dangers of civil war. There is only one plausible reason for Atalante’s presence in the camp: she had only recently been summoned by Perdikkas in order that she might marry Attalos and thus seal a political union, much like (though on a smaller scale) those involving Nikaia and Kleopatra (Diod. 18.23; Justin 13.6.4–7; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21, 26). Atalante’s marriage to Attalos concluded an earlier agreement between Perdikkas and the son of Andromenes, which won for the guardian of the Kings the support of the Tymphaian infantry.

When Alexander died, the most prominent leaders of the phalanx (Krateros and Polyperchon, along with Gorgias, White Kleitos, and the hypaspist/argyrapсид commander Antigenes) were absent in Kilikia. Koinos had died shortly after espousing the cause of the common soldiery at the Hyphasis. The remaining battalion commanders included Meleagros, Attalos, and Alketas, as well

29 For Koinos’ marriage to Parmenion’s daughter see Curt. 6.9.30, supported by Arr. 1.24.1, 29.4. See also Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 332, where the son, Perdikkas, is named. See also Berse II, 312–3 no. 626. Those women who did come to Asia, such as Stratonike and Phila, joined their husbands after they had been appointed satraps and had taken up permanent residence in Kelainai and Tarsos respectively.

as the commander of light infantry, Philotas (a known supporter of Krateros). To judge from the hostility of the phalanx towards Perdikkas, Alketas' influence cannot have been significant, and, when Perdikkas and his supporters were forced to withdraw from Babylon, Alketas is unlikely to have remained behind. There is no reason to suppose that the other three supported Perdikkas at this point. Meleagros certainly did not, while Philotas remained loyal to Krateros throughout the period of the First Diadoch War; Perdikkas later deposed him from the satrapy of Kilikia for this very reason.<sup>30</sup> Attalos too belonged to this conservative faction: he had been a friend of the other Philotas, Parmenion's son, and was, in the very late stages of the campaign associated with those battalion commanders who opposed Alexander's orientalism.<sup>31</sup> These men presented a united front against Perdikkas, who attempted to preserve the unity of the empire and Alexander's oriental policies. Attalos, by virtue of his family connections and his leadership of the conservative *pezhetairoi*, very likely shared the sentiments of the common soldiery, whom Meleagros had incited. Only in 321/0 does he appear as a supporter of Perdikkas, together with his brother Polemon.<sup>32</sup>

We are told that, not long after the rift occurred between the cavalry and the infantry, Perdikkas effected a reconciliation. The cavalry had cut off the grain supply to the city, and the infantry were uncertain about the course of action to be taken: should the matter be decided by arms or diplomacy? Suspicion prevailed, and the ill will of the troops soon turned against Meleagros, whom they held chiefly responsible for their predicament.<sup>33</sup> We are told that the negotiations were carried out by Pasas the Thessalian, Amissos (read "Damis") of Megalopolis, and Perilaos (Perillos),<sup>34</sup> but we are not told who the peacemakers among the infantry were. Meleagros was given, for the moment, the rank of hyparch—in essence, he was Perdikkas' lieutenant, charged with protecting

<sup>30</sup> Justin 13.6.16: *Cilicia Philotae adempta Philoxeno datur*. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 24.2: Φιλόταν μὲν τὸν ἔχατράπην τῆς χώρας ἐπιτήδειον τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατερὸν γιγνώσκων παρέλυσεν τῆς ἀρχῆς, Φιλόξενον δὲ ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν κατέστησεν. See also Berve no. 803; Heckel, *Who's Who* 219 "Philotas [6]."

<sup>31</sup> Opposition to Alexander's policies: Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–10 (Krateros); Curt. 8.5.22 ff. (*Polyperchon*); Curt. 8.12.17–8 (Meleagros); and Curt. 9.3.3–16, Arr. 5.27.2–28.1 (*Koinos*). Cf. Niese I, 194 n.1: "da Attalos mit Meleagros eng verbunden war und sicherlich neben ihm ein hohes Amt bekleidete."

<sup>32</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 24.1; cf. 1.25, where Polemon alone is mentioned. See also Badian 1967b: 189 n.34.

<sup>33</sup> Curt. 10.8.5 says that the soldiers were angry with Meleagros because he instigated the attempted murder of Perdikkas. This would argue against Justin's (13.3.7) claim that Attalos was responsible, but it does not alter the fundamental fact that Attalos was nevertheless a supporter of the phalanx against the leaders of the cavalry. Niese I, 194 n.1 is probably wrong in believing that Attalos instigated the murder, though he correctly draws attention to Attalos' close connections with Meleagros. Attalos may well have read the changing mood of the army and exploited the bad feeling towards Meleagros. For the mood of the army see Curt. 10.8.9; for their deliberations on a course of action, 10.8.12.

<sup>34</sup> Damis: Heckel, *Who's Who* 102 "Damis [2]"; Berve II, 25 resists the identification (by emendation) of Amissos (Curt. 10.8.15) with Damis. Pasas: Berve II, 206–7 no. 608; Heckel, *Who's Who* 192. Perilaos (Perillos): Berve II, 317 no. 630; Heckel, *Who's Who* 202–3 "Perilaus [1]" (possibly Greek); Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 199 (following Berve's identification of him as Makedonian).

the interests of Krateros, who had been named *prostatae* of Philip Arrhidaios—but he was quickly liquidated, without opposition and unlamented.<sup>35</sup> The key to Perdikkas' success in achieving this reconciliation, and in eliminating the troublesome Meleagros, was his ability to win the support of Attalos and his military followers.

To seal the alliance, Perdikkas offered his sister, Atalante, to Attalos as wife. She was summoned some time later and arrived in Asia Minor in order to complete the arrangement and consummate the marriage. When Attalos was sent out with the fleet, she remained with her brother and, ultimately, shared his fate.<sup>36</sup> For Attalos the alliance was a costly miscalculation. Atalante bound him to a losing cause.

First attested in Perdikkas' service during the winter of 321/0, Attalos attempted, with his brother Polemon, to recover Alexander's funeral carriage. This had been diverted from its westerly route at Damaskos by Arrhidaios, who was taking it to Egypt against the express orders of Perdikkas.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, Ptolemy had come with an army to escort the King's body to his own satrapy (Diod. 18.28.3). Consequently, Attalos' efforts were thwarted and he rejoined Perdikkas, who had now invaded Kilikia and deposed Philotas.

Here Perdikkas equipped two fleets. One, led by Aristonous, the former *somatophylax*, was to suppress the Ptolemaic faction on the island of Kypros. The other was entrusted to Attalos, who skirted the coast of Phoinikia and secured the Pelousiac mouth of the Nile, where he remained, guarding the entrance to the Delta against the naval forces of Antigonos and Antipatros. Attalos was near Pelousion in May 320 when he received word that Perdikkas had been assassinated and Atalante murdered by the raging army (Diod. 18.37.3). From Pelousion, he took the fleet to Tyre, where the Makedonian garrison commander Archelaos received him into the city and handed back 800 talents, which Perdikkas deposited there for safekeeping. There too Attalos received those troops who had remained loyal to the Perdikkian cause and had fled from the army near Memphis (Diod. 18.37.3–4). There were further defections at Triparadeisos, where Attalos appeared in person (Arr. *Succ.* 1.33, 39) to incite the army, which now rejected the leadership of Peithon and Arrhidaios.<sup>38</sup> Attalos thus gathered a force of 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, with which he set sail for Karia, intending to attack Knidos, Kaunos, and Rhodes.<sup>39</sup> But the Rhodians, led by their navarch Demaratos, defeated him,

35 Meleagros' death: Diod. 18.4.7; Arr. *Succ.* 1.4; Justin 13.4.7–8; Curt. 10.9.7–21, esp. 20–1.

36 Diod. 18.37.2. The “daughters of Attalos” who accompanied Olympias to Pydna in the winter of 317/16 and were captured along with Roxane and Alexander IV (Diod. 19.35.5), were probably the children of Attalos and Atalante. Like Roxane and her son, they will have returned to Makedonia with Antipatros after the settlement of Triparadeisos. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 276–7 F38–9.

37 Arr. *Succ.* 1.25 (naming Polemon alone); *Succ.* 24.1 (line 3: [οἱ] ἀμφ' Ἀτταλον καὶ Πολέμωνα).

38 Cf. Errington 1970: 67 n.131; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 278 n. 6; Billows, *Antigonos* 68.

39 Arr. *Succ.* 1.39. Arrian's account does not say that Attalos and his fleet actually attacked the Kaunians and Knidians. Either these states joined forces with the Rhodians, with the credit for

and Attalos soon rejoined that portion of the Perdikkan army under Alketas, which had only recently separated from Eumenes in Phrygia.<sup>40</sup>

### ***The war against Antigonos***

Reunited, Alketas and Attalos successfully repulsed an attack from the Karian satrap Asandros, acting on Antipatros' orders (Arr. *Succ.* 1.41). Nevertheless, they now withdrew into Pisidia, where in the following year, they were defeated near Kretopolis by Antigonos.<sup>41</sup> Attalos was captured, together with his brother Polemon, Dokimos, and two otherwise unattested commanders named Antipatros and Philotas.<sup>42</sup> They were imprisoned in a secure fortress which, although unnamed, appears to have been in Greater Phrygia; for Stratonike, Antigonos' wife, who resided in Kelainai, was said to have been nearby (Diod. 19.16.4).<sup>43</sup> In 317, when Antigonos had moved to the East to campaign against Eumenes, the captives overpowered their guards and planned to escape, but Attalos' health was failing and the Antigonid forces from neighboring garrisons arrived quickly to lay siege to the place. Dokimos, who had planned the whole affair, escaped by a secret route and betrayed his former comrades. The fortress was recaptured after a siege of one year and four months.<sup>44</sup> If Attalos lived to see its capture, he did not outlive it by much.

the victory going to Rhodes and Demaratos, or Attalos' strike against them was pre-empted by the Rhodian victory. Berthold 1984: 60 treats them as separate battles. Hauben, *Vloot*. 21, speaks of “een aanval op Rhodos en de tegenover gelegen steden Knidos en Kaunos,” as if referring to a single engagement.

- 40 The rupture between Alketas and Eumenes: Plut. *Eum.* 8.8. Alketas' supporters were Polemon and Dokimos. Plutarch's failure to mention Attalos may be an oversight, but it appears more likely that Attalos did not rejoin Alketas until the latter had moved into Karia.
- 41 Diod. 18.44–5, 50.1. Diod. 18.41.7 says that Antigonos set out against Alketas and Attalos, “who commanded the entire fleet” (*τὸν τοῦ στόλου παντὸς κυριεύοντα*). What had become of Attalos' fleet, or what remained of it after its defeat by the Rhodians, we do not know. Hauben, *Vloot*. 22–3 thinks Attalos' fleet might have been at anchor in Lykia or Pamphylia.
- 42 Diod. 18.45.3; 19.16.1. Dokimos, who is unattested in the Alexander historians, had been a supporter of Perdikkas, capturing Babylon and deposing Archon, who had collaborated with Arrhidaios in the diverting of Alexander's corpse to Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 24.3–5). After the failure of Perdikkas' expedition he joined Alketas and Eumenes, but was reluctant to serve the latter (Plut. *Eum.* 8.8). He served with Alketas in Karia (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.41) and at Kretopolis (Diod. 18.44–5), where he was captured (Diod. 18.45.3). Imprisoned in Greater Phrygia (?), he planned to escape, eventually betraying his comrades to Antigonos' forces (Diod. 19.16; cf. Simpson 1957b: 504–5). Antigonos took him into his service, and in 313 Dokimos and Medios captured Miletos (Diod. 19.75.3–4). Shortly before the battle of Ipsos (301), Dokimos went over to Lysimachos and secured for him Pergamon, together with its wealth and the treasurer Philetairos (Paus. 1.8.1; cf. Diod. 20.107.4–5). For his career see also Billows, *Antigonos* 382–3 no. 35; Berve no. 285 (very brief); Kaerst *RE V* (1905) 1274 nos. 4–5. Antipatros cannot be identified; Philotas may have been the chiliarch (or pentakosiarch) of Curt. 5.2.5.
- 43 Ramsay 1920: 107 identifies it as Afiom-Kara-Hissar (Leontos-Kephalai).
- 44 Diod. 19.16 for the full account. For Attalos' poor health, caused by incarceration, see 19.16.3. The length of the siege: 19.16.5. Diodorus does not say what became of the prisoners, but it is likely that they were executed.

## Polemon son of Andromenes

Berve II, 322 no. 644; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 157; Simpson 1957b; Bosworth I, 363–4; Heckel, *Who's Who* 224–5 “Polemon [3].”

About Polemon we know very little indeed. Born soon after 350, he was the youngest of four brothers: he appears to have been in his late teens when Amyntas was implicated in the Philotas affair (Curtius 7.2.4 describes him as *iuvensis . . . primo aetatis flore pubescens*). Thus he was probably a Page or a Royal Hypaspist in 330. His flight from the camp on the occasion of Philotas’ arrest heightened suspicions that Amyntas and his brothers had been in some way involved in the affair (Arr. 3.27.1–2; Curt. 7.1.10). But Polemon was persuaded by Amyntas to return and, in the subsequent trial, acquitted (Arr. 3.27.3; cf. Curt. 7.2.1–10 for a different version).<sup>45</sup>

Nothing else is known of his career during the King’s lifetime. Alexander was undoubtedly distrustful of the youth. But the subsequent marriage of Attalos to Perdikkas’ sister Atalante brought the sons of Andromenes into renewed prominence. Perdikkas sent Polemon (Arr. *Succ.* 1.25),<sup>46</sup> together with Attalos (Arr. *Succ.* 24.1), to prevent the funeral carriage of Alexander from continuing south to Egypt. But Arrhidaios, supported now by Ptolemy, rebuffed them, despite repeated attempts, and sent them back to Perdikkas empty-handed. Whether Polemon served with the land army that approached Memphis or remained with his brother and the fleet, we cannot say. Certainly he is found with Attalos and Alketas (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.8) after Perdikkas’ death: at Kretopolis (319) Polemon, Attalos, Dokimos, Antipatros, and Philotas were captured by Antigonos (Diod. 18.45.3; 19.16.1). Imprisoned in a fortress not far from Kelainai, he and his fellow captives made a desperate bid for freedom, only to be hemmed in and besieged for one year and four months (Diod. 19.16). In all likelihood, he was executed upon his surrender.<sup>47</sup>

45 According to Curtius, Polemon was captured by others and brought in after Amyntas had made his defense; his tears contributed in no small way to the acquittal of Amyntas. Bosworth I, 364 argues that Ptolemy misrepresented the facts—because Polemon was later an enemy of his—suggesting that Polemon owed his acquittal to Amyntas. Curtius 7.2.1 does not, however, say that Polemon returned of his own volition (thus Bosworth, *ibid.*), and in this respect Arrian’s version is perhaps more sympathetic. Now much of Curtius’ account is heavily dramatized and the trial of Amyntas is clearly modelled on that of M. Terentius, who had been a friend of Sejanus; cf. Devine 1979: 150 ff., building on the work of Sumner 1961. Curtius 7.2.4, plausibly, adds that Polemon was carried away by the panic among the cavalrymen who had served Philotas: he was not the only one to flee the camp.

46 Simonettoni Agostinetti 1993: 63–5.

47 Cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 383 s.v. “Dokimos”; Simpson 1957b.

# 13 Polyperchon

Berve II, 325–6 no. 654; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 156; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.97 ff.; Lenschau, *RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1798–806 no. 1; Bengtson, *Diadochen* 39 ff.; Errington, *Hist. Mac.* 123 ff.; Heckel, *LDT* 48–54, *Who's Who* 226–31, 2007a; Paschidis 2008; Carney 2014.

Polyperchon son of Simmias<sup>1</sup> began as a major player in the wars that followed the death of Antipatros in late 319, wars fought with equal (or, sometimes, greater) vigor by political pamphleteers and partisan historians. Hence Plutarch, drawing on an unnamed source, implies that Pyrrhos admired the man's generalship, yet Douris of Samos, in the seventeenth book of his *Histories*, said that Polyperchon, though he was an old man and held in honor by the Makedonians, would dance whenever he was under the influence of wine, and that he would wear a saffron robe and Sikyonian slippers.<sup>2</sup> The latter scene recalls Philip II, who was chided after the victory at Chaeronea for “playing Thersites when history had cast him in the role of Agamemnon.”<sup>3</sup> Aelian (*VH* 12.43) adds that Polyperchon once made his living as a brigand (ἐλήστευε), possibly a slanderous

1 The form Πολυσπέρχων found in some literary sources (Plut. *Mor.* 184c; Ael. *VH* 12.43; Athen. 4.155c) is etymologically sound (“eilig,” Pape-Benseler 1230), but the epigraphic and papyrological evidence supports Polyperchon, as found in the Latin sources (cf. Polypercon): *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 387 (an Athenian decree of 319/8), line 8; *OGIS* I, 4, line 24 (with n.14); I, 5, line 39; cf. *P.Cas.* 30.5 for the occurrence of the name in Egypt. Son of Simmias: Arr. 2.12.2; 3.11.9.

2 Generalship: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8.7; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 184c. Anecdotes of this sort are meant to illustrate a point, namely that Pyrrhos cared more for military matters than the arts, and thus the name of the general is not strictly relevant. On the other hand, Polyperchon appears to have had close contact with Epeiros and Aitolia.

Robe and slippers: Douris *ap.* Athen. 4.155c = *FGrH* 76 F12. Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.97, describing Polyperchon as “ein jovialer alter Herr, der gern einmal eins über den Durst trank, und es dann nicht unter seiner Würde hielt, einen Tanz zu riskieren,” is not sufficiently skeptical of Douris (cf. Bengtson, *Diadochen* 39). For old men dancing, colorful robes, and Sikyonian slippers, see the discussion in Carney 2014: 24–5. See also Pownall 2013: 50; Landucci, *Duride* 125. For Douris’ mockery of the extravagance and decadence of famous men see Kebric, *Duris* 21, 34. The episode, if true, belongs to the period 307–301 (Kebric, *Duris* 50; but see Landucci, *Duride* 73, between 297 and 293).

3 Philip II as Thersites: Diod. 16.87.1–2.

charge that originated in the age of the Successors or, what is more likely, a misunderstanding of Curtius (or his source).<sup>4</sup> Driven from the Makedonian homeland, he saw many reversals of fortune in his struggles to assert his authority. Though tenacious, resilient, and surprisingly durable, he nevertheless ceased to be reckoned among the great Diadochoi. He had become little more than a marauder, a jackal among lions.<sup>5</sup>

Polyperchon was of Tymphaian origin.<sup>6</sup> Hence Berve (II, 440: Stamma Baum V: “Fürstenhaus von Tymphaia”) assumes that Andromenes and Polyperchon were brothers, sons of the elder Simmias. But their relationship might be more distant. Possibly Andromenes married a sister of Polyperchon; their (second?) child, Simmias, thus bears the name of the maternal grandfather. That Amyntas son of Andromenes was named for his paternal grandfather is consistent with Greek and Makedonian practice, but we know too little about the occurrence of the names of maternal grandfathers to establish any rules. Nevertheless if Polyperchon and the sons of Andromenes were connected by marriage rather than blood, it becomes easier to explain their lack of cooperation in the late 320s.

## Family and early career

Born between 390 and 380, Polyperchon was among the prominent veterans sent home in 324 from Opis.<sup>7</sup> His son, Alexandros, can scarcely have been born long after the late 340s: he was appointed *somatophylax* of Philip III Arrhidaios at Triparadeisos in 320 and was old enough to lead an army in 319/8.<sup>8</sup> Lenschau’s (*RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1798) identification of Polyperchon with the mercenary of the same name, who served Kallippos at Rhegion and took part in his murder in 351/0 (*Plut. Dion* 58.6), should be rejected as implausible.

<sup>4</sup> This comment in Ael. *VH* 12.43 derives from either the propaganda wars of the Successors (Heckel 1994a: 75) or, possibly, Curtius’ remark 4.13.8: *latrunculorum . . . et furum ista sollertia est quam praecipitus mihi* (cf. *Plut. Alex.* 31.12: οὐ κλέπτω τὴν νίκην) about “stealing of victory,” in the manner of thieves (see Heckel 2007a). It is possible, however, that his Tymphaian origin has something to do with the slander. Cf. Hammond 1967a: 685, whose reference to Strabo I have not been able to track down: τὸ δὲ ἔθνος ἐπιεικῶς παράβολόν τε καὶ βάρβαρον καὶ ληστείας ἐπιεικῶς προσκείμενον.

<sup>5</sup> Landucci, *Diodoro* 217, describing the situation in 319, calls him “un personaggio di secondo piano.” He was certainly not the equal of men like Krateros, Perdikcas, and Antipatros, but he earned his reputation for mediocrity by squandering the opportunity he was presented with.

<sup>6</sup> Tzetz. *ad Lyc.* 800 calls him ὁ Τυμφαῖος Αἰθίκων βασιλεύς; Diod. 17.57.2; cf. 20.28.1; Hackmann 1902: 10. Carney 2014: 3 makes a plausible case for making Polyperchon a member of Tymphaia’s ruling house. For his connection to the sons of Andromenes see *Stemma VII*.

<sup>7</sup> Justin 12.12.8 names also Antigenes, Gorgias, Kleitos, Polydamas.

<sup>8</sup> Alexandros son of Polyperchon: Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 1435 no. 13; Berve II, 21 no. 39; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 20 “Alexander [6]”; G. Wirth, *Kl. Pauly* I, 250 no. 9. *Somatophylax* of Philip III: Arr. *Succ.* 1.38. Commander of a force sent to Attika: Diod. 18.65.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1. Married to Kratesipolis no later than 315/4: Diod. 19.67.1; cf. *Plut. Demetr.* 9.5.

Although he was a contemporary of Philip II,<sup>9</sup> nothing is known of Polyperchon's career during that man's reign. What motivated the grant of *proxenia* from Delphoi in the archonship of Sarpadon (335/4), a year in which much of Greece was antipathetic to the new King, Alexander, is unclear.<sup>10</sup> It appears that Polyperchon set out for Asia with Alexander in 334 and, late in the following year, assumed command of the Tymphaian battalion of *pezhetairoi* (or, rather, *asthetairoi*), replacing Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, who fell at Issos; thus he is found at Gaugamela, leading the “so-called Stymphaians” ( $\tauῶν ὄνομαζομένων Στυμφαιῶν$ ), between the battalions of Meleagros and Amyntas.<sup>11</sup>

Curtius tells us that Polyperchon supported Parmenion's proposal of a night attack at Gaugamela, thus eliciting reproach from Alexander, who declared: “The subterfuge you recommend to me is characteristic of brigands and thieves.”<sup>12</sup> The criticism was directed in other sources against Parmenion himself, but Curtius says that Alexander was reluctant to find fault with his general a second time—he had been excessively harsh only shortly before—and thus singled out Polyperchon. Some of this may be explained in terms of Curtius' narrative technique; for he put much more thought into his compositions than many have given him credit for. But the question remains: why Polyperchon?<sup>13</sup> In the light of his family connections with sons of Andromenes, whose friendship with Philotas is well attested, the choice is not unusual. Perhaps the story belongs to the hostile tradition of the late fourth century, possibly originating with Douris and known to Curtius through Timagenes of Alexandria.<sup>14</sup> At any rate, Plutarch's comment that “the older *hetairoi*, and especially Parmenion” favored a night attack shows that the basic elements of Curtius' story were already in place. It is not the only time Polyperchon is cast in a negative (and embarrassing) role, and the explanation must be that he was vilified by his enemies in the age of the Successors.

At the Persian Gates (winter 331/0), Polyperchon, Amyntas, and Koinos, along with some cavalry under Philotas' command, were sent ahead to bridge the Araxes river, while Alexander dealt with Ariobarzanes. This, at least, is the version given by Curtius (5.4.20, 30). Arrian (3.18.6) does not mention Polyperchon,

<sup>9</sup> Carney 2014: 2 n.4 suggests that he may have been “younger than Philip, but probably not much younger.” He was thus coeval with Antigonos Monophthalmos. Carney also notes that Tymphaia had strong ties to Epeiros (Strabo 7.7.8 C326) and that, at the time of his birth, the canton had not yet been annexed by the Makedonian king (2014: 2–3); cf. Cross 1932: 130 n.3. Ellis, *Philip II* 91 (cf. Hammond 1967a: 533–4) dates its incorporation in the Makedonian kingdom to c.350. For a description of the region see Hammond 1967a: 680–1.

<sup>10</sup> SEG XVII, 230; Bousquet 1957: 487–9; discussed by Arnush 1995 and 2000: 300–2. Delphoi was at the same time honoring Thessalians and Aitolians.

<sup>11</sup> Arr. 3.11.9; cf. Diod. 17.57.2–3 and Curt. 4.13.28, both with textual problems; Atkinson I, 422–3. For “Stymphaia” cf. Diod. 20.28.1. The death of Ptolemaios son of Seleukos: Arr. 2.12.2. For the view that Polyperchon and Amyntas both commanded Tymphaians see Heckel 2009b: 107.

<sup>12</sup> Curt. 4.13.8.

<sup>13</sup> Heckel 1994a.

<sup>14</sup> The hostile portrait of Polyperchon: Atkinson I, 415–6. Douris of Samos: Kebric, *Douris* 20–1, 51.

and it is unclear whether this can be attributed to Ptolemy's bias. The accounts can, however, be reconciled by assuming that Polyperchon's force was detached at some point, while Amyntas, Koinos, and Philotas continued toward the Araxes.<sup>15</sup> Polyperchon is not heard of again until 328, when he is left at Baktra with Meleagros, Attalos, and Gorgias, during Alexander's cavalry campaigns in Sogdiana. Their instructions were to protect the area against the incursions of rebels like Spitamenes.<sup>16</sup>

### The *proskynesis* episode

According to Curtius (8.5.22–6.1), Polyperchon mocked the Persians who did *proskynesis* at Alexander's court in 327. Consequently, he was roughly handled and imprisoned by the King. Arrian (4.12.2) gives a less dramatic account, naming Leonnatos, apparently the true culprit. Berve, nevertheless, accepts Curtius' story as historical, and in keeping with Polyperchon's nature.<sup>17</sup> Such behavior might indeed have been consistent with Polyperchon's character (as far as this may be determined), but his role in the affair must be rejected, on Curtius' own evidence. Arrian tells us that in 327 Polyperchon, Attalos, and Alketas were left behind in Sogdiana, under the command of Krateros, to complete the subjugation of Paraitakene, while Alexander returned to Baktria.<sup>18</sup> Curtius (8.5.2) records Polyperchon's mission before the unsuccessful experiment with *proskynesis* in Baktra (8.5.5 ff.). Furthermore, Krateros and his force were still in Sogdiana when the Hermolaos conspiracy was uncovered; for we are told that Alexander informed them of it by letter.<sup>19</sup> Plutarch says that the letter was addressed to Krateros, Attalos, and Alketas. His failure to mention Polyperchon indicates merely that he was absent from Krateros' camp: Polyperchon was conducting a separate mission in the region of Bubacene at that time.<sup>20</sup> Certainly it is unlikely that he completed this mission and returned to Baktra in time to witness the *proskynesis* ceremony.

Once again, one must ask: did Curtius himself introduce him into this episode, or is this the version of Kleitarchos (or of an intermediary source)? Diodorus' version is, unfortunately, lost; the summary of Book 17 gives no clue to how the episode might have been handled. Nor do Justin-Trogus and the *Metz Epitome*

15 Thus Speck 2002: 68 n.61; for his attack on Ariobarzanes' position see Speck 2002: 180–1; also Moritani 2014: 124 Fig. 23.

16 Arr. 4.16.1. The commander-in-chief of the contingent in Baktria must have been Krateros (cf. Arr. 4.17.1). Lenschau, *RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1799, mistakenly asserts that these men were left behind in Baktria, when Alexander advanced into India(!), "doch wurden seine Truppen später nachgezogen."

17 Berve II, 326: "die Tatsache selbst ist nicht zu bezweifeln, zumal sie zu dem starr makedonischen Charakter des P. stimmt . . ." Cf. Lenschau, *RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1799.

18 Arr. 4.22.1.

19 Plut. *Alex.* 55.6; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 155.

20 Curt. 8.5.2. Bubacene cannot be located with certainty: cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 144; his Map 25 locates it northeast of Paraitakene between the Wakhsh and Amu Darya.

offer any clues. Plutarch, on the other hand, has a similar story about Kassandros at Babylon.<sup>21</sup> But it is a common theme in the history of the Successors that Alexander was at one time or another hostile to them,<sup>22</sup> and the stories that Kassandros and Polyperchon were roughly treated for their opposition to Alexander may have been influenced by their antipathy after the King's death or, in Polyperchon's case, by his general unpopularity.<sup>23</sup>

### The Indian campaign

As the army moved towards India, Polyperchon remained directly under Alexander's command, while Perdikkas and Hephaistion led the advance party to the Indus.<sup>24</sup> In the early stages, he accompanied Krateros, whom Alexander left in the vicinity of Andaka to subdue the neighboring towns.<sup>25</sup> Once this mission had been completed Polyperchon rejoined Alexander briefly at Arigaion, only to be left there again with Krateros to fortify the city, which the Indians had put to the torch and abandoned.<sup>26</sup> Reunited with Alexander a second time, he joined in the attack on the Assakenoi (Arr. 4.25.6) and fought at Massaga.<sup>27</sup> Curtius (8.11.1) says that it was Polyperchon who was sent to attack Ora (MSS. Nora); Arrian (4.27.5) names only Attalos, Alketas, and Demetrios the hipparch. Has Curtius again inserted Polyperchon's name in error?<sup>28</sup> This seems unlikely, since those earlier passages where Polyperchon obtrudes appear to come from a hostile source, and the details concerning Ora are flattering. Arrian may have omitted Polyperchon's name through oversight. But the details are significantly different, and it looks suspiciously as if Arrian (Ptolemy?) denies Polyperchon's capture of Ora and gives it instead to the King himself.

For the remainder of the Indian campaign, Polyperchon is regularly found in that contingent of the army led by Krateros. At the Hydaspes, his battalion, and that of Alketas, remained with Krateros in the main camp, across the river from Poros' position, and thus played only a secondary role in the defeat of Alexander's most formidable Indian adversary (Arr. 5.11.3; cf. 5.15.3 ff.). In the descent of the Indus river system, Polyperchon served briefly under Hephaistion,

21 Plut. *Alex.* 74.3: ὁ δὲ Αλέξανδρος ὠργίσθη, καὶ δραξάμενος αὐτοῦ τῶν τριχῶν σφόδρα ταῖς χερσὶν ἀμφοτέραις, ἔπαισε τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον (cf. Curt. 8.5.24: *tum detractum eum [sc. Polyperonta] lecto rex praecepsit in terram et, cum is pronus corruiisset . . . inquit . . .*).

22 Ael. *VH* 12.16; 14.47a; Justin 15.3.3–10.

23 Cf. Berve II, 326: "die wenig sympathische Rolle, die er in den Diadochenkämpfen spielte . . ."

24 The battalions of *asthetairoi* all remained with Alexander (Arr. 4.23.1).

25 Arr. 4.23.5 (Krateros at Andaka). Alexander left Andaka with only the battalions of Koinos and Attalos (Arr. 4.24.1). Alketas and Polyperchon clearly remained with Krateros. For the possibility that Andaka is to be found in Justin's reference to Daedalan mountain (12.7.9; for a town of that name see Steph. Byz. s.v. Δαιδαλα) see McCrindle: 194 n.2; Bosworth II, 158 equates Andaka with the "fortified town" mentioned by *ME* 35.

26 Arr. 4.24.6–7.

27 Arr. 4.26.1–27.4.

28 Thus Berve II, 326, followed by Lenschau, *RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1799.

but was soon transferred to the west bank, thus rejoining Krateros (Arr. 6.5.5). Whether Polyperchon left India with Krateros or continued with Alexander through Gedrosia is uncertain. Justin (12.10.1) mentions Polyperchon's departure for Babylonia just before Alexander's Gedrosian march. But Justin regularly substitutes the name of Polyperchon for Krateros (cf. 13.8.5, 7; 15.1.1). It was shortly before Alexander reached the mouth of the Indus that he sent Krateros to Karmania via Arachosia and Drangiana: according to Arrian (6.17.3), Krateros took with him the battalions of Attalos, Meleagros, Antigenes, as well as those *hetairoi* and other Makedones who were unfit for military service. Polyperchon does resurface in the company of Krateros, at Opis in 324, but, unless Arrian has failed to mention him (deliberately or by accident), there is no good reason for preferring the evidence of Justin, who appears once more to have confused the two marshals.<sup>29</sup>

## Return to the West

When Krateros was sent from Opis, with some 10,000 discharged veterans, to replace Antipatros as regent of Makedonia, Polyperchon was designated his second-in-command; for Krateros was in very poor health, and it was not at all certain that he would survive the journey (Arr. 7.12.4; cf. Justin 12.12.8). Arrian explains the purpose of this appointment: "so that, if something should happen to Krateros along the way, . . . those who were making the journey would not lack a general" (7.12.4). And, from this wording, one might conclude that Polyperchon's status pertained only to the journey home. But Alexander was eager to replace Antipatros and for the latter to bring reinforcements to him in Asia, and it is doubtful that he would have sent Krateros, whose chances of surviving the trip home were questionable, without designating an alternative regent. That man must have been Polyperchon.

At the time of Alexander's death (June 323), Polyperchon, Krateros, and the veterans had not advanced beyond Kilikia, where they now remained for a second winter. In 322, they answered Antipatros' call and returned to Makedonia and Thessaly. Augmenting the Makedonian forces, they contributed in no small way to the defeat of Antiphilos at Krannon.<sup>30</sup> What role Polyperchon played, either militarily or politically, during the Lamian War is impossible to determine. But, when Krateros and Antipatros made a truce with the Aitolians in the winter of 321/0, in order to give themselves a free hand to deal with Perdikkas (Diod. 18.25.4–5), Polyperchon was entrusted with the defense of Makedonia in their absence (Justin 13.6.9). The Aitolians, however, had made a secret pact with Perdikkas to invade Thessaly in order to distract Antipatros. Quickly they attacked Amphissa, defeating and killing the Makedonian general, Polykles,

29 On the confusion see Schachermeyr 1920: 332–3; Boerma, *Justinus* 199; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 158, 218.

30 Diod. 18.16.4 ff.

who had been left behind in Lokris, and moved into Thessaly where they incited rebellion and threatened Makedon with a force of 25,000 infantry and 1,500 horse.<sup>31</sup> But the danger was lessened by the sudden departure of the Aitolians themselves—in response to an attack by the Akarnanians—and Polyperchon won a decisive victory over the Thessalians and their general, Menon of Pharsalos, the maternal grandfather of Pyrrhos.<sup>32</sup>

### **Polyperchon as regent and the war with Kassandros**

Upon Antipatros' death in late 319, Polyperchon assumed the regency and guardianship of the Kings, with Kassandros designated his chiliarch. In short, Polyperchon had inherited the political and military leadership of Makedonia.<sup>33</sup> But Kassandros, who had already played second fiddle to Antigonos in 320, had no wish to do so again.<sup>34</sup> Polyperchon sought to strengthen his own position by offering the guardianship (*epimeleia*) of Alexander IV to Olympias and by proclaiming the “Freedom of the Greeks.”<sup>35</sup>

In Makedonia, and in the Greek states to the south, support was divided between the newly-appointed guardian of the Kings and his rebellious chiliarch. Loyalty to the latter was, predictably, based on allegiance to Antipatros and

31 The Aitolian general Alexandros had brought 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, which are surely included in this number (Diod. 18.38.1, 3). Nothing else is known about him (Grainger, *APS* 89 “Alexandros [1]”).

32 Diod. 18.38.5–6. This Menon was apparently descended from the commander of the same name who served Kyros the Younger at Cunaxa (see Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.21 ff., for an unfavorable character-sketch). That man was alleged to have been intimate with Tharyps the Molossian (Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.28), and it was the daughter of the younger Menon, Phthia, who married Aiakides, son of Arybbas and Troas, of the Molossian royal house (Plut. *Pyrr.* 1.6; cf. Heckel 1981c: 81 n.11. For his death see also Plut. *Phoc.* 25.5. The Akarnanian invasion of Aitolia is treated by Diodorus as a chance occurrence; it may have been prompted by Makedon.

33 Diod. 18.47.4: ἡ δὲ τῶν ὄλων ἱγεμονία καὶ τῶν βασιλέων ἡ ἐπιμέλεια. Diod. 18.48.4: ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1. The decision was doubtless made in consultation with Antipatros' *consilium* (cf. Hammond, *HMac.* III, 130, with n.3) and not, as Lenschau, RE XXI.2 (1952) 1800 suggests, by the terms of Antipatros' testament. Müller 2009: 26 points to Kassandros' lack of “Führungsqualitäten” as the reason for Antipatros' decision to name Polyperchon as his successor. Will 1985b: 1.41 (with n.47), thinks that Ptolemy's invasion of Koile-Syria and the expulsion of Laomedon were triggered by news of Antipatros' death (cf. p. 42: “the Syrian venture was a challenge to the order which Polyperchon symbolized and as it could be foreseen that the new regent would find it difficult to keep his position it was important for Ptolemy to be on the side of his opponents”). But Diod. 18.43 places these events before Antipatros' death, and App. *Syr.* 52, which Will calls “confused and inaccurate” (41 n.47), shows that Laomedon joined Alketas in Asia Minor. It was after the defeat and death of Alketas that Antigonos learned of Antipatros' death; Ptolemy could scarcely have had the news sooner!

34 Diod. 18.49.1–3; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; *Heidelberg Epitome* 1.4 = *FGrH* 155 F1. On the *Heidelberg Epitome* see Wheatley 2013. For Kassandros as Antigonos' chiliarch, see Arr. *Succ.* 1.38; Diod. 18.39.7.

35 Diod. 18.55.2–57.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1; cf. Rosen 1967: 64–8. I see no evidence for Bengtson's suggestion (*Diadochen* 40) that the revival of the *koine eirene* was Adea-Eurydike's idea.

an endorsement of his policies. And, whether or not Polyperchon shared these sentiments initially, he was soon forced into a political stance that was diametrically opposite. In retrospect, it is easy to regard this policy as reactive and myopic.<sup>36</sup> But there must have been many in Polyperchon's council who had returned to Europe from Opis and scarcely needed reminding that it had been Alexander's intention to replace Antipatros and to bring a new order to Europe. For Alexander in 324, just as for Polyperchon in 319/8, the reassertion of Argead power in the European part of the empire required the eradication of the house of Iolaos from power. Hence, not only Antipatros himself needed to be replaced, but also the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies that had been established in the south.<sup>37</sup> Polyperchon could now claim to be reviving Alexander's instructions to Krateros, to guard "the freedom of the Greeks," which must have been closely connected with the so-called Exiles' Decree,<sup>38</sup> proclaimed at Olympia in the summer of 324. Polyperchon had been Krateros' second-in-command at that time (Arr. 7.12.4), but Alexander's death in the following year put the proposed changes on hold. Krateros reacted to the situation, the danger to Makedon from Leosthenes and the Greeks, and the aspirations of Perdikkas, by throwing in his lot with Antipatros. But the death of the old regent and his designated successor gave Polyperchon the opportunity to champion the cause of the royal house. Ironically, similar action by the Greek Eumenes elicited praise from ancient and modern writers; the Makedonian Polyperchon is, instead, accused of "grandstanding," of making transparent gestures in the hope of holding on to power. Nothing can be further from the truth. For Polyperchon harmed his cause by giving away too much power—by offering to share it, with Olympias and with Eumenes, all in the name of the Kings.

In the beginning support for Polyperchon was strong in Makedonia (Diod. 18.54.2), and he was soon joined by White Kleitos, driven from Asia by Antigonos (Diod. 18.52.6); Olympias was slower to respond to Polyperchon's invitation.<sup>39</sup> Threatened by Kassandros, Polyperchon extended an amnesty to Eumenes and the outlaws, if they supported the cause of the Kings, promising to come in person to Asia with an army to oppose Antigonos.<sup>40</sup> In addition to Eumenes, Polyperchon

36 Thus Errington, *Hist. Mac.* 124–5.

37 Diod. 18.55.2: ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Έλλάδα πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὀλιγαρχίας καθεσταμένας ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου καταλύειν. Cf. Asirvatham 2010: 104.

38 Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 224 does not link the Exiles' Decree with Krateros' mission but comments that Philip III's and Polyperchon's "famous *diagramma* . . . re-enacted the Exiles' Decree . . ." Cf. also Mendels 1984: 129 ff., esp. 143–6. Less convincing is Will's view (1985b: 1.43) of Polyperchon's actions as "completely original, without antecedent and without sequel." Cf. Seibert, *Flüchtlinge* 167 ff. See now Poddighe 2013, who evaluates the *diagramma* in relation to the policies of Philip II, Alexander, and Antipatros.

39 Support in Makedonia: Diod. 18.54.2. White Kleitos: Diod. 18.52.6. Olympias: Diod. 18.57.2 does not imply a second invitation. 18.49.4 records the original decision of Polyperchon and his council, 18.57.2 the issuing of the invitation to the queen mother. For her reluctance to come immediately see 18.58.3–4.

40 Diod. 18.57.3–4.

wrote to the argyrapids, who were guarding the treasures at Kyinda in Kilikia (Diod. 18.58.1) and with whose commander, Antigenes he was doubtless well acquainted.<sup>41</sup>

Things could hardly have started better. Eumenes and the generals in Kilikia threw their support behind the Kings.<sup>42</sup> Athens was quick to dissociate itself from the pro-Antipatrid policies of conservatives such as Phokion, and in February 318 made public its enthusiasm for Polyperchon.<sup>43</sup> But the March deadline for the implementation of Philip III's decree passed, with Nikanor still firmly entrenched in Mounychia.<sup>44</sup> A force led by Polyperchon's son Alexandros advanced to Attika, bringing with it many of the exiles and putting pressure on Nikanor, who had seized and fortified Peiraieus and ignored Olympias' order to withdraw his garrison.<sup>45</sup> But Polyperchon's duplicity soon became evident: Alexandros entered into frequent and secret negotiations with Nikanor, perhaps even through the agency of Phokion, who thought to ingratiate himself with the Polyperchan party and protect himself at home if he could persuade Nikanor to turn over Mounychia and Peiraieus to Alexandros.<sup>46</sup>

Polyperchon, meanwhile, held the bulk of the Makedonian army in reserve in Phokis, that is, inside Thermopylai, where he was met by Athenian delegations.<sup>47</sup> One of these was headed by Phokion, whose crimes included collaborating with Nikanor in his seizure of Peiraieus and whose favorable stance towards the house of Iolaos now placed him in jeopardy; nevertheless, his recent negotiations with Alexandros led him to hope for a better reception from Polyperchon.<sup>48</sup>

41 Engel, *Machtaufstieg* 42 sees Antigonos' preoccupation with affairs in western Asia Minor as the main reason for the “defection” of the argyrapids from Antigonos. But Antigonos was surely regarded as an appointee of the Kings, and as such he had now been deposed in favor of Eumenes. The argyrapids could be expected to remain loyal to Antigonos only as long as he exercised authority on behalf of the royal house.

42 Letters to Eumenes and the commanders in Kilikia: Diod. 18.57.3–4, 58.1. Eumenes was appointed στρατηγός τῆς ὀλης Ασίας αὐτοκράτορ, essentially the same office which Antipatros had conferred upon Antigonos (Diod. 18.58.1; cf. 18.39.7, 40.1). The Silver Shields resisted the appeals of Ptolemy (Diod. 18.62.1–2) and Antigonos' agent Philotas (Diod. 18.62.4 ff.). A fleet was prepared for Polyperchon in Phoinikia (Diod. 18.63.6).

43 See Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 315 = *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 387 for Athenian support of Polyperchon in February 318. For the popular support for Polyperchon cf. Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.1.

44 The thirtieth day of Xanthikos (Diod. 18.56.5), the sixth Makedonian month. Ferguson, *HA* 30–2 dates Alexandros' arrival in Attika to March 318. For the events of 319–317, I have adopted the changes suggested by Williams 1984 to the chronology of Errington 1977: 478 ff.

For Nikanor, whom Kassandros had installed in Mounychia as a replacement for Menyllos before the news of Antipatros' death became known (Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1), see also Berve no. 557.

45 Olympias' letter: Diod. 18.65.1. Olympias' reluctance to return to Makedonia at this time does not rule out her intervention in Athenian affairs on behalf of Polyperchon and the Kings. Alexandros in Attika: Diod. 18.65.3 ff.

46 So Diod. 18.65.3–5; but Plut. *Phoc.* 33 (understandably) does not mention Phokion's role. See Gehrke, *Phokion* 115 n.39.

47 Polyperchon in Phokis: Diod. 18.68.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.4–12; cf. Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.3.

48 Thus Gehrke, *Phokion* 115 n.39 notes that, had Phokion not received some reassurances from Alexandros, his visit to Polyperchon would have been little more than “glatter Selbstmord.”

The latter made a great show of ceremony—with Philip III enthroned beneath a golden canopy—but the process quickly degenerated into a shouting-match, and Polyperchon was forced to restrain the enraged king, who nearly transfixed Phokion's comrade, Hegemon, with his spear.<sup>49</sup> In the end, White Kleitos was instructed to take the opponents of the new regime under guard to Athens, where they were denounced and executed (Plut. *Phoc.* 34–5).<sup>50</sup>

Unable to win Athens for himself,<sup>51</sup> Polyperchon left Alexandros behind with a small force and marched to Megalopolis, where some 15,000 men prepared to withstand a siege.<sup>52</sup> Elsewhere in the Peloponnese, his envoys called upon the cities to overthrow the oligarchies of Antipatros and even to put the latter's supporters to death, measures that met with some success.<sup>53</sup> The Megalopolitans, however, led by Damis, a man who had served with Alexander in Asia and had experience of elephants, prevailed militarily and soon turned the swelling political tide in Greece against Polyperchon. Although the Makedonians had been successful in breaching the walls, Damis planted spikes (*caltrops*) in the path of the elephants, injuring the beasts who, in their frenzy, fell back on their own troops and inflicted numerous casualties.<sup>54</sup> Perseverance was not a strong point of the old regent. He turned his attention to more pressing matters.

Diodorus (18.72.1) does not say what these matters were; Polyperchon may have feared that Kassandros would lead his army into Makedonia, whither he himself returned. Satisfied that affairs there were in order, he moved south into Epeiros—in order to prepare for Olympias' return to Makedonia, which he entrusted to his ally, and Olympias' own nephew, Aiakides<sup>55</sup>—and, from there,

49 Plut. *Phoc.* 33.7–12. Cf. Paspalas 2005.

50 Phokion drank hemlock on 19 Munychion (= May 7) 318; cf. Williams 1984: 304–5. For the final stages of Phokion's career see Gehrke, *Phokion* 108–20; also Trito 1988: 133–40.

51 Polyperchon did manage to send relief to Salamis, which was being besieged by Kassandros' forces (Diod. 18.69.2).

52 Diod. 18.70.1–3.

53 Diod. 18.69.3–4.

54 For the campaign see Diod. 18.70–1; Campbell 2004: 102 no. 123; Kistler, *War Elephants* 55–6; Romm, *Ghost* 233–4. Whether Damis invented these traps or had seen them used in Asia is unclear; Ptolemy used something similar at Gaza in 312 (Diod. 19.83.2, 84.1–5). Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.14, describing how Polyperchon encouraged his men by assuming the dress of the Arkadians, in order to show them what sort of enemy they were up against, and then appearing in Makedonian armor for the sake of comparison, must refer to the Megalopolitan campaign. Berve's entry on Damis (II, 115 no. 240) contains misleading errors. Damis may be identical with the Amisus of Curt. 10.8.15 (Berve no. 53; Niese I, 45 n.3; cf. Heckel 1981e: 63 and *Who's Who* 102 “Damis [2]”; Atkinson and Yardley, *Curtius* 199); see also Kirchner, *RE* IV (1901) 2056 no. 1. His support for Kassandros was rewarded in 315, when the latter appointed him *epimeletes* of Megalopolis (Diod. 19.64.1).

55 Diod. 19.11.1–2. Against the view, prevalent in much modern scholarship (see, most recently, Hammond, *HMac.* III, 139), that Alexander IV and Roxane were left for some time in Epeiros, see Macurdy 1932. Polyperchon could be expected to leave Philip III and Adea-Eurydike in Makedonia, rather than bring them to Epeiros, where their “enemy” Olympias resided. I see no other good reason for Polyperchon to separate himself from Philip III. Certainly, he is unlikely to have done so *after* Adea-Eurydike announced that she was transferring the “guardianship” of the “King” (Hammond, *HMac.* III, 140 n.1, may be correct in suggesting that Justin's [14.5.3] use of the singular *rex* is significant, “indicating a rejection of ‘reges’ by Eurydike”) to Kassandros.

perhaps to the Aitolians, whose friendship he cultivated.<sup>56</sup> In his absence, the queen, Adea-Eurydike, persuaded her husband, Philip III, to transfer the “guardianship” of his kingdom to Kassandros (cf. Justin 14.5.1–3).

This shrewd move, which Kassandros doubtless encouraged,<sup>57</sup> meant an immeasurable loss of prestige for Polyperchon, for whom it now became imperative either to reassert his control over the half-witted king and (what was more difficult) his rebellious wife or to establish the primacy of Alexander IV. It is, most likely, in this historical context that a pamphlet on *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great* was published. The emphasis placed on the legitimate kingship of Alexander IV and the favorable treatment of Olympias and Roxane, in sharp contrast to the accusations of regicide levelled against the family of Kassandros and the supporters of Antigonos, suggest that the original version of this pamphlet—which was soon embellished, contaminated, and otherwise distorted in the interests of other parties—originated in the Polyperchan camp.<sup>58</sup>

Failure at Megalopolis had devastating effects in the south: contemptuous of Polyperchon, some Greek cities went over to Kassandros,<sup>59</sup> who pursued his goals with great energy and through the formidable alliances secured by his father in the first years that followed Alexander’s death.<sup>60</sup> To counter the most dangerous of these allies—Antigonos, who had supplied Kassandros with thirty-five ships to secure Nikanor’s position in Peiraeus—Polyperchon dispatched Kleitos to the Hellespont with the fleet. That he went to Asia in person, as Paschidis suggests on the basis of the Thersippos decree (*OGIS* 4), strikes me as implausible. Instead, he must have sent agents to Asia exacting payment to support the naval campaign.<sup>61</sup> Kleitos, for his part, had a score to settle with Antigonos, who had driven

56 For Polyperchon’s relationship with the Aitolians see Mendels 1984: 158 ff.

57 Perhaps during Kassandros’ first return to Makedonia (probably in the spring of 317; so Hammond, *HMac*. III, 137; Diod. 18.75.2; cf. 19.35.7 and Polyaenus, *Strat*. 4.11.2).

58 For a full discussion see Heckel, *LDT*. Bosworth 2000 rejects an earlier date and believes that the *Last Days and Testament* belongs to the time when Ptolemy was making a bid for power c.308. This view has garnered considerable support (see Meeus 2014b: 293 n.113 for a survey of scholarship), although it raises as many questions as it answers. Ausfeld (1895, 1901), whose arguments were refined by Merkelbach (1954, 1977), attempted to date the pamphlet implausibly to the lifetime of Perdikkas. Nevertheless this view has been adopted by Rathmann, *Perdikkas* 68–71. Seibert 1984 is probably the last attempt by a serious scholar to treat the work as literary fiction.

59 Diodorus’ claim that “most of the cities defected from the Kings and inclined towards Kassandros” (*ai πλεῖσται τῶν Ἐλληνιδῶν πόλεων ἀφιστάμεναι τῶν βασιλέων πρὸς Κάσανδρον ἀπέκλιναν*, 18.74.1) is grossly exaggerated, as Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.440–1 recognized. It is to this period that we should date Polyaenus’ reference to ἡ πρὸς Πολυπέρχοντα ὄργη among the Makedonians (*Strat*. 4.11.2).

60 His sisters Eurydike, Nikaia, and Phila had married Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Demetrios Poliorketes respectively. See Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.125 ff.; Seibert, *Verbindungen* 11 ff., 72, 93; Heckel 1989: 32–3; Landucci, *L’arte del potere* 58–69.

61 Paschidis 2008: 233–46 argues that the text of *OGIS* 4 (with his restoration: καὶ Πολυπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Ασί[αν διαβά]ντος) supports a military mission by Polyperchon in person: this mission constituted the “pressing matters” referred to by Diod. 18.72.1 (αὐτὸς δ’ ἐφ’ ἔτέρας ἀναγκαιοτέρας

him from Lydia after Antipatros' death. But his initial success near Byzantium, in which he destroyed or captured about half Nikanor's fleet, was followed by an overwhelming disaster; for Antigonos, with a large contingent of light-armed troops, fell upon Kleitos' sailors after they had disembarked for the night. Those who managed to board ship and make for open water fell in with the remnants of Nikanor's fleet and were annihilated. Kleitos himself fled to shore and attempted to reach Makedonia by land, only to fall into the hands of Lysimachos' troops, who put him to death.<sup>62</sup>

In sharp contrast to the lethargy and ineffectiveness of Polyperchon's party, Kassandros had shown himself a force to be reckoned with. The return of Nikanor's fleet, sailing into Peiraeus with the beaks of Kleitos' warships, spelled the end of Polyperchon's hopes in Athens.<sup>63</sup> The Athenians, having flirted briefly with democratic revolution, came to terms with Antipatros' son and Greece in general reverted to a pro-Antipatrid stance. Polyperchon could do little but concentrate his efforts on driving Kassandros and his supporters from Makedonia, while hoping that his son Alexandros could keep in check the dissension in the Peloponnese.

In the northwest, Olympias and Aiakides brought their forces to Euia, on the Makedonian-Epeirot border,<sup>64</sup> where they confronted Philip III and Eurydike. Douris' description of the battle as one fought between women, with Olympias

πράξεις ἐτρέπετο). There was, in fact, no advantage to be gained by Polyperchon in crossing to Asia at a time when Kassandros' forces threatened him at home. Furthermore Paschidis' restoration of the text is both speculative and unnecessary. It is clear from all that precedes this sentence that Thersippus had used his influence to lighten the financial burdens of the city when the Makedonian rulers had sought to exact tribute (e.g., πάντων τῶν ὅλων εἰσφερόντων Θέρσιππος παργενόμενος πρὸς βασίληας καὶ Ἀντίπατρον ἐκοι[ύ]φισσε τὰμ πόλιν). The reading Πολυπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Λασί[αν πέμψα]ντος fully captures the sense of Polyperchon's demand for support (presumably financial), although Paschidis 2008: 233 n.3 argues that this “is impossible without an object” (see, however, LSJ s.v. πέμπω I, 3). In the long list of services, Thersippus is described as being present at the side of Antipatros and the Kings (*παργενόμενος*)—this may have been while the regent was in Asia—and this will have been the case also when he reduced Nisos' contributions to the Kyprian expedition of Kleitos. The genitive absolute referring to Polyperchon also shows a shift in position: Thersippus was not with Polyperchon at the time. Furthermore, the order of events and the reference to Arrhidaios (the inscription, lines 25–6, has Αρριδαῖον) shows that the military mission, if this can in fact be inferred from the inscription, would have to belong to 319/8, not a year later, as Paschidis suggests. For the date, see Poddighe 2001: 100 (“fine dell'autunno o al principio dell'inverno 319/8”). The supposed military mission to Asia is also regarded as “doubtful” by Anson, *Heirs* 99.

62 Kleitos' naval campaign: Diod. 18.72.2–9; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.6.8; cf. Engel 1973; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.103–4; Billows, *Antigonos* 86–8. Lysimachos was, as a result of his marriage to Nikaia, an ally of Kassandros. But I see no strong evidence for Engel's characterization of him as “Polyperchons persönlicher Feind Lysimachos” (*Machtaufstieg* 98 n.166). Cf. Will, commenting on Polyperchon's appointment as *epimeletes*: “The illegality of the procedure was not what shocked the new masters of the empire, however, but the fact that the succession to Antipater aroused secret ambitions in some of them. Lysimachos, Macedon's immediate neighbour, would certainly not have disdained the idea of one day restoring for his advantage the union of Macedon and Thrace . . .” (*CAH VII<sup>2</sup>* 1.41).

63 Diod. 18.75.1.

64 For the location of Euia see Hammond, *HMac.* III, 140, with n.2.

in Bakchic attire and Eurydike in Makedonian armor, is tragic history in its most crass form.<sup>65</sup> At first, the benefits of alliance with Olympias became clear: overawed by the prestige of the queen mother, the troops of Philip and Eurydike deserted, leaving their “King” to fall into enemy hands and his bride to make a desperate bid at escape. She was captured as she made her way to Amphipolis with her advisor, Polykles, perhaps a relative of the general who had been killed by the Aitolians in 321/0.<sup>66</sup> But Polyperchon would have been wise to curtail Olympias’ power: her reprisals against personal enemies, and those of her family, soon turned the reverence of the Makedonians into disgust, and this feeling for the woman discredited the man who had summoned her.<sup>67</sup>

Polyperchon now took extensive military precautions against Kassandros, who was at the time besieging Tegea in the Peloponnese. He himself occupied Perrhaibia, while his son Alexandros threatened the Peloponnese; the approach from the south was further secured by the Aitolians, who blocked Kassandros’ advance at Thermopylai (Diod. 19.35.1–2). But Kassandros ferried his men around the pass, landing them in southern Thessaly, and sent one of his officers, Kallas, to hold Polyperchon in check. A second general, Deinias, secured the entrances to Makedonia before Olympias’ forces could seize them.<sup>68</sup> Olympias for her part took refuge in Pydna and entrusted the campaign against Kassandros to Aristonous.<sup>69</sup>

### The end of Polyperchon’s supremacy

Besieged at Azoros,<sup>70</sup> Polyperchon suffered the indignity of watching his troops desert to Kallas (Diod. 19.36.6), and he was forced to sit idle as Kassandros

65 Douris *ap.* Athen. 13.560f = *FGrH* 76 F52; cf. Heckel 1981c: 83–4; Carney 1987b: 496 ff., esp. 500.

66 Diod. 19.11.3. For Polykles the general see Diod. 18.38.2. It is tempting, though fruitless, to speculate that he was also her lover.

67 Diod. 19.11.4–9. Philip III was stabbed by his Thracian guard and Adeia-Eurydike forced to commit suicide. Kassandros’ brother, Nikanor, was executed on her orders and the grave of another brother, Iolaos, overturned. Diodorus (19.11.8) further adds that she murdered a hundred prominent supporters of Kassandros. Cf. Diod. 19.51.5; Justin 14.5.1 ff. Anson, *Heirs* 91: “With Olympias, however, there was also a downside. Her actions upon returning to Macedonia turned much of the country against her and her sponsor, Polyperchon.” Despite Polyperchon’s (and Olympias’) blunders at home, the authority of their name could still be used to inspire the troops in Asia (Diod. 19.23.2); Polyperchon’s crossing into Asia was, however, fabricated by Eumenes himself.

68 Diod. 19.35.3. Kassandros also sent Atarrhias against Aiakides in Epeiros (Diod. 19.36.2–3), a move which soon led to the expulsion of the King and his replacement by Kassandros’ agent Lykiskos (Diod. 19.36.3–5). Identification of Atarrhias with the hypaspist commander of the same name is remotely possible—the commanders of Alexander’s veterans had an enviable record of longevity—but Kassandros’ generals appear to have been men who had spent their careers in Europe rather than Asia (see Heckel, *Who’s Who* 60). One notable exception, Damis of Megalopolis (Diod. 18.71.2; 19.64.1; cf. Curt. 10.8.15, with Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 199), was Greek, and not a leader of Makedonian troops.

69 Olympias in Pydna: Diod. 19.35.5–7; Justin 14.6.1–4; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.11.3. Aristonous: Diod. 19.35.4.

70 Or Azorios (Diod. 19.52.6). The town is in Perrhaibia, on the western side of Mt Olympus (see Hammond, *HMac.* III, 58, fig. 6).

starved Olympias and the remnants of the royal family into submission;<sup>71</sup> nor was he able to bring much-needed relief to Monimos in Pella or Aristonous, both of whom remained loyal to the house of Alexander.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, it was only with difficulty that he escaped to Aitolia (Diod. 19.52.6). Little remained of his former power, except perhaps those cities of the Peloponnese that retained their allegiance thanks to the presence of Alexandros<sup>73</sup>—and even he soon found himself hard pressed by Kassandros. Alexandros had blocked the Isthmus, but Kassandros was able to land his troops in the Argolid<sup>74</sup> and capture Argos. From there he marched across to Messenia and won over all the towns of the region except Ithome. On his return to the north, he left 2,000 troops with Molykkos at the passes between Megara and the Korinthiad.<sup>75</sup>

A rift between Kassandros and his former ally, Antigonos, offered Polyperchon some hope of recouping his losses. In 315, Antigonos sent his agent Aristodemos to secure a pact with Polyperchon and his son, whereby Polyperchon was recognized as *strategos* in the Peloponnese. Oaths were exchanged by Aristodemos and Polyperchon; Alexandros sailed to Asia to complete negotiations with Antigonos.<sup>76</sup> But, despite Lenschau's (*RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1804) belief that this was a contract between equal parties, Polyperchon had clearly accepted a subordinate role in return for Antigonid support in Greece;<sup>77</sup> for Aristodemos brought to his new allies some 8,000 mercenaries recruited in the Peloponnese.<sup>78</sup> Kassandros meanwhile secured Orchomenos in Arkadia but failed to make further gains in Messenia and prepared to return to the north, stopping first to celebrate the Nemean games (Diod. 19.64.1). It was presumably during this brief respite that he tried, in vain, to persuade Polyperchon to abandon Monophthalmos. On his return to Makedonia, Kassandros sent Prepelaos to Alexandros, offering him the title of “general of the Peloponnese”—the very office which the father exercised for Antigonos—and inducing him to defect. Thus Kassandros did even greater harm to Polyperchon’s credibility.<sup>79</sup> Or so Diodorus (and presumably his

71 With her were Roxane and Alexander IV, as well as Deidameia, Aiakides’ daughter, to whom Alexander was betrothed (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.3; cf. Sandberger, *Prosopographie* no. 27), Thessalonike, the daughter of Philip II and Nikesipolis, the daughters of Attalos (and, presumably, of Atalante), and the relatives of some of Olympias’ friends (Diod. 19.35.5; cf. Justin 14.6.2–3). An attempt to help her may have misfired (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.11.3). For the siege of Pydna and Olympias’ death see Carney, *Olympias* 80–4.

72 Diod. 19.50.7–8. Monimos appears to have had earlier connections with Olympias (cf. Phylarchos ap. Athen. 13.609c = *FGrH* 81 F21).

73 Diod. 19.35.1, 53.1.

74 Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.441 assumes that Kassandros’ landing-place, Epidavros, had been captured in the campaign of the preceding year.

75 Diod. 19.54.3–4.

76 Diod. 19.57.5, 60.1, 61.1; cf. 19.62.5.

77 Polyperchon’s *strategia* involved recognition of Antigonid claims to the regency (Diod. 19.61.3; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 114, with n.41; Simpson 1957a), and probably also his territories in Asia, which had been threatened by the coalition of Lysimachos, Kassandros, and Ptolemy (Diod. 19.57.1).

78 Diod. 19.60.1.

79 Unsuccessful attempts to enlist Polyperchon: Diod. 19.63.3. Alexandros corrupted by Prepelaos: Diod. 19.64.3–5.

source) alleges. This may simply be hostile propaganda, intended to discredit Polyperchon, who would thus seem to be unable to command the loyalty of even his own son.

Lenschau (*RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1804) suggested that Alexandros' defection may have been little more than a ploy, to buy time from Kassandros. But, if this was mere deception by Polyperchon and his son, Antigonos too was taken in; for he sent his nephew Telesphoros to liberate the cities in which Alexandros (and Kassandros) had placed garrisons. Soon only Sikyon and Korinth held out against Antigonos and these are described by Diodorus in the following terms: ἐν ταύταις γὰρ Πολυπέρχων διέτριψεν δυνάμεις ὀδρᾶς ἔχων καὶ πιστεύων ταύταις τε καὶ ταῖς τῶν τόπων ὄχυρότησιν (19.74.2). It appears also that the willingness of the Aitolians to join Aristodemos—they had formerly been allies of Polyperchon—was prompted by Polyperchon's alliance with Kassandros. Beloch suggests, plausibly, that Alexandros served as Kassandros' *strategos* because Polyperchon could not bring himself to serve the younger man.<sup>80</sup> Now seventy years old, Polyperchon may have relinquished control of affairs to his son, allowing him to make his best deal, which, in this case involved abandoning Antigonos in favor of his father's bitter enemy. Polyperchon's “retirement” thus paved the way for *rapprochement*. But Alexandros was quickly swept aside by Aristodemos, and his alliance with Kassandros was perhaps the cause of his assassination and the uprising in Sikyon (314).<sup>81</sup> These events drew Polyperchon out of retirement to pursue an independent policy. Hence, in the Peace of 311, Polyperchon plays no part, and Antigonos' letter to Scepsis shows that Antigonos at least was anxious to deprive him of allies. In lines 37–40, Antigonos writes: “Nevertheless, because we thought that after a settlement had been reached with him [sc. Ptolemy] the matter of Polyperchon might be arranged more quickly as no one would then be in alliance with him . . .”<sup>82</sup> This suggests that, by including Ptolemy in the treaty, Polyperchon would be cut off from all potential allies, and it was surely one of the aims of the Peace to isolate him.<sup>83</sup>

80 “Es erklärt sich auch sehr einfach, dass nicht Polyperchon, sondern Alexandros die Strategie des Peloponnes von Kassandros erhalten hat. Es war nur eine Frage der Anciennetät; Polyperchon konnte sich dem viel jüngeren Kassandros nicht unterordnen” (*IV<sup>2</sup>* 2.443).

81 Diod. 19.66–7. The assassins were a Sikyonian named Alexion and some others who pretended friendship; these were clearly the anti-Makedonian faction, who took seriously Antigonos' proclamation of Greek autonomy (cf. Griffin, *Sikyon* 77). By allying themselves with Kassandros, Alexandros and Polyperchon went back on their own promises of 319/8. The uprising in Sikyon was, however, quelled by Alexandros' widow, Kratesipolis (Diod. 19.67.1–2), who appears to have held the city for Polyperchon until 308 (Diod. 20.37.1). See further Macurdy 1929, with some speculation on the woman's family background (esp. 277–8).

82 Dittenberger, *OGIS* I, 5 = Welles, *RC* 1: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ | διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοῦτον | συντελεσθέ[γ]των τὰ πρὸς Πολυπέρχοντα | θᾶσσον ἀν διοικηθῆναι, μηθενὸς αὐτῶν συνορκοῦντος . . . English translation by C.B. Welles.

83 Lenschau, *RE* XXI.2 (1952) 1805 takes the words διὰ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν (lines 41–2) as referring to Polyperchon, when in fact they refer to Ptolemy. The translation of Austin 1981: 58 is ambiguous: “nevertheless, because we understood that a settlement with him

Polyperchon made one last bid for power, bringing Herakles, the illegitimate son of Alexander and his Persian mistress, Barsine, from Pergamon to Greece.<sup>84</sup> The claims of this child to the throne had been rejected as early as in 323, but at that time the marshals were already divided on the question of Roxane's unborn child. But, in 310, Kassandros laid that problem to rest by ordering the murder of Alexander IV and his mother in Amphipolis.<sup>85</sup> Herakles, a boy of seventeen or eighteen years, could now be exploited for political gain (Diod. 20.20). Polyperchon brought him to his native Tymphaia in Upper Makedonia, at the head of an army of 20,000 infantry and 1,000 horse, and seriously threatened Kassandros, who remembered with anxiety the enthusiasm which had gripped the Makedonians earlier on Olympias' arrival at Euia. But Kassandros had come to know Polyperchon's nature and the limits of his ambitions. He persuaded the old man to murder the boy in exchange for a share of power, which amounted, in fact, to little more than the *strategia* of the Peloponnesos.<sup>86</sup>

With the murder of Alexander's son in Tymphaia in late 309,<sup>87</sup> Polyperchon lost all credibility. Satisfied that he had obtained as much as he could from the exercise, he attempted to return to the south, only to be forced by a coalition of Peloponnesians and Boiotians to winter in Lokris (Diod. 20.28.4; Trogus, *Prol.* 15).<sup>88</sup> Kratesipolis, holding Korinth and Sikyon in his absence, was forced to turn the cities over to Ptolemy Soter (Diod. 20.37.1), who in 308 made his only serious bid for power in Europe and revived the old slogan of "Greek Liberty." That the daughter-in-law acted with Polyperchon's approval is doubtful; nor is it likely that she felt a great deal of affection for the most disreputable of Alexander's Successors.

too (Ptolemy) would speed up a solution to the question of Polyperchon, and also because of our relationship with him . . ." [my italics]. See, however, Billows, *Antigonos* 132: "Excluded from direct participation in the peace were Polyperchon and Seleukos; they were implicitly placed under the authority of Kassandros and Antigonos respectively, who were evidently given a free hand to deal with them more or less as they pleased."

<sup>84</sup> For Barsine and Herakles see Berve nos. 206, 353; Heckel, *Who's Who* 70, 138. Cf. Brunt 1975, against Tarn 1921. For the end of the Argead house see Carney 1994.

<sup>85</sup> Diod. 19.105.1–2; Paus. 9.7.2; Justin 15.2.5; cf. also Schachermeyr 1920: 332–7, esp. 334 ff. Hammond, *HMac*. III, 165–6, reverses the order of the deaths of Alexander's sons, placing that of Herakles before Alexander IV's, and thus prefers the garbled evidence of Justin (which Hammond has earlier recognized as confused, 165 n.1) and Pausanias to Trogus, *Prol.* 15. Rejection of Herakles' claims in 323: Curt. 10.6.11–2; cf. Justin 13.2.7, with Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 66–9.

<sup>86</sup> For Polyperchon's position and also his office in relation to Kassandros' general Prepeiaos, see Bengtson, *Strategie* I, 136–9. The power sharing in Makedonia (Diod. 20.28.2: πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ δυναστείᾳ τῇ Κασάνδρου κοινωνὸς ἔσται) was, in the end, an empty promise, although Polyperchon did recover his lands (Diod. 20.28.3: τάς τε ἐν τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ δώρεάς). Since Polyperchon's support came primarily from the Aitolians, Mendels 1984: 176 reasonably infers that the agreement may have included territorial concessions for the Aitolians as well.

<sup>87</sup> Tarn, *CAH* VI, 493 n.2, suggests 308, since Kassandros concealed the death of Alexander IV for some time. Late 309 is more likely: Wheatley 1998; cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 233–4.

<sup>88</sup> Kassandros gave him 4,000 Makedonian infantry and 500 Thessalian horse (Diod. 20.28.3).

## Decline and obscurity

Polyperchon nevertheless continued to wreak havoc in the Peloponnese in the years between Ptolemy's defeat at Salamis and the battle of Ipsos in 301. In 304, Demetrios was still intent on liberating the Greek cities from Kassandros and Polyperchon, and indeed he captured and crucified the latter's garrison commander in Arkadian Orchomenos (Diod. 20.100.6, 103.5–7). What became of Polyperchon himself is unknown. Paschidis challenges the views of Lenschau, who dates the old general's death to shortly before Ipsos, and of Beloch, who believes that Demetrios' campaign against Messene in 295 was directed against him, though he was by now nearly ninety years old!<sup>89</sup> Paschidis argues that, although Demetrios acted against men who had been placed in positions of power by Kassandros and Polyperchon, they continued to exercise power after Polyperchon's death.<sup>90</sup> Although the last two references to Polyperchon in Diodorus' *Bibliotheca* do not prove that he was still alive in 303, there is also no explicit evidence that he died around or soon after 308, and we need not assume that Kratesipolis' actions (above) were influenced in any way by his death.<sup>91</sup>

Throughout the last twenty (or, possibly, thirty) years of his life, Polyperchon displayed an astonishing durability. His political longevity is difficult to explain; for, although Pyrrhos is said to have praised him for his generalship, he demonstrated considerable ineptitude in military affairs as well as in public relations. His duplicity and ruthlessness towards the Greek states and the Makedonian royal family followed closely the proclamations of his political idealism. Perhaps he owed his survival to the fact that, after 317/6, he ceased to be a major player in the struggles of the Successors. Difficult to dislodge from southern Greece, he was a thorn in the side of, and an embarrassment to, Kassandros and Antigonos alike. In the end, he was little more the scavenger of the Peloponnese, feasting briefly—now here, now there—on the decaying carcass of Alexander's Empire.

89 Paschidis 2008: 246–8; Lenschau, RE XXI.2 (1952) 1806; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.445. Demetrios' campaign against Messene: Plut. *Demetr.* 33.3–4.

90 Diod. 20.100.6: οἱ γὰρ περὶ Κάσανδρον καὶ Πολυπέρχοντα τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ἥδειαν ἐσχηκότες ἐπόρθουν τὰ πλεῖστα μέρη τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Diod. 103.6: τὸν μὲν οὖν Στρόμβιχον τὸν ὑπὸ Πολυπέρχοντος καθεσταμένον φρούραρχον . . . . Both passages indicate that these were Polyperchon's men, but neither requires us to assume that Polyperchon was still alive. But since Kassandros was still alive in 303, one wonders why Strombichos is not simply identified as Kassandros' man in Orchomenos if Polyperchon was no longer relevant.

91 Paschidis 2008: 248: "Placing Polyperchon's death in 308 makes the motivation of Kratesipolis much simpler: she merely hastened to secure herself an alliance with a powerful leader because her protector and father-in-law had just died." But see Hauben 2014: 254 n.104: "even alive the aged Polyperchon would not have been a great help, as he had just been expelled from southern Greece." Palagia 1998: 28 suggests that the marble hunting frieze from Messene, now in the Louvre, comes from the tomb of Polyperchon and shows him hunting a lion. A fuller version of this theory is provided in Palagia 2000: 202–6, with Figures 15–8; cf. Cohen 2010: 76–8. The relief is dated on stylistic grounds to the early third century B.C.

# 14 The family of Harpalos

## Kalas son of Harpalos

Berve II, 188 no. 397, *RE Supplbd.* IV (1924) 854 no. 1; Baumbach, *Kleinasien* 29, 43, 56; Badian 1961: 18; Billows, *Antigonos* 38–40, 44–5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 74–5.

Kalas son of Harpalos was, in all probability, a kinsman—perhaps a cousin<sup>1</sup>—of Harpalos the Treasurer, hence a member of the Elimiote royal house. In the spring of 336, he crossed into Asia Minor with Parmenion, Attalos, and Amyntas (Justin 9.5.8–9; cf. Diod. 16.91.2). Berve II, 188 regards Kalas as Attalos' successor, and it may be that he was sent to Asia later, with Hekataios in order to secure Attalos' elimination; for Harpalos was at that time one of Alexander's most trusted *hetairoi*.<sup>2</sup> Kalas' conduct of the war in the Troad was far from successful: he nearly lost Kyzikos to Memnon and was driven back into Rhoition.<sup>3</sup> Memnon's successes in 335/4 may be attributed only in part to his generalship; Alexander, preoccupied with the turmoil in Greece had been forced to leave Parmenion and Kalas to their own devices.<sup>4</sup>

When the Asiatic campaign began in 334, Kalas was appointed hipparch of the Thessalian cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4), which he commanded at the Granikos (Arr. 1.14.3), though he and the other officers on the left were subordinated to Parmenion (Arr. 1.14.1). But he was soon assigned the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia and took up residence in Daskylion, which Parmenion occupied.<sup>5</sup>

1 Son of Harpalos: Arr. 1.14.3; Diod. 17.17.4, where the form Kallas occurs; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 196. It is remotely possible, though unlikely, that he was the Treasurer's son. We have no proof that the infamous Harpalos was coeval with Alexander. For the family see *Stemma VIII*.

2 The fact that Parmenion shared the command with one Elimiote and secured a second (*Koinos*) as a son-in-law may represent a political realignment for the old general; ironically, their relatives contributed in no small way to his demise.

3 Kyzikos: Diod. 17.7.3–8; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.44.5; Rhoition: Diod. 17.7.10. Cf. McCoy 1989: 423–4; Judeich, *KL Studien* 305–6.

4 Wirth, *Kampfverbund* 153–4.

5 Arr. 1.17.1–2. Bosworth I, 127, points out that the appointment was a logical one, given Kalas' experience in the area. Similarly, Alexander later appointed Peithon son of Agenor and Philippos son of Machatas as satraps of areas in which they had actively campaigned. For Daskylion see Ruge, *RE* IV (1901) 2220.

The Thessalian horse were turned over to Alexandros Lynkestes, with whom Kalas secured that portion of the Troad known as “Memnon’s Land.”<sup>6</sup>

Of Kalas’ administration of the satrapy little is known. In 333, Paphlagonia was annexed to his territory, and the satrap cooperated with Antigonos Monophthalmos (Phrygia) and Balakros son of Nikanor (Kilikia) in crushing Persian resistance to Makedonian authority in Asia Minor.<sup>7</sup> Memnon of Herakleia (*FGrH* 434 F12 §4) records a defeat at the hands of a Bithynian dynast named Bas no later than 328/7 (cf. Bosworth I, 127, with further literature). This need not have been the occasion of Kalas’ death, nor is it likely, as Billows suggests (*Antigonos* 45, with n.85), that the campaign against Bas, and Kalas’ death, occurred in the late 330s. Alexander appointed Demarchos satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, probably late in the campaign (Arr. *Succ.* 1.6). Badian’s suggestion (1961: 18) that Kalas was removed from office in the aftermath of Harpalos’ misconduct is attractive but lacks proof.

## Harpalos son of Machatas

Berve II, 75–80 no. 143; Stähelin, *RE* VII.2 (1912) 2397–401 no. 2; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 129–31. First Flight: Badian 1960b; Green, *Alexander* 222–3; Heckel 1977c; Bosworth I, 284, 1988: 57; Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos* 10–8; Carney 1982; Worthington 1984; Kingsley 1986; Landucci 1994a. Python’s Agent: Snell 1964: 99–138; Sutton 1980a, 1980b: 75–81. Famous Flight: Badian 1961; Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos* 23 ff.; Worthington 1986a; Blackwell, *Absence of Alexander*.

## Family

Harpalos son of Machatas was in all probability the nephew of Philip’s Elimiote wife, Phila, whom Satyrus describes as the sister of Derdas and Machatas.<sup>8</sup> This, at least, appears to be the source of Harpalos’ importance and the reason for his close association, from the early years, with Alexander. As a nephew of one of Philip’s wives, he may have been brought up at the Court, a *syntrophos* of

<sup>6</sup> Arr. 1.17.8; cf. Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.15. For this campaign see Bosworth I, 131 (also Seibert, *Eroberung* 37); Memnon and his brother Mentor undoubtedly had estates there, but “Memnon’s Land” may refer to the realm of the mythical Memnon and not estates of the Rhodian general, as Berve II, 188 maintains (see Strabo 13.1.11 C587; cf. Ael. *NA* 5.1; Heckel 1994b). Alexandros and Kalas took with them the Peloponnesians and other allies except the Argives (Arr. 1.17.8). Bosworth, *ibid.*, assumes that these are the allied infantry, normally commanded by Antigonos, though the latter was in Priene at the time (Tod II, 186). Certainly, if Alexandros and Kalas took with them the Thessalian horse, it is less likely that the allied force comprised the cavalry squadrons of Philippus son of Menelaos.

<sup>7</sup> Paphlagonia: Arr. 2.4.2; Curt. 3.1.24. Persian resistance in Asia Minor: Curt. 4.5.13; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 43–5.

<sup>8</sup> Satyrus ap. Athen. 13.557c = *FHG* III, frg. 5. Son of Machatas: Arr. 3.6.5. For the relationship to Phila see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 165. Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.75, however, regards Harpalos’ connection with the Elimiote royal house as “ganz unsicher.” See *Stemma VIII*.

Alexander, but the evidence for the careers of Alexander's other banished *hetairoi* suggests otherwise. It is therefore more likely that he was born at least in the mid-360s. Machaitas (*sic*), who is found in the circle of notables around Philip, is probably identical with the brother of Phila; an older Harpalos—presumably a brother or a cousin of Machatas and father of Kalas, the later satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Stähelin, *RE* VII.2 (1912) 2398 no. 1)—also appears. According to Plutarch (*Apophth. Phil.* 24 = *Mor.* 178f–179a), a certain Macha[i]tas was unjustly fined by Philip II, who had not heard the arguments that had been presented but had fallen asleep during the proceedings. Philip, we are told, would not reverse the decision—although Macha[i]tas launched a vigorous appeal—but made amends by paying the fine he had himself imposed. Plutarch's story (*Apophth. Phil.* 25 = *Mor.* 179a) about the elder Harpalos is somewhat similar, involving the law courts, and suggests that this man was on intimate terms with Philip.

Two sons of Machatas, Tauron and Philippos, were very likely brothers of Harpalos.<sup>9</sup> Kalas son of Harpalos may have been a cousin,<sup>10</sup> as was perhaps Derdas, whom Alexander sent as ambassador to the Skythians beyond the Iaxartes.<sup>11</sup> But we know little about the family, most of whose members vanish without a trace.<sup>12</sup> Even Phila remains an enigma, though she was Philip's (second?) wife. Karanos certainly was not her son, nor a cousin of Harpalos.<sup>13</sup> The royal house of Elimiotis, which enjoyed considerable prestige during Philip's reign and saw many of its members promoted by Alexander, lapses into obscurity after Harpalos' disgrace

9 Philippos: Arr. 6.27.2; Curt. 10.1.20; Plut. *Alex.* 60.16; cf. Berse no. 780; Heckel, *Who's Who* 212–3 “Phil [5].” Tauron: Curt. 5.3.6, 10; Arr. 5.14.1; *IG* xii.9 197, 4 identifies Tauron as son of Machatas and *proxenos* of Eretria; cf. Berse no. 741; Heckel, *Who's Who* 260.

10 Arr. 1.14.3; Diod. 17.17.4 (Kallas); cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 165. If, however, Harpalos was (like Erigyios) a much older man, it is remotely possible that Kalas was his son. In that event, he would be identical with the Harpalos of Plut. *Mor.* 179a but not a nephew of Phila; Tauron and Philippos might yet be younger brothers.

11 Berse II, 131 no. 250; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 201–2; Heckel, *Who's Who* 111. Apparently a relative of Alexander's treasurer Harpalos. An elder Derdas was the brother of Phila, Philip II's Elimioite wife (*Satyrus ap. Athen.* 13.557). His embassy to the Skythians in 329: Curt. 7.6.9; cf. Arr. 4.1.1–2. He returned with a Skythian delegation in 328 (Curt. 8.1.7; cf. Arr. 4.15.1). The embassy was actually an intelligence-gathering mission. Curtius speaks of Skythians “beyond the Bosphorus,” which reflects the mistaken geography of Alexander and his historians, who believed that the Iaxartes was the Tanais (i.e., the Don), which flowed into the Sea of Azov and separated Europe from Asia. See Brunt, *Arrian I*, 524–5.

I would now exclude from the family Machatas Sabattara of Europos, voted a proxyne at Delphoi (Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 269J; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 164, who regards his membership in the Elimioite royal family as “sehr zweifelhaft”).

12 Kalas vanishes from Hellespontine Phrygia. Cf. Badian 1961: 18: “there is little support for the orthodox interpretation that Calas was killed on that occasion [sc. in 327] . . . it is more likely that the disappearance of Calas is to be connected with the disgrace of his cousin Harpalus . . .” (but cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 45, with n.85, for an earlier date). Similarly, Philippos' death in India comes suspiciously soon after Harpalos' flight (Arr. 6.27.2; cf. Curt. 10.1.20–1).

13 Berse I, 7 regards this as a possibility; but see Heckel 1979a: 386–7.

and Alexander's death.<sup>14</sup> The origins of a certain "Calis" (Kalas?), named by Curtius as a co-conspirator with Demetrios the Bodyguard, are mysterious.<sup>15</sup>

### *Early career and first flight*

Alexander's *hetairoi* appears to have suffered from a physical ailment. We do not know of what sort, only that it prevented him from pursuing a military career ( $\tauὸ σῶμα ἐξ τὰ πολέμια ἀχρεῖον ὄν$ ).<sup>16</sup> This was perhaps the origin of his ills. Imposed inactivity drove him to various forms of self-indulgence. But that was yet to come. In 336, he shared in Alexander's misfortunes but soon reaped the rewards of his loyalty. In the turmoil that followed Philip's ill-timed union with Kleopatra-Eurydike, Alexander's *hetairoi* had, it appears, encouraged and abetted him in his intrigues with the Karian Pixodaros; like Alexander, they undoubtedly misconstrued Philip's intention to marry the half-witted Arrhidaios to Pixodaros' daughter. For this they were banished for the duration of Philip's reign, Harpalos among them. We do not know where they went. Not far, probably, and they were quick to return once Alexander had come to the throne.<sup>17</sup>

According to Arrian (almost certainly basing his account on Ptolemy),<sup>18</sup> Alexander rewarded these companions in various ways (according to their capabilities), once Philip had died and they themselves had returned from exile. But Arrian's report is vague (perhaps deliberately so), and it should not be taken to mean that Harpalos became treasurer immediately, or even, as Berve suggests, "vielleicht vor Beginn des Perserzuges" (II, 76); Ptolemy's appointment to the office of *somatophylax* looks ahead to 330. Harpalos' term of office was, however, a short one, and he soon gave an indication of the course that his life was to follow. Harpalos makes his first appearance in Arrian's *History of Alexander* in the context of the events of 331.

14 The family may have had connections with the house of Antigonos the One-Eyed. Tauron may have been in the service of Antigonos (*IG XII.9*, 197, 4), and in the second century we find a prominent Beroian named Harpalos son of Polemaios (Tataki, *Beroea* no. 230); Polemaios was, of course, the name of Monopthalmos' nephew (and, apparently, his brother; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 16–7). See also Kuzmin 2013 for the family in Hellenistic and Roman times.

15 Curt. 6.11.36–7. Berve II, 189 no. 398; Heckel, *Who's Who* 75. The name appears to be a corruption of Kalas, but Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 208 accepts the form as genuine.

16 Arr. 3.6.6. "Vielleicht hatte er einen hinkenden Gang, worauf die Bezeichnung Παλλιδης (Ath XIII, 595f) deuten könnte" (Berve II, 76 n.3; cf. Stähelin, *RE VII.2* (1912) 2397). The nickname Pallides comes from the satyr-play *Agen*, attributed to Python. Meineke (1867: 280–1) derives the name from the word "phallos." Python perhaps wrote "Pallides" instead of "Phallides" to make the word play on Har-palos; for a summary of earlier views see Snell 1964: 104, with n.9. Sutton 1980a derives the name from "Pallas": "Harpalus is the 'child of Pallas', a gibe at his dealing with the Athenians." But here we might expect the form Παλλάδης.

17 Alexander's banished *hetairoi*: Ptolemy, Erigyios, Nearchos, and Harpalos (Plut. *Alex.* 10.4; cf. Arr. 3.6.5, adding Laomedon). For the date see Heckel 1981c: 51–7, esp. 55–7; cf. Olmstead, *HPE* 490. They may have gone to Epeiros. For Erigyios and Laomedon see Appendix IX.

18 Arr. 3.6.6. Strasburger, *Polemaios* 34; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 129–30.

Alexander himself was already starting inland towards Thapsacus and the river Euphrates, after appointing Coeranos, a Beroean, to collect taxes in Phoenicia, and Philoxenos to be collector in Asia this side of the Taurus. In their place he entrusted the custody of the moneys with him to Harpalus son of Machatas, who had just returned from exile; Harpalus had first been sent into exile while Philip was still on the throne, because he was loyal to Alexander; Ptolemy son of Lagus was exiled on the same account, with Nearchus son of Androtimus, Erigyius son of Larichus and Laomedon his brother, since there was a lack of confidence between Alexander and Philip after Philip took Eurydice to wife, and disgraced Olympias the mother of Alexander. On Philip's death those who had been banished on Alexander's account returned, Ptolemy was appointed one of the bodyguards, Harpalus treasurer, since his physique made him unfit for fighting, Erigyius commander of the allied cavalry, Laomedon his brother, since he was bilingual, officer in charge of the barbarian captives, and Nearchus satrap of Lycia and the country bordering on Lycia as far as Mount Taurus. But not long before the battle of Issus (ὁλίγον δὲ πρόσθεν τῆς μάχης τῆς ἐν Ἰσσῷ γενομένης) Harpalus was led astray by Tauriscus, a scoundrel (ἀνὴρ κακός), and fled with him. Tauriscus made his way to Italy to Alexander (king) of Epirus, and died there; and Harpalus took refuge in the Megarid. However, Alexander persuaded him to return, giving assurances that he would not suffer for his flight; and in fact on his return he was again (αὖθις) set in charge of the treasure.<sup>19</sup>

It is clear from this account that Harpalos had been treasurer at the time of his flight, and that during his absence the duties had been shared by Koiranos and Philoxenos, both of whom were given other (tax-collecting) duties upon Harpalos' reinstatement. But, although Arrian provides the context of the flight and the details about Harpalos' (and Tauriskos') activities in the west, he says nothing about what motivated Harpalos to flee, except that he was persuaded by Tauriskos to do so (ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς Ταυρίσκου ἀνδρὸς κακοῦ Ἀρπαλος φεύγει ἔνν Ταυρίσκῳ). Consequently, the first flight has generated considerable scholarly debate.<sup>20</sup>

19 Arr. 3.6.4–7; P.A. Brunt, translation.

20 A “rational explanation” of Harpalos’ flight was attempted by Badian 1960b: 246. His conclusion that “Alexander, *for some reason* [my emphasis], had decided to remove Harpalos from his post and give it to two minor figures,” that is, to Philoxenos and Koiranos, explains nothing. Badian further compares the case of Harpalos in 333 with “what happened to the Hetaeric cavalry after the death of Philotas: the command he had held was divided . . . , since Alexander . . . did not want one man to have such power again” (246). Cf. Badian 1971: 79: “H[arpalus] left because Alexander had reorganized the treasury under two others. He returned when Alexander found this unsatisfactory and asked him to.” But this argument amounts to *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. We have no evidence that the appointment of Philoxenos and Koiranos was the cause and not, in fact, the result of Harpalos’ departure; the political climate at the time of the Philotas affair, which was much later than this, was so different that it cannot be relevant to Harpalos’ case; and the theory omits to account for,

Peter Green (*Alexander* 222) argued that Harpalos had gone to Greece on a secret spy mission “with defection as his cover-story.” Such a story might have been effective and, indeed, necessary in 333/2, but one wonders why the truth was not made clear after the King’s death, or even in the early third century, when Ptolemy wrote his history. Harpalos had been a close friend, and, if his flight was really a “cover,” Ptolemy ought to have said so, in order to save a friend’s reputation. In fact, one senses in the existing account a deliberate brevity, a reluctance to divulge all the details of Harpalos’ crimes.<sup>21</sup>

Other scholars have concentrated on the context of the flight: soon before the battle of Issos, Alexander’s victory over Dareios was far from certain, and Harpalos may have lost heart and fled.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps it was the fear that Alexander would not survive the illness that befell him at the Kydnos which drove Harpalos from the Makedonian camp: whoever seized power in Asia might be expected to conduct a purge of the King’s friends and relatives (Harpalos was also a nephew of Alexander’s step-mother, Phila). Hence, Jaschinski believes that Harpalos returned to Europe in order to encourage Alexandros I of Epeiros to press his claims to the Makedonian throne; for he was married to Alexander’s sister, Kleopatra, and would have had the support of the Queen Mother, Olympias.<sup>23</sup>

The key to Harpalos’ first flight must surely be the obscure Tauriskos. Not only does Arrian single him out for attention—and his designation as ἀνὴρ κακός must be significant—but he records the man’s fate. Harpalos was, as later events were to show, a man of weak moral fiber. It seems that he and Tauriskos had been up to some sort of mischief. When Arrian 3.6.7 says that Harpalos was persuaded by Tauriskos, this must have been persuasion not only to take flight but also to commit the crime.<sup>24</sup> Probably the crime involved Harpalos’ official position: perhaps, at the suggestion of Tauriskos, who may have befriended him for this very

as Badian himself later recognized (1971: 79), the role of Tauriskos. For Koiranos and Philoxenos see Berve II, nos. 441, 793; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 93 “Coeranus [1],” 220 “Philoxenus [1].”

21 Landucci 1994a: 556 believes that the truth concerning Harpalos’ mission to Greece (which she regards as an attempt to defuse rebellious sentiment in the cities in the time leading up to Agis’ revolt) was misrepresented after Harpalos’ famous flight in 324.

22 Bosworth I, 284; cf. Rogers, *Alexander* 66; cf. Worthington, *Man and God* 69; Nawotka, *Alexander* 169, calling Harpalos “evidently emotionally weak.”

23 Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos* 12–8. For a different (economic) interpretation of Harpalos’ activities in Greece see Kingsley 1986; cf. Garnsey 1988: 158–9. Python’s *Agen* (Athen. 13.596a–b) says that Harpalos supplied a large amount of grain to the Athenians and was rewarded with citizenship. This does not have to belong to the time of his first “flight,” as Kingsley suggests. Instead, he may have authorized the grain shipments in his role as treasurer at some point in the years 330–326, when there were attested shortages in Athens. For a later date see also Mossé, *Alexander* 64.

24 I was not suggesting in Heckel 1977c: 135, as Worthington 1984: 169 n.18 assumes, that this is the meaning of the verb ἀναπειθώ (ἀναπεισθεῖς πρὸς Ταυρίσκου ἀνδρὸς κακοῦ Ἀρπαλος φεύγει ξὺν Ταυρίσκῳ). It is merely a logical inference that a man, described as “bad” or, possibly, “cowardly,” did not induce Harpalos to flee without being in some way involved in his mischief!

purpose, Harpalos absconded with a sizeable amount of money.<sup>25</sup> Together they fled to Greece. Harpalos, as a member of the Elimiote royal house, may have had connections with Alexandros of Epeiros, to whom he sent Tauriskos in the hope of gaining political asylum or, at least, of mitigating his crime. But Tauriskos, as we have seen, accomplished little and soon met his end.

It is a reasonable assumption that Harpalos' flight was preceded by an unauthorized withdrawal from the royal treasury, but that does not rule out a stronger underlying motivation. Hence, the view of Bosworth and others, that Harpalos had misgivings about the success of the upcoming confrontation with Dareios III, may be correct. Fear and uncertainty may have been the inducement to flee; the theft of moneys provided the means. Nor is it certain that the motives of Harpalos and Tauriskos were the same, though both hoped to benefit from the crime.

Berve assumes from Tauriskos' intrigues with Alexandros the Epeirot that there were political considerations ("daß politische Momente in Spiele waren" II, 76). What these were is not entirely clear, but it is worth noting that the name Tauriskos occurs twice in an Aitolian family between c.300 and 245.<sup>26</sup> If Harpalos' "accomplice" belonged to this family—or even if he came from elsewhere in Aitolia—the flight and the activities of the two men take on more sinister proportions; for the Aitolians were inveterate enemies of the Makedonians. But such an interpretation makes it more difficult to understand the ease with which Harpalos was reconciled with Alexander.

Harpalos, as it turned out, remained unmolested in the Megarid. Perhaps his lack of fear was prompted, at first, by the failure of Alexander to take action against him and by the hope of safety through the efforts of Tauriskos in Italy. It may also be that Alexander made his first entreaties to Harpalos very shortly after his departure. In view of his noble lineage, and his past friendship to Alexander, he could be forgiven his prodigal ways, indeed even reinstated in his former office. Thus it seems more likely that Harpalos' actions were not treasonous, and there is no reason to suppose that Alexander did not earnestly desire the return of his longtime companion. By putting the fox back in charge of the henhouse, Alexander showed a trust in his friends that did not extend to others in his army. Little did he suspect that he would be twice burned by the faithless Harpalos.

### **Treasurer**

In 331 Harpalos rejoined Alexander in Phoinikia, where he was promptly reinstated, undoubtedly much to the chagrin of Philoxenos (Arr. 3.6.4). The year that followed saw the most decisive blows dealt to the staggering Achaimenid empire:

25 It matters little whether the money was stolen in one lump sum or embezzled in smaller amounts over a period of time, as Worthington 1984: 165 argues. Cf. Anson, *Themes and Issues* 38: "Harpalus had fled to Greece with part of the treasury."

26 Grainger, *APS* 7.

Gaugamela, Babylon, Persepolis. The accumulated spoils were left with Harpalos at Ecbatana, and with them 6,000 Makedonian troops, some cavalry and lightly armed infantry, Menidas, Sitalkes, Kleandros, and, for a time, Parmenion (Arr. 3.19.7; cf. Curt. 10.1.1–6). Not only did Harpalos control an immense treasure, but he also supplied the needs of Alexander in the east: he regulated the very pulse of the empire. Whatever Alexander required from the west, for war or leisure, Harpalos provided: men, equipment, even books. Perhaps while he wintered in Baktria-Sogdiana (ἐν τοῖς ἄνω τόποις), Alexander received from Harpalos the works of Philistos, tragedies of Euripides, Sophokles, Aischylos, and dithyrambs of Telestos and Philoxenos.<sup>27</sup> There were unpleasant duties as well: Parmenion could not have been liquidated without Harpalos' aid (thus Badian 1961: 22–3). And, after Parmenion's death, Harpalos was, as Berve II, 77 noted, the most important link between east and west.

At an unspecified time, he shifted the seat of his power to Babylon, almost certainly on Alexander's instructions. There he was entrusted with the royal treasure and the collected revenues.<sup>28</sup> That trust was misplaced. Lavish dinners and splendid gardens, these were harmless extravagances. But they were only the beginning. The King may even have been somewhat amused by the tales of Harpalos' delicacies from the Persian Gulf, his exotic gardens and fruitless attempts to grow ivy in Media.<sup>29</sup> Yet he will have become less tolerant with each new report and stories that doubtless exaggerated the extent of Harpalos' depravity. In 326, 7,000 infantrymen reached India from Babylon, bearing 25,000 suits of exquisite armor (Curt. 9.3.21) and further tales of debauchery. Much of this could be dismissed as malicious gossip, but there was no denying that he had used the imperial treasures to buy and bring to Babylon the Athenian courtesan Pythionike, whom he pampered with gifts while she lived and, after she had died, revered as Pythionike Aphrodite.<sup>30</sup>

From the resources of the empire, Harpalos erected two great monuments to harlotry: a temple in Babylon and, on the Sacred Way to Eleusis, a tomb, which Dikaiarchos deemed “worthy of Perikles or Miltiades or Kimon” (*ap.* Athen. 13.594f = Wehrli, frag. 21). The tomb in Attika, impressive still in Pausanias' day, cost thirty talents, according to Plutarch; Theopompos claimed that both buildings were erected at the expense of 200 talents.<sup>31</sup> And the cause of this

27 Plut. *Alex.* 8.3; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 21; for a date after 330 see Mossé, *Alexander* 91; see also Brown 1967.

28 Diod. 17.108.4: τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι θησαυρῶν καὶ τῶν προσόδων τὴν φυλακὴν πεπιστευμένος.

29 Gardening: Plut. *Mor.* 648c–d; A 35.15; Theophr. *HP* 4.4.1; Pliny, *HN* 16.144. Fishes from the Red Sea: Diod. 17.108.4.

30 Diod. 17.108.5; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F253 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*) = Athen. 13.595c, *Letter to Alexander* (trans. in Shrimpton, *Theopompos* 271). On the relevance of Theopompos' letter to the question of Alexander's “divinity” see Flower, *Theopompos* 258–62. Pythionike: Berve II, 338 no. 676; Heckel, *Who's Who* 240; Müller 2006 and 2009: 78, 254–5; see also Ogden, *PPD* 231–2, Diodorus and Plutarch call her “Pythionike.” Pythionike Aphrodite: this anticipated the practices of Hellenistic queens (thus Lane Fox, *Alexander* 412; cf. Ogden, *PPD* 262).

31 Paus. 1.37.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 22.1–2. Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F253 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*). See also Scholl 1994.

extravagance, wrote Theopompos, a woman who was “thrice a slave and thrice a harlot.”<sup>32</sup> Still Harpalos’ passion for courtesans continued unabated: he summoned Glykera from Athens, and ordered her to be revered as a queen in Tarsos; he even erected a statue of her in Syrian Rhossos.<sup>33</sup>

### ***Disgrace and second flight***

The Alexander who emerged from Gedrosia was not the same man who had forgiven, or even laughed off, Harpalos’ earlier “indiscretions”: a serious wound in the town of the Mallians had fueled rumors of his death, and with it defection in the northeastern satrapies. And, even if reports of his demise had proved false, few gave much consideration to the possibility, much less the consequences, of his return. Harpalos’ crimes, it turned out, could be viewed as part of larger, more sinister, activities, done in concert with Kleandros, Sitalkes, Agathon, and others. His amors with native women transgressed both law and acceptable morality (Diod. 17.108.4: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ὕβρεις γυναικῶν καὶ παρανόμους ἔρωτας βαρβάρων ἐξεπέραπτ. Cf. Curt. 10.1.1–5, for similar crimes by the generals who had remained with him), and they brought shame upon the new Great King. We are told that, when Kissos and Ephialtes brought the news of Harpalos’ flight, Alexander was so struck with disbelief that he ordered them placed in chains: for he believed that they were surely slandering and falsely accusing him.<sup>34</sup> He did not yet understand the enormity of Harpalos’ crime. But patterns of maladministration soon became evident, and nothing short of a purge would restore order and security to the heart of the empire. Harpalos himself had anticipated these measures and fled to Kilikia, whence he would make his way to Attika<sup>35</sup> with thirty ships, bringing 6,000 mercenaries and 5,000 talents from the Babylonian treasury.<sup>36</sup> By now he was a desperate man, and a general uprising, led by Athens, seemed the only way to avoid

32 Theopompos *ap.* Ath 13.595a–c = *FGrH* 115 F253: *Letter to Alexander*.

33 Glykera: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 254 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*); Diod. 17.108.6; Ogden, *PPD* 231, 237, 262; Müller 2006: esp. 81–92. Ogden, *PPD* 237 notes that “Glycera had owned huge grain supplies,” on the basis of Athen. 13.596b. I take this passage to mean that Harpalos’ grain shipments were linked to his procurement of the courtesan from Athens. If this is so, then Harpalos’ myriads of grain, should be dated to the period after 330 and not to his first flight, as Kingsley 1986 argues.

34 [ἔδησεν] Ἐφιάλτην καὶ Κίσσον, ὡς καταψευδομένους τοῦ ἀνδρός (Plut. *Alex.* 41.8). Ephialtes and Kissos are otherwise unknown (see Berse nos. 330, 420, unless the latter can be identified with Kittos the Athenian actor: *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2418; cf. Ghiron-Bistagne 1976: 72, 337). For actors as envoys and messengers cf. Thessalos and Aristokritos in the negotiations with Pixodaros (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1–2; Berse nos. 125, no. 371; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 47, 265). I no longer believe that this passage refers to the first flight, which occurred at the time when Harpalos was in Alexander’s camp and would not need to be reported by itinerant actors (see Kingsley 1986: 165, with n.3).

35 For Harpalos’ flight in general see also Arr. *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* p. 68b; cf. Diod. 17, *argumentum*.

36 6,000 mercenaries, 5,000 talents (Diod. 17.108.6; cf. Prandi, *Diodoro* 185); thirty ships (Curt. 10.2.1; cf. Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 111–2).

punishment.<sup>37</sup> But the Athenians were uncertain about how to deal with Harpalos' arrival,<sup>38</sup> and at first rebuffed him. Taking the fleet and his mercenaries to Tainaron in the Peloponnes, Harpalos soon returned to Athens as a suppliant (Plut. *Dem.* 25.3), albeit bearing 700 talents. Demosthenes who had originally been in favor of barring him from the city, now accepted a generous bribe,<sup>39</sup> for which he was later indicted by Hypereides, Pytheas, Menesaichmos, Himeraios, and Stratokles (Plut. *Mor.* 846c; 848f),<sup>40</sup> convicted and forced to go into exile.<sup>41</sup>

At some point in 324, the King allowed the production in the Makedonian camp of a satyr-play entitled *Agen*. The author was Python, a Byzantine (or possibly Katanian), though it was alleged—quite implausibly—in antiquity that Alexander himself wrote the play. This work, in which Harpalos appeared as “Pallides,” mocked his relationships with Pythonike and Glykera, and predicted that *Agen* (Alexander) would soon punish him for his crimes. For the troops, Harpalos' sex life served as a useful diversion after the hard campaigning in Baktria and India, and the deprivations of the Gedrosian march. And the view, held by many scholars, that Alexander would not have allowed such political lampooning, fails to take into account the poem of Pranichos or Pierion, which purportedly raised the ire of Kleitos in Marakanda (Plut. *Alex.* 50.8). The exact time and place of the performance was debated in antiquity, just as it is today. Athenaeus (13.595e) claims that the play was first performed at the Hydaspes, which has led some to believe that it dates to the time of the Indian campaign.<sup>42</sup> This is far too early: we are told that the play was first performed after Harpalos' flight and rebellion.<sup>43</sup> It is more likely that the play was staged in Ecbatana in 324 and that the river is the Medus Hydaspes (mentioned by Virgil and explained by Servius as “fluvius Mediae”).<sup>44</sup>

37 Arr. *Succ.* 16 = Anecd. Bekk. p. 145, 18 s.v. ἐκπολεμῆσθαι. Harpalos reached Athens before July 21, 324 (so Badian 1961: 42; Philokles' term as *strategos*, 325/4, had not yet expired; Develin, *AO* 402), and the Athenians were already aware of Nikanor's intention to proclaim the Exiles' Decree at the Olympic Festival. The Athenians were, in fact, on the verge of going to war over this very matter (cf. Ashton 1983: 47 ff.); Harpalos' sudden arrival, ironically, delayed rather than prompted the outbreak of this “Hellenic” War. For the impact of Harpalos' arrival on Greece see Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos*, and Blackwell, *Absence of Alexander*.

38 Ashton 1983: 56–7: “The Athenians might well have suspected that he was on a punitive mission from Alexander, who had become aware of their intention to oppose the restoration of the exiles and the consequent surrender of Samos.”

39 Justin 13.5.9. Plut. *Mor.* 846a (1,000 darics), 846c (30 talents); Plut. *Dem.* 25 (a golden drinking-cup and 20 talents).

40 Patrokles or Prokles is probably a corruption of Stratokles (cf. Badian 1961: 32 n.113). Another opponent of Harpalos and those who accepted his money was Deinarchos (Plut. *Mor.* 850c–d).

41 Plut. *Mor.* 846c; Paus. 2.33.3 claims that Demosthenes did not take any money; for his exile cf. Diod. 18.13.6.

42 Thus Snell 1964: 109 ff.

43 Athen. 13.595e: ἐδιδάχθη δὲ τὸ δρᾶμα ἥδη φυγόντος τοῦ Ἀρπάλου ἐπὶ θάλατταν καὶ ἀποστάντος.

44 Verg. *Georg.* 4.211. Droysen I<sup>3</sup> 406 n.101, suggests Choaspes instead of Hydaspes. For the Medus Hydaspes (possibly the Karkheh?) see Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.434–6. Goukowsky II, 77 thinks it was the Iranian “Hydaspes” (Halil-rud), and that the *Agen* was produced at Salmous in

By now Alexander had already initiated moves to deal with his fugitive treasurer.

Back in Athens, Harpalos himself was imprisoned and his money confiscated, but he escaped to Megara; eventually he went to Tainaron and Krete.<sup>45</sup> The Athenians, though tempted by Harpalos' bribes, were paralyzed by the arrival of Alexander's admiral, Philoxenos.<sup>46</sup> Ultimately, the money helped finance the Lamian War (*Diod.* 18.9.1); for the Athenians sent some of it to Leosthenes (*Diod.* 18.9.4). But, by this time, it was too late for Harpalos. Disappointed by the Athenians, he sailed away, perhaps intending to go to Kyrene, where his forces went after his death. On Krete, he was killed by one of his friends, namely Thibron—though others say he was killed by a servant or by a certain Makedonian named Pausanias.<sup>47</sup>

### **Philippos son of Machatas**

Berve II, 384–5 no. 780, and II, 386–7 no. 784; Treves, *RE* XIX (1938) 2545 no. 55, and 2545–6 no. 56; Bosworth 1973: 252–3; Heckel, *Who's Who* 212–3 “Philip [5].”

Philippos son of Machatas (*Arr.* 5.8.3) was, in all probability, the brother of Harpalos the Treasurer and Tauron, who commanded the archers in the second half of Alexander's campaign. Although Philippos is attested with patronymic only once in the Alexander historians, his career can be reconstructed with a measure of certainty. He first appears in the Aspasia campaign of 327/6, leading a battalion of light infantry in that third of the army which Alexander had entrusted to Ptolemy son of Lagos.<sup>48</sup> At Taxila, Philippos was ordered to govern the newly formed satrapy east of the Indus (*Arr.* 5.8.3), and on the death of Nikanor (*Arr.* 5.20.7) his province was extended to include Gandhara (*Arr.* 6.2.3),

Karmania; cf. Blackwell, *Absence of Alexander* 143. But Alexander's sojourn in Karmania is also, I believe, too early for the production of Python's *Agen*. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 149 suggests “sometime before the summer of 324.” I favor the view of Beloch (*ibid.*), followed by Worthington 1986a: 64, who dates the production of the play to October 324, at Ecbatana (*Diod.* 17.110.7–8); see also Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 108–10.

45 Plut. *Mor.* 846b; Justin 13.5.9. Plutarch details Phokion's involvement with Harpalos. The latter attempted to bribe Phokion with 700 talents; Phokion rejected his bribes, though others accepted (*Phoc.* 21.3–4). Harpalos befriended Phokion's son-in-law, Charikles (21.5), who was put on trial for his dealings with Harpalos (22.4). After Harpalos' death, his daughter (by Pythonike?) was raised by Charikles and Phokion (22.3).

46 Hypereides, *Dem.* col. 8; Paus. 2.33.4; Plut. *Mor.* 531a. Olympias and Antipatros had also demanded Harpalos' extradition (*Diod.* 17.108.7). On the chronological problems see Worthington 1986a, and now Atkinson & Yardley, *Curtius* 108–11; for the political and legal activities in Athens: Will, *Athen und Alexander* 113 ff. with earlier literature; Blackwell, *Absence of Alexander*, and Jaschinski, *Flucht des Harpalos*.

47 Thibron: *Diod.* 18.19.2; *Arr. Succ.* 1.16; cf. Strabo 17.3.21 C837; see also Berve II, 180 no. 372; Poralla, *Lakedaimonier* 65–6 no. 376; Heckel, *Who's Who* 265–6. Thibron is not named by *Diod.* 17.108.8; *Curt.* 10.2.3. Pausanias as Harpalos' murderer: Paus. 2.33.4–5.

48 *Arr.* 4.24.10. This cannot have been a battalion of *pezhetairoi* commanded (perhaps) by Philippos son of Balakros.

which he restored to order with the help of Tyriespis, the ruler of the Parapamisadai.<sup>49</sup> As the Makedonian conquests continued, Philippos received additional territory between the rivers Akesines and Indus as far south as their confluence, regions which he had himself helped to subdue.<sup>50</sup>

When Alexander moved south towards Sogdia and the kingdom of Mousikanos (with its capital at Alor; cf. Eggermont, *Sind* 5–9), Philippos remained in the enlarged satrapy, supported by all the Thrakians (presumably under Eudamos' command) and a force of mercenaries, with instructions to found a city at the confluence of the rivers and build dockyards (Arr. 6.15.2).<sup>51</sup> In 325 Philippos was assassinated by mercenaries, some of whom were killed in the act by the satrap's bodyguard, others were arrested and executed. Alexander, who learned of Philippos' death as he marched from Gedrosia to Karmania, appointed Eudamos as his replacement (Arr. 6.27.2; Curt. 10.1.20). His sudden death, corresponding roughly to the time of Harpalos' misadventures, raises certain questions about Alexander's role in the man's murder.

### Tauron son of Machatas

Berve II, 371–2 no. 741; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 201; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 450 no. 139; Heckel, *Who's Who* 260.

The son of Machatas (*IG IX.9*, 197), hence a brother of Philippos and Harpalos and a member of the royal house of Elimeia, Tauron first appears in late 331. Alexander, intending to attack a town of the Ouxians, sent him with a force of 1,500 mercenary archers and 1,000 Agrianes to occupy the heights above that town.<sup>52</sup> Arrian assigns to Krateros the command of this force, which in his version was intended to cut down the Ouxians who fled to the heights. Now it may be that Tauron commanded only the archers, with the supreme command belonging to Krateros. But Bosworth argues persuasively for two different engagements fought on the journey from Sousa to the Persian Gates.<sup>53</sup> Tauron's maneuver was carried out successfully and the appearance of the archers and Agrianes disheartened the Ouxians who were now under attack by Alexander.

49 Tyriespis: Berve II, 376 no. 758; Heckel, *Who's Who* 269. The Philippos who was installed as commandant (*phrourarch*) of Peukelaotis (= Charsada), under the general supervision of Nikanor, who ruled the Cophen (Gandhara) satrapy (Arr. 4. 28. 6), is unlikely to have been the son of Machatas. But Berve (II, 386, no. 783) equates the commandant of Peukelaotis with the man who campaigned with Tyriespis in Gandhara; the latter Philippos was clearly the son of Machatas.

50 Further extension of Philippos' satrapy: Arr. 6.14.3, 15.2; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 60.16. His role in the conquest: Arr. 6.2.3, 4.1; cf. *Ind.* 19.4. See Bosworth 1983.

51 The city may be the one described by Diod. 17.102.4 and Curt. 9.8.8 (so Welles, *Diodorus* 413 n.2); Brunt (*Arrian* II, 144 n.3) thinks Curt. 9.8.8 could refer to the city founded by Alexander near Sogdia (Arr. 6.15.4; cf. Tarn II, 237). I am inclined to believe that both Diodorus (who says the city was founded by Alexander—possibly inaccurate shorthand) and Curtius refer to the latter foundation.

52 The Ouxian campaign: Curt. 5.3.6, 10; cf. Diod. 17.67.4–5.

53 Arr. 3.17.4; Bosworth I, 321–3.

Tauron is not mentioned again until 326, this time with the title *toxarches*, in the battle with Poros. Along with Seleukos and Antigenes, he commanded infantrymen who were clearly not *pezhetairoi*.<sup>54</sup> According to Diod. 17.88.5 the archers were used to make a direct attack on Poros himself.

The next stages of his life are difficult to reconstruct. His career undoubtedly suffered because of his relationship to Harpalos, whose flight to Greece in 324 was an overt act of rebellion. He reappears in the late fourth century, honored at Eretria together with Myllenas son of Asandros (*IG XII.9*, 197), a *grammateus* of Alexander. Since most of the honorific decrees of Eretria in this period concern men in the service of the Antigonos and his son, it appears that Tauron too became an Antigonid supporter (Billows, *Antigonos* 450, “Taurion”).<sup>55</sup>

54 Hydaspes battle: Arr. 5.14.1, 16.3; cf. Curt. 8.14.15, wrongly substituting Leonnatos for Seleukos.

55 It is tempting to postulate a family connection between the Antigonids and the royal house of Elimeia: a certain Harpalos appears, perhaps as governor of Beroia, in the mid-third century (Tataki, *Beroea* 116 no. 228) in the service of Antigonos Gonatas; a later Harpalos son of Polemaios (Tataki, *Beroea* 116–7 no. 230) was Perseus' ambassador to Rome in 172. Polemaios was, of course, the name of Antigonos Monopthalmos' nephew (cf. Tataki, *Beroea* 25 no. 1082). See Kuzmin 2013. Furthermore, Tauron is honored along with Myllenas son of Asandros (possibly another Beroian; cf. Tataki, *Beroea* 231–2 no. 910); Asandros son of Agathon, satrap of Karia, is described by Arr. *Succ.* 25.1 as welcoming Antigonos κατὰ γένος ἐπιτήδειος ὄν.

## 15 Ptolemy son of Lagos

To the modern reader, Ptolemy son of Lagos is probably the best known of Alexander's generals, but he is included in the cast of marshals only because, unlike those others who became major players in the wars of the Diadochoi, his contributions to Alexander's war of conquest were greater and his later *History* tells us as much about his relations with the other marshals as it does about his own career.<sup>1</sup> Lysimachos, Seleukos, Kassandros, and Antigonos were to dominate the decades that followed Alexander's death. So, too, for a shorter period, Eumenes of Kardia. But of their careers in the years 336–323, very little is known. As fate would have it, they became Alexander's true heirs, though few of their contemporaries could have predicted their impact on the events of the late-fourth and early-third centuries.<sup>2</sup> Ptolemy thus presents an unusual problem: much of what we know about his career in Alexander's lifetime derives from Arrian and, ultimately, from Ptolemy himself.<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, too, in his eighteenth book, uses in places a

1 Ptolemy's career: Volkmann, *RE* XXIII (1959) 1603 ff. no. 18; Bevan, *House of Ptolemy* 1–55; Seibert, *Ptolemaios*; Ellis, *Ptolemy*; Bengtson 1975: 10–35. His service under Alexander: Berse II, 329–35 no. 668 Heckel, *Who's Who* 235–8 “Ptolemy [6]”; Howe 2008, 2013a, 2014, 2015b; Müller 2012a, 2014a. His years in Egypt: Hauben 2014; Meeus 2014b. Military aspects: Devine 1989b; Hammond 1996b; Kertész 1974. Several full-scale biographies of Ptolemy are currently in preparation.

2 Brief discussions of these men were included in the first edition of this book. I have chosen to omit them from the current volume in order to give a greater sense of cohesion and unity to the work, but the basic discussion of their careers under Alexander and somewhat beyond can be found in Heckel, *Who's Who* 32–4 (“Antigonus [1]”), 79–81 (“Cassander”), 120–1 (“Eumenes”), 153–5 (“Lysimachus [2]”), 246–8 (“Seleucus”). In addition to extensive articles in *RE*, full accounts, with additional bibliography, can be found in Billows, *Antigonos*; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*; Engel, *Machtaufstieg*; Müller, *Jahr der Könige*; Landucci, *L'arte del potere*; Vezin, *Eumenes*; Schäfer, *Eumenes*; Anson, *Eumenes*; Hünerwadel, *Lysimachos*; Landucci, *Lisimachos*; Lund, *Lysimachus*; Mehl, *Seleukos Nikator*; Grainger, *Seleukos*, *SPG*, and *Rise of the Seleukid Empire*; Schober.

3 Ptolemy's *History*: Jacoby, *FGrH* 138 (Timothy Howe's entry on Ptolemy in *BNJ* is still in preparation); Auberger 2001: 316–65, with French translation; for an English translation see Robinson 1954: 183–205. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios*; Pearson, *LHA* 188–211; Errington 1969; Roisman 1984; Pédech, *Historiens* 215–22. Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte*, though much maligned, should not be dismissed entirely. See also Bengtson 1975: 30–2. Meeus 2014b: 305: “it seems clear enough that the history aimed at stressing Ptolemy's special role in Alexander's conquests” (see also 305

pro-Ptolemaic source. In contrast, the popular tradition tells us little. But, whereas this tradition is silent about the minor commands, which Ptolemy may in fact have exaggerated for the sake of self-promotion, it does treat him very favorably in the description of three episodes, which Ptolemy himself either omits or disputes.<sup>4</sup>

## Family and early career

The son of Lagos and Arsinoë, purportedly a member of a lesser branch of the Makedonian royal house,<sup>5</sup> Ptolemy came from Eordaia and may have been brought up at the Court in Pella.<sup>6</sup> Rumors that he was an illegitimate son of Philip II are just that and originated in the early years of the Diadochic age, when blood relationship with the house of Philip had tremendous propaganda value.<sup>7</sup> It was alleged that Arsinoë had been Philip's mistress and when she was given in marriage to Lagos she was already pregnant with the King's child.<sup>8</sup> The only source for Ptolemy's birthdate is of dubious worth: Ps.-Lucian (*Macrob.* 12) places it in 367/6, a date that was once rejected because it conflicts with the view that Ptolemy was coeval with Alexander.<sup>9</sup>

n.159 with additional literature). I am less certain that Ptolemy wrote his history in the fourth century, but there is insufficient evidence to allow us to date the work.

4 His alleged role in the Kleitos affair; the Mallian incident; and his near-death experience at Harmatelia: Curt. 8.1.48; 9.5.21; 9.8.22–7; Diod. 17.103.6–8.

5 See e.g., Arr. 2.11.8; 3.6.5. For occurrences of the patronymic in Arrian, see Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 8–9. Ogden 2013: 185, with n.6, observes that although the patronymic is common in the literary tradition, Ptolemy in his inscriptions avoided calling himself son of Lagos. On Lagos see also Plut. *de cohib. ira* 9 = Mor. 458a–b. Son of Arsinoë: Porphyry ap. Euseb. Arm. *chron.* p. 74, 19 ff. = *FGrH* 260 F2 §2. Makedonian royal house: Satyrus, frg. 21 = *FHG* III, 165; Theocritus 17.26, with Gow 1965: II, 331; Curt. 9.8.22; Dittenberger, *OGIS* I, 54, line 6; cf. also Wilcken, *RE* II (1896) 1281, s.v. “Arsinōe (24).” For the descendants of Lagos see Stemma IX.

6 Eordaian: Arr. 6.28.4; Ind. 18.5.

7 See especially the *Last Days and Testament of Alexander* in Ps.-Kall. 3.32 [A]. See also Bosworth 2000: 226, with n.93.

8 Illegitimacy: Paus. 1.6.2, 8; Curt. 9.8.22; Aelian, frg. 285; *Suda* s.v. Λάρυος; Collins 1997; Ogden, *PPD* 67–8. Importance of connections with Philip: Errington 1976: 155–6. On Ptolemaic claims to descent from Philip II see also Ellis, *Ptolemy* 3. A paternal link to the Argeads (or rather the Heraklid Argeads) was deemed more important than a maternal one. A full discussion of the “birth myths” of Ptolemy, linking him with Philip II and Zeus, and thus also with Alexander, is provided by Ogden 2013. This has more to do with dynastic propaganda than the reality of Ptolemy’s life. If [Lucian], *Macrob.* 12 is correct in placing his birth in 367/6, this makes the story about Philip and Arsinoë more difficult, though not impossible.

9 Bouché-Leclercq 1903: I, 3 (cf. Bevan, *House of Ptolemy* 21) suggests that he entered the ranks of the *paides basilikoi* (“C'est là, dans cette pépinière de fonctionnaires et d'officiers, qu'il eut l'occasion de mériter l'amitié et la confiance d'Alexandre”). See also Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.126, who sees the slow advancement of Ptolemy’s as a sign of his youth; cf. Bengtson 1975: 11. But, if Ptolemy was a *pais basilikos*, this would have been in the years 354 to 349, too early for him to have had significant contact with Alexander, who was born in 356. That Ptolemy was ten to eleven years older than Alexander is now generally accepted (see Jacoby, *FGrH* IIB “Kommentar” 498: “der zweifel von Beloch . . . und Berwe . . . ist meines erachtens unbegründet”; Bagnall, *CDCC* 732 s.v. “Ptolemy I”; Dorothy J. Thompson, *OCD*<sup>3</sup> 1271).

In the spring of 336, Ptolemy and four other *hetairoi* of Alexander were banished by Philip II for their role in the Pixodaros affair. They had clearly induced the Crown Prince to conduct private negotiations with the Karian dynast through the agency of the actor Thessalos, negotiations which scuttled Philip's own diplomacy. Hence they were exiled, and did not return to Makedonia until after Philip's death.<sup>10</sup>

### **Ptolemy emerges: from the Persian Gates to Phrada**

Ptolemy almost certainly took part in the Asiatic expedition from the very beginning. Probably as a member of the Companion Cavalry, he joined in the pursuit of the Persians who fled from the battlefield of Issos. In his own *History* he remarked that “the pursuers of Darius meeting a deep gully in the pursuit crossed it over bodies of the dead.” Bosworth assumes that Ptolemy was “one of the senior *hetairoi* of the *ile basilike*” at Issos.<sup>11</sup> But he held no independent command until late 331, when Alexander reached the Persian Gates. Here Arrian (3.18.9)—probably drawing on Ptolemy’s own account<sup>12</sup>—assigns to him the command of 3,000 troops to guard a route by which Ariobarzanes’ men might possibly retreat. Ptolemy’s role is omitted by the authors of the popular tradition, who really had no good reason to diminish his contributions; for there are two later episodes in which these authors report stories that enhance Ptolemy’s reputation.<sup>13</sup> Bosworth may be correct in suggesting that “he cast himself for the role played by Philotas.”<sup>14</sup> Certainly, Ptolemy’s lack of achievement up to this point, combined with the conspicuous silence of the other sources, raises suspicions about the man’s sudden prominence in an account based, most likely, on his own record of events.<sup>15</sup>

What evidence we have for the ages of those *hetairoi* who were banished by Philip on account of their roles in the Pixodaros affair shows that they were older men. In addition to [Lucian], *Macrobius*, 12 on Ptolemy, we have the evidence of Curt. 7.4.34, where Erigyios is described in 330/29 as *gravis aetate* and white haired. They were probably like the *hetairoi* that Antigonos assigned to young Demetrios Poliorcetes (Diod. 19.69.1)—older men who acted as advisors. For full discussion see Heckel 1985a. It is interesting to note that three of the five *hetairoi* of Alexander were naturalized Makedones of Greek origin.

10 Plut. *Alex.* 10.4; Arr. 3.6.5; that they went to Epeiros, as Bengtson 1975: 11 suggests, is pure speculation.

11 Arr. 2.11.8 = Ptolemy, *FGrH* 138 F6; cf. Bosworth I, 217 with earlier literature.

12 Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 35; Kornemann, *Alexandergeschichte* 60; Heckel 1980a: 169 n.7; Howe 2015b: 181 n.47.

13 Curt. 9.5.21; 9.8.22–7; Diod. 17.103.6–8.

14 Bosworth I, 328.

15 Seibert (*Ptolemaios*) makes a valiant attempt to defend Ptolemy, first (4–7) by rejecting Welles’ arguments (1963: 101–16, esp. 107), and then (8–10) by arguing, on the basis of a meticulous study of Arrian’s use of Ptolemy’s patronymic, that the officer at the Persian Gates was not, in fact, the son of Lagos. Bosworth I, 328–9 is rightly skeptical of Seibert’s conclusions; cf. Atkinson II, 93; but my dismissal of Seibert’s conclusions (Heckel 1980a: 169 n.7) elicits a petulant and sarcastic response (“Offenbar ist Heckel die Problematik dieser Stelle verborgen geblieben,” *Eroberung*

In the autumn of 330, after Demetrios the Bodyguard had been deposed, and presumably executed,<sup>16</sup> on the charge of conspiring against the King, Alexander appointed Ptolemy *somatophylax*.<sup>17</sup> Arrian (3.6.6), in a passage that anticipates the appointment, regards it as a reward for Ptolemy's loyalty to the King in the past, especially in 337/6. When Justin writes that he had been "promoted from the ranks (*ex gregario milite*) on account of his *virtus*," he is merely indicating that Ptolemy, up to this point, had had no unit under his command.<sup>18</sup> It was at about this time that Alexander began to make greater use of his *somatophylakes* on an *ad hoc* basis. This is almost certainly because the composition of the unit had changed significantly and its members were all younger men whom the King felt he could trust.

### Independent commissions

In 329, we find Ptolemy assigned the task of bringing in the regicide Bessos, whom Spitamenes and Dataphernes had arrested and were prepared to extradite, presumably in exchange for immunity.<sup>19</sup> Here again, Arrian, when he follows Ptolemy, shows signs of embellishment, and Ptolemy's own role is doubtless exaggerated. Diodorus' version omits Ptolemy altogether, saying that a Persian named Bagodaras fled Bessos, who had threatened to put him to death, and found refuge with Alexander, who guaranteed his safety and gave him gifts. This welcome induced other leading Persians to arrest Bessos and bring him to Alexander (συλλαβόντες τὸν Βῆσσον ἀπήγαγον πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον). And, in Curtius' version, Spitamenes brings Bessos to Alexander at the "Tanais" (Iaxartes).<sup>20</sup> It appears that Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin followed a source

104 n.14). Further arguments for identification with the son of Lagos are provided by Speck 2002: 188–9, Moritani 2014: 128, and by Howe 2015b. In the light of Speck's detailed study of the topography, Ptolemy's role, though perhaps somewhat exaggerated, should not be dismissed as fabrication (Moritani 2014: 128 is skeptical).

16 It follows from Curt. 6.11.37–8 that Demetrios was one of those executed for involvement in the conspiracy; Arr. 3.27.5 says only that he was replaced by Ptolemy. Müller 2014a: 182 n.52 argues that Ptolemy was careful not to appear to be a beneficiary of Philotas' (and Demetrios') fall: "Rettete Ptolemaios Hephaistions Ehre, war er noch mehr darum bemüht, den—zutreffenden—Verdacht zu zerstreuen, er habe ebenfalls von Philotas' Tod profitiert." See Heckel, "The Conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard" (forthcoming).

17 Arr. 3.27.5; cf. 6.28.4 = Aristoboulos, *FGrH* 139 F50 (cf. Pownall, *BNJ*).

18 Justin 13.4.10. In much the same way, Appian (Syr. 56 [283]) calls Seleukos στρατιώτης before his appointment as commander of the Royal Hypaspists; noted by Bouché-Leclercq 1903: I, 2 n.1. Romm, *Ghost* 16, comments that "Ptolemy was hardly the most skilled of Alexander's officers, but perhaps the cleverest, as his subsequent career would prove."

19 Arr. 3.29.6–30.5 = *FGrH* 138 F14; long discussion in Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 10–6. Aristoboulos' version: Arr. 3.30.5 = *FGrH* 139 F24: Αριστόβουλος δὲ τοὺς ἄμφι Σπιταμένην τε καὶ Δαταφέρνην Πτολεμαῖῷ ἀγαγεῖν Βῆσσον καὶ παραδοῦναι Αλεξάνδρῳ γρυνὸν ἐν κλοιῷ δήσαντος. Text, translation, and commentary by F. Pownall in *BNJ*. *Itiner. Al.* 34 also mentions Ptolemy's role, but this work is derivative of Arrian.

20 Diod. 17.83.7–9; Curt. 7.5.19–26, 36–43; Justin 12.5.10–1. Curtius calls him Cobares, probably Gobares or Gobryas (see Heckel, *Who's Who* 126 "Gobares").

(probably Kleitarchos) that omitted Ptolemy's role as intermediary. But, from Arrian's account, we do gain a sense of how delicate the extradition process was and how great the fear of betrayal. Spitamenes and Dataphernes had asked that only a small force be sent to them; Ptolemy's contingent probably exceeded 5,000 men.<sup>21</sup> Alexander had clearly not forgotten Satibarzanes' treachery and the death of Anaxippos.<sup>22</sup>

Ptolemy's claim to have reported the discovery of oil at the Oxos is contradicted by Plutarch and Curtius, and probably untrue. But Müller argues, persuasively, that Ptolemy deliberately associated himself with the discovery of the oil (in this case, olive oil: *elaion*)—bringing the information to Alexander's attention—in order to enhance his later claim to kingship: for the oil was said by Aristandros to foretell further labors (*ponoi*), in which Ptolemy played no small part, for the securing of the Makedonian empire. It had, also, important cultural and religious aspects.<sup>23</sup>

That, in 328, Ptolemy commanded one of five columns that swept through Sogdiana comes once again from his own *History*. Curtius mentions only three contingents, led by Koinos, Hephaistion, and Alexander respectively.<sup>24</sup> One soon gets the impression that, although Ptolemy the *hetairos* may have played some limited role in the events of 330–328, this was embellished by the historian at a time when few of his fellow commanders were alive to expose the fiction.<sup>25</sup> In late summer or autumn of that year, he attended the banquet in Marakanda where Alexander killed Kleitos. Although it is generally agreed that he made some attempt to restrain Kleitos or Alexander himself, it could be argued that he had failed to prevent the murder, and it is difficult to determine what, if anything, Ptolemy said about the episode in his *History*.<sup>26</sup> Over the winter, Ptolemy and his

21 Three hippocries of Companions, the battalion of Philotas, one chiliarchy of hypaspists, all the Agriane, and half the archers. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 11 n.33, following Berve, puts the figure at c.5,000. But the calculation of 300 men per hippocry (= *ile*) is probably incorrect, since the hippocries had by this time been reformed (cf. Bosworth I, 375–6), and the strength of a battalion of *psiloi* (i.e., Philotas' battalion) was not necessarily equal to that of its counterpart in the *pezhetairoi*.

22 Satibarzanes and Anaxippos: Arr. 3.25.2, 5; Howe 2015c: 166–70.

23 Arr. 4.15.7–8; Plut. *Alex.* 57.5 ff. and Curt. 7.10.14. Plutarch says the man who discovered the oil was Proxenos, described as ἐπί τῶν στρωματοφυλάκων τεταγμένος (that is, he was in charge of the king's equipment, specifically the tent). On the episode see Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 16–7; Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 83, and Müller 2014a.

24 Arr. 4.16.2–3 (they were led by Perdikkas, Hephaistion, Koinos and Artabazos, Ptolemy, and Alexander himself; Curt. 8.1.1 assigns the command to Alexander, Hephaistion, and Koinos, adding at 8.1.10 that Artabazos accompanied Hephaistion). For the campaign see Holt, *Bactria* 60–2.

25 Thus Howe 2008.

26 Restraint of Kleitos: Arr. 4.8.9 = Aristoboulos, *FGrH* 139 F29 (cf. Pownall in *BNJ*). Restraint of Alexander: Curt. 8.1.45, 48. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 19, assumes that he omitted the episode, since it was unflattering to both Alexander and Ptolemy: "Sehr wahrscheinlich führte Ptolemaios die Kleitoskatastrophe nicht an, da sie auf Alexander ein ungünstiges Licht warf, aber auch auf seine eigene Person wie die der anderen Beteiligten, da sie nach den vorliegenden Quellen die Ermordung des Kleitos hätten verhindern können." Arrian's citation of Aristoboulos suggests too

fellow *somatophylakes*, Perdikkas and Leonnatos, conducted the night operations in shifts during the siege of Sisimithres' fortress (the Rock of Chorienes).<sup>27</sup>

In the spring of 327, after Alexander's marriage to Roxane and before the departure for India, Ptolemy played a major role in bringing the conspiracy of Hermolaos and the Pages to the King's attention. The details of the plot had been divulged to him by Eurylochos, and, in Arrian's version, Ptolemy alone informed Alexander. Curtius says that Ptolemy and Leonnatos were approached by Eurylochos, and it appears that, in his own *History*, Ptolemy took full credit by suppressing Leonnatos' contribution.<sup>28</sup>

## Ptolemy in India

During the Swat campaign, Ptolemy was wounded in a skirmish with the Aspasians near the Choes River. The wound could not have been serious, for Ptolemy soon afterwards pursued the Indian hyparch up a hill and killed him in single combat, the account of which almost certainly comes from Ptolemy's own pen.<sup>29</sup> Once the Makedonians had advanced beyond Arigaion, Ptolemy was again sent ahead to reconnoiter, and he reported large numbers of enemy campfires (Arr. 4.24.8). In the attack on this concentration of Indian forces, Alexander divided his troops into three contingents, assigning the command of one third to Ptolemy, to whom he assigned the light-armed battalions of Philotas and Philippos, as well as one third of the hypaspists (Arr. 4.24.10). While Alexander dealt with the Indians who had rushed down onto the plain, Ptolemy successfully dislodged those who occupied

that the latter's information differed from or supplemented Ptolemy's account. Cf. Errington 1969: 238–9; Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 84; see also Borza 1981 = *Makedonika* 173–88. Whether Curtius was following Kleitarchos or Timagenes, both of whom had reason to flatter Ptolemy, or possibly Ptolemy himself, is unknown. Certainly, it could be argued that the attempt to prevent Kleitos' murder, even if unsuccessful, exculpated Ptolemy. For Timagenes see *FGrH* 188, with McInerney and Roller, *BNJ*.

27 Arr. 4.21.4. On Sisimithres and Chorienes see Schwarz, *Feldzüge in Turkestan* 73; Berve II, 354–5 no. 708; Heckel 1986a and *Who's Who* 250; Holt, *Land of Bones* 82; contra Bosworth II, 135; Holt, *Bactria* 66 n.64 is ambivalent. See also Vacante 2012: 109–11. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 18, says of Ptolemy's military undertakings that served as bookends for the Kleitos affair: "Ptolemaios erscheint als einer unter vielen Heerführern Alexanders, er hebt seine Rolle nicht besonders hervor." This may be true of the siege of the Rock of Chorienes, but his role as commander of an independent contingent in Sogdiana might be called into question.

28 Ptolemy alone: Arr. 4.13.7. Ptolemy and Leonnatos: Curt. 8.6.22. Cf. Errington 1969: 234. Cf. Arr. 4.25.3, in which Ptolemy, after reporting in some detail the contributions of his third of the army, and that of Alexander, says only that Leonnatos' troops fared equally well (ἴσοτύπως ἔπραξαν). Eurylochos was the brother of the page Epimenes (Arr. 4.13.7; Curt. 8.6.20): see Berve II, 159 no. 322; Heckel, *Who's Who* 123 "Eurylochus [2]."

29 Wounded against the Aspasians: Arr. 4.24.3–4. Jacoby rightly includes Ptolemy's *aristeia* in F18; cf. Brunt, *Arrian I*, 421 n.3; and Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 19, with earlier literature in n.54. Howe 2008 suggests that Ptolemy was using the Pharaohs (especially Thutmose III and Amenhotep II) as models: "Ptolemy used the Indian Campaign to show himself as Alexander's right-hand man, every bit as courageous and talented and daring as Alexander himself, in order to justify his succession to the throne of Egypt and emphasize his own military pedigree" (2008: 229).

the hills (Arr. 4.25.2–3). And Ptolemy himself reported that, in the engagement, more than 40,000 Indians and 230,000 oxen were captured by the Makedonians.<sup>30</sup> But, despite Ptolemy’s tendency to focus in his *History* on his own achievements, there is little to support Curtius’ remark that “Ptolemy took the most cities, but Alexander captured the greatest ones” (8.10.21). Not surprisingly, Ptolemy also played a key role in the assault of Aornos in Arrian’s version (4.29.1–6). The popular tradition knows nothing of it, and Curtius in particular ascribes a similar command to Myllenas.<sup>31</sup>

The popular tradition preserves a story that Ptolemy was one of many Makedonians wounded at Harmatelia, a town of Brahmins—located by Diodorus and Curtius in the kingdom of Sambos, but placed by Strabo in the land of the Oreitai.<sup>32</sup> These Indians smeared the tips of their weapons with poison extracted from snakes, thus causing the wounded to die in excruciating pain.<sup>33</sup> Apart from the implausible tale that Alexander saw in a dream a serpent carrying in its mouth the plant that was the antidote to the poison, it is clear that the whole story is a fiction invented to glorify Ptolemy. Like the false report that Ptolemy saved Alexander’s life in the town of the Mallians, which is disproved by Ptolemy’s own *History*,<sup>34</sup> this story contains late elements that render it even more suspect. Diodorus emphasizes the character and popularity of the later ruler of Egypt; Curtius adds that Ptolemy was thought to be an illegitimate son of Philip II. The snake itself is thought by some to be connected with the cult of Sarapis, instituted in Egypt by Ptolemy.<sup>35</sup>

## Return to the West

He was responsible for building the funeral pyre, on which the famed Indian philosopher Kalanos committed suicide amidst the flames shortly before the army reached Sousa.<sup>36</sup> At Sousa in 324, Ptolemy married Artakama, a daughter

30 Arr. 4.25.4 = *FGrH* 138 F18. Ptolemy has clearly concentrated on his own role in the battle, to the extent of misrepresenting its importance. Leonnatos and Alexander are pushed aside, as Ptolemy emphasizes his own achievement. See Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 21 and Howe 2008.

31 Curt. 8.11.5; Myllenas is probably the son of Asandros, a Beroian; cf. Tataki, *Beroea* no. 910; also Berve II, 267–8 no. 542; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 170.

32 Strabo 15.2.7 C723, followed by Eggermont, *Sind* 125 ff.

33 Diod. 17.103.3–6; Curt. 9.8.20; Strabo 15.2.7 C723.

34 Curt. 9.5.21; Paus. 1.6.2. Arr. 6.11.8 notes that on Ptolemy’s own evidence he was absent when the attack on the Mallian town occurred, but it is not certain that Ptolemy was explicitly refuting an account written before he himself composed his history. Nevertheless, Müller (*Makedonien und Persien* 85) speculates “so könnte es auch eine Ausrede sein, um sich von dem militärischen Debakel zu distanzieren.” This is particularly noteworthy if Ptolemy’s main purpose was to put the responsibility for Alexander’s wounding on Perdikkas’ men (see Bosworth 1996a: 140).

35 Ptolemy’s popularity: Diod. 17.103.6–7; cf. Curt. 9.8.23–4. Curt. 9.8.22; cf. Paus. 1.6.2 for his relationship to Philip II. On the problems associated with Sarapis see Fraser 1967; cf. Bosworth 1988: 167 ff.; Ogden, *MGS* 34–5, 45. See Eggermont, *Sind* 112–4, with earlier literature.

36 Arr. 7.3.2; cf. Bosworth 2013.

of Artabazos<sup>37</sup>—a sister of Alexander’s mistress Barsine—and, along with his fellow *somatophylakes*, was awarded a golden crown.<sup>38</sup>

Ptolemy’s last commission under Alexander came against the Kossaians, whose territory the King invaded in the winter of 324/3. Here he seems to have been Alexander’s second-in-command, but Arrian’s narrative (undoubtedly based on Ptolemy’s own account), though vague and abbreviated, suffices to depict Ptolemy as a full partner in the undertaking and, consequently, equally responsible for its success.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, his prominence in this undertaking can also be explained by the absence of Krateros, who had taken some 10,000 veterans from Opis to Kilikia and the death of Hephaestion; Perdikkas had been given the task of conveying Hephaestion’s corpse to Babylon.<sup>40</sup> The forty-day campaign, which served to divert Alexander’s attention away from the recent loss of Hephaestion, was not as successful as Diodorus claims, as Antigonos discovered in 317.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Arr. 7.4.6; cf. Phot. *Bibl.* 68b; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1.7, who calls her Apame. There is no evidence that Ptolemy had been previously married. The Athenian courtesan Thaïs, who had accompanied the expedition, became Ptolemy’s mistress (Plut. *Alex.* 38.2; Hamilton, *PA* 100)—possibly she joined the expedition in that capacity—and bore him two sons (Lagos and Leontiskos) and a daughter, Eirene, who later married Eunostos, king of Kyproi Soloi (Athen. 13.576e). Tarn believes that Ptolemy secured his position by marrying a woman of the Egyptian pharaonic family and that “his marriage with the Egyptian princess must therefore have taken place very soon after his arrival in the country; it shows that (as one supposed) he had decided that he was going to be king of Egypt before the allotment of the satrapies at Babylon” (1929: 139). The logic of this argument escapes me. Müller 2013: 206 rejects an Egyptian bride for Ptolemy. But if he really did marry an Egyptian, who was either renamed Ptolemais or the mother of a woman of that name, his alleged repudiation of Artakama (because of her barbarian blood) is less likely. Nevertheless, Müller 2013: 203–6 rightly notes that a *Persian* bride, especially one of Achaemenid ancestry (she was a great-granddaughter of Artaxerxes II; but see O’Neil 2002: 170) would have offended the sensibilities of the Egyptians. Ogden, *PPD* 69: “we cannot prove that she did not sit out her life quietly at the Alexandrian court.” See also Macurdy, *HQ* 102.

<sup>38</sup> Arr. 7.5.6. Volkmann, *RE* XXIII (1959) 1607 speculates that, at this time, Ptolemy may have been appointed ἐδέατρος (the equivalent of the Roman *praegustator*) or “king’s Taster” (Athen. 4.171b = Chares, *FGrH* 125 F1). The actual “tasting” of the King’s food appears to have been assigned to one or more of the Pages (thus Justin 12.14.9 describes the sons of Antipatros as *Philippus et Iollas praegustare ac temperare potum regis soliti . . .*) but it is consistent with the functions of the *somatophylakes* to be concerned for the King’s personal safety. Ptolemy was in all likelihood “a court dignitary placed in charge of the royal meals” (Collins 2012a: 418; cf. Hesychius s.v. ἐδέατρος: προγεύστης βασιλέως. ἐπιμελητής δείπνου); a less distinguished role is unlikely for a man of Ptolemy’s standing (Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 71 n.318). Since Chares speaks of Ptolemy as ἐδέατρος in Book Three of his *History*, it is more likely that his role as *edeatros* coincides with his appointment as *somatophylax* in 330 (a time when Alexander began to adopt Persian practices) rather than the events of 324 in Sousa, as Volkmann (above) assumes. Collins demonstrates that the view of Kallérīs (cited in Collins 2012a: 414 n.1), that the office is of Greco-Makedonian origin and not Persian, is unfounded.

<sup>39</sup> Arr. 7.15.1–3; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios* 47. Note that here, and at 4.24.10 (above), Ptolemy commands contingents that were normally under Alexander’s personal command. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 25–6: “Durch die Verherrlichung Alexanders lobt er sich selbst, ohne es direkt auszusprechen.”

<sup>40</sup> Krateros discharged: Arr. 7.12.1–4. Death of Hephaestion: Arr. 7.14; Plut. *Alex.* 72. Perdikkas: Diod. 17.110.8.

<sup>41</sup> Kossaian campaign: Diod. 17.111.5–6; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 72.4. But see Diod. 19.19.3–8; Billows, *Antigonos* 92–3; cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 165.

## Power broker or separatist

Alexander's sudden death in Babylon found Ptolemy in a strong position to benefit from the restructuring of power. Though not able to mount a serious challenge to the most eminent marshals (Antipatros, Krateros, and Perdikkas),<sup>42</sup> Ptolemy was nevertheless the equal of their most powerful supporters—and opponents. Only Leonnatos, whose pedigree counted as much as his personal ambition and courage, and Peithon exercised greater authority in Babylon;<sup>43</sup> and there was still Antigonos in Phrygia. But unlike Ptolemy, Antigonos was not in Babylon in 323—or, at least, there is no record of his being there—and thus not actively involved in the decision-making process.<sup>44</sup> Except for a brief period, at the beginning of the last decade of the fourth century, when Ptolemy planned to marry Alexander's sister, Kleopatra, and promoted the interests of the Greek states,<sup>45</sup> he spent more time attempting to undermine the positions and claims of his rivals than putting himself forward as a viable alternative.<sup>46</sup> In both word and action he

42 His proposal that the Makedonians exercise the kingship by committee was rejected. Adams 1997: 229 interprets Ptolemy's suggestion as that "the council itself govern the empire, exercising royal authority without a king, and await the outcome of Roxane's pregnancy." This would be an intriguing interim solution, but it does not reflect that actual wording of Curt. 10.6.13–5, which makes it clear that Ptolemy preferred a permanent council to being ruled by a king whose bloodline was that of the conquered peoples (cf. Romm, *Ghost* 39; Anson, *Heirs* 16–7). See also Atkinson and Yardley, *Curtius* 182; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 70–2.

43 Peithon's ambitions in the Upper Satrapies, his betrayal of Perdikkas, his failure to support Eumenes, and his undoing at the hands of Antigonos have all contributed to a negative portrayal of a man whose importance should not be underestimated. See Heckel, *Who's Who* 195–6 "Peithon [3]."

44 Billows, *Antigonos* 52: "Had Antigonos been in Babylon, it is quite possible that his age and experience, and the prestige of his connection with Philip and his victories in Asia Minor, could have enabled him to move at once to a position at the center of the stage." Justin's statement (13.4.15) that Lykia and Pamphylia were given to Nearchos is generally rejected as an error (cf. Anson, *Heirs* 43 n.37), but it may represent another attempt to restrain a powerful figure (i.e., by giving him a *hyparchos*), and this information may have been subsequently suppressed (Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 101).

45 On these activities, Ellis, *Ptolemy* 46, observes: "This uncharacteristic aggression, along with his engagement to Cleopatra, have led some historians to believe that Ptolemy was contemplating a bid for absolute power at this time. If so, it was a short-lived aberration from *Ptolemy's consistently modest claims as satrap of Egypt*" (emphasis added).

46 Bosworth 2000: 228 believes that Ptolemy flirted with greater power in 309/8, to which time he dates the *Liber de Morte* (which he regards as Ptolemaic propaganda): "From 305 onwards Ptolemy probably was a separatist, but he may not have been consistent in his ambitions. Indeed there is evidence that he encouraged his subjects to term him king even before he adopted the title for dating purposes in Egypt." Meeus 2014b presents a well-documented case against the view that Ptolemy was a separatist, adding that "propaganda after all is what provides us with the best insights into a ruler's aims" (306). But there is a chasm between ambition and the ability to realize it, as the successive failures of Perdikkas and Antigonos (both working with greater resources and support networks than Ptolemy could even hope for) make eminently clear. I am inclined to agree with Peter Green, whose private correspondence with W.M. Ellis is cited by Meeus 2014b: 306, with n.160, that Ptolemy reaped "the rewards of carefully limited ambitions." He would almost certainly have taken the greater role, had it been presented to him and attainable. It was not.

opposed Perdikkas, and after him, Antigonos. His unwillingness to assume the regency of the Kings in 320 speaks volumes.<sup>47</sup> The sources emphasized his moderation (or “restraint”), largely to set him apart from those driven by unbridled ambition.<sup>48</sup> But his restraint was also dictated by realism: he grasped opportunity when it presented itself, but he knew better than others its limitations. In the Babylon settlement, we must assume, he won Egypt through tough negotiation. Opponents found it impossible to dislodge him from a satrapy made easily defensible by topography and the elements,<sup>49</sup> but the best Ptolemy could do was secure his borders (and his finances) by acquiring adjacent territory. It was not a base from which to pursue an expansionist agenda, neither for himself nor for his successors in the almost three centuries that followed.

The wonder of Alexandria and Ptolemaic patronage of learning and culture, along with the relative stability and longevity of the dynasty, have given the son of Lagos a luster that has remained untarnished over the ages.<sup>50</sup> Ptolemaic propaganda depicted the greatness of the man known by the epithet *Soter* as determined at birth,<sup>51</sup> and it is thus hard to imagine that his brilliance and destiny were not manifest both in the years of his service under Alexander and also in his relationship with the man. But, in truth, Ptolemy the marshal, like the later King, was a character of his own making.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup> If, as Roisman 2014: 471 (cf. *Veterans* 106–8) observes, there is no certainty that Ptolemy was offered the regency, this only reinforces the view that in the first years after Alexander’s death his importance in relation to some of the other marshals was not as great as the pro-Ptolemaic sources would have us believe. Anson, *Heirs* 70: “Ptolemy may have been reluctant to accept the office because he perceived either the transitory nature of the current appointment, with Antipater and Craterus, whose death was not yet known, approaching, or that the regency and guardianship were themselves ephemeral.” Similarly, Ellis, *Ptolemy* 39, commenting on the *epimeleia* of the Kings: “There is every reason to believe that he was not biding his time for a better offer. This was as good an opportunity as he was ever likely to get. He had already made up his mind to stay in Egypt.”

<sup>48</sup> Justin 13.6.19: *Quippe et Aegyptios insigni moderatione in favorem sui sollicitaverat et reges finitimos beneficiis obsequisque devinxerat* (“He had won the support of the Egyptians by his exceptional restraint, and he had also put the neighbouring monarchs in his debt by his benefactions an indulgent behaviour towards them”). Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 151; cf. also Diod. 18.14.1, 33.3 with Landucci, *Diodoro* 86, 149–50.

<sup>49</sup> Bevan, *House of Ptolemy* 27, notes that, even after his setbacks resulting from defeat in the battle of Salamis in 306, Ptolemy “was still absolute lord in the rich and populous country of the Nile, shut off by its desert frontiers and its almost harbourless coast from the rest of the world. Here, in spite of all disasters, he could await the turn of fortune, drawn safely in from the outside storm.”

<sup>50</sup> Ellis, *Ptolemy* 62: “Ptolemy I Soter founded the first, the most successful, and the longest lasting of the Hellenistic monarchies. Although he may have lived much of his life in the shadow of Alexander the Great, Ptolemy himself cast a long shadow.” Cf. 63: “No one other than Ptolemy deserves to be called the father and creator of the Hellenistic state. Curtius spoke truthfully when he said that Ptolemy was even more talented in the civilian arts than he was in the military.”

<sup>51</sup> See especially Ogden 2013. For a brief introduction to the coinage and propaganda of Ptolemy see Dahmen 2007: 10–4, 112–6.

<sup>52</sup> Howe 2008: 228: “But then, how else could it end for an Egyptian king, dictating his own story for posterity?”

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## **Part II**

# **The instruments of power**

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# A Alexander and the Makedonian aristocracy

## King and companions

It may seem superfluous to observe that Alexander, as King of the Makedones, represented the apex of the power pyramid. Nevertheless, it is salutary to note that in his relationship with the Makedonian aristocracy, the army, and (to a lesser extent) with his civilian subjects the King's power was the product of negotiation, both from the beginning of his reign and on a daily basis.<sup>1</sup> That is not to say that he was in any great danger of losing his control over the army—although even this was threatened on occasions<sup>2</sup>—but rather that, despite the ancient sources' fondness for depicting Alexander as corrupted by oriental practices, the shift from *primus inter pares* to despot was neither fully realized nor entirely objectionable to those who stood to gain most from a more centralized and autocratic style.<sup>3</sup>

E.N. Borza provides a convenient summary of the powers of Makedonian kings:

In short, the restrictions on the king's power were not institutional, but situational. That is, the king's ability to act depended upon a number of factors

1 See my comments in Heckel 2003a. In this section, I am not concerned with the day-to-day functions of Alexander's Court and the influence of those whom we could classify as "courtiers," many of whom were in fact non-Makedonian and non-aristocratic. For the organization and functioning (as well as the self-presentation) of Alexander's Court, see Völcker-Janssen, Spawforth 2007a, and Weber 2009.

2 The most serious threat came in 324 at Opis. The so-called mutiny at the Hyphasis appears to have been contrived: see Spann 1999; Heckel 2003b; Howe and Müller 2012; *contra* Anson 2015a and Roisman, *Veterans* 32 n.4.

3 There is a tendency in modern scholarship to regard the changing nature of Alexander's kingship—especially in the years after the death of Dareios III—as something unpalatable to the military aristocracy, whose attitudes are thought to be reflective of the mood of their troops. This ignores the benefits that the new kingship bestowed upon those who formed Alexander's inner circle. Lane Fox (*Alexander* 323) rightly notes that the attempt to introduce *proskynesis* met with only limited opposition from the *hetairoi* who were present. Similarly, the view that the *hetairoi* accepted their Persian brides with reluctance is equally misleading. Arrian notes that "some" found the marriages (or at least the ceremony) objectionable and this surely means that the others did not share their distaste.

including the force of his own personality; the balance of power that existed between himself, other Argeadae, barons, and soldiers; the constraints of the external situation in which the king found himself; and a rather vague set of *mores* concerning tradition. The king could do exactly what he could get away with.

(*Shadow of Olympus* 238)<sup>4</sup>

It is only the final sentence that gives pause. The implication of this statement is that the king did, in fact, seek to “get away with” things, and this kind of thinking lends credence to the views of those who see Alexander as a ruthless autocrat, exceeding his authority and even “conspiring” against his own men. This Alexander knows only how to rule but not how to be ruled.<sup>5</sup> Hence, any suggestion that Alexander bent to the will of his council, that on occasions he had difficulty asserting himself, or that he found himself in a position of weakness is rejected as preposterous. But in fact the argument that Alexander desired and exercised unbridled power is itself preposterous, in the true sense of the word: whatever autocratic powers the King had managed to win for himself towards the end of his reign are generally ascribed to him in the early stages.

To begin with, Alexander’s hold on the kingship was based on heredity and tradition but supported by the foremost men of the kingdom and the control of the army.<sup>6</sup> But the early challenges to his right to succeed Philip—the threat posed by the Attalos faction,<sup>7</sup> the support for the Lynkestians and Amyntas Perdikka—were overcome by purges that increased Alexander’s dependence on the political

4 In contrast, Landucci, *Filippo* 37, quotes with approval the view of Bearzot 2011: 194: “la Macedonia fosse una federazione di gruppi etnici affini tra loro, guidata da una monarchia di tipo omerico, in cui il re, guerriero e sacerdote, era eletto dall’assemblea del popolo in armi; essendo un *primus inter pares*, doveva sottomettersi alla legge, anche se è molto discussa l’entità del condizionamento esercitato su di lui dall’assemblea. . . .” For doubts about the so-called Homeric nature of Macedonian kingship see Carlier 2000.

5 The extant Alexander historians come mainly from the world of Imperial Rome, and their portrait of Alexander is heavily influenced by the history and the actions of the emperors. He is at once the paradigm for all bad emperors and the creation of writers who had experienced their reigns.

6 The view of the constitutional powers of the Makedonian army has changed dramatically since the publication of Granier’s *Heeresversammlung* (1931), though his views have been supported by Hatzopoulos (I, 278–9) and Landucci (*L’arte de potere* 32–3). There is no evidence to support the view that the army had any control over the selection of a candidate for the kingship (see Errington 1978; Anson 1985b, 1991; for an overview of the problem, Anson, *Themes and Issues* 26–30; also Mitchell 2007). Rather it confirmed the decisions of the leading aristocrats (*principes* or *protoi*). Nevertheless, it will have been essential for the King, once enthroned, to retain the goodwill of the army. For the bond between King and army see Heckel 2009a. See also Antela-Bernárdez 2011 and Psoma 2012.

7 There has been a tendency to read too much in Attalos’ words about “illegitimacy,” but, even if we accept (as I think we must) that Karanos was not Kleopatra-Eurydike’s son (if he existed at all), the ambitions of Attalos and his supporters must have played a role in Antipatros’ support for Alexander’s kingship. If Parmenion was a supporter of Attalos in the early going, his decision to sacrifice his son-in-law amounted to self-preservation. Nevertheless, it only emphasized Alexander’s indebtedness to Philip’s general.

rivals of his victims. Even within the royal family, the young King's support was limited. His mother and full-blooded sister, Kleopatra, had been marginalized by Philip in his final year; his half-sister, Kynnane, now widowed, had little love for her new King. Arrhidaios remained as the only other male of Philip's line: mentally incompetent, he was nothing more than a potential puppet for the aspirations of others. Furthermore, whatever support Alexander might have derived from the royal family was diluted by distance, as the expedition moved ever eastward. Consequently, the new King became increasingly dependent upon Philip's generals (Antipatros in Makedonia and Parmenion in the field) and on the support of his *syntrophoi* and their familial networks.

A Makedonian king's power was tempered by the particularism of leading nobles and through interaction with a larger group of *hetairoi*. In the formative years of the kingdom, these men functioned as the king's *comitatus*.<sup>8</sup> Warriors, protectors, and advisors, they formed the backbone of the ruler's power. But their individual fortunes varied, and over time there emerged a core of powerful men and a network of political alliances whose interests the king ignored at his peril. To this Lower Makedonian aristocracy were added the first families of the Upper Makedonian cantons whose allegiance Philip had secured through diplomacy and military might.<sup>9</sup> The influence of the remaining *hetairoi*, now distinguished primarily by their service in the Makedonian cavalry, declined accordingly. Less formidable than the magnates, they nevertheless retained a measure of respect and could not be taken lightly.<sup>10</sup>

### *Somatophylakia*

The extant Alexander historians apply the term *somatophylax* not only to the seven-man elite bodyguard (whose members are referred to as οἱ σωματοφύλακες or οἱ σωματοφύλακες οἱ βασιλικοί),<sup>11</sup> but occasionally to the so-called Royal

<sup>8</sup> Noted by Tarn, who rightly observes that the *comitatus* "was coeval with the [Macedonian] monarchy itself, and of its essence" (II, 137 n.3). For an excellent discussion of the concept of the *comitatus* and its prevalence in the Eurasian world see Beckwith, 2009: 12–28, although he, curiously, remarks that: "The Chinese—like the Classical and later Greeks—did not themselves have the *comitatus* tradition" (20), adding (n.61) that "the early Romans clearly did have the *comitatus*" (emphasis in the original). Beckwith is clearly unaware of the Makedonian tradition.

<sup>9</sup> Hammond (MS 54) argues, unconvincingly, that "the pastoral society from which the Macedonian state developed had not had a traditional nobility. When the Temenidae came to rule over them, the Temenidae were the only aristocrats, being in their origin entirely separate from the Macedonians." On the changes to the body of *hetairoi* see Ellis 1977: 105.

<sup>10</sup> As can be seen in the support for the conspiracy of Demetrios the Bodyguard in 330, and that of Hermolaos in 327.

For *hetairoi* and *phili* see Plaumann, RE VIII (1913) 1374–80 s.v. Ἐταῖροι. Also Herman 1980/81 and 1997; Hammond, MS 53–8; Hatzopoulos I, 334–6. Stagakis 1970 is more confusing than helpful but should nevertheless be considered. Corradi 1929: 232–343 discusses συνέδριον, σύντροφοι, σωματοφύλακες, παῖδες βασιλικοί, and φίλοι at the Hellenistic courts. See especially pp. 318–43 for the *phili*.

<sup>11</sup> Henceforth the "Seven," the "somatophylakes" or the "Bodyguard."

Pages (normally the παιδες βασιλικοί), and the infantry bodyguard (the “Royal Hypaspists”) as well. The term is most frequent in Arrian, usually denoting a member of the first group. Not surprisingly, for one of Arrian’s sources belonged to the seven-man Bodyguard.<sup>12</sup> But Arrian uses the word *somatophylakes* of the hypaspists on four, perhaps five, occasions,<sup>13</sup> and Diodorus (17.65.1) speaks of the institution of the Pages as the *somatophylakia*. Indeed *somatophylakia* or *custodia corporis* was the common function of members of these three groups. All were responsible for guarding the Makedonian king, whether in battle, during the hunt, or at the Court, and they shared also the adjective *basilikos* (“the king’s own”; the Latin *regius* is used, as far as I can see, only of the Pages).<sup>14</sup> Four units were organized specifically for the king’s protection: the Pages, hypaspists, the Seven and the cavalry guard (or *ile basilike*); the term *somatophylakes* was, however, never applied to the last group.

### ***The education of aristocratic youths***

Droysen, *RE* III, 97 s.v. βασιλικοὶ παιδεῖ; Fischer, *RE* XVIII, 2385–6; Griffith, *HMac*. II, 401 ff.; Carney 1980–1: esp. 227–8, and 2008 = *King and Court* 207–23; Heckel 1986c; Scholl 1987; Hammond, *MS* 56–7, 1990b; Koulakiotis 2005; Strootman 2014.

### ***Background***

The institution of the Pages dates, according to Arrian (4.13.1; cf. Ael. *VH* 14.48), from the reign of Philip II, apparently inspired by a similar practice at the Persian Court. Curtius (8.8.3) and Valerius Maximus (3.3 ext. 1), however, emphasize its antiquity in Makedonia, and it appears that Dekamnikos and Krateuas (“Krataios,” Arist. *Pol.* 1311b; “Krateros,” Diod. 14.37.6) may have been *paides basilikoi* of King Archelaos.<sup>15</sup> About the Pages of Philip II we are ill informed. Only two are attested by name: Aphthonetos and Archedamos, both punished for disobedience (Ael. *VH* 14.48). Diodorus 16.93.4–6 gives a sensational account of Pausanias of Orestis, τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως σωματοφύλαξ, who, because of his good looks, had been Philip’s lover but was supplanted by another Pausanias, who perished fighting by the King’s side in early 336 (πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως στὰς ἀπάσας τὰς φερομένας ἐπ’ αὐτὸν πληγὰς ἀνεδέξατο τῷ ιδίῳ σώματι καὶ μετήλλαξεν: 16.93.6). Pausanias of Orestis seems to have been a Royal Hypaspist, but his alleged sexual relationship with Philip has been regarded as belonging to his younger days, when he served as one of the King’s Pages; for it seems that homosexuality was common,

12 I note twenty-three passages in Arrian where *somatophylakes* are named. Twelve of these name Ptolemy son of Lagos: Arr. 3.6.6, 27.5; 4.8.9, 13. 7, 15.8, 16.2, 21.4, 29.1; 5.13.1; 6.28.4; 7.3.2, 4.6.

13 Arr. 1.6.5, 24.1; 3.17.2; 4.3.2 and 4.30.3 (distinguishing between the *agema*, i.e., the *somatophylakes*, and the rest of the hypaspists).

14 Unless the Amyntas who is described as *praetor regius* (Curt. 6.9.28) was an officer of the Royal Hypaspists.

15 Cf. Hammond, *HMac*. II, 167; Carney 1983: 271–2.

if not encouraged at the Court (cf. Berve I, 39).<sup>16</sup> Justin 8.6.4–8 provides a similar picture of Olympias' younger brother, Alexandros of Epeiros: raised at Philip's Court in the late 350s and early 340s, he was reputedly the King's lover.<sup>17</sup> Other young aristocrats were clearly brought up at the Court as *syntrophoi* of Amyntas son of Perdikkas III, Arrhidaios and Alexander the Great, just as later Alexander IV was surrounded by young men of the nobility.<sup>18</sup>

### *Recruitment*

There is general agreement that the *παιδες βασιλικοι* were a body of young men, the sons of prominent Makedones (τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, Arr. 4.13.1; τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δοκιμωτάτων τοὺς νιεῖως, Ael. VH 14.48; *principum Macedoniae liberos adultos*, Curt. 5.1.42, cf. 8.6.2; *pueri regii apud Macedonas vocabantur principum liberi*, Livy 45.6; cf. also Diod. 17.65.1; Justin 12.7.2), whose function in general was *θεραπεία τοῦ βασιλέως*. This involved guarding the king while he slept (*custodia corporis*, σωματοφυλακία), bringing his horse to him and accompanying him in the hunt and in battle.<sup>19</sup> Often their tasks were menial (*munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis abhorrentia*, Curt. 8.6.2). And it was the king's prerogative to order punishment, which, in the few recorded instances, was severe (Curt. 8.6.5; Ael. VH 14.48); thus a type of Laconic endurance was fostered among these young men (cf. Val. Max. 3.3 ext. 1).<sup>20</sup> Ultimately they provided the Makedonians with generals and governors (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.6).

16 Hence Justin 9.6.5 claims that Pausanias' rape by Attalos occurred *in primis pubertatis annis*. Modern scholars have followed suit, but it has recently been established that homosexual relations among the Makedonians often involved individuals who were much older than was usual in the Greek states to the south. Carney 1983: 272 (= *King and Court* 162) probably goes too far in suggesting “the ‘institutionalized’ pederasty of the Macedonian court may have had something to do with ‘institutionalized’ regicide” (cf. also *King and Court* 165: “the violence at the Macedonian court rooted in sexual tensions there can perhaps be best understood as kind of honor killing”).

17 *Omnique studio sollicitatum spe regni simulato amore ad stupri consuetudinem perpulit* (8.6.6).

18 The *syntrophoi* of Amyntas Perdikka may have included Philotas son of Parmenion (Curt. 6.10.24), Hegelochos son of Hippostratos (Curt. 6.11.22–9), Amyntas son of Antiochos (see Ellis 1971), and perhaps the two oldest sons of Andromenes, Amyntas and Simmias (Curt. 7.1.11). Among Alexander's *syntrophoi* we find Hephaistion (Curt. 3.12.16: *is longe omnium amicorum carissimus erat regi, cum ipso pariter eductus, secretorum omnium arbiter . . .*), Marsyas son of Periandros, historian and half-brother of Antigonos Monopthalmos (*Suda* M 227. Cf. Heckel 1980d: 446–7, and Who's Who 156; Berve II, 247–8 no. 489; Billows, *Antigonos* 399–400 no. 67), and Leonnatos (Arr. *Succ.* 12 = *Suda* s.v. Λεοννάτος). For Alexander IV's *syntrophoi* see Diod. 19.52.4: τοὺς ειωθότας παιδας συντρέφεσθαι.

19 Arr. 4.13.1: καὶ ὅποτε ἔξελανοι βασιλεύς, τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τὸν ἵπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἔκεινοι προσῆγον καὶ ἀνέβαλλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινονοὶ ἤσαν.

20 A Page attending Alexander as he sacrificed endured in silence as a hot coal fell on his arm and burned his skin, fearing to cry out and disrupt the religious ceremony. Aelian, VH 14.48 mentions two Pages who were punished by Philip II: Aphthonetos was flogged for leaving the ranks and going to an inn to quench his thirst; Archedamos was executed for failing to obey orders to stay in armor. The flogging of Hermolaos for anticipating Alexander as he was about to strike a boar in the hunt is more problematical. See Roisman 2003a: 302–3, 315–6; Carney 2008: 151–7.

Dietmar Kienast has argued that Philip II used Persian models for the organization of the Court and the army.<sup>21</sup> If the Royal Pages were established by Philip himself or whether the practice dates from the time of Persian rule in Makedonia cannot be determined. The positions of Dekamnikos and Krateuas at the court of Archelaos suggest the latter—though we cannot identify them with *certainty* as Pages<sup>22</sup>—and Hammond makes a strong case for an early date.<sup>23</sup> That the Makedonians took the Persian court as their model is generally accepted, and we have Xenophon's description of the sons of Persian nobles raised at the court of the Great King:

πάντες γὰρ οἱ τῶν ἀρίστων Περσῶν παῖδες ἐπὶ ταῖς βασιλέως θύραις παιδεύονται· ἔνθα πολλὴν μὲν σωφροσύνην καταμάθοι ἄν τις, αἰσχρὸν δ' οὐδὲν οὕτ' ἀκοῦσαι οὕτ' ιδεῖν ἔστι. Θεῶνται δ' οἱ παῖδες καὶ τιμωμένους ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ ἀκούονται, καὶ ἄλλους ἀτιμαζομένους· ὅστε εὐθὺς παῖδες ὄντες μανθάνουσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

(Anab 1.9.3–4)

And, whether this institution was intended to unite the aristocratic families of Makedon amicably or whether these sons served as hostages for the good conduct of their fathers, it is certain that Philip's primary aim was stability within the kingdom and at the Court.<sup>24</sup> For, if the practice did not originate with Philip, it was undoubtedly he who extended the membership of the corps to Upper Makedonia.<sup>25</sup>

We are not told how large the corps of the Pages was, or if its number was fixed. In 330 Amyntas son of Andromenes brought fifty young men from Makedonia to serve as Alexander's Pages (Curt. 5.1.42; cf. Diod. 17.65.1), and Berge I, 37 n.3 estimates that the entire unit numbered in excess of 100. Hammond (1989: 56 n.24) prefers a figure in the range of 200, arguing that the fifty Pages mentioned by Curtius and Diodorus “probably represented the oldest year.”<sup>26</sup> Other figures

21 Kienast 1973.

22 Hammond, *MS* 56 n.22, argues that Arr. 4.13.1 should be taken to mean that the Pages existed already in Philip's time, not that he established the institution.

23 Hammond 1990b: 261–4.

24 Kienast 1973: 30.

25 Of the *somatophylakes* named by Arr. 6.28.4, Leonnatos (in this passage and in Arr. *Ind.* 18.3) came originally from Lynkestis, Perdikkas from Orestis; the *somatophylax* Attalos (Diod. 16.94.4), whether Page or hypaspist, was from Tymphaia, as was Alexandros son of Polyperchon, a *somatophylax* of Philip III Arrhidaios (Arr. *Succ* 1.38). The hypaspist commanders (Curt. 5.2.5) include a certain Lynkestes Amyntas, but it is not certain that he belonged to the aristocracy. The *somatophylax* Arybbas (Arr. 3.5.5) appears to have come from Epeiros, and Neoptolemos, who is called *archihypaspistes* by Plutarch, *Eumenes* 1.6, belonged to the Aiakidai and was Epeirot in origin. Cf. also Lane Fox, *Alexander* 51; Griffith, *HMac*. II, 402–3.

26 Griffith, *HMac*. II, 401 calculates that about fifty youths may have been added every three years and that “the Pages at any one time will have numbered about eighty-five.” This strikes me as unnecessarily low. Griffith also believes that no more than one member of a family served in the unit at any given time. This appears to be refuted by the case of Philippos and Iolaos, the sons of Antipatros.

are of limited value: sixteen Pages accompanied Perdikkas, son of Orontes, in 323 (Curt. 10.8.3); they were numerous enough to allow the nine conspirators named by Curtius (8.6.7–9) to be on guard duty on the same night in 327; but Berve identifies only thirteen individuals as Pages, Hoffmann (*Die Makedonen*) fourteen, two of these from Philip's time. The *paides* who appear in Eumenes' army (Diod. 19.28.3) and with Alketas in Pisidia (Diod. 18.45.3) may have been “the sons of the native nobility respectively of Kappadokia and Pisidia” (Anson 1988b: 132 n.11). More problematical are the two hundred *paides* of Plut. *Eum.* 3.11 (διακοσίους δὲ τῶν παιδῶν ὄπλοφόρων), whom Spendel (*Heerwesen* 27), identified as infantrymen. But these examples of individuals, from (apparently) non-Makedonian backgrounds and the Diadochic age, add little to our understanding of Alexander's Pages.

### Terminology

In the Alexander historians, the Pages are officially the *παῖδες* (Plut. *Alex.* 55.6–7; Diod. 17.66.3, 76.5; 19.52.4; Arr. 4.12.7, 13.1–2) or *παῖδες βασιλικοί* (Diod. 17.79.4; Arr. 4.16.6; cf. Diod. 17.36.5: οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως παῖδες).<sup>27</sup> In Latin they are *pueri* (Curt. 8.6.24, 7.8; 10.7.16, 8.3–4), *pueri regii* (Curt. 5.2.13; Livy 45.6) or *pueri nobiles* (Curt. 8.6.7; 10.5.8; cf. Val. Max. 3.3 ext. 1: *nobilissimi pueri*), though in the last case the “term” is always further explained; hence it might be unwise to speak of a “term” at all. As a unit, they are the *regia cohors* or *puerorum regia cohors* (Curt. 8.6.7; 9.10.26; 10.8.3), sometimes merely the *cohors* (Curt. 8.6.6, 18; 8.8.20). Clearly they were meant to be the king's bodyguards (Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 10.5.8), but, while they appear to have been called *σωματοφύλακες* (though never *δορύφοροι*) by the Greeks, Roman writers did not apply to them the terms *custodes corporis* or *armigeri*.<sup>28</sup> The rather vague *satellites* is never used, as far as I am aware, to refer to the Pages.<sup>29</sup>

Pages are often described in less precise phrases or in specific terms hitherto disregarded. Some of this terminology will involve descriptions of their functions, age group, aristocratic affiliations, or any combination of the aforementioned. Hence the *cohors . . . quae excubabat ad tabernaculum regis* (Curt. 3.12.3; cf. 8.13.20; 8.6.3: *excubabant servatis noctium vicibus proximi foribus eius aedis, in*

27 Scholl 1987: 110–1, seeks to distinguish between the *basilikoi paides* and the Pages. Since Diod. 17.65.1 calls the Pages *vioi* instead of *παῖδες* (cf. Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.2: *adulti liberi*), Scholl argues: “Das würde dann ein Anhaltspunkt dafür sein können, dass wir es mit verschiedenen Gruppen bei den Pagen und den königlichen Paides zu tun haben” (111). But Arr. 4.13.1 (ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ηδὴ καθεστηκός τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας ὅσοι ἐξ ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακιεύοντο καταλέγεσθαι ἐξ θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως) leaves little doubt about the origins of the *paides*, and Curt. (5.1.42; 8.6.2) calls the sons of Makedonian nobles (*principum adulti liberi*) *pueri regii* (= *παῖδες βασιλικοί*).

28 *custos corporis*: Curt. 4.13.19; 5.11.6; 6.7.15, 11.8; 7.5.40, 10.9; 8.2.11; 8.6.21, 11.11; 9.6.4, 8.23; 10.2.30, 6.1; Justin 9.6.3–4; 12.12.3; *ME* 2; cf. Curt. 7.7.9. *armiger*: Curt. 3.12.7; 4.7.21; 4.15.29; 5.4.21; 6.1.5; 6.8.17, 19, 24; 7.1.14, 18; 7.2.13, 28; 8.1.45, 2.11.

29 Curt. 3.12.10; 4.7.21; 6.7.24, 29; 6.8.19; 10.5.14, 7.14; 10.7.17, 8.3, 8.8; Justin 12.6.3, 8.4, 12.4.

*qua rex adquiescebat.* Cf. also Arr. 4.13.1: κοιμώμενον [sc. βασιλέα] φυλάσσειν τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο) will, by analogy with Curtius 8.6.18 (*iam alii ex cohorte in stationem successerant, ante cubiculi fores excubituri*), refer to the Pages. To which group one may add an individual *qui ministrare regi solebat*,<sup>30</sup> if he belongs to one of the noble families of Makedonia: that is, not a slave but a boy of aristocratic descent engaged in θεραπεία τοῦ βασιλέως. By contrast, other functions similar to those of the Pages were handled by slaves, and although the Pages were entrusted with the king's horses on occasions, they are not to be identified with the grooms (ἱπποκόμοι); for Curtius makes a clear distinction between Pages and *agasones* (8.6.4).<sup>31</sup>

Most important is the terminology that involves age limits for membership in the unit. Berve (I, 37) assumes that a youth entered the ranks of the Pages sometime between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, a “boy” by ancient and modern standards. But this training must have continued for several years, perhaps until shortly before the age of twenty. Hence the Pages belonged to that group that included *pueri, meirakia* (Plut. Alex. 55.2; Arr. 4.13.1) and presumably νεανίσκοι (Plut. Alex. 10. 5). They are *adulti liberi* and *iuvenes* (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.2.35, 6.2): for example, Hermolaos, who calls himself a *puer* (Curt. 8.7.8), is referred to by Curtius (8.6.8) as a *iuvenis*, and the Pages in general are called *iuvenes* at 8.6.25. Similarly, the Page Metron (cf. Diod. 17.79.4), who received the news of Dimnos' conspiracy against Alexander in 330, is called *iuvenis nobilis* (Curt. 8.7.22). But again the difficulty is this: if *iuvenis nobilis* is used regularly as a substitute for *puer regius*, and even if every instance of a Makedonian *iuvenis nobilis* involves an individual who could be a Page, this does not mean that every *iuvenis nobilis* is by definition a Page. We must rule out, however, Berve's claim that Philippos, the brother of Lysimachos, could not have been a Page because Curtius calls him *iuvenis* instead of *puer*.<sup>32</sup>

But, if Philippos was not one of the Pages, then we have a group of young men, described in similar terms, who are apparently hypaspists, but not clearly distinguished from the Pages because of the ambiguity of the words that indicate age. Alexander, Charos and their colleagues, *iuvenes promptissimi ex sua cohorte* (Curt. 8.11.9–10), belong to this group. Berve originally identified them as Pages (*RE Supplbd IV* (1924) 15, 215), but promoted them to the hypaspists in his prosopography (II, 21 no. 40; II, 408 no. 826). Pausanias of Orestis, the assassin of Philip II, whom Diodorus calls *somatophylax* and whom Justin describes as

30 Justin 12.14.6; cf. Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.2; Metz *LM* 89: *cum Iolla . . . praeministro Alexandri.* Cf. Justin 12.14.9; Livy 45.6; Curt. 5.2.13; Diod. 17.36.5.

31 Cf. Arr. 4.13.1. The *hypaspistai basilikoi* found together with the *hippokomoi* at Gaugamela (Arr. 3.13.6) are probably an error for *paides basilikoi*.

32 Curt. 8.2.35: *Nobiles iuvenes comitari eum soliti defecerant praeter Philippum. Lysimachi erat frater, tum primum adulst et, quod facile adpareret, indolis rarae.* Berve II, 382: “Als Page würde er als puer bezeichnet und vermutlich beritten gewesen sein.” Cf. the description of Polemon son of Andromenes: *iuvenis . . . primo aetatis flore pubescens . . .* (Curt. 7.2.4).

*nobilis ex Macedonibus adulescens*,<sup>33</sup> is unlikely to have been one of the Pages, and his status was clearly the same as that of Leonnatos, Perdikkas, and Attalos, who were his fellow *somatophylakes* in 336 (Diod. 16.94.4).<sup>34</sup>

The institution of the Royal Pages marked the beginning of the careers of most, if not all, Makedonian aristocrats (Curt. 5.1.42: *magnorumque praefectorum et ducum haec incrementa sunt et rudimenta*). This institution had two restrictions: age and birth. On the latter point, it is important to note that Philip II had opened up the Makedonian aristocracy to highlanders and Greeks (cf. Griffith, *HMac*. II, 402–3). The sons of Philip's newly created non-lowland *hetairoi* were presumably raised at Pella and enrolled as Pages. Thus we find Leonnatos, who was undoubtedly of Lynkestian origin, referred to as Πελλαῖος in Arrian's only complete list of the *somatophylakes* (Arr. 6.28.4). Similarly, Lysimachos, whose father appears to have been Thessalian, was raised at Pella along with his brothers. Most notable among Philip's highland *hetairoi*, whose sons were raised at the Court, were Andromenes and Polyperchon of Tymphaia, Derdas and Machatas of Elimeia,<sup>35</sup> Aéropos of Lynkestis, Orontes, Alexandros and Antiochos of Orestis. Of the Eordaian nobility we know little, though men like Krateus (and perhaps Lagos) were especially prominent.<sup>36</sup>

### *The Royal Hypaspists*

The greatest difficulty is presented by the hypaspists, or rather by Alexander's personal footguard or *Hypaspistenleibwache* (Berve I, 122 ff.). We know very little indeed about the composition of this group and its relationship to the Pages and the Seven. Yet it is precisely this unit which is vital to our understanding of the

33 Justin 9.6.3–4. Pausanias had very recently been sexually abused by Attalos (or his muleteers); at that time his age is given as *primis pubertatis annis* (cf. Polemon, above).

34 Pausanias could not have been one of the Seven (*pace* Hammond, 1978c, 347): it is difficult to imagine that Attalos and his friends could have, with impunity, degraded a man of such high standing. Hammond also identifies the Attalos of Diod. 16.94.4 with the uncle of Kleopatra-Eurydike. This Attalos could not have been one of the Seven since he was absent from the Court at the time of Philip's assassination; the identification also implies that Perdikkas and Leonnatos were members of the Seven in 336. See Heckel 1979a.

35 Derdas (Heckel, *Who's Who* 111; Berve II, 131 no. 250; Curt. 7.6.12; 8.1.7), whom Alexander sent to the Skythians, was probably a member of this family, but we do not know in what capacity he accompanied Alexander. Kalas son of Harpalos became satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia; Tauron son of Machatas commanded the archers, and his brother Philippos was a satrap in India at the time of his death in 324; Harpalos the treasurer may have been their brother as well.

36 We know very little about Peithon son of Krateus (Berve II, 311 no. 621) before 323; Ptolemy son of Lagos was rumored to have been a bastard son of Philip of Makedon by Arsinoë. For Ptolemy's alleged humble origins see Justin 13.4.10: *ex gregario milite Alexander virtutis causa provexerat*. Since Ptolemy's birthdate, according to Ps.-Lucian (*Macrob.* 12), was 367/6, it is difficult to determine whether Ptolemy's failure to appear as a Page or hypaspist is due to age or ineligibility for such offices. It is possible that Ptolemy came from a good family, but that suspicions of illegitimacy hindered his promotion. Later in his career, Ptolemy made political hay out of this disadvantage and promulgated the view that he was Philip's bastard son. We know nothing of importance about the early career of his brother Menelaos (perhaps identical with Berve no. 505).

organization of Alexander's *somatophylakes*. The connection between the Pages and the Seven is obvious:

- 1 Both were exclusive to the Makedonian aristocracy (or, rather, to the sons of Philip's *hetairoi*), and presumably a man who became a member of the Seven had at one time been a Page.
- 2 The Pages and the Seven shared the function of *somatophylakia* at the Court, guarding the King while he slept; for the Pages guarded the outside of the bedchamber, while the *somatophylakes* were probably inside. Thus we find Eurylochos divulging the details of Hermolaos' conspiracy to Ptolemy and Leonnatos, who were that night on guard within the doors.<sup>37</sup>
- 3 At the king's banquets, we find in his immediate vicinity, his *hetairoi*, some Pages (who attended him), the *somatophylakes*, who were high in the king's esteem but also protected him, and some of the hypaspists (Curt. 8.1.45 ff.; Arr. 4.8.8, 9; Plut. *Alex.* 51.6). The accounts of the Kleitos affair name five of the seven *somatophylakes*, and Hephaestion and Leonnatos appear at the banquet that saw the introduction of *proskynesis*.<sup>38</sup>

Now, since the number of the Bodyguard was fixed at seven, it was not possible for more than a very few ever to attain that rank. Apparently, a *somatophylax* held office for life (or, at least, until retirement) unless appointment to another post—such as a governorship<sup>39</sup>—or the charge or suspicion of some misconduct led to his replacement (Demetrios: Arr. 3.27.5). We are told that the institution of the Pages served as a training school for future officers and governors (*Haec cohors velut seminarium ducum praefectorumque apud Macedonas fuit*, Curt. 8.6.6; cf. 5.1.42). Yet, it is inconceivable that every Page, upon 'graduation', advanced directly to a high military or administrative post. Nor is it likely that he fought in the ranks with the common soldiers, among the *pezhetairoi* (or *asthetairoi*), slingers, or archers. There must have been an intermediate stage in what we might call the Makedonian *cursus honorum*. Possibly, the ex-Page was enrolled in the *ile basilike*, though there is not one piece of evidence for this; what evidence we have suggests instead that he joined the *agema* of the hypaspists.

37 Curt. 8.6.22: *Ptolemaeum ac Leonnatum excubantes ad cubiculi limen. . . .* Cf. Giacone 1977: 514 n.14: "I σωματοφύλακες, generali aiutanti del re, dormivano all'interno dell'appartamento reale, ossia *ad cubiculi limen*; i paggi reali invece vegliavano fuori, *ad cubiculi fores*." The assumption is probably correct but the evidence is not explicit, as Joseph Roisman has pointed out to me.

38 Kleitos affair: Aristonous (Plut. *Alex.* 51.6; cf. Ziegler 1935: 379–80); Perdikkas, Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Leonnatos (Curt. 8.1.45–6, 48). *Proskynesis*: Hephaestion (Plut. *Alex.* 55.1; the Lysimachos at 55.2 is the Akarnanian); Leonnatos (Arr. 4.12.2); for the story that substitutes Polyperchon for Leonnatos (Curt. 8.5.22), see Heckel 1978d.

39 Arr. 2.12.2 (Balakros); Arr. 3.16.9 (Menes). Peukestas, upon accepting the satrapy of Persis (Arr. 6.30.2), ceased to be *somatophylax*. His appointment was both honorary and temporary.

### The agema

To identify and define the *agema* of the hypaspists is, however, no easy task. Berve (I, 122–6) argued that the hypaspists were divided into the regular hypaspists—part of which was the *agema*, which corresponded to the *ile basilike* of the cavalry—and the “Royal Hypaspists,” who formed the personal guard of the King (the *Hypaspistenleibwache*). Tarn (II, 148–54) rejected Berve’s arguments, claiming that all hypaspists were “royal” (*basilikoi*) but that the original *agema* continued to form the King’s personal guard. R.D. Milns has modified that view further, suggesting that one of the three chiliarchies of the hypaspists (formed in late 331; cf. Curt. 5.2.5)<sup>40</sup> was the so-called *agema*, and that it was subdivided into eight tetrarchies (125 per unit, as in the tetrarchies of Philip V). He proposed “that each day a ‘tetrarchia’ from the *agema* of the hypaspists was detailed to act as Alexander’s personal bodyguards . . .” (Milns 1983: 49). Thus, when Arrian (5.13.1) says that Alexander embarked Ptolemy, Lysimachos, Perdikkas (roughly half of the *somatophylakes*), and Seleukos, with half of the hypaspists, on board a triakonter, Milns takes this to mean about sixty-five men or half of one tetrarchy of the *agema* (49).

There is an easier solution. The *agema* of the hypaspists was the infantry equivalent of the *ile basilike*, which itself later became known as the *agema* of the cavalry—references to the cavalry *agema* as early as 331/0 are anachronistic (Curt. 4.13.26; 5.4.21),<sup>41</sup> and we do not know exactly what happened to the *ile basilike* after the division of the Companions between Hephaestion and Kleitos (Arr. 3.27.4). Like the Companion Cavalry (ἡ ὑππος ἡ ἐταιρική), which had an *ile basilike* (= *agema* in later times), the hypaspists of the Companions (οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἐταίρων)<sup>42</sup> had an ἄγημα βασιλικόν. These *agemata* were both part of and yet distinct from their respective units: the distinction is clearly made between “the king’s own” troops (βασιλικός -ή -όν) and the Companions in general (ἐταῖροι). Thus we find that the Makedonian troops are normally called the King’s Companions, whereas only troops specifically organized for the King’s protection and under his personal leadership were given the adjective *basilikos*. When Arrian 5.13.3 speaks of ὑπασπισταὶ βασιλικοί, the ἄγημα βασιλικόν, and οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπασπισταί, he fails to realize that the “Royal Hypaspists” and the “royal *agema*” are one and the same.<sup>43</sup>

40 Bosworth I, 148–9 argues for four chiliarchies of hypaspists.

41 The mss. of Arr. 1.8.3 read τὰ δὲ ἀγήματα καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς, which Schmieder emended to τὸ δὲ ἄγημά τε καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς. See Bosworth I, 81–2. Diodorus 19.27–9 names the *agema* of the cavalry three times, twice speaking of a squadron of 300 men, one each in the armies of Eumenes (19.28.3) and Antigonos (19.29.5); Eudamos’ *agema* numbered only 150 (19.27.2).

42 Arr. 1.14.2. Bosworth I, 117 thinks τῶν ἐταίρων is an error which originated as a scribal gloss.

43 The term “Royal Hypaspists” comes up only three times in Arrian (1.8.4; 3.13.6; 5.13.4). In the first instance, a distinction is made between “Royal Hypaspists” and the *agema* (but this *agema* could be the *ile basilike*); in the second (3.13.6) we do not know which group of hypaspists Arrian has in mind, and possibly the *páides basilikoi* are meant; and, in the third, Arrian himself has made a mistake, for there we find three separate groups—hypaspists, “Royal Hypaspists,” and “Royal

*Royal and regular hypaspists*

That we have in the hypaspists of Alexander two groups—one smaller aristocratic contingent and a larger non-noble unit—is clear from both the origins of the hypaspists and the details about their commanders.<sup>44</sup> The regular hypaspists were originally known as *pezhetairoi*.<sup>45</sup> These are described by Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F348) as ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ισχυρότατοι ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πεζέταιροι. I would disagree, however, with Anson’s claim that in Philip’s time these *pezhetairoi* were “only the *agema* . . . one thousand troops as opposed to the later three thousand” (Anson 1985a: 248). The *pezhetairoi* of Philip II took the name hypaspists or, more specifically, “the hypaspists of the Companions” (οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἔταιρων) when the name *pezhetairoi* came to be applied generally to the Makedonian infantry. The regular hypaspists, who were under the command of Nikanor son of Parmenion until his death in 330, appear to have developed into the argyraspids, as is foreshadowed by Diod. 17.57.2. The argyraspids, it may be worth noting, have no attested *agema*.

The *agema*, then, was regarded as separate from the main troop of the hypaspists and it was virtually always with the King (cf. Arr. 1.1.11, 5.10, 6.9; 3.1.4, 17.2, 18.5 etc.). The very name *agema* suggests that it was, in theory, led by the king (τὸ ἡγεύμενον or τὸ ἀγούμενον, so Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 85; or ἡγημα = “that which leads”). It comprised aristocratic troops (ex-Pages), who were known in Philip’s time as *somatophylakes*, a name which was applied to certain hypaspists even in the early years of Alexander’s reign. Thus, Ptolemy son of Lagos, who had been a member of this group, sometimes called them by their former name, *somatophylakes basilikoi*. When Alexander leads only a portion of the army,

*agema*,” The use of the adjective *basilikos* to designate an elite unit is more likely than its use for a larger one (3,000–4,000 men). It is worth noting that the Companion Cavalry never appear as the “Royal Companion Cavalry” but only the elite squadron receives the adjective “Royal” (Arr. 3.11.8 wrongly separates the *ile basilike* from the “other Royal *Ilai*,” which is impossible since the adjective *basilike* is the only thing which can distinguish it from the other *ilai*).

44 Unlike the members of the *agema*, the hypaspist officers who were subordinate to Nikanor and later Neoptolemos (the *archihypaspistes*) were men of obscure background, of whom only one has an attested patronymic—Atarrhias son of Deinomenes (Plut. *Mor.* 339b = *de fort.* Al. 2.7). Antigenes, Atarrhias, Antigonos, two Amyntases, Hellanikos, Philotas, and Theodotos were all selected chiliarchs or pentakosiarchs (so Bosworth I, 148–9) in Sittakene in a contest of valor that would surely have been demeaning for *syntrophoi* of the King (Curt. 5.2.5). Two chiliarchs, Adaios and Timandros, who may have been hypaspist-commanders, are also of unknown origin, as is Antiochos, a chiliarch in 327/6; that Nearchos was a chiliarch of the hypaspists (thus Arr. 4.30.6) is doubtful (cf. Badian 1975: 150–1, with n.23). The later argyrapid commander, Teutamos, is equally obscure; he too may have been a pentakosiarch of the regular hypaspists at some point. That the pride of Makedon’s aristocratic youth served under such leaders is inconceivable.

45 Anson 1985a. But see now Erskine 1989, who argues that the *pezhetairoi* were Philip’s footguard but that these were replaced by the hypaspists in Alexander’s reign. The *pezhetairoi*, however, continued to operate as a “higher status unit” (394), but Alexander preferred a footguard composed of men of whose loyalty he could be sure.

he invariably takes with him at least some of the hypaspists. In most cases, the terminology is too general to allow us to determine which hypaspists are meant. But there are passages in Arrian which refer to the King leading “the *agema* and the hypaspists” (1.1.11, 8.3–4), and in the troop dispositions at Issos and Gaugamela we have “the *agema* and the hypaspists” or “the *agema* of the hypaspists and the other hypaspists” (2.8.3; 3.11.9). Later, we hear of “the Royal Hypaspists and the hypaspists” in the Ouxian campaign (3.17.2) and “the *somatophylakes* and the hypaspists” in Sogdiana (4.3.2); and in India, Alexander leads “seven hundred of the *somatophylakes* and the hypaspists” (4.30.2). Thus it becomes clear that the members of the *agema* were also known as *somatophylakes*. When Diodorus says that Hephaestion was wounded at Gaugamela while leading the *somatophylakes* ( $\tauῶν δὲ σωματοφυλάκων ἥγούμενος$ , 17.61.3), he must mean that he was the nominal commander of the *agema*,<sup>46</sup> which differed from the main hypaspist unit in one very significant way—its membership was restricted to the aristocracy. In the following year, Hephaestion was appointed commander of one-half the Companion Cavalry and replaced as leader of the *agema* by Seleukos son of Antiochos; he in turn may have been succeeded by Kassandros (Justin 13.4.18).<sup>47</sup>

### *The agema and the hetairoi*

We have already seen that the term *hetairoi* came to be applied in a flattering way to the Makedonian infantry—but only in the form *pezhetairoi* (“foot companions”). *Hetairos* itself was a title reserved for the noble Makedonian (whether by birth or by naturalization).<sup>48</sup> Arrian refers to members of the “royal bodyguard” or “Royal Hypaspists” as *hetairoi* on occasions. In the assault on Tyre (2.23.6), “Alexander took possession of the wall with his Companions ( $\xiὺν τοῖς ἑταίροις$ ).”

46 He appears to have replaced Admetos, who died bravely in the assault on Tyre (Arr. 2.23.5; Diod. 17.45.6). So Berve I, 124. Berve, however, thinks that Hephaestion held this office until around 328/7, when he was appointed to the Seven and replaced by Seleukos. I have argued for 334 as the year of Hephaestion’s promotion to the Seven (Heckel 1978d: 227; though I have since changed my mind about the meaning of Diod. 17.61.3): that he was both *somatophylax* and commander of the *agema* poses no difficulties, but I do not see how Hephaestion could have commanded both his half of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. 3.27.4) and the hypaspists. Thus, I would place Seleukos’ appointment in 330.

47 While Alexander lived, the *chiliarchos* was Hephaestion (until 324) and then Perdikkas; Seleukos commanded the *agema*. After Alexander’s death, when Perdikkas became *epimeletes* or *prostatae* of the Kings, Seleukos became the new *chiliarchos* and the *agema* appears to have passed on to Kassandros. Note that Seleukos did not follow Perdikkas in the order of the hippocles (as one might wrongly deduce from Diod. 18.3.4) during Alexander’s lifetime. Plut. *Eum.* 1.5 shows that the order of the hippocles was (I) Hephaestion, (II) Perdikkas and (III) Eumenes. When Perdikkas was advanced to the first hippocles, he became *chiliarchos*, and Eumenes replaced him in the second hippocles. By contrast, Seleukos, who was still commander of the *agema* of the hypaspists at Alexander’s death, was promoted to command the first hippocles (which was  $\epsilonπιφανεστάτην$  = Hephaestion’s *chiliarchy*) over the head of Eumenes.

48 Prominent foreigners could also become *hetairoi*: e.g., Abdalonymos, Bagoas, Demaratos of Korinth, Nithaphon.

Here the *hetairoi* are the hypaspists and not the *pezhetairoi* of Koinos' battalion, who were, at any rate, on a different ship; for a little earlier we were told that Alexander intended to take the wall “with his hypaspists” (2.23.4). These hypaspists were carried on a single ship, and represent only a fraction of the total number; probably they are the *agema*. At 1.6.6 Alexander occupies a hill σὺν τοῖς ἑταίροις, a group made up of *somatophylakes* and *hetairoi* (1.6.5). Seleukos, who leads the “Royal Hypaspists” (5.13.4) is described as Σέλευκος τῶν ἑταίρων to distinguish him from Perdikkas, Lysimachos, and Ptolemy who are *somatophylakes*, that is, members of the Seven (5.13.1); and Neoptolemos, who appears to be fighting as a “Royal Hypaspist” at Gaza (2.27.1), is called Νεοπτόλεμος τῶν ἑταίρων τοῦ Αιακιδῶν γένους (2.27.6). Both Seleukos and Neoptolemos belonged to aristocratic families—one from Orestis, the other Epeiros—and both commanded hypaspists. The term *hetairos* is also used of Leonnatos (Arr. 2.12.5), just after the battle of Issos, when he was not yet one of the Seven and held no independent command; he was last identified as *somatophylax* in 336, in a context where *somatophylax* undoubtedly means *hypaspistes basilikos*.<sup>49</sup>

### *From Royal Page to Royal Hypaspist*

The transition from *paides basilikoi* to the *hypaspistai basilikoi* required aristocratic youths to fight in an infantry unit for the first—and only—time in their careers. To fight in this way was beneath the dignity of the Makedonian noble, and Amyntas son of Andromenes, quite naturally, objects that he would not give up his horse to the *scriba equitum*, Antiphanes, *nisi pedes militare vellem* (Curt. 7.1.34). As Pages the young men of Makedon accompanied their King on horseback, especially in the hunt. In fact, Hermolaos’ punishment for striking a boar, instead of yielding the “kill” to the King,<sup>50</sup> included the removal of his horse (Arr. 4.13.2). And, when the Pages were forced to fight, as in the skirmish with the Massagetai at Zariaspa (Baktra) in 328, they did so on horseback (Arr. 4.16.6). Thus, it is clear that, as Page and as commander, the Makedonian noble fought on horseback. Why, then, should we expect him to dismount around the age of eighteen and fight as an infantryman instead of joining the Companion Cavalry?

For the view that the young man joined the Companion Cavalry upon leaving the *paides basilikoi* I can find not one shred of evidence. Aretis, described by Arrian as ὀναβολεύς τῶν βασιλικῶν, fights on horseback in the battle at the Granikos (1.15.6). He may have been one of the Pages, whose functions are described as τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἵπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον καὶ

49 *somatophylax* (Diod. 16.94.4); *ex purpuratis* (= *hetairos*, Curt. 3.12.7); *somatophylax* (Arr. 3.5.5); *hetairos* (Arr. 4.12.2). Note that Pausanias of Orestis who, like Leonnatos, is *somatophylax* (Diod. 16.93.3) in 336, is described by Plut. *Mor.* 170e–f as *doryphorus*, and by Josephus, *AJ* 19.1.13 (95), as τῶν ἑταίρων.

50 On this incident see Roisman 2003a: 316.

ἀνέβαλλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον (Arr. 4.13.1; cf. Berve I, 38). At Gaugamela, we encounter a certain Aretes, commander of the Paionians. If Aretis is identical with Aretes, then we see the man at two different stages of his career. But there is nothing to indicate that he was necessarily a cavalryman immediately before his appointment to the command of the Paionians.

On the other hand, we have a number of nobles who are unmistakably infantrymen. The best example is Philippos, the son of Agathokles and brother of Lysimachos. Curtius (8.2.35–6) leaves us in no doubt about his status:

*Nobiles iuvenes comitari eum soliti defecerant praeter Philippum: Lysimachi erat frater, tum primum adultus et, quod facile adpareret, indolis rarae. Is pedes, incredibile dictu, per D stadia vectum regem comitatus est, saepe equum suum offerente Lysimacho; nec tamen ut digrederetur a rege effici potuit, cum lorica induitus arma gestaret.*

Justin (15.3.11–2) knows the story and attributes similar conduct to Lysimachos himself:

*Denique omni ex animo huius facti memoria exturbata post in India insectanti regi quosdam palantes hostes, cum a satellitum turba equi celeritate desertus esset, solus ei per immensas harenarum moles cursus comes fuit. Quod idem antea Philippus, frater eius, cum facere voluisset, inter manus regis expiraverat.*

Berve correctly describes Philippos as “anscheinend dem Leibhypaspistenkorps Al[exander]s angehörend,” adding the note “als Page würde er als puer bezeichnet und vermutlich beritten gewesen sein” (Berve II, 382 n.2).

Around the age of eighteen or nineteen, the young noble was ready for more vigorous training; the emphasis now shifted to the military sphere and to fighting on foot. The development of the equestrian arts was appropriate for boys who were not yet full grown, who lacked the size and strength to wield the sarissa, to endure forced marches and to stand up to hardened veterans. In battle, they appear to have fought as *hamippoi*, accompanying the King and the royal squadron on foot (Heckel 2012). For the noble it was a humbling experience, but one that prepared him to lead infantry and, if necessary, to dismount and fight alongside his men (cf. Ptolemy, Arr. 4.24.3). In contemporary North American slang, we would call it “paying one’s dues,” but in practice it was not radically different from the Spartan system which subjected the children of the *homoioi* to similar and harsher treatment, exempting only the children of the king (as was, apparently, the case in Makedonia as well).

Since Agis was the legitimate heir to the throne, it was expected that Agesilaus would spend his life as a private citizen, and he was therefore brought up according to the regular Spartan system of education, which was austere in its way of life, full of hardships, and designed to train young men to obey

orders. . . . The law exempts the heir apparent to the throne from the necessity of undergoing this training.<sup>51</sup>

The education of aristocratic youths thus led them through stages of both real and mock servitude. As παιδεῖς/pueri (a term that implies both boys and slaves), as hypaspists and as *somatophylakes*, they performed duties reserved in other societies for slaves and eunuchs. Like the Persian youths described in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, they learned ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ("both to rule and to be ruled": 1.9.4). The *agema* was the second stage of mock servitude, the king's "Shield-bearers" or, to use the same medieval analogy from which we adopted the term Pages, "the king's Squires." Always at the king's side in battle and under his watchful eye, they were young, vigorous, fast troops. And what better bodyguard for the king than young men eager to exhibit their bravery in the hope of winning a promotion? It was in this capacity, as a member of the *agema* of the hypaspists, that Pausanias died in Philip's defense in the battle with the Illyrians; thus Peukestas protected Alexander in the town of the Mallians.<sup>52</sup> Best explained as members of the *agema* are Curtius' *promptissimi iuvenes*: Charos, Alexander (8.11.9–16), Nikanor and Hegesimachos (8.13.13–6), Philippos son of Agathokles (8.2.35–9; cf. Justin 15.3.12)—all men *ex sua cohorte*, but not Pages. If *ex sua cohorte* does not, in fact, refer to the Pages, then we have the words *somatophylakes* and *cohors* used of young men in different age classes, i.e., at successive stages of their careers.

Finally, there is an otherwise inexplicable passage in Curtius (7.1.18), which attests to the importance of the concept of *somatophylakia* in the military and political education of the aristocrat. Amyntas son of Andromenes, before speaking in his own defense in 330, asked that the attire of an *armiger* (= *somatophylax*) be restored to him: *ut habitus quoque redderetur armigeri*. Neither Amyntas nor any other son of Andromenes was ever known to have been *somatophylax* of the King. But, in all likelihood, Amyntas had served as Page, then Royal Hypaspist of Philip II (cf. his brother Attalos, Diod. 16.94.4). The lance, which was given to him on the King's orders and which Amyntas held in his left hand (7.1.19)—presumably as a gesture that there was no hostile intent—was symbolic: with this weapon, and in his capacity as Royal Hypaspist, Amyntas had "earned his stripes," proved his loyalty to the Argead house. The testimony of such a man could not be taken lightly.

51 Plut. *Ages.* 1.2–4: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς βασιλείας Ἀγιόι προσηκούστης προσηκούστης κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ιδώτης ἐδόκει βιοτεύσειν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ἥκθη τὴν λεγομένην ἀγωγὴν ἐν Λακεδαιμονι, σκληρὸν μὲν οὖσαν τῇ διατῇ καὶ πολύπονον, παιδεύουσαν δὲ τοὺς νέους ἄρχεσθαι. . . . ταῦτης ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀνάγκης τοὺς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τρεφομένους παῖδας. English translation by I. Scott-Kilvert (Penguin Classics).

52 Diod. 16.93.6 (Pausanias); Arr. 6.10.2; Diod. 17.99.4; Curt. 9.5.14–7 (Peukestas). Curtius adds Timaeus (= Limnaios), also one of the hypaspists (Plut. *Alex.* 63.5, 8). Diodorus calls Peukestas "one of the hypaspists;" Arr. 6.10.2 says he held the sacred shield from Ilion, which was carried by a member of the hypaspists (Arr. 1.11.8).

### The Seven

Arrian (6.28.4) lists the seven individuals who held the rank of *somatophylax* in 324, adding the name of Peukestas, who was created an exceptional (though clearly temporary) Bodyguard at that time. The seven regular members of the unit—Lysimachos, Aristonous, Peithon, Hephaistion, Leonnatos, Perdikkas, and Ptolemy—are all household names in the field of Alexander studies, either because of their contributions to the King’s campaigns or on account of the roles they played in the history of the Successors. Whether their importance derived from the fact of their holding this distinguished office or if they were appointed on the basis of the importance of their families or places of origin is not clear. The latter seems unlikely, since at least three of the *somatophylakes* in 324 were from Eordaia; Perdikkas was Orestian and Leonnatos Lynkestian, while the geographical origins of Hephaistion and Lysimachos are unknown. But, even if two more regions were represented, it is hard to explain the prevalence of the Eordaians. Of the four remaining individuals who are attested as *somatophylakes* with certainty, Balakros and Menes were reassigned to other positions, Arybbas died of illness, and Demetrios was removed (and presumably executed) for his role in the Dimnos conspiracy. Balakros, Arybbas, and Demetrios all appear to have held the office since the time of Alexander’s accession, and thus had probably served Philip II in the same capacity. Alexander’s appointment of Menes, during the second year of the Asiatic campaign, may suggest that in 333 the power of faction or tradition restrained him from promoting his closest friends to the office.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Too little is known about Menes son of Dionysios, who replaced Balakros as *somatophylax*. He was clearly a man of high standing, as is attested by his subsequent appointment as *hyparchos* of Kilikia, Syria, and Phoinikia in 331 (Arr. 3.16.9). He may have been a strong supporter of Alexander in 336 and thus rewarded for his loyalty. See Berse II, 257 no. 507; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 164. The choice of Balakros son of Nikanor as satrap of Kilikia, which required his removal from the group of Seven, was probably due to his familial connection with Antipatros—he was married to Phila, daughter of Antipatros—rather than Alexander’s displeasure. For Balakros see Berse II, 100–1 no. 200, and also II, 101–2 no. 203; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 68–9 “Balacrus [2].”

## B Organization of the army

The discussion that follows is meant to serve as an overview and handy reference for matters that would otherwise overwhelm the already extensive footnotes to the main narrative. It is not intended to be exhaustive, though it is more extensive on matters of command structure and terminology of major units. A detailed treatment of military matters would require a substantial volume in itself. The most convenient discussions of the army can be found in: Berve I, 103–217; Tarn II, 135–69; Fuller, *Generalship* 39–54; Sekunda 1984; Sekunda and Warry 1998; Ashley, *Macedonian Empire* 22–54 (of limited use); English, *Army*; Sekunda 2010; Karunanithy, *War Machine*; cf. also Faure, *Vie quotidienne*; Sekunda 2007: 330–3; and Engels, *Logistics* 146–52, Appendix 5, Tables 4–6, for numbers of troops and reinforcements. Articles of a more specialized nature are cited in the appropriate sections and in the main bibliography.

When Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia in 334, his forces comprised 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry. Of these, 12,000 foot soldiers and 1,800 cavalrymen were Makedonians, the remainder were Greek allies, mercenaries, or troops contributed by bordering states within the Makedonian political orbit.<sup>1</sup> Over the next eleven years, until the demobilization of 10,000 veterans at Opis in 324, the Makedonian component remained relatively constant, despite casualties and reinforcements. There had, of course, been some growth in the numbers of *pezhetairoi*, and a case can be made for increases in the numbers of Makedonian cavalry (offsetting those of the Thessalians who returned home in 330), and perhaps for the addition of new hypaspists. But most of the same men who set out on the expedition were poised to return as conquerors in the months that preceded Alexander's death.

### The Makedonian core

#### *Makedonian cavalry*

Before the reign of Philip II, the military strength of Makedon resided in the aristocratic cavalry, the *hetairoi* who formed the king's *comitatus*. Although the

<sup>1</sup> Diod. 17.17.4. Plut. *Alex.* 15.1, *Mor.* 327d; Front. *Strat.* 4.2.4.

introduction of the sarissa-bearing infantry revolutionized Greek warfare and formed the basis of Makedon's rise to power, the cavalry remained the striking force *par excellence*. In the army that Alexander took to Asia, the Companion Cavalry (designated as οἱ ἑταῖροι, ἡ ἵππος ἡ ἑταιρική, or οἱ ἵππεῖς οἱ ἑταῖροι) comprised seven regionally recruited *ilai* and a select squadron (ἱλη βασιλική), which formed the King's cavalry guard.<sup>2</sup> The regional breakdown, as far as the evidence will allow us to determine was: two *ilai* from the coastal areas (Bottiaia, Amphipolis); two from Chalkidike (Anthemos, Apollonia); one of uncertain origin (Leugaia); two unknown. Berve notes that the core of Makedonian aristocracy thus remained at home with Antipatros.<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (17.17.4) tells us that the number of Companions transported to Asia was 1,800.<sup>4</sup> If the nominal strength of the *ile* was the same in every case, then each squadron appears to have comprised 225 riders ( $8 \times 225 = 1,800$ ). Fuller estimates "each *ile* numbered from 200 to 300 horsemen armed with the *xyston*".<sup>5</sup> Certainly, whatever weapon they carried, it was distinct from the *sarissa* or there would be little point in mentioning the *sarissophoroi* separately. Fuller may be right about the variable size of the *ilai*, but  $8 \times 225$  does bring us to exactly 1,800.<sup>6</sup>

Attached to the Companions were, apparently, five *ilai* of scouts (*prodromoi*); for Plutarch (*Alex.* 16.3) speaks of Alexander "plunging into the river [Granikos] with thirteen *ilai*." If these are the 900 Thracian *prodromoi* and the Paionians mentioned by Diodorus (17.17.4), then the size of each of these *ilai* would have been about 180; squadrons used for reconnaissance need not have been as large as the regular ones. But it is highly unlikely that Alexander's *prodromoi* were Thracians; for they are regularly detailed with the Companions and never are they described as being of a different nationality.<sup>7</sup> It has been suggested that the

2 Arr. 3.11.8.

3 Berve (I, 105) comments on "die auch politisch hochbedeutsame Tatsache, daß Al. zunächst nur die Hälfte des Reiteraufgebotes, und zwar im wesentlichen die Kontigente der Küstenländer auf seinen Zug mitnahm, während die Adelsreiterei Altmakedoniens unter Antipatros' Kommando zurückblieb." And, he continues: "Nur so ist es überhaupt verständlich, daß keiner der uns für Gaugamela sämtlich bekannten Führer landschaftlicher Ilen sonst irgendwie hervortritt, daß keiner der großen makedonischen Feldherren aus der Hetairenreiterei hervorgegangen ist, endlich, daß die nationalmakedonische Opposition nicht, wie man erwarten sollte, bei dem berittenen Adel, sondern durchaus beim Fußvolk lag."

4 Rzepka 2012 believes that the original number of cavalry Companions in the army of Philip II was 1,800. But this involves two unnecessary and unlikely assumptions: first, he assumes that the *hetairoi* in Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F225b; cf. Morison, *BNJ*) are the same as η ἵππος η ἑταιρική and not the Makedonian aristocracy; second, he is forced to emend the text to read οὐ πλεῖστος δῆτας κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον <χιλίων> ὀκτακοσίων. Finally, there is no good reason why the total number of Philip's cavalry should equal the number taken by Alexander to Asia, when the grand total of Makedonian cavalry in 334 came to 3,300 or 4,200, depending on how one interprets the evidence of Diod. 17.17.4–5.

5 Fuller, *Generalship* 49.

6 I see no reason why the *ile basileike* ought to have been larger than the others. Certainly nominal and actual sizes varied throughout the campaign.

7 Berve I, 129; Brunt 1963: 27–8. The text of Diod. 17.17.4 is generally recognized as corrupt: Θράκες δὲ πρόδρομοι καὶ Παιόνες ἐννακόσιοι. Of course, the original sense of Diodorus' comment

manuscript reading of Diodorus is corrupt, and that the Thrakians, who along with the Paionians, are said to number 900 are not identical with the *prodromoi* at the Granikos but with cavalrymen stationed on the Makedonian left.<sup>8</sup> The *prodromoi* comprise four *ilai*, and the fifth *ile*, the Paionians, is distinct from the *prodromoi* (who are also called *sarissophoroi*).<sup>9</sup> One solution to the problem is to assume that the Makedonian *prodromoi* were not among those troops who arrived in 334 but part of the advance force sent out in the spring of 336. What makes this suggestion more attractive is the fact that the *prodromoi* and lancers at the Granikos were under the command of Amyntas son of Arrhabaios, probably the same Amyntas who crossed into Asia in 336.<sup>10</sup>

Now, if the eight *ilai* of the Companions and the four *ilai* of *prodromoi* together total 1,800 men, we are left with a squadron size of about 150. This seems to be supported by the fact that the *ilai* from Leugaia and Anthemos (at Issos) numbered 300 (Arr. 2.9.3–4: ἐκείνοις δὲ ιππέας τριακοσίους ἐπιτάξαι εξήρεσεν). But, if Diodorus has incorrectly identified the *prodromoi* as Thrakians, and if the *prodromoi* and Paionians together amounted to 900, then the total for the cavalry would be 2,700, which would give us twelve *ilai* of 200 and perhaps a larger *ile basileike* of 300. In favor of such an arrangement is Sekunda's view (following Aelian's *Tactica*) that a tetrarchy comprised forty-nine men. Hence an *ile* with a nominal size of 200 would contain four tetrarchies (196 men).<sup>11</sup> There were reinforcements of 300 at Gordion in the spring of 333 (Arr. 1.29.4) and 500 near Sittakene in late 331 (Curt. 5.1.40–1; Diod. 17.65.1), and these more than made up for casualties (twenty-five at Granikos; sixty-six at Gaugamela).

Like the *pezhetairoi*, the Companion Cavalry comprised regionally recruited troops. We know the geographic origins of all but two *ilai* from the first half of the campaign (see above). The only complete list of ilarchs comes from the account of Gaugamela: Kleitos son of Dropidas, Glaukias, Ariston, Sopolis son of Hermodoros, Herakleides son of Antiochos, Demetrios son of Althaimenes, Meleagros, and Hegelochos son of Hippostratos (Arr. 3.11.8). One of these ilarchs

is difficult to recover: Berve I, 134; cf. Beloch II<sup>2</sup> 2.325. Goukowsky's Budé edition (*Diodore XVII* 28) emends the text to read Θρῆκες δὲ <καὶ> πρόδρομοι καὶ Παιόνες ἐννακόσιοι, and in his note on p. 179 he suggests that the numerical breakdown was 300 Thrakians, 300 *prodromoi*, and 300 Paionians. This breakdown will not, however, explain how we arrive at four *ilai* of *prodromoi* and one *ile* of Paionians; for the Paionian squadron would be larger than all the others and four times as large as each of the lancer squadrons.

8 For the problem see Brunt 1963: 27–8.

9 The commander of the Paionians at Gaugamela is Ariston (Berve II, 74–5 no. 138; Heckel, *Who's Who* 48–9 “Ariston [31]”). The *prodromoi* were led at Issos by Protomachos (Berve II, 329 no. 667; Heckel, *Who's Who* 234); Aretas (no. 109; Heckel, *Who's Who* 43 “Aretes”) commanded them at Gaugamela (Arr. 3. 12. 3); Hegelochos (no. 341) appears to have been their commander from 334 until the shuffle of commands at Gordion in the spring of 333. Brunt 1963: 27 n.5 recognizes that cavalry sarissa must have been shorter than that carried by the infantryman.

10 Brunt 1963: 34, who notes also that Kalas son of Harpalos, the commander of the Thessalians in 334, was with the Makedonian force in Asia Minor in 335 (Diod. 17.7.10). For Amyntas in 336 see Justin 9.5.8.

11 Sekunda and Warry 1998: 17.

has replaced Sokrates son of Sathon, who commanded the horse from Apollonia at the Granikos River (Arr. 1.12.7, 14.1). Amyntas son of Arrhabaios commanded a further four *ilai* of *prodromoi* (Arr. 1.12.7) and in the actual battle he led the *sarissophoroi hippoi* and the Paionians. This raises the question of whether the *sarissophoroi* are *prodromoi*, or whether the latter are the Paionians. The *prodromoi* at Issos (Arr. 3.9.2) are led by Protomachos—presumably replacing Amyntas son of Arrhabaios—and the Paionians are led by Ariston. Hence, the likelihood that the *prodromoi* are the *sarissophoroi* and distinct from the Paionians. Two other ilarchs are named at Issos: Pantordanos, in charge of the Leugaian *ile*, and Peroidas, leading those from Anthemos.

This basic organization (with some changes in the leadership of the *ilai*) appears to have remained constant until the arrival of reinforcements in late 331. But, even at that point, we do not know how the new levies impacted the overall structure. Some of the new arrivals will have brought the existing *ilai* up to strength, but as far as reorganization is concerned, we have little to go on except the evidence of Arrian 3.16.11. Here we are told that Alexander created two *lochoi* in each *ile*, which presumably means that the number of horsemen in each *ile* was also increased.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know the strength of the *lochos*, either as a new cavalry unit or in the infantry, where the rank of *lochagos* had previously existed (for discussion see Bosworth I, 320–1). The *lochoi* themselves may have been subdivided into two tetrarchies (two per *lochos* and, as the name implies, four per squadron; cf. Arr. 3.18.5). The Companions and the *prodromoi* received a supplement of 1,100 men, which (allowing for campaign losses and attrition due to illness) represents roughly a 33 percent increase. The Makedonians and the mounted lancers may now have totaled about 3,500–3,600.

The commander of the entire force of Companions between the spring of 334 and autumn of 330 was Philotas son of Parmenion: his official title was presumably *hipparchos* or *hipparches*. After his execution, Alexander placed the cavalry under two *hipparchs*, Black Kleitos and Hephaestion (Arr. 3.27.1), but there is no need to assume that, at this time, he altered the basic organization of the Companions. If we assume that the entire Makedonian cavalry force was divided equally<sup>13</sup> between the two men, each *hipparch* had under his command four ilarchs (and thus also eight *lochagoi*) of the regular Companions, and two ilarchs of *prodromoi*. Further adjustments to the command structure became necessary as a result of Kleitos' death and Hephaestion's unsuitability for military command at this level. The five units that conducted sweep campaigns in Baktria-Sogdiana must each have contained a cavalry component. These may have been identical with, or at least the precursors of, the *hipparchies* mentioned

12 This change is also reflected in the sudden occurrence of a tetrarchy at the Persian Gates (Arr. 3.18.5), but the strength of this unit is unknown—could it be the equivalent of four *lochoi*, hence two *ilai*?—and the term is never used again by Arrian or the other Alexander historians.

13 By which I mean an equal number of units, though not necessarily the same number of men, since the size of the *ile basileike*, later called the *agema*, is not certain.

in the Indian campaign. The latter were clearly smaller units than the hipparchies of Hephaestion and Black Kleitos, but larger than the *ilai* and commanded by men of greater importance (with the exception of the former ilarch, Demetrios son of Althaimenes).<sup>14</sup>

### **Makedonian infantry**

#### *Pezhetairoi and asthetairoi*

##### ORGANIZATION AND TERMINOLOGY

The strength of Alexander's army was its infantry phalanx, 9,000 sarissa bearing Makedonians, organized in six battalions (or brigades) of 1,500 men recruited on a regional basis. In Alexander's time, they were termed *pezhetairoi* (or *pezetairoi*), "foot companions," a title that had originally been given to the elite troops of Philip II, who were now renamed *hypaspistai* ("shield bearers").<sup>15</sup> Of the Makedonians who participated in the Asiatic campaign, the majority of the *pezhetairoi* appear to have come from Upper Makedonia, from the mountain cantons that ringed the lower Makedonian plain. Their semi-independent rulers had been placed securely under Makedonian rule in the reign of Philip, and their sons were brought up at the Court as "Pages" (*paides basilikoi* or *pueri regii*); here they were indoctrinated in the ways of the central government and held as hostages for the good behavior of their fathers. Nevertheless, they continued to lead regional troops; for it was the practice of the Makedonian levies to fight under the leadership of their local aristocrats.

Most of the known phalanx commanders are either explicitly identified as being of Upper Makedonian origin or bear names that suggest such a background.<sup>16</sup> Amyntas son of Andromenes and his brothers, and Polyperchon, were from Tymphaia;<sup>17</sup> Perdikkas and Krateros were Orestians (Arr. *Ind.* 18.5); Koinos appears to have been Elimiote (Diod. 17.57.2). We are not told the composition of Krateros' forces, but Berve's suggestion that they were "Kernmakedonen" strikes me as implausible.<sup>18</sup> Polyperchon is attested as commanding the Tymphaians at Gaugamela, and it would follow that Ptolemaios son of Seleukos and (probably)

14 For the *ilai* and *hipparchiae* in the age of the Diadochoi see Scheuble-Reiter 2014.

15 For the *pezhetairoi* see Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F348 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*); Dem. 2.17; Anaximenes ap. Harpocration = *FGrH* 72 F4; *Etym. Magn.* 699.50–1; cf. Erskine 1989; Griffith, *HMac* II, 705–9; Anson 2009a; Sekunda 2010: 447–8. Battalions and brigades: both modern terms are used to describe the phalanx units of 1,500 men. Neither is strictly correct.

16 Ellis, *Philip II* 304 n.23 cites an unpublished paper by Charles Edson ("Who was Parmenion?"), in which he suggested that Parmenion (who has been, somewhat imprecisely, called the commander of the phalanx) may have been from Upper Makedonia. Certainly, Arrian 1.2.5 says that Philotas commanded "the cavalry from Upper Makedonia."

17 Arr. *Ind.* 18.6; Diod. 17.57.2; Tzetz. *ad Lycophr.* 802; Diod. 20.28.1.

18 Thus Berve I, 115. I take "Kernmakedonen" to refer to the Lower Makedonian core. But see Berve II, 220: "Anscheinend von des Königs Thronbesteigung, sicher aber vom Aufbruch nach Asien an, führte K. eine, vielleicht aus der Landschaft Orestis sich rekrutierende Taxis der Pezhetairen."

Philippos son of Balakros were also of Tymphaian origin. Certainly the sons of Andromenes commanded their regional troops in successive battles (Amyntas at Granikos and Issos, Simmias at Gaugamela, and Attalos at the Hydaspes). Moreover, reinforcements who arrived in the course of the campaign were integrated into the phalanx according to their regional origins (Arr. 3.16.11: κατὰ ἔθνη).<sup>19</sup> Meleagros was the son of Neoptolemos, the latter a common name in Upper Makedonia and Epeiros. Neoptolemos the *archihypaspistes* was known to be an Aiakid and thus a kinsman of Alexander's mother, the Epeirot Olympias. Hence, it would be reasonable to assume that Meleagros' troops were also from one of the cantons bordering on Epeiros. Perhaps, they accompanied the King for the same reason that their family members served at the Court, as a security measure.

We must not forget that at the time of Philip II's death, there were many who challenged Alexander's right to succeed and supported the Lynkestian house of Aëropos. Plutarch (*Mor.* 327c) says that "all Makedonia was festering and looking towards Amyntas son of Perdikkas and the Lynkestians." Two sons of Aëropos, Heromenes and Arrhabaios, were executed on the charge of complicity in Philip's murder (Arr. 1.25.1). The other known members of the family served with Alexander as cavalry commanders (Alexander son of Aëropos, Amyntas son of Arrhabaios); except for Neoptolemos son of Arrhabaios, who had defected to the Persians and was killed at Halikarnassos in 334.<sup>20</sup> It may be for this reason that Perdikkas commanded a mixed battalion of Orestians and Lynkestians; the remainder of each unit may have been led by Krateros. On the other hand, an equal number of infantrymen had been left with Antipatros to protect Makedonia and the state's interests in Europe, and many of these will have been recruited from Lower Makedonia (Diod. 17.17.5). Whether the 12,000 infantry comprised eight battalions of *pezhetairoi* or six battalions and three chiliarchies of hypaspists is unclear.

The lowest ranking officer of the *pezhetairoi*, with the exception of Habreas the *dimoirites* (who may, at any rate, have been a hypaspist),<sup>21</sup> known by name is the phalanx commander. It is common practice to call these officers taxiarchs, but the term was not used specifically to designate any of the phalanx commanders. Indeed, it is debatable whether the word *taxis* means anything more than "unit"

19 I would note also on the subject of recruitment that the *neogamoi* who returned to Makedonia for the winter of 334/3 brought back new recruits, which must surely have been drawn from their highland cantons (the officers were Koinos, Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, and Meleagros).

20 Arr. 1.20.10; but Diod. 17.25.5 puts him on the Makedonian side. Which source is in error is unclear: Bosworth I, 145.

21 The rank of *dimoirites* is mentioned in Arr. 7.23.3, where it is clear that this NCO earned more than the ten-stater man (*dekastateros*) and double the wage of a regular infantryman. There was one *dimoirites* per *dekas*. But the *dimoirites*, Habreas, who died defending Alexander at the Mallian town (Arr. 6.10.1), was probably a member of the hypaspist corps. Since hypaspists are thought to have earned more than their counterparts in the *pezhetairoi*, it follows that a hypaspist *dimoirites* did not earn the same wage as one who served in the regular phalanx.

and tells us nothing about the size or nature of the force. Hence we do not know what a battalion of the phalanx was actually called or what the official title of its leader was, though one possibility is *strategos*.<sup>22</sup> But, since 1,500 (or rather 1,536) is not an easily manageable unit, there must have been commanders of *lochoi* or *syntagma* (presumably units of 256 and 512) whose names are lost to us—or, at least, there may have been known individuals who cannot be identified as *lochagoi* or *syntagmarchai*.<sup>23</sup>

Among the *pezhetairoi* we find troops designated as *asthetairoi*, and there has been considerable debate concerning the meaning of the term and the identity of the units. A.B. Bosworth 1973 (cf. Bosworth I, 170–1) has demonstrated that the term ἀσθέταιροι (or ἀσθέτεροι) is correctly used by Arrian (2.23.2; 4.23.1; 5.22.6; 6.6.1; 6.21.3) to denote a part of the Makedonian phalanx, and that the reading of the mss., emended by editors to πεζέταιροι, should be retained; in fact, the validity of the term is virtually proved by Arr. 7.11.3 which speaks of the introduction of πεζέταιροι Πέρσαι καὶ ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι. There is no longer any doubt that *asthetairoi* (or οἱ ἀσθέταιροι καλούμενοι)<sup>24</sup> is the correct way of designating a portion of the Makedonian infantry. Bosworth suggested that word meant “closest companions” in the sense of “closest kinsmen”; Hammond, MS 148–51 believed that the word was a combination of *astoi* (“townsmen”) and *hetairoi* (“companions”);<sup>25</sup> Griffith, *HMac* II, 709–13, followed by Devine,

22 I owe this observation to Dr Graham Wrightson. It is true that the word *archon* is used in conjunction with *taxis*, just as the *toxarches* is sometimes called *archon* of the *toxotai*. But the *toxarches* can also be called *strategos* (of the archers). Perhaps neither term is, strictly speaking, technical. In passages like 3.9.6, Arrian may be providing his own summary and not repeating the language of an original source. Arrian 5.23.1, describing the attack on Sangala, says that Alexander, recognizing that the task was not one for cavalry, jumped down from his horse and led on foot the phalanx of the *pezoi*. But here the “infantry phalanx” appears to be the hypaspists.

23 The smaller units of the Makedonian infantry are hard to identify. Later Hellenistic tacticians, like Asclepiodotus and Aelian, supply terminology that is clearly at odds with that used by Arrian’s source (almost certainly Ptolemy in the case of military matters). But there are references to *dekades* and *lochoi* in Arrian and one must make certain assumptions concerning organization. The *dekas* was presumably a file (originally ten, but now sixteen), and a *lochos* comprised either eight or sixteen *dekades*. Thus we have, in ascending order, either *dekas* (16), *lochos* (128), *syntagma* (256), *pentakosiarchiai* (512) and *chiliarchia* (1,028) or *dekas* (16), *lochos* (16 × 16 = 256), *syntagma* (2 *lochoi* = 512), and a *taxis* (3 *syntagma* = 1536). But all this is, at best, speculation. See the discussion in Wrightson 2006.

24 The participle καλούμενος accompanies the term on each occasion except 5.22.6. *pezhetairoi* appears an eighth time, Arr. 7.2.1 (without the variant *asthetairoi*), unnoticed by Bosworth; but this does not affect the argument in any significant way.

25 Hammond, MS 150 claims to have made the suggestion originally in 1973 but does not say where his view was published. It appears, as far as I am aware, for the first time in Hammond 1978a: 129–31. I do not understand why the Upper Makedonian phalangites should be any more likely to be termed “townsmen” than those from Lower Makedonia. Furthermore, Hammond’s claim that “the phalangites . . . came half from the old kingdom and half from Upper Macedonia” (MS 150) is completely unsubstantiated. Even less convincing is the assertion that the “name which Philip invented for the new phalangites from Upper Macedonia was obviously intended to augment the term *pezhetairoi*, and to be, like it, both self-explanatory and complimentary” (*ibid.*). See also Sekunda 2010: 456–7 for an overview; also English, *Army* 3–27. See also Kleymenov 2015.

regarded the units so designated as the “best companions,” i.e., *aristoi + hetairoi*. Against the last of these, Bosworth 1973: 251 n.3 argues that the contraction of *arist-* into *ast-* (e.g., Aristodamos becomes Astodamos) is a Thessalian, rather than Makedonian, usage. Hammond’s case is weakened by the unlikelihood that units of *pezhetairoi* were drawn entirely or primarily from cities, since cities were, at any rate, in relatively short supply in Makedonia and the infantrymen were chiefly of peasant stock.

Griffith, *HMac* II, 711–2 noted that Koinos’ battalion, which had held the second position on the right of the Makedonian line at the Granikos, had moved into the first position at Issos; at Tyre his troops are designated *asthetairoi*. This Griffith took as an indication that Koinos’ unit was judged to be the best of the *pezhetairoi* and was, accordingly, stationed closest to the King adjacent to Nikanor’s hypaspists, at Issos, whereas it had held only the second spot (beside Perdikkas) at the Granikos. In his description of the final assault on Tyre, therefore, Arrian (2.23.2) speaks of ἡ Κοίνου τάξις οἱ ἀσθέτεροι καλούμενοι. Hence Griffith comments: “Perhaps it distinguished itself at Granicus or Halicarnassus: perhaps it was always the smartest and the best on the job: perhaps at this time Alexander liked Coenus best.”<sup>26</sup> But we do not know for what reason Alexander changed the order of the other battalions: at Issos, Koinos takes up Perdikkas’ position, Ptolemaios son of Seleukos replaces Philippos son of Amyntas, and Meleagros has exchanged positions with Amyntas on either side of Polyperchon, who had now replaced Ptolemy. Meleagros’ unit, as far as we know, was never honored with the title *asthetairoi*—if this is in fact an honor—but moved instead to the third position.

The correlation between an infantry unit’s battle position from right to left with its performance and honor strikes me as unlikely. Moreover, Lendon 2005: 130 takes the idea to absurd conclusions by alleging:

[t]he Macedonian array was a gigantic Homeric ranking system. In principle, every soldier was placed in rank order relative to every other, from the haughty Ajax in the royal Horse Guard on the extreme right to the Thersites, ‘the worst man who came beneath Ilion’, in the humble foot battalion of Krateros, forever at the left of the line.

Not only does this ignore the exceptional skills of Krateros and his men, but it is contrary to the hypothetical arrangement proposed by Asclepiodotus:

The entire army as well as its units is disposed on the basis of a fourfold division, so that of the four half wings the bravest holds the right of the right wing, the second and third in point of valour the left and right of the left wing, and the fourth the left of the right wing<sup>27</sup>

26 *HMac*. II, 712.

27 Asclepiodotus, *Tactica* 3.1 (Loeb tr.).

Griffith correctly draws attention to the position of the unit within the phalanx, but Bosworth is more likely to be right in deriving the term from the word for “closer” or “closest.” Nevertheless, the notion of closeness must be spatial rather than familial. The abbreviated prefix *asth-* comes not from *assista* but from ἄστων or ἀστώτερος -τάτος. Thus, the units denoted as *asthetairoi* were those that traditionally fought closest to Alexander in the battle line. It was a nickname, or a type of shorthand, and the word is usually preceded by καλούμενοι, the “so-called *asthetairoi*,” those who fought closer or closest to the king.<sup>28</sup> Whether their relative positions were determined by their fighting qualities is unknown, but it appears less likely that they were designated *aristoi*. It would have been a blow to the pride of Krateros, who was second only to Parmenion in the infantry chain of command, to think that his position on the far left was in some way determined by the performance of his battalion.

It is possible that the name *asthetairoi* refers in some way to the units’ fighting style or armament. If it is possible (in some dialects at least) to contract *aristoi* into *ast-* (or *asth-* when it precedes an aspirated vowel), then one should not rule out the contraction of *aspistai + hetairoi* into *asthetairoi*. Hence, these would be “shield bearing” *hetairoi*, similar to the hypaspists in their armor. Indeed, they are positioned next to these troops, and they were often used by Alexander in tandem with the hypaspists when he conducted sieges or fought on rugged terrain.<sup>29</sup> They could, on occasions, fight with the sarissa and the smaller shield, like the other units of *pezhetairoi*. Or they could carry the larger shield and fight in the manner of hoplites. Anson (2010a) offers a different perspective, arguing that the *asthetairoi* were indeed named for their shields, but that the root of the prefix is *aster*, that is, the “star” (which was the symbol of the Makedonian royal house) that decorated their shields.<sup>30</sup> Certainly, an explanation that involves equipment rather than kinship or honor makes it easier to explain Alexander’s creation of Persian *asthetairoi*.<sup>31</sup>

#### COMMAND STRUCTURE

The commanders of the Makedonian heavy infantry are named in Arrian’s description of the battle order at the Granikos: Perdikkas son of Orontes, Koinos son of Polemokrates, Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippos son of Amyntas, Krateros (son of Alexandros), Meleagros (son of Neoptolemos).<sup>32</sup> Meleagros and Philippos are mentioned together already during the Getic campaign;<sup>33</sup> Koinos and

28 See Heckel and Jones 2006: 31–2, Heckel 2009b.

29 Upper Makedonians would have been particularly well suited for this style of fighting.

30 This view has been incorrectly attributed to me by Sekunda 2010: 457, with n.37.

31 Arr. 7.11.3: ή στρατιὰ ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἐξ λόχους τε καταλεγομένη καὶ τὰ Μακεδονικὰ ὄνόματα ἄγματα τι Περσικὸν καλούμενον καὶ πεζέταιροι Πέρσαι καὶ ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι καὶ ἀργυρασπίδων τάξις Περσικὴ . . .

32 Arrian does not give the patronymika of Krateros and Meleagros in this list.

33 Arr. 1.4.5. It is, of course, not certain that these are the phalanx commanders. Philippos is a common name (Heckel, *Who’s Who* 211–2 “Philip [3]”); Meleagros could possibly be identical with the ilarch (Berve II, 250 no. 495; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 161 “Meleager [2]”).

Perdikkas led their own units in the battle with the Illyrians, Kleitos and Glaukias (Arr. 1.6.9); and the battalions of Perdikkas and Amyntas son of Andromenes are attested at Thebes (Arr. 1.8.1–2; Diod. 17.12.3 names only Perdikkas). By the time of the battle of Issos, Philippos has dropped out of the list, replaced by Ptolemaios son of Seleukos; but this Ptolemaios died in the battle and was in turn replaced by Polyperchon son of Simmias, perhaps immediately after the battle of Issos. The command structure undergoes no significant changes until the period 328–326, except for the replacement of Amyntas and Perdikkas by their respective brothers, Attalos and Alketas.

In the spring of 328, Alexander left four battalions in Baktria: Polyperchon [Philippos], Attalos [Amyntas], Meleagros, and Gorgias [—].<sup>34</sup> Arrian does not name the commander-in-chief in this passage (4.16.1), but it becomes clear from 4.17.1 that he was Krateros. Gorgias' battalion is thus either new or else Krateros' own. Indeed, in the spring of 327, Krateros, Polyperchon [Philippos], Attalos [Amyntas], and Alketas [Perdikkas] are found together in Paraitakene, Krateros still having τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν (Arr. 4.22.1). Now it is Arrian's practice to refer to the commander-in-chief as having under his authority "his own battalion" (or "hipparchy") and those of others.<sup>35</sup> And on this occasion it appears that the actual leadership of the battalion was someone else's responsibility, namely Gorgias'. When the army moved into India (Arr. 4.22.7), Perdikkas and Hephaestion (both hipparchs) led Gorgias [—], (White) Kleitos [—]<sup>36</sup> and Meleagros, leaving Alexander with the *asthetairoi* (see above): Polyperchon [Philippos], Attalos [Amyntas], Koinos, and presumably Alketas [Perdikkas]. What has happened to Krateros' battalion? Again the obvious explanation is that Gorgias is now in command of it (cf. Bosworth 1973: 247 n.1; Tarn II, 145). At first glance, it seems odd that Krateros' battalion should be included in the forces of Perdikkas and Hephaestion. But, in the campaigns to come, Krateros leads contingents that include Alketas [Perdikkas] (Arr. 4.23.5; 5.11.3).<sup>37</sup> So it seems that, in the spring of 326, there were seven battalions named for the following commanders: Gorgias [Krateros], Meleagros, Attalos [Amyntas], Koinos, Alketas [Perdikkas], Polyperchon [Philippos], and Kleitos [new].

Seven phalanx battalions reappear at the Hydaspes. Krateros remains in the main camp with his own hipparchy and the battalions of Polyperchon [Philippos] and Alketas [Perdikkas].<sup>38</sup> Between this camp and the "island," Alexander located Meleagros, Attalos [Amyntas], and Gorgias [Krateros],<sup>39</sup> keeping with him

<sup>34</sup> Berve II, 113 no. 233; Heckel, *Who's Who* 127 "Gorgias [1]."

<sup>35</sup> Antiochos commands his own chiliarchy and two others (Arr. 4.30.6); at the Hydaspes Koinos leads his own hipparchy as well as Demetrios (5.16.3); in India Peithon commands his own battalion and two hipparchies.

<sup>36</sup> Berve II, 209 no. 428; Heckel, *Who's Who* 87–8 "Cleitus [3]."

<sup>37</sup> Perhaps another example of Alexander's balancing of power, which in Heckel 2002a I called "the politics of distrust."

<sup>38</sup> Arr. 5.11.3.

<sup>39</sup> Arr. 5.12.1. Bosworth 1973: 247 n.2, argues that Meleagros, Gorgias, and Attalos commanded mercenary forces and "are not attested with battalions and cannot have commanded battalions . . . ."

Koinos and Kleitos [new].<sup>40</sup> But, since Koinos appears subsequently as a hipparch (Arr. 5.16.3), we may assume that the leadership of his battalion was assumed by Peithon son of Agenor (cf. 6.6.1: τῶν ἀσθεταίρων καλουμένων τὴν Πειθώνος τάξιν).

What became of the heavy infantry battalions after 325 is hard to determine. Attalos and Meleagros returned to Karmania with Krateros (Arr. 6.17.3; Antigenes' battalion must have comprised hypaspists or argyraspids). In 324 Polyperchon set out for Makedonia with Krateros (Arr. 7.12.4), as did Gorgias and Kleitos (Justin 12.12.8); Attalos, Alketas, and Meleagros were all still in Babylon when the King died. Many of the 10,000 veterans who accompanied Krateros must have been discharged *pezhetairoi*, and it appears that there was a reorganization of the infantry or that only three or four battalions of Makedonian infantry remained with the King.

### *Makedonian elite infantry: the hypaspists and argyraspids<sup>41</sup>*

#### HYPASPISTS

In addition to the 9,000 *pezhetairoi*, the Makedonian contingent included 3,000 elite infantrymen known as “shield bearers.” Unlike the regional levies, the *hypaspistai* were selected on the basis of physique and valor. The regular hypaspists were originally known as *pezhetairoi*.<sup>42</sup> These are described by Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F348) as ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ισχυρότατοι ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλούντο πεζέταιροι. I would disagree, however, with Anson’s claim that in Philip’s time these *pezhetairoi* were “only the *agema* . . . one thousand troops as opposed to the later three thousand” (Anson 1985a: 248). The *pezhetairoi* of Philip II took the name hypaspists or, more specifically, “the hypaspists of the Companions” (οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἔταιρων) when the name *pezhetairoi* came to be applied generally to the Makedonian infantry, probably at the beginning of Alexander’s reign. The regular hypaspists, who were under the command of Nikanor son of Parmenion until his death in 330, appear to have developed into the argyraspids, as is foreshadowed by Diod. 17.57.2.

He points to “the absurdity of Alexander going into battle with two battalions and leaving five unengaged on the far bank of the Hydaspes . . .” But this is exactly what the other evidence for the battle suggests: the leaders of the *pezoi* are Seleukos (Royal Hypaspists), Antigenes (regular hypaspists) and Tauron (archers). I find it hard to believe that Alexander would place the battalions of three experienced commanders under new and unnamed commanders for this battle only.

40 Arr. 5.12.2. Koinos was by now hipparch, but his battalion kept Koinos’ name until his death: cf. 5.21.1; only at 6.6.1, that is, after Koinos’ death [6.2.1], does it become known as Peithon’s battalion.

41 The relationship between hypaspists and argyraspids is discussed at length by Heckel 2013a.

42 Anson 1985a, 2009a. Erskine 1989 argues that the *pezhetairoi* were Philip’s footguard but that these were replaced by the hypaspists in Alexander’s reign. The *pezhetairoi*, however, continued to operate as a “higher status unit” (394), but Alexander preferred a footguard composed of men of whose loyalty he could be sure.

The hypaspists were the multi-purpose, crack troops of the King, armed very much like Greek hoplites. In a set battle, such as Issos or Gaugamela, they were the articulating force between the heavy infantry and the cavalry; they were conspicuous in the King's sieges, selected for special missions that required speed and flexibility, and they served as the guard and military police.<sup>43</sup> Divided into *chiliarchiai* (units of a thousand, i.e., 1,028), they were further subdivided into *pentakosiarchiai* (groups of 512), which perhaps represented two *lochoi*. Their commanders, too, like the men themselves, were selected on the basis of merit, and Curtius gives a list of nine individuals selected in a contest of valor in Sittakene (in 331), of whom three were certainly appointed chiliarchs; the remainder, if they too were hypaspists, as one can reasonably assume, were presumably given the subordinate rank of pentakosiarch.<sup>44</sup> Certainly, a unit of 3,000 would require three chiliarchs and six pentakosiarchs. Nevertheless, the supreme commander of the hypaspists, the *archihypaspistes*, was a nobleman, appointed by Alexander himself. From 334 until 330, this office was held by Nikanor son of Parmenion; thereafter, by Neoptolemos, a kinsman of Alexander.

The transformation of the hypaspists into argyraspids ("Silver Shields") appears to have occurred in India, but apparently after the battle at the Hydaspes.<sup>45</sup> The new armor, which must have included the distinctive silver shields from which the unit took its new name, did not arrive until Alexander returned to Hydaspes from the Hyphasis.<sup>46</sup> The transformation of the hypaspists into argyraspids may represent a recognition of their service and the expectation that they would soon be

43 Police force: Atarrhias takes 300 men (almost certainly hypaspists like himself) to arrest Philotas (Curt. 6.8.19–21); the hypaspists are also ordered to seize the mutineers at Opis (10.2.30: thirteen troublemakers are arrested by the *custodes corporis*). Atarrhias and another hypaspist commander, Amyntas, were employed by Alexander to incite the assembled army against Philotas (Curt. 6.9.28) and against Alexandros Lynkestes (Curt. 7.1.5: saying his actions were "no doubt prearranged"). They served also as a security force (Curt. 8.1.45, 49).

44 Curt. 5.2.3–5: *Novem, qui fortissimi iudicati essent, singulis militum milibus praefuturi erant—chiliarchas vocabant—tunc primum in hunc numerum copiis distributis: namque antea quingenariae cohortes fuerant nec fortitudinis praemia cesserant. Ingens militum turba convenerat egregio interfutura certamini, testis eadem cuiusque factorum et de iudicibus latura sententiam: quippe verone an falso honos cuique haberetur ignorari non poterat. Primus omnium virtutis causa donatus est Atarrhias senior, qui omissum apud Halicarnason a iunioribus proelium unus maxime accenderat, proximus ei Antigenes visus est, tertium locum Philotas Augaeus obtinuit, quartus Amyntae datus, post hos Antigonus et ab eo Lyncestes Amyntas fuit, septimum locum Theodotus, < . . . > ultimum obtinuit Hellanicus.* For different discussions of the problem see Atkinson II, 56–61, and 1987; Daniel 1992; and Hatzopoulos I, 444–52. Three of the men named in this list are clearly hypaspist leaders, and it follows that the remainder are as well. Many aristocratic officers held their commands on the basis of family background. I know of no cases where they were ranked according to merit (*pace* Lendon 2005: 130, noted above).

45 Justin 12.7.4–5, claiming the entire army had arms decorated with silver and came to be known as the argyraspids is incorrect, as is the claim that this occurred at the beginning of the Indian campaign. But, if there is any truth to Curtius' report (9.3.21) that there was armor "emblazoned with gold and silver, sufficient for 25,000 soldiers" (cf. Diod. 17.95.4), then the hypaspists were not the only ones to receive an equipment upgrade.

46 Curt. 9.3.21; Diod. 17.95.4.

demobilized. Certainly, when Krateros left India in 325 and returned to Karmania via the Bolan Pass, he took Antigenes<sup>47</sup> (and presumably his men) with him. Alexander must have prepared for this by creating new hypaspists, who accompanied him on the Gedrosian march.<sup>48</sup> When Perdikkas inherited the Royal Army in 323, he had with him a corps of hypaspists, distinct from the argyraspids (who had gone to Kilikia with Krateros); this must have been the unit formed in India to replace the veterans.<sup>49</sup>

#### ARGYRASPIDS

The argyraspids,<sup>50</sup> or Silver Shields, are generally believed to have strong connections with the regular hypaspists of Alexander the Great. According to Berve (I, 128), they came into being in India “durch eine Auswahl aus altgedienten Hypaspisten” but were not identical with the entire hypaspists corps; for he draws attention to the existence of hypaspists alongside the argyraspids at Paraitakene (Diod. 19.28.1). But the hypaspists mentioned in the army of Eumenes—they appear also at Gabiene (Diod. 19.40.3)—are clearly not the hypaspists of Alexander. Significantly, it is the argyraspids who pride themselves on their service, and their stainless record, under Alexander, not the hypaspists who are positioned next to them. Spendel (*Heerwesen* 45) regarded the argyraspids as synonymous with the hypaspists of Alexander (cf. Tarn II, 151–2; and Anson 1981: 117–20). But Lock has argued that the argyraspids were actually 3,000 disgruntled veterans from the Royal Army at Triparadeisos who were

47 The belief that Antigenes served as a phalanx commander at the Hydaspes is, in my opinion, misguided. This was proposed by Crämer 1893: 53 and rejected by Berve II, 41 n.1, but the notion persists in modern scholarship (Bosworth II, 298 believes he may have had temporary command of White Kleitos' battalion). When Alexander crossed upstream from Poros' position, he brought with him no more than two battalions, those of White Kleitos and Peithon. In the main camp he left Polyperchon and Alketas, under the command of Krateros, and halfway upstream he had stationed Meleagros, Attalos, and Gorgias. When Alexander gives instructions to Antigenes he speaks also to Tauron and Seleukos. It is clear that he is discussing the roles of the archers, the Royal Hypaspists and regular hypaspists. Perhaps Antigenes' appearance in place of Atarrhias means that a portion of the regular hypaspists remained behind. If the story is true that a certain Attalos (Curt. 8.13.21; also *ME* 58: *Attalus quidam*) was posing as Alexander in the King's absence, he may have been accompanied by a hypaspist guard for the sake of realism.

48 See, for example, Arr. 6.22.1.

49 Diod. 18.33.6, 34.2. Bosworth, *Legacy* 83 suggests that these *hypaspistai* are merely “the storming group proper which literally ascended under their shields.” This seems unlikely, since what we should expect in that case is *hyperaspizein* “to put one's shield over [oneself or someone else],” that is, in a protective manner. The fact that *hypaspistai* appear with *klimakophoroi* (the latter not an official, but rather ad hoc, unit) does not, to my mind, give strong support to the view of *hypaspistai* as a “purely descriptive term.” The armies of the Successors and the Hellenistic kings replicated that of Alexander, just as their courts featured *hetairoi* and *paides basilikoi*.

50 Berve I, 128; Tarn II, 151–2; Lock 1977a; Anson 1981; Heckel 1982a: 63, and 2013a; Yardley & Heckel 237–8; Baynham 2013.

entrusted with the task of bringing the treasures from Sousa to Kyinda in Kilikia for the satrap Antigenes (Arr. *Succ.* 1.38).

But four points are immediately apparent: (i) the hypaspists were referred to by at least one primary historian, the common source of Diod. 17.57.2 and Curt. 4.13.27, as argyraspids; (ii) both units are named for their shields; (iii) the hypaspists are generally thought to have numbered 3,000 (i.e., three chiliarichies; and at Paraitakene, Eumenes' hypaspists do number 3,000: Diod. 19.28.1), which is the precise figure given for the argyraspids (Diod. 18.58.1; 19.28.1); and (iv) Antigenes is associated with both the hypaspists (Curt. 5.2.5) in late 331 and the argyraspids, as early as 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 1.35). So the links between the two units are very clear. Furthermore, the number of troops assigned to Antigenes to convey the treasures from Sousa to Kyinda was also 3,000.

Now Lock supposes that these 3,000 men became the argyraspids but were not identical with the hypaspists. This is, I believe, refuted by the points raised above and also by the fact that the argyraspids are spoken of as a unit which served undefeated under Alexander; Lock's veterans would have been drawn from various battalions and brigades. Furthermore, Curtius (8.5.4) says that Alexander's troops adopted splendid new arms on the eve of the Indian invasion; Justin 12.7.5 mistakenly calls the entire army the argyraspids!<sup>51</sup> Added to this is the strong likelihood that the hypaspist veterans (now the argyraspids) were dismissed at Opis in 324, at which time Antigenes accompanied Krateros to Kilikia.<sup>52</sup>

#### *Elite troops ("The King's Own")*

In addition to the regular troops employed by the King, there were elite groups, designated by the adjective "royal" (*basilikos*), among both the infantry and the cavalry. These were assigned the task of fighting in the immediate vicinity of the King, and they are clearly drawn from the Makedonian nobility. In the case of the infantry, the distinction is an easy one. The *hypaspistai basilikoi* were beyond doubt young noblemen, and their unit (which perhaps had no fixed nominal strength) is often termed the *somatophylakes* or *somatophylakes basilikoi*, further emphasizing their role as the King's protectors. The members of the unit were most likely aged nineteen or older; between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, they had been enrolled in the *paides basilikoi* ("royal boys," "Pages"), at which time they were mounted and developed the equestrian skills that would later be required of officers, whether they led infantrymen or cavalry (Heckel 1986).

51 Justin 12.7.5: *phaleras equorum et arma militum argento inducit exercitumque suum ab argenteis clipeis Argyraspidas appellavit*. Unless Justin uses *exercitus suus* to mean the hypaspists ("Alexander's own troops"), he has made an error, wrongly calling the whole army the argyraspids. But this does not make his testimony worthless (so Lock 1977b: 375; Tarn II, 123–4). He was aware of the formation of the argyraspids, but he did not understand exactly who they were. See full discussion in Yardley & Heckel 237–8.

52 Hammond 1989: 64 believes that the argyraspids remained in Babylon in 323, "to form the Macedonian part of the multiracial phalanx."

These troops and their commanders are discussed in detail under the rubric of *somatophylakia*.

### *Lightly armed troops (psiloi)*

The relative obscurity of the *psiloi* and their commanders is, to a certain extent, attributable to the fact that they are troops drawn from the lowest socio-economic class of eligible fighters. But, although they seldom decided the outcome of battles, they played an essential role as skirmishers before the phalanges engaged and in the fights that took place on rough terrain or against specialized opponents. Berve I, 130 rightly notes that Makedonia must have produced *psiloi* from the earliest times and continued to supply them during Alexander's reign. With the notable exception of the Makedonian archers (Arr. 3.12.2), few units are specifically identified as Makedonian, but it is virtually certain that Alexander did not rely entirely on foreign troops to supply slingers and javelin men. The presence of Makedonian commanders does not establish the origins of the troops themselves. We find an Attalos commanding the Agrianes, a Ptolemaios leading the Thrakians, just as Erigyios commanded the mercenary horse and Kalas and Alexandros Lynkestes were placed over the Thessalian cavalry. Diodorus 17.17.3–4 speaks of only 12,000 Makedonian *pezoi*, and these must be the 9,000 *pezhetairoi* and 3,000 hypaspists. The Agrianes and the archers, according to the same account, numbered only 1,000. Hence, it is possible that *psiloi* were of mixed origins. The archers by themselves can scarcely have numbered more than 500 (cf. Berve I, 132). But the reform of the army at Sousa in late 331 saw them increase to at least 3,000: Tauron commanded 1,500 in the land of the Ouxians (Curt. 5.3.6), and these constituted only a portion of the force; in 327 not fewer than three chiliarichies are attested (Arr. 4.24.10). Berve (I, 133) may be correct in assigning the command of the reformed archers to Tauron son of Machatas.

Arrian mentions both Makedonian (Arr. 3.12.2; cf. 2.9.2) and Kretan (Arr. 2.9.3) units, and the few attested commanders have names that are recognizably Makedonian (Antiochos, Kleandros, Klearchos) or Kretan (Eurybotas, Ombrion). But the division of command becomes blurred: Arrian's terminology, here as elsewhere, is vague and the man identified specifically as commander of the Makedonian archers, Brison (Arr. 3.12.2), may be identical with the Kretan Ombrion. Berve's attempt (I, 131–2) to distinguish between the ranks of στρατηγὸς τῶν τοξοτῶν and τοξάρχης is misguided and fruitless: by his own scheme the *strategos* Kleandros is replaced by an ἄρχων τῶν τοξοτῶν (which must surely be the equivalent of *toxarches*) Antiochos.

### **Non-Makedonian troops**

Four types of non-Makedonians served in Alexander's army: allies from the states within the Makedonian political orbit; members of the League of Korinth; the ubiquitous mercenaries; and, finally, oriental contingents. The terms of service of the first were dictated, to a great extent, by Alexander himself, those of the

second group by the League's official recognition of the war against Persia, and those of the third by the need for and availability of pay. Since the obligations of the League allies were thought to terminate with the fall of the Persian capitals, or the death of Dareios III, the King was forced to disband them, though many continued to serve as mercenaries. Their numbers, after 330, cannot be reconstructed with confidence.

### **Cavalry: Thessalian, allied, Thracian, and Iranian**

Foremost among the non-Makedonian troops were the Thessalian cavalry who, like the Companions, numbered 1,800, and they were generally stationed on the left wing and under the general command of Parmenion.<sup>53</sup> It may be assumed, though there is little proof, that these were subdivided in much the same way as the Companions. Diod. 17.21.4, 60.8 speaks of Thessalian *ilai* (*eilai*), though without indicating how many such squadrons there were. The most logical assumption is that, like the Companions, they comprised eight *ilai*, one of which formed Parmenion's guard (and was commanded by Polydamas).<sup>54</sup> Apart from Polydamas, not a single Thessalian ilarch is known by name, unless Ariston of Pharsalos can be identified as such. Two hundred additional Thessalians joined Alexander at Gordion, but it is uncertain whether these formed a ninth *ile* or merely reinforced or brought up to strength the existing *ilai*.<sup>55</sup> During their five years of service in Asia with Alexander—they were dismissed in 330 at Ekbatana—they were commanded by Kalas son of Harpalos and Alexandros the Lynkestian (both in 334), and then by Philippos son of Menelaos (334/3–330). They were clearly distinct from the rest of the allied cavalry, as can be seen in the fact that Philippos was promoted from command of the latter to become hipparch of the Thessalians.

Although Alexander, like Philip II before him, could call upon the Thessalians as *archon* of the Thessalian League, they probably served under the same conditions as forces of the League of Korinth.<sup>56</sup> This is suggested by the favorable “press” they are given, presumably from the pen of Kallisthenes, who wrote with a view to emphasizing the contributions of the allied troops in the hope of encouraging further allies and mercenaries to serve in the future, and by the fact that they were dismissed when the “Panhellenic” aspect of the war was drawing to close in 330. Some of them chose, or were enticed, to stay; but most were sent to the coast from Ekbatana—without their mounts.

53 Diod. 17.17.4. In the same passage, the reference to the infantry, all under the command of Parmenion, must be restricted to the non-Makedonians. The Thessalians formed the left flank guard for this infantry, and the Pharsalians constituted Parmenion's cavalry bodyguard (Arr. 3.11.10), paralleling Alexander's *ile basilike*. For a full discussion of the Thessalians and their cavalry see Strootman 2012.

54 Arr. 3.11.10; cf. Curt. 4.15.6–7.

55 Arr. 1.29.4.

56 That they were members of the League is also suggested by Arr. 1.24.3, where we hear of Parmenion commanding “the Thessalians and the *other* allies.”

The remainder of the League allies supplied 600 horsemen, according to Diodorus (17.17.4). These were commanded in 334 by a Makedonian general, Philippos son of Menelaos, and in 333 (after the arrest of Alexandros the Lynkestian, who was replaced as commander of the Thessalians by Philippos) by Erigyios son of Larichos, one of Alexander's most trusted *hetairoi*. Their normal position in the battle line was to the left of Krateros' battalion of *pezhetairoi* and to the right of the Thessalians. The men themselves came primarily from the Peloponnese—an additional 150 Eleians joined Alexander at Gordion in 333 (Arr. 1.29.4)—but we hear also of Lokrians, Malians, Phokians (Diod. 17.57.3; Curt. 4.13.29), and a group of Boiotians from Orchomenos, who made a dedication to Zeus on their return (*JG* VII, 3206). Of their activities in the campaign, before their demobilization in 330, very little is known; nor do we know the original size of their contingent.<sup>57</sup>

The greatest difficulty is posed by the Thrakian horsemen (clearly not members of the League), whom Diodorus (17.17.4) may have confused with the *prodromoi*, but whose numbers (if Diodorus' reference to 900 Thrakian *prodromoi* and Paionians is rejected) are not given. Alexander certainly took a number of Thrakian cavalrymen from Ephesos to Miletos (Arr. 1.18.3), presumably those commanded by Agathon son of Tyrimmas. But the King's cavalry force included only four *ilai* of Companions, and one wonders where the *prodromoi* have gone, if they are not identical with the Thrakian horse.<sup>58</sup> Five hundred additional Thrakian cavalry joined Alexander in Egypt in 331 (Arr. 3.5.1).

Similarly, we cannot be sure about the origins of the squadrons of mercenary cavalry. Diodorus mentions only mercenary infantry, but Arrian (1.23.6) tells us that Ptolemaios (probably the son of Philippos) was left in Karia with 3,000 mercenary infantry and 200 cavalry (the latter, as the structure of the Greek sentence implies, also mercenaries). Four hundred mercenaries arrived in Egypt (331) under the command of Menoitas son of Hegesandros. If Menoitas is a scribal error for Menidas, then these 400 may be identical with the mercenary cavalry at Gaugamela (Arr. 3.12.3); the other mercenary horse under Andromachos son of Hieron (Arr. 3.12.5) may be what remained of the squadrons that crossed the Hellespont in 334.<sup>59</sup> After the dismissal of allied troops in 330, the only Greek cavalrymen who remained served as mercenaries.

57 A list of the dedicatees (for those who do not have access to the text of the inscription) can be found in Heckel, *Who's Who* 345. See also Tritle 2009: 131–2.

58 Cf. Bosworth I, 136 for the absence of the *prodromoi*. Amyntas son of Arrhabaios, who led the *prodromoi* (on the right) across the Granikos, commanded the left at Sagalassos, but Arrian (1.27.4) says that the cavalry were of no use in the hill country of the Pisidians. Nevertheless, his presence in Alexander's portion of the army is worthy of note. Amyntas appears to have commanded *above* the “unit” (i.e., *taxis* or *ile*) level, and he may have led the scouts as hipparch, just as Philotas was hipparch of the remaining Companions. Agathon's Thrakians were stationed on the left at the Granikos (Arr. 1.14.3) and can therefore not be identical with the *prodromoi*.

59 Berve I, 146 suggests that there were originally 600 mercenary horsemen, and he directs the reader to 1.178, though here he speaks only of the 600 allied cavalry. Nevertheless, if Andromachos' force balanced that of Menidas (and these were the 400 who arrived in Memphis), then the original number of *hippeis mistophoroi* may have been 600 (that is, 400 at Gaugamela + 200 left behind in Karia).

Barbarian horsemen became increasingly important in the campaigns of Central Asia and India. If the propagandists can be believed, there were orientals serving in Alexander's armies in the first years of the campaign.<sup>60</sup> Although there has been a tendency to downplay the role of oriental troops in Alexander's army, at least in the early stages, G.T. Griffith rightly remarked: "with so much of the fine cavalry of the former Persian armies available now, it would seem surprising indeed if Alexander did not make use of it, always supposing that it was politically sound to do so."<sup>61</sup> Olbrycht argues convincingly that horsemen of the Persian aristocracy (*nobiles*) joined Alexander in Arachosia, and meanwhile a barbarian force of cavalry (included in the phrase ὅσοι ἄλλοι ιππεῖς) remained with Parmenion in Ecbatana.<sup>62</sup>

It is possible that the *hippakontistai* (mounted javelin men), who appear for the first time in Hyrkania (Arr. 3.24.1) and very soon after the Thessalian cavalry were dismissed, were barbarian troops. Scholars cannot agree on their origin—it is possible that they are the Paionians, who are not mentioned in the second half of Alexander's campaign, and that they replaced the *prodromoi*.<sup>63</sup> It has also been suggested that the forty *hippakontistai* with Anaxippos were barbarian horsemen. But this makes Satibarzanes' slaughter of Anaxippos' force more difficult to understand. It seems odd that he did not attempt to win over his countrymen and, if he did so unsuccessfully, this shows them to have been unusually dedicated to their new overlord.<sup>64</sup>

The mounted archers (*ippotoxotai*) were almost certainly oriental troops; for there was no unit in the Macedonian or Greek force that functioned in this way. And Olbrycht notes that "they took the place of the *hippakontistai* in the army's hierarchy."<sup>65</sup> They make their first appearance in India in the battle with Poros at

60 Arr. 2.14.7: ὅσοι τῶν μετὰ σοῦ παρατάξαμένων μὴ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ἀπέθανον, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἐμὲ κατέψυγον, τούτων ἐπιμέλομαι καὶ οὐκ ἄκοντες παρ’ ἐμοὶ εἰσίν ("I hold myself responsible for all of your troops who did not die in the field but took refuge with me: they are with me of their own free will, and voluntarily serve in my army." For Orientals in Alexander's army see English, *Army* 50–5.

61 Griffith 1963, quoted by Olbrycht 2011: 71.

62 Olbrycht 2011: 72–3. Curt. 7.3.4; 8.5.9. Barbarian horsemen with Parmenion: Arr. 3.19.7. Olbrycht 2011: 74–5.

63 The *hippakontistai* are mentioned at Arr. 3.24.1 as forming one *taxis*, and Olbrycht 2011: 75 notes that "a few weeks previously Alexander had no *hippakontistai* under his command": he suggests that from the Mardian campaign on they fulfilled the functions of the *prodromoi*, who are last mentioned at Arr. 3.21.2.

64 Cf. English, *Army* 51. Bosworth I, 352 notes that the *hippakontistai* were grouped with the Makedonian troops (Arr. 3.29.7; 4.4.7; 6.17.4; cf. Bosworth 1980: 14) and they may represent a conversion of lancers into mounted javelin men. Berke I, 151; Brunt 1963: 42 and Griffith 1963: 69–70 regard them as Iranian. Like Ashley, *Macedonian Empire* 35, I am content to leave the matter in abeyance.

65 Olbrycht 2011: 76. This suggests to me that the experiment in converting *prodromoi* into *hippakontistai* was only marginally successful. Olbrycht 2011: 81 (with n.55) observes that *hippakontistai* as the name for the formation appears to have begun and ended with Alexander. In the age of the Diadochoi, they were replaced by the so-called Tarentinoi (ταρεντῖνοι).

the Hydaspes.<sup>66</sup> They appear to have numbered 1,000 (Arr. 5.16.4) and were not merely the Dahai, but Skythians in general (cf. Bosworth II, 279). Their contribution to the Makedonian victory was clearly considerable.<sup>67</sup>

### *Infantry*

That the allied and mercenary infantry receive very little attention in the Alexander historians is hardly surprising. On the one hand, they were used largely in a supportive role, as reserves and, in the case of the mercenaries, as garrison troops. On the other, it is typical of literature that originates in the conqueror's camp that the roles of allies (especially those of other races or ethnic groups) are overlooked or deliberately omitted. Like Cortés (and his historians), who scarcely mentioned the Indian allies except to blame them for post-battle atrocities, Alexander could blame the destruction of Thebes on the hostility of the Boiotians and their neighbors.

According to Diodorus, the non-Makedonian infantry comprised 7,000 allies, another 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians, and 5,000 mercenaries. Since the total number of infantry is given as 32,000, and 12,000 of these were Makedonians (phalangites and hypaspists), we may assume that the Agrianes and archers made up the remaining 1,000. The archers, at least half of whom were Kretans,<sup>68</sup> are discussed above. The Agrianes were Balkan javelin men (in 336/5, their king was Langaros: Arr. 1.5.2), whose territory bordered on Paionia and the Maidians of the lower Strymon.<sup>69</sup> Alexander relied on them heavily, often employing them on special missions along with the hypaspists. At the beginning of the campaign they numbered 500 (cf. Diod. 17.17.4, the archers and Agrianes together totaled 1,000), but a supplementary force of equal size was added later (Curt. 5.3.6; Arr. 4.25.6; Berve I, 138).

### *The epigonoi*

Although the *epigonoi* constitute a unit in Alexander's army, they belong to the final stages of the King's life and to the post-conquest phase.<sup>70</sup> The sources are in

66 Olbrycht 2007: 316; cf. Olbrycht, 2004: 110–41. The *hippotoxotai* at the Hydaspes: Arr. 5.12.2, 13.4, 14.3. Only ten of them were killed in the engagement (Arr. 5.18.3).

67 Bosworth II, 298–9 and 1980: 15; Lendering 2005: 291. At Sangala, they were used for containment (Arr. 5.22.5); the engagement was primarily an infantry battle (Arr. 5.23.1). See Fuller, *Generalship* 255–8. The *hippotoxotai* are normally found under Alexander's direct command, but if the Skythian cavalry were with Koinos at the Hydaspes (Arr. 5.12.2; Anspach II, 16), these too may have been mounted archers.

68 Of the original 500 archers, probably 250 were Makedonian. See Sekunda 2010: 459.

69 Strabo 7 frg. 36: οὐ μόνον δ' ὁ Αἴγιος ἐκ Παιώνων ἔχει τὴν ρύστην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Στρυμών ἔξ Αγριάνων γὰρ διὰ Μέδων καὶ Σιντῶν εἰς τὰ μεταξὺ Βισαλτῶν καὶ Οδομάντων ἐκπίπτει. Hammond, *HMac*. II, 434 calls Langaros “a personal friend, and the model client king.”

70 Perhaps for this reason they are omitted by English, *Army*. Full discussion in Olbrycht 2015; cf. Ashley 1998: 419; Bosworth 1980: 17–8; Briant, *Alexander* 115–6.

general agreement about their origins, although there are some problems relating to the chronology of the program. The most plausible account of their origins comes (perhaps surprisingly) from Curtius, who says that, when Alexander was preparing to invade India, “he gave orders for 30,000 men of military age to be selected from all the provinces and brought to him in arms, to serve simultaneously as hostages and as soldiers” (8.5.1). Two other sources appear to imply that Alexander had conceived the idea as early as 330, when he was adopting other Persian practices: Plutarch (*Alex.* 47.6) speaks of their formation in a chapter that ranges chronologically from the campaign in Hyrkania (330) until the marriage of Alexander and Roxane (327), and it is necessary to treat the chapter as thematic rather than chronological; Justin mentions, in the context of 330, children born in the camp and adds that they were destined to supplement the fighting force and were called *epigonoi* (12.4.10: *haec suboles nomen habuit Epigoni*). But the evidence of Justin is almost certainly contaminated by a misunderstanding on the part of the epitomator and experience of Roman frontier troops.<sup>71</sup> In all likelihood, the decision to form the *epigonoi* was made in Baktria-Sogdiana, when Alexander embarked on his second stage of orientalism, which included mixed marriages and the attempt to introduce *proskynesis*. The process of selecting and training the Iranian boys in both language and military arts would take time, and it is reasonable that Diodorus’ comment about “sufficient time” (χρόνον ικανόν, 17.108.2) refers to the interval between 327 and the appearance of the *epigonoi* at Sousa in 324.<sup>72</sup> How these 30,000 troops—they are generally thought to be infantrymen—were to be employed and subdivided is unclear, although one may assume from the fact of their training in the use of Makedonian weapons and techniques that they would be organized and deployed along the lines of the *pezhetairoi*.<sup>73</sup>

71 For the chronological problems in Plutarch see Hamilton, *PA* 129; Olbrycht 2015: 201; cf. Prandi, *Diodoro* 182. For the problems in Justin see Yardley & Heckel 208. Bosworth accepts Justin’s account as referring to a second body of *epigonoi*, different from the 30,000 but forces rooted in Asia who would be loyal to the person of the King. “The two bodies of *Epigoni* were alike in their close attachment to the court and their training in Macedonian discipline. In both cases Alexander was attempting to create a supra-national army, but his motives were grounded in practical politics and military considerations were paramount” (Bosworth 1980: 18).

72 Olbrycht 2015: 198–200 argues that the 30,000 allies mentioned by Diod. 17.95.4 as joining Alexander at the Hydaspes are the *epigonoi* (since the term σύμμαχοι is used also of barbarian troops). Hence, he assumes that this contingent joined Alexander in India and returned from there with Krateros. The latter point is pure speculation. It is doubtful that the program of recruiting and training these boys could have been completed in time for them to join the Makedonian army (where they are otherwise unattested) within one year. The scale of the undertaking is clear from Plut. *Alex.* 47.6: “He chose out thirty thousand boys and gave orders that they should learn the Greek language and be trained to use Macedonian weapons, appointing many instructors for this work” (B. Perrin tr.). Furthermore, it is difficult to account for the reaction of the Makedonian soldiery to the *epigonoi*, when they appeared in 324, if they had already been exposed to them in 326.

73 Presumably sarissa-bearing infantrymen; or else hoplites. Briant 1999: 122–4 believes they may have been modelled on the Achaemenid *kardakes*, that they represented “the ‘Macedonization’ of these levies” (Briant, *Persian Empire* 1037).

Whereas other units (see above for barbarian cavalry) were used in combination with Makedonian troops as early as the campaign in the Upper Satrapies, the *epigōnoi* are a different breed, not yet integrated into the army and envisioned by Alexander, who allegedly had become disillusioned with his Makedonians, as a counterweight (an *antitagma*) to them.<sup>74</sup> Diodorus claims that Alexander wished to form such a counter unit after his experience at the Hyphasis (wrongly “the crossing of the Ganges”), but this occurred too late to affect Alexander’s decision about the formation of the unit, though it may have reinforced the need for such an *antitagma*. Bosworth notes that the formation of the *epigōnoi* (as described by Curt. 8.5.1) was “a security measure—a measure against Iranians not the Macedonians” (1980: 17).

74 For the Makedonian reaction to their appearance in Sousa see Arr. 7.6.2. For the concept of an ἀντίταγμα see Diod. 17.108.3.

# Appendices

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# Appendix I: Sirrhas (Irrhas) the Illyrian

The identity (or, rather, the ethnicity) of Sirrhas is a matter of interest and debate. Strabo (7.7.8 C326) tells us that the mother of Philip II, Eurydike, was the granddaughter of Arrhabaios and that Sirrhas was her father. “The Lynkestians came under the control of Arrhabaios, who was of the clan of the Bakchiadai: the granddaughter of this man was Eurydike, the daughter of Sirrhas and the mother of Philip son of Amyntas” (Οι δὲ Λυγκησταὶ ὑπὸ Ἀρραβαίῳ ἐγένοντο τοῦ Βακχιαδῶν γένους ὅντι· τούτου δ’ ἦν θυγατριδῆ ή Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδίκη, Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ). In addition to the prosopographical information that this passage provides, we may conclude also that Arrhabaios (almost certainly the son of Bromeros: Thuc. 4.83.1) was the first king of the Lynkestians. His attempts to assert his independence brought him into conflict with two successive Makedonian rulers, Perdikcas II and Archelaos. It appears that, in this struggle, he found an ally in Sirrhas, whom he bound even closer to himself by marriage to his daughter.

Scholarly opinion is divided on whether Sirrhas was Lynkestian or Illyrian.<sup>1</sup> The only three ancient passages that mention the ethnicity of Eurydike—and thus, by extension, that of her father—all describe her as “Illyrian.” Plutarch (*Mor.* 14b–c) speaks of “Eurydike, who was Illyrian and thrice a barbarian” (Ιλλυρίς οὖσα καὶ τρισβάρβαρος). Libanius (*Vit. Dem.* 18) and the *Suda* (s.v. Κάρανος) also call her “Eurydike the Illyrian.” Why these three sources should all be mistaken about Eurydike’s background is not clear—though all three may have a common source. Nor is there a single piece of explicit evidence to the contrary. Plutarch’s adjective *trisbarbaros* is certainly a slur against a woman

<sup>1</sup> For the view that Sirrhas was Illyrian see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 162–3; Mortensen 1991; Bosworth 1971a: 99–100; Badian 1982a: 103; and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus* 164, 191. Carney, *Women and Monarchy* 41 is non-committal concerning the daughter’s origins, but in *Olympias* 154 n.91 she rightly observes: “Since at least two sources . . . refer to her as Illyrian and a passage in Plutarch’s corpus (*Mor.* 14c) seems to as well, it is difficult to doubt that some of her ancestry was Illyrian.” In support of Lynkestian origins see Kapetanopoulos 1994; Ogden, *PPD* 12–3; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 203 no. 13; Hammond, *HMac.* II, 15, who believes Sirrhas was a member of the Lynkestian royal house, adding that the Bakchiadai practiced endogamy. Errington, *Hist. Mac.* 27 calls Sirrhas “a baron from Upper Macedonia, possibly also from Lyncestis.”

whose reputation in antiquity was tainted by scandal. But there is no obvious reason, except simple fact, for attributing Illyrian origin to her (cf. Bosworth 1971a: 99). Kapetanopoulos 1994 questions Sirras' Illyrian origin and argues that (a) the form of the name, with the double *rho* and the ending –*ας*, supports a Makedonian origin; (b) the claim of Leonnatos to be related to Philip II through Eurydike argues for a Lynkestian background; and (c) the term Illyrian is used as a substitute for *barbaros*.

(a) The argument concerning name forms proves nothing, since we know far too little about Illyrian names and many names found in Makedonia are also attested in Epeiros and Illyria.<sup>2</sup> To this point we might add that, if Sirras' father had married a Makedonian woman (which is entirely possible), the son may have taken a Makedonian name (cf. Philotas son of Karsis, who was probably the son of a Thracian father and Makedonian mother).<sup>3</sup> What is equally striking is that name does not appear elsewhere in Upper Makedonia, nor does it repeat within the family.

(b) Leonnatos' Lynkestian connections are not vitiated by attributing Illyrian origin to Sirras. Kapetanopoulos argues: “Leonnatos’ relation is to be traced to Eurydike’s father (Sirras), and not to her maternal grandfather (Arrhabaios I), as the latter is removed by two generations” (1994: 13). But Leonnatos was, like Alexander the Great, two generations removed from Eurydike, and since the *Suda* (Λ 249) calls him “a relative of Philip’s mother” (κατὰ γένος προσήκων <τῇ> Φιλίππου μητρὶ) this need not imply a direct line of descent from Sirras. The emphasis is on his connection to the Makedonian royal house and not to Sirras and Arrhabaios (cf. Curtius 10.7.8: *Perdiccam et Leonnatum, stirpe regia genitos*). For example, Leonnatos’ great-grandmother could have been a sister of Eurydike’s mother (neither woman, of course, is known by name).<sup>4</sup>

(c) The claim that imputing Illyrian ancestry to someone is tantamount to calling him or her a barbarian may well be correct, but it is certainly overkill to call a woman “Illyrian *and* thrice a barbarian.”

Beloch’s contribution to the debate relies on a number of unfounded assumptions. First, he argues, if Sirras (Irrhas) had been an Illyrian, Aristotle would have said that Archelaos fought against Arrhabaios and the Illyrians, rather than

2 Alketas, Arybbas and Neoptolemos are all found in the Molossian royal house; Glaukias and Kleitos were Illyrian chieftains (Arr. 1.5.5–6). Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 163 remarks that “Σίρρας ist aus dem Griechischen kaum zu erklären, was doch bei einem Argeaden-Namen der Fall sein müsste, klingt dagegen an mehrere illyrische Stamm- und Ortsnamen an.”

3 On Philotas son of Karsis see Heckel, *Who's Who* 219 “Philotas [5]”; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 180.

4 On this point, I would respectfully disagree also with Ogden, *PPD* 12–3. Eurydike was undoubtedly the victim of a smear campaign, but I doubt that her Illyrian origin played an important part in how she was portrayed. She was after all only half-Illyrian (even less, if Sirras himself was half-Illyrian). The stemma of Leonnatos’ family can be constructed in various ways: the mother of Anteas may have been the sister of Eurydike (as I suggested in *Marshals* 1992: 372).

naming the Illyrian ruler.<sup>5</sup> The Makedonians took Illyrian women only as concubines (“Nebenfrauen”) and not as queens (“Königinnen”). And, since rulers are already attested for Lynkos and Elimeia, Sirrhas must have been of the royal house of Orestis. Thus, Beloch concludes that Leonnatos too was Orestian, the great-grandson of Sirrhas (*Irrhas*). F. Geyer (*Makedonien* 78–80) concludes a convoluted discussion with the view that Sirrhas was ruler of Elimeia. The interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks about the Archelaos’ marriage alliance with the ruler of Elimeia is critical to the argument. Aristotle says that Krataios was angry with Archelaos because he had promised to give him the hand of one of his daughters in marriage but reneged. “But he gave the elder to the king of Elimeia when hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrhabaeus (ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πρότεραν κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Αρράβαιον ἔδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλμείας), and the younger to his son Amyntas.”<sup>6</sup> Geyer assumes that Archelaos used the marriage offer to Sirrhas (who was thus king of Elimeia) to break up the alliance with Arrhabaios, and he suggests (implausibly) that Sirrhas was so attracted by the prospect of a marriage alliance with the Argead ruler that he either made Arrhabaios’ daughter a concubine or divorced her.<sup>7</sup> He regards Sirrhas as the father of Derdas II, though the identity of the mother is unclear. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see what attraction Eurydike would have held for Amyntas, since she would have done little to enhance his legitimacy or his security against the Illyrian enemy. Borza’s interpretation is more to the point: “That Amyntas III should marry a woman of Lyncestian-Illyrian blood during a period in which the western frontier of Macedon was unstable is consistent with the Argead practice of making foreign marriages for political necessity.”<sup>8</sup>

Kapetanopoulos’ assertion that Attalos could not, in Philip’s presence, have brought a charge of illegitimacy against Alexander on the basis of his mother’s origins if Philip himself had an Illyrian mother serves only to underscore the problem associated with Attalos’ much publicized toast. He did not say that Alexander was illegitimate. That remains a fact no matter how many times scholars assert the opposite. It was only Alexander’s insecurity (or hypersensitivity) that led him to believe that the remark was directed against him.<sup>9</sup> And, even if Attalos’ remark was an attack on Olympias, we do not know that he was speaking of her ethnicity. At any rate, there is little doubt that Attalos, in his drunken state, was not guided by reason.<sup>10</sup>

5 Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.79: “wenn es sich aber um Kriege gegen die Illyrier handelt, werden diese genannt, und nicht ihre Fürsten.”

6 Aristotle, *Politics* 1311b. H. Rackman tr. (Loeb).

7 Geyer, *Makedonien* 80: “Doch wäre es verständlich, wenn Sirrhas die Ehre, Schwiegersohn des makedonischen Königs zu werden, so hoch eingeschätzt hätte, daß er seine lynkestische Gemahlin entweder zur Nebenfrau machte oder verstieß.”

8 Cf. Borza, *Shadow of Olympus* 191.

9 It is a characteristic of paranoid personality disorder that the sufferer reads things into statements and perceives them as personal attacks, even though they are neither intended nor regarded in that way by others around him.

10 Too much has been read into Attalos’ prayer that the union of Philip and Kleopatra-Eurydike would produce “legitimate” heirs, though it is likely that he expressed thereby the hope that they would

In 424/3, when Arrhabaios resisted the forces of Perdikkas and Brasidas, he managed to persuade the Illyrians, who had been summoned to aid the Makedonian king, to change sides. This force may have been led by Sirrhas, who was brought into an even tighter alliance by political marriage. When Arrhabaios and Sirrhas campaigned together against Archelaos (sometime between 413 and 399), they did so as allies and in-laws. The later marriage of Sirrhas' daughter to Amyntas III will have lessened the Illyrian threat to his rule, but as it consolidated Makedonian power it hastened the end of Lynkestian independence.

have legitimate claims to the throne. It is doubtful that the Makedonians were concerned about the regional origins of the king's wives, or that they were as sensitive to ethnicity as modern scholars tend to assume. Philip married two Thessalians, an Epeirot, an Illyrian, and a Thracian, in addition to Makedonian wives (Athen. 13.557b–e); he had no compunctions about offering one child to a Karian princess (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1) and another to an Epeirot king (Justin 9.7.7); and Pyrrhos of Epeiros had a particular fondness for his Illyrian wives, much to the chagrin of his Syracusan wife, Lanassa (Plut. *Pyrr.* 10.7). Cf. Müller, *Makedonien und Persien* 172: "In einer polygamen Struktur waren alle Kinder aus dem offiziellen Ehebündnissen des Herrschers legitim; dieser Status wurde nicht ungültig, wenn ihr Vater die nächste Hochzeit feierte."

## Appendix II: The so-called conspiracy of Amyntas Perdikka

Aymard 1950 (1967); Ellis 1971 (reiterating Ellis 1970); Errington 1974; Prandi 1998; Worthington 2003; and Hammond, *HMac.* II, 651.

Crucial to our understanding of the political alliances and aspirations of certain members of the Upper Makedonian nobility are the status, the activities, and the fate of Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas III and, apparently, heir to the Makedonian throne in 360/59. There has been considerable discussion concerning whether he was ever recognized as king (*basileus*)—and thus whether Philip II began his rule as regent for his underaged nephew—or whether his claims were swept aside in a time of crisis in favor of a mature and competent ruler. Although Justin (7.5.10) does claim that Philip served “for a long time” (*diu*) as regent, he adds that later on “he assumed the kingship when compelled by the people” (*compulsus a populo regnum suscepit*). But the only apparent literary support for the view that Philip did not rule as king for the entire period from 359 to 336 is Satyrus’ statement that he ruled for twenty-two years (Athen. 13.557b: ἐν ἔτεσι γοῦν εἴκοσι καὶ δυσὶν οἵς ἐβασίλευεν). Justin is hardly a credible source, but it would be myopic to dismiss all his evidence as worthless whenever it disagrees with other sources. In stark contrast to his claim we have two sources (Diod. 16.1.3 and a scholiast to Aeschines 3.51) that state unambiguously that Philip was king from the very beginning.<sup>11</sup>

At first sight, it seems that Satyrus and Justin are vindicated by *IG VII*, 3055, which named as one of those who visited Lebadeia and descended into the cave of Trophonios a certain “Amyntas Perdikka, king of the Makedonians” ([Α]μύντα[ζ] Π[ερ]δίκκα [Μά]κεδόνων βασιλεύ[ζ]), although the evidence is not without its problems.<sup>12</sup> He is moreover the same Amyntas honored in another Boiotian inscription (this one from the Amphiaraios in Oropos: *IG VII*, 4251) which grants

11 Ellis 1971: 16 adds that it is unlikely “that Demosthenes and others found the regency unworthy of mention.” This is, of course, an argument from silence, but it would have served Demosthenes’ purposes to depict Philip as a “usurper,” even if he took the kingship with the people’s approval.

12 The actual stone is now lost and the text was published as *IG VII*, 3055 by Köhler in 1889 based on transcriptions made by R. Pococke in the eighteenth century and by W.M. Leake in the nineteenth century. But although the restorations are far from certain, they appear to be supported by a second reference to Amyntas Perdikka on a Boiotian inscription.

*proxenia* to “Amyntas Perdikka the Makedonian.” Furthermore, the existence of what Ellis calls “the twin of 4251,” *IG VII*, 4250, bestowing the same honors on the Makedonian Amyntas son of Antiochos, shows that both men were active in Boiotia (Rhodes & Osborne, no. 75). Ellis 1971: 18 argued that “the natural assumption” that the epigraphic evidence “belongs early in the 350s since it appears to coincide with Philip’s regency” is not the correct one. Instead he notes that Amyntas son of Antiochos was one of those prominent Makedonians who fled to Dareios III at the beginning of Alexander’s reign, taking with him a treasonous letter from Alexandros Lynkestes. Ellis’ main thesis is summed up in a short paragraph that I provide in full (1971: 19):

The most reasonable explanation of these fragments of information, I suggest, especially in view of the events following Philip’s death, is that we have here a group in opposition to the Macedonian throne trying to strengthen the royal claim of one of its members by seeking support outside Macedonia. And it is tempting to see behind the two central, recorded figures the influence (though probably not the presence) of the powerful Lynkestian royal house, traditionally opposed to the Argead dynasty at Pella and perhaps now intending to rule the country through the claimant to the throne.<sup>13</sup>

Ellis’ case is strengthened by another inscription (published in 1966) naming one more defector to the Persian king, Aristomedes the Pheraiān. In short, the theory proposed by Ellis helps to make sense of Plutarch’s remark (*Mor.* 327c) that “all Makedonia was festering and looking to Amyntas and the sons of Aëropos” ( $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\delta'$   $\tilde{\nu}\pi\omega\nu\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \tilde{\eta}\nu\ \text{Μακεδονία}$   $\pi\rho\varsigma\ \text{Ἀμύνταν}$   $\dot{\alpha}\pi\omega\beta\lambda\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma\ \kappa\dot{\alpha}\ \tau\omega\varsigma\ \text{Ἀερόπου}$   $\pi\alpha\tilde{\iota}\delta\alpha\varsigma$ ). Furthermore, it explains why Amyntas son of Antiochos and Aristomedes fled to the Persians, why Amyntas Perdikka was executed and what motivated Alexandros Lynkestes’ treason. It is also assumed that the Theban rebellion against Alexander was intended to serve the interests of these conspirators.

Nevertheless, this thesis has met with limited success. There are certainly problems, some chronological, some involving the text of *IG VII*, 3055 and official Makedonian titulature. But these problems do not entirely vitiate the core of Ellis’ hypothesis, which draws attention to the factional divisions in Makedonia at the time of Alexander’s accession and brings to light the danger posed by the Lynkestians, whose role in the murder of Philip has often been dismissed or at least downplayed. The main chronological difficulties in Ellis’ reconstruction have been itemized by Prandi (1998: 94): the dedication of Aristomedes of Pherai cannot have been made any later than 340, since he was known to have been fighting against Philip II at Perinthos in that year;<sup>14</sup> the association with the

13 Ellis 1971: 19. Several of Ellis’ proposals were anticipated by Aymard 1950 (republished in Aymard 1967).

14 Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F222 (cf. Morison, *BNJ*) = Didymus 9.43 (specifying that he was from Pherai); Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 177–8; Errington 1974: 27; Hofstetter, *Griechen in Persien* 28 n.1; Heckel, *Who’s Who* 47–8.

Theban revolt of 335 is seriously weakened by the fact that Amyntas Perdikka was already dead at that time<sup>15</sup> and Oropos had, since 338, been under the control of Athens (Hammond, *HMac.* II, 651 n.1). R.M. Errington (1974) pointed out that it was not normal for Makedonian kings to style themselves “king of the Makedonians” (*Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς*) but this need not have been intended as an official title (i.e., it did not represent Amyntas’ own usage; cf. Prandi 1998: 96). Rather the Lebadeians were proud to record the presence of a Makedonian ruler, but if the Lebadeians chose to designate Amyntas Perdikka as king, either on his instructions or on their own initiative, this would have been a highly dangerous thing to do, as Hammond (*HMac.* II, 651 n.1) has observed. Since there is the possibility of an error in transcription—Pococke and Leake did not provide matching, or completely reliable, texts—the inscription may have read Ἀμύντας Περδίκκα Μακεδόνων βασιλέως (“Amyntas son of Perdikkas who was king of the Makedonians”).<sup>16</sup>

Hammond (*HMac.* II, 651 n.1) believes that the Lebadeian inscription (*IG* VII, 3055) and the visit to the cave of Trophonios date to the early 350s (when Amyntas was still a child—though his age cannot be determined with certainty) and the phrase *Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς* supports the explicit (Justin) and implicit (Satyrus) claims that Amyntas ruled as king and Philip was temporarily regent. Prandi (1998: 99–101), who finds fault with many of the details of Ellis’ theory, nevertheless believes in the existence of some conspiracy by Amyntas Perdikka to regain the throne, which he believed was rightfully his—whether he had previously held the actual kingship is irrelevant. But she believes that Amyntas’ activities belong to the period before Alexander’s accession and that his aim was to remove Philip from power; in this he had the support of many Greeks, particularly the Thebans. Worthington dissociates Amyntas Perdikka from the alleged conspiracy of the Lynkestians against Philip II and argues that the Thebans who were exiled in 337 met Amyntas Perdikka in Lebadeia, and that their rebellion would draw Alexander south, “allowing Amyntas time to move on the Macedonian throne.”<sup>17</sup>

That Plutarch’s remark about “Amyntas and the sons of Aëropos” refers to the son of Antiochos strikes me as highly unlikely, even if we were to speculate that the patronymic indicates that he belonged to the Orestian royal house.<sup>18</sup> The honoring of both Amyntases by Oropos (see now Rhodes & Osborne, no. 75) can

15 Arr. 1.5.4; cf. Heckel, *Who’s Who* 100–1 “Cynnane.”

16 See Errington 1974: 25, who calls this “conceivable (though entirely speculative).”

17 Worthington 2003: 83; see also p. 79: “What is important is that *Moralia* 317c refers only to one Amyntas, not two, and Amyntas son of Antiochus must be meant given his mission from Alexander son of Aeropus. Amyntas son of Perdiccas’ involvement in all of this is thus even more removed.”

18 For the Orestian royal house see Beloch III<sup>2</sup> 2.78: “Von den Königen dieser Landschaft wird nur ein einziger ausdrücklich erwähnt, Antiochos, der am Anfang des Peloponnesischen Krieges regiert hat.” I do not accept Beloch’s view that Sirras (Irrhas) and Leonnatos belonged to this family (cf. Geyer, *Makedonien* 83). See also Hammond, *HMac.* II, 17–8. Orestians and Lynkestians were brigaded together in the Asiatic campaign (Diod. 17.57.2).

hardly be a coincidence, and it is generally assumed that the son of Antiochos fled Alexander on account of his support for his namesake. There is, however, little to fix the time of his flight or that of the execution of Amyntas Perdikka (*Arr. Succ.* 1.22 says Alexander killed him “when he crossed into Asia”: ὅπότε εἰς τὴν Ασίαν διέβατον). That the two Amyntases were sent on a mission to Oropos by Philip is not unlikely—though it cannot be proved—and it appears that the son of Perdikkas was loyal to his uncle (also his father-in-law) and that he did not resent his relegation until the accession of Alexander. In this matter, he may have been egged on by his wife, who (we may imagine) preferred her husband as king to her half-brother. Nevertheless, I can see no overwhelming evidence for a connection between Amyntas Perdikka and the Theban rebellion.

## Appendix III: Asandros son of Philotas

Asandros son of Philotas<sup>19</sup> is often identified as the brother of Parmenion (Badian 1960a: 329; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 271–2 no. 313), but the patronymic is far too common and the implications of such a relationship difficult to reconcile with the remainder of the evidence (see Heckel 1977a; cf. Bosworth I, 130).<sup>20</sup> Asandros was appointed satrap of Lydia (Arr. 1.17.7) and, later, together with Ptolemaios (identified as a brother of Antigonos the One-Eyed by Billows, *Antigonos* 425–6 no. 99, s.v. “Polemaios I”), defeated Orontobates (Arr. 2.5.7, with Bosworth I, 195–6). In 331, he was replaced as satrap by Menandros (Arr. 3.6.7); in 329/8, he rejoined Alexander in the Upper Satrapies (Curt. 7.10.12). What became of him is unknown. He is perhaps identical with the [K]asandros of Diod. 17.17.4, if this man is not Asandros son of Agathon.<sup>21</sup>

If Asandros was, in fact, Parmenion’s brother, Alexander’s act of recalling him from Sardis to the main camp (Curt. 7.10.12) cannot have been politically astute. This could only have revived unpleasant memories and accentuated the sufferings of the house of Parmenion. It is remarkable that his arrival created no recorded sensation in Alexander’s camp, although there was a dissident faction in the army, which disapproved of Parmenion’s murder (Diod. 17.80.4; Justin 12.5.4–8; Curt. 7.2.35–8). If we make Asandros Parmenion’s brother, we create a historical situation that the sources must have suppressed, i.e., the reaction of Alexander’s camp to Asandros’ arrival.<sup>22</sup>

19 For the patronymic: Arr. 1.17.7. See Berve II, 87 no. 165; Bosworth I, 130; Heckel 1977a and *Who’s Who* 56–7 “Asander [1]”; Tataki, *Macedonians Abroad* 271–2.

20 Welles 1970: 39, calling him Parmenion’s cousin, could be closer to the truth, but even this is speculative.

21 Adams 1979 argues that this commander is Kassandros son of Antipatros, but such an appointment would be inconsistent with the rest of his career. Cartledge 2004: 97 assumes that Asandros is the correct reading and describes the man as Parmenion’s brother.

22 Lane Fox, *Alexander* 532, writes (implausibly) that “Asandros (Parmenion’s brother, possibly arrived, ignorantly [my emphasis], in camp in 329 (A. 4.7.2), and is probably never mentioned again.”

## Appendix IV: Artakoana

Artakoana (Chortakana: Diod. 17.78.1) and Alexandreia in Areia appear to have been separate settlements (so Bosworth I, 356–7, locating Artakoana “somewhere along the Hari Rud in the vicinity of Herat”);<sup>23</sup> but Engels, *Logistics* 91 believes Artakoana may have been located seventy miles northeast of Kalati-Nadiri, and thus possibly in what at Engels’ time of writing was the Soviet Union. In 330, Alexander accepted the surrender of Satibarzanes at Susia (Tūs: Engels, *Logistics* 85: cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 118–9), reinstating him as satrap of the Areians (Arr. 3.25.1). Learning that Bessos had fled to Baktria and was now styling himself “King of Asia,” Alexander set out for Baktra by the shortest route.<sup>24</sup> But it was soon reported to him that Satibarzanes had rebelled and massacred Anaxippus and the mounted javelin men with him (Arr. 3.25.6). Thus, he turned back, leaving the bulk of the army with Krateros, and arrived two days later at Artakoana—some 600 stades (about 66 miles)—where Satibarzanes had taken refuge (Arr. 3.25.6). Krateros, it appears from Arrian, did not join him until after the capture of Artakoana and the appointment of a new satrap, Arsakes, in Areia (Arr. 3.25.7–8). If we trust the evidence of the Vulgate, Arrian (or his sources) omitted entirely Krateros’ important contribution to the suppression of the revolt in Areia.

Curtius (6.6.20–34) tells us that, when Alexander had turned back to deal with Satibarzanes the rebel fled with his cavalry in the direction of Baktria; cf. Arr. 3.25.7, showing that they abandoned Artakoana (Σατιβαρζάνης . . . ξὺν ὄλιγοις ἵππεύσι τῶν Αρείων ἔφυγε. Curt. 6.6.22 says there were 2,000 cavalrymen with Satibarzanes). Some 13,000 Areians took refuge at a rocky outcrop, which can

23 See also Pliny, *HN* 6.93, discussing Areia: *oppidum Artacoana, Arius amnis qui praefuit Alexandriam ab Alexandro conditam* (“There is the town called Artacoana and the river Arius, which flows by Alexandria, which was founded by Alexander”); cf. Strabo 11.10.1 C516. Engels, *Logistics* 91 n.89 claims that “[it: Artacoana] is not the same as Alexandria Areion, since both cities are named distinctly in our sources.” But this does not rule out the likelihood that Alexander founded his city in the vicinity of Artakoana. The Arius is almost certainly the Hari Rud. A concise discussion of the problem can be found in Seibert, *Eroberung* 120, with n.74.

24 Via the Merv Oasis, according to Engels, *Logistics* 89, and Bosworth I, 20; but Seibert, *Logistics* 119, opts for the easterly route over the Zulfikar pass and Bala Murghab to Baktra (Balkh).

only have been Kalat-i-Nadiri (Engels, *Logistics* 87–9; cf. Green, *Alexander* 337). These were blockaded by Krateros (Curt. 6.6.25) and finally “smoked out” by Alexander (Curt. 6.6.25–32). But Curtius then goes on to say:

From here Alexander returned to Craterus, who was engaged in the siege of Artacana [sic] and who, after making the necessary preparations, was awaiting the king’s arrival in order to cede to him the honour of taking the city, as was right and proper.<sup>25</sup>

Engels, *Logistics* 90 appears to be suggesting that Kalat was where Alexander left Krateros when he turned to deal with Satibarzanes at Artakoana, which was 600 stades distant. It seems unlikely, however, that Satibarzanes’ people would have fled in the direction of the main Makedonian force in order to find refuge there.<sup>26</sup> Schachermeyr, *Alexander* 313, correctly noted that Alexander instructed Krateros’ troops to follow in the direction of Artakoana. Furthermore, to seek Artakoana in “the region 70 miles north to east of Kalāt” (Engels, *Logistics* 91) makes little sense, if Alexander was moving northeast, in the direction of Baktria. Satibarzanes had been left behind in Areia and it was apparently on the road to his capital, Artakoana, that he slaughtered Anaxippos and his men. That this satrapal capital was located to the north and east of Kalat-i-Nadiri is highly unlikely. It is better located in the vicinity of Herat, if not at Herat itself (thus Olmstead, *HPE* 4 n.55; the rock to which Satibarzanes fled was probably Naratu). And it is clear that Alexander had to turn back from his initial attempt to invade Baktria. When he did move on to the satrapy the second time it was through Drangiana, Arachosia, and Parapamisos, that is, along the Helmand valley.

25 Curt. 6.6.33: *hinc ad Craterum, qui Artacana obsidebat, reddit. Ille omnibus praeparatis regis expectabat adventum, captae urbis titulo, sicut par erat, cedens.* English translation by J.C. Yardley (Penguin Classics).

26 Atkinson II, 208: “It would make more sense if the fugitives from Artakoana headed away from, rather than into, the path of Alexander’s army. If Kalāt does not need to be the Rock, then we may look for a site for Artacoana further south, in the environs of Herāt, which has generally been recognised as the natural centre of Areia.”

## Appendix V: The office of chiliarch and Hephaestion's chiliarchy<sup>27</sup>

With the exception of Antipatros' role as *strategos autokrator* of Europe, no part of the “compromise” at Babylon has given modern scholars less trouble than Perdikkas' designation as chiliarch. Typical is R.M. Errington's assessment:

The remainder of the compromise is now comparatively straightforward. Perdiccas' position was fully understood by Arrian and *it creates no difficulty*: he was to be “chiliarch of the chiliarchy which Hephaestion had commanded”; and Arrian further defines this as “supervisor of the whole kingdom.” The command of Hephaestion's chiliarchy implied the Grand Viziership, and this has generally been recognized. The Persian Grand Vizier was effectively the second-in-command of the whole Persian empire after the king: Perdiccas as Macedonian chiliarch was second-in-command of the whole Macedonian empire, clearly including Europe. With an idiot king Perdiccas was effectively in the position which Alexander had indicated for him, recognized as the most powerful single individual in the empire.<sup>28</sup>

The view that the chiliarchy of Hephaestion was the equivalent of the Persian office of *hazarapati-* (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F15 §46; Aelian, *VH* 1.21; Hesychius s.v. ἀζαραπατεῖς), the officer who was second to the king in authority (Nepos, *Conon* 3.2), has found almost universal acceptance.<sup>29</sup> But Arrian (*Succ.* 1.3) explains

27 The discussion that follows deals with the nature and importance of Hephaestion's chiliarchy during Alexander's lifetime and in the early years of the Successors. For the Persian chiliarchy and its relationship to the Makedonian practice see the thorough and convincing arguments of Collins 2001; cf. 2012c. For the various offices exercised by the leading Makedonians in the period from 323 to 319 see the excellent discussion by Meeus 2009b; also Anson 1992; Landucci, *Diodoro* 17–22. Although much of this Appendix has been superseded by the aforementioned works, I have chosen to retain it, virtually unaltered, since Collins, Meeus, and Landucci make reference to it in its original form in the first edition. See also Simonetti Agostinetti 1993: 39–41.

28 Errington 1970: 56; but, for a different approach see Griffith 1963: 74 n.17 and Bosworth 1971b: 131–3.

29 Thus we have the following comments: “Die Chilarchie, die Perdikkas in Babylon bestätigt wurde, bedeutet zwar an sich nur das Kommando über die erste Hipparchie der Hetairenkavallerie, also an sich einen militärischen Rang; mit ihm hatte jedoch Alexander das persische Amt des Großwesirs,

that “to chiliarch the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion” implied the “guardianship of the entire empire” (τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπὴ τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας). And Diodorus says that in 319 Antipatros revived the chiliarchy for his son, Kassandros, and thus made him “second in authority.”

The position and rank of chiliarch had first been brought to fame and honour by the Persian kings, and afterwards under Alexander it gained great power and glory at the time when he became an admirer of this and all other Persian customs. For this reason, Antipater, following the same course, appointed his son Cassander, since he was young, to the office of chiliarch.<sup>30</sup>

Chiliarchies and chiliarchs of a purely military nature existed within both Persian and Makedonian armies (Aesch. *Pers.* 302–5; Hdt. 7.81; Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.23; 3.3.11; 4.1.4; 7.5.17; 8.6.1; *Oecon.* 4.7; Arr. *Tact.* 10.5; Hesychius s.v. χιλιόρχος; Arr. 1.22.7; 3.29.7; 4.24.10, 30.5–6; 7.14.10, 25.6; Curt. 5.2.3; Athen. 12.539e = Phylarchos, *FGrH* 81 F41); in the Makedonian army, these were natural developments from existing units (Arr. *Tact.* 10; cf. also Curt. 5.2.3). And it seems logical that the commander of the Great King’s cavalry should be regarded as the most prestigious officer in the army, hence also his chief executive officer. The rank of *magister equitum* comes to mind. In Makedon before Alexander’s reign no such position existed. Neither Kleitos, as commander of the Royal Squadron (*ile basilike*), nor Philotas the hipparch of the “Companions,” served as the King’s second-in-command—but rather this function was carried out by Parmenion in Asia (or by Antipatros or Parmenion in Europe). It was only with Alexander’s attempt to give greater military authority to his best friend, Hephaistion, that the foremost cavalry officer became the King’s military chief-of-staff.

Upon the death of Philotas, the command of the “Companions” was shared by Hephaistion and Black Kleitos (Arr. 3.27.4; cf. Bosworth I, 364–5), but we have no record of Hephaistion ever commanding the half assigned to him. In Sogdiana

Ersten nach dem Großkönig im Reich . . . , verschmolzen” (Bengtson, *Strategie* I, 66). “Wenn also Alexander einen Hipparchen seiner Hetaerenreiterei, den Hephaistion, zum Chiliarchen ernannte, so lag darin sicher eine Nachahmung persischer Hofsitte” (Brandis, *RE* III (1899) 2276). “Hier spätestens ward er [sc. Hephaistion] zum Chiliarchen und damit zum ersten Würdenträger des Reiches ernannt” (Berve II, 173). “Die beherrschende Figur der frühesten Diadochenzeit ist kraft seiner amtlichen Stellung und seiner machtvollen Persönlichkeit Perdikkas, der Erste unter den Leibwächtern, seit Hephaistions Tode mit der Wahrnehmung der Geschäfte des Chiliarchen betraut . . . . Das war nach den einleuchtenden Darlegung von Brandis, Plaumann und Berve nichts anderes als ein Grosswesirat, das Alexander in Anlehnung an persische Regierungstradition für seinen Seelenfreund Hephaistion geschaffen hatte” (Schur 1934: 130). For the *hazarapati*- see Junge 1940; Benveniste, *Titres et noms* 67–71; Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 31–7.

<sup>30</sup> 18.48.5: ἡ δὲ τοῦ χιλιάρχου τάξις καὶ προαγωγὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν Περσικῶν βασιλέων εἰς ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν προήθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὑπ’ Αλεξάνδρου μεγάλης ἔτυχεν ἔχουσίας καὶ τιμῆς, ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Περσικῶν νομίμων ζηλωτῆς ἐγένετο. Διὸ καὶ Αντίπατρος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν τὸν νιὸν Κάσσανδρον ὄντα νέον ἀπέδειξε χιλιάρχον. English translation by R.M. Geer.

he led one-fifth of the army (Arr. 4.16.2) or, if Curtius (8.1.1) is correct, one-third of the forces north of the Oxos River, in conjunction with the satrap, Artabazos (cf. Curt. 8.1.10). It was at about this time, when Kleitos had been designated Artabazos' successor, or immediately after Kleitos' murder in the autumn of 328, that the command structure of the Makedonian cavalry, augmented by reinforcements, was changed. The enlarged unit was divided into hipparchies—in place of the *ilai*, to which the term hipparchies, was sometimes (anachronistically) applied—which were likewise “chiliarchies.”

Political pressure, as well as military considerations, had prevented Alexander from assigning the entire cavalry to Hephaestion in 330. Now, in late 328, he was faced with a similar problem. But whereas in 330 it had been necessary to placate the “Old Guard,” the failure to increase the number of troops under Hephaestion’s command was predicated on a need to promote several “New Men,” formerly phalanx commanders, to the rank of hipparch: Koinos, Perdikkas, Krateros. In order to offset this apparent demotion of Hephaestion, Alexander assigned to him the honorific “first hipparchy (or chiliarchy).” Hence, Griffith (1963: 74 n.17) rightly remarks that the unit was called “Hephaestion’s Chiliarchy” in order to “distinguish it from other chiliarchies.” And this suits both Arrian’s description of Hephaestion’s chiliarchy (7.14.10) and the promotion of officers from one hipparchy to the next, as related by Diodorus (18.3.4), Appian (Syr. 57 [292]), and Plutarch (*Eum.* 1.5). Hephaestion was probably designated χιλιάρχης τῆς ὑππού (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.38), in imitation of the Persian practice, in spite of commanding only one hipparchy. Arrian’s remark (7.14.10) that Hephaestion’s chiliarchy was left vacant after his death has generally been regarded as incorrect and attributed to bias in Ptolemy’s *History*. Perdikkas succeeded him as commander of the “First Hipparchy” (which Diod. 18.3.4 describes as ἡ ἐπιφανεστάτη) and thus, *de facto*, as “chiliarch of the cavalry.”

The so-called Compromise settlement at Babylon—which saw the recognition of Arrhidaios as King (with Roxane’s child as *symbasileus*, should it turn out to be male), Krateros as *prostates*, Perdikkas as chiliarch of Hephaestion’s chiliarchy and Meleagros as *hyparchos* (Arr. *Succ.* 1.3; cf. Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §4, an arrangement echoed by Justin 13.4.5: *castrorum et exercitus et rerum*<sup>31</sup> *cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur*)—represented a defeat for Perdikkas’ political ambitions; for he managed only to retain the authority he had exercised at the time of Alexander’s death. And now Krateros was technically his superior, Meleagros his watchdog. But Krateros’ absence made it easier to eliminate Meleagros and exercise the *prostasia* of Arrhidaios’ kingship, to which he soon added the guardianship of Alexander IV (thus Diod. 18.23.2). Hence Perdikkas distributed the satrapies “in the name of King Philip” and assigned to Seleukos the “First Hipparchy,” that is, Hephaestion’s chiliarchy (Diod. 18.3.4; cf. Justin 13.4.17: *summus castrorum tribunatus Seleuco, Antiochi filio, cessit*).

<sup>31</sup> Thus the MSS. Seel adopts Madvig’s emendation *regum*. There was only one king at this time (Philip Arrhidaios). See Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 80 for discussion.

In this capacity, Seleukos accompanied Perdikkas to Egypt and participated in his assassination near Memphis (Nepos, *Eum.* 5.1). Guardianship of the Kings passed in turn from Peithon and Arrhidaios to Antipatros (Diod. 18.36.6–7; 18.39.1–2), who left them in charge of Antigonos, the *hegemon* of Asia. He was instructed “to guard and administer to the Kings” (*τοὺς βασιλέας φρουρεῖν τε καὶ θεραπεύειν*), and Kassandros was designated his chiliarch of the cavalry (*χιλιάρχης τῆς ὑππού*: Arr. *Succ.* 1.38; cf. Diod. 18.39.7). The *Heidelberg Epitome* places the assignment of Babylonia to Seleukos and the appointment of Kassandros as chiliarch side by side. Seleukos had clearly relinquished Hephaistion's chiliarchy to Kassandros, whose relationship to Antigonos was similar to that of Seleukos to Perdikkas.<sup>32</sup> By now the title “Hephaistion's chiliarchy” may have become defunct. At the time of his death, Hephaistion was Alexander's dearest friend, his foremost commander (by virtue of his command of the first hipparchy; see Plut. *Eum.* 1.5; Diod. 18.3.4; App. Syr. 57 [292]), and husband of Alexander's sister-in-law, Drypetis. But Alexander's own death precipitated many changes in the army, which accompanied the gradual disintegration of the empire. Also, it was likely that the distinction that Hephaistion's name had given to the chiliarchy had now become meaningless.

Kassandros and Antigonos soon fell out and, on the former's advice, Antipatros took the Kings to Makedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1.42; Diod. 18.39.7 abbreviates events and obscures the process). Whether Antipatros appointed a chiliarch we do not know. Polyperchon was undoubtedly the obvious candidate. On his death bed in the autumn of 319, Antipatros recognized Polyperchon as guardian of the Kings and *strategos* of Europe, again appointing Kassandros as chiliarch (Diod. 18.48.4–5). But Kassandros rebelled against Polyperchon's authority. The office of chiliarch was unquestionably one of second rank, desired by none of Hephaistion's successors—Perdikkas, Seleukos, Kassandros. In the almost three years that Perdikkas exercised power in Asia he did so as *prostatae* or *epimeletes*, not as chiliarch.<sup>33</sup>

32 Except that Perdikkas exercised the offices of Antipatros and Antigonos, as *epimeletes* and *hegemon*.

33 For example, Engel, *Machtaufstieg* 4–10 (cf. Engel 1972a) regularly speaks of Perdikkas as “der Chiliarch.” He is not alone in this, and the usage is clearly intended to avoid the repetition of the proper name. Nevertheless, it reveals the mistaken view of Perdikkas' position and of the relative unimportance of the chiliarchy. The relative unimportance of the chiliarchy seems to explain why Diod. 18.48.5 says that Antipatros assigned this office (rather than the regency) to his son, “because he was young” (*ὅντα νέον*).

## Appendix VI: White Kleitos and the naval war in the Aegean

It has generally been recognized that the decisive battles of the Lamian War were those fought at sea by the Makedonian admiral White Kleitos in 322.<sup>34</sup> Yet Diodorus' account (18.15.8–9) is vague and confusing:

Since the Macedonians had command of the sea, the Athenians made ready other ships in addition to those which they already had, so that there were in all one hundred and seventy. Cleitus was in command of the Macedonian fleet, which numbered two hundred and forty. Engaging with the Athenian admiral Evetion he defeated him in two naval battles and destroyed a large number of the ships of the enemy near the islands that are called the Echinades.<sup>35</sup>

The passage does, however, provide a good starting point for an examination of several points relating to the naval operations in the Lamian War.

The wording of Diodorus is ambiguous: either Kleitos fought two sea battles and then destroyed numerous Athenian ships near the so-called Echinades Islands or the battle of the Echinades was the second of Kleitos' two naval victories. The latter is clearly the more likely interpretation. The Athenian ships must surely have been destroyed by Kleitos in a *naumachia*, and that *naumachia* will have been the second of the two mentioned by Diodorus, who perhaps used καὶ . . . διέφθειρε . . . rather than a subordinating participle to avoid the false impression that both battles were fought near the Echinades. Otherwise we must follow Goukowsky in assuming that Kleitos fought three sea battles against Euetion—at Abydos, Amorgos, and the Echinades.<sup>36</sup> But this creates a number of difficulties. Diodorus (18.10.2) gives the Athenian naval strength at the outset of the war as

34 Thus Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.72: “die Entscheidung des Krieges lag auf dem Meere.”

35 Diod. 18.15.8–9: τὸν δὲ Μακεδόνων θαλασσοκρατούντων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ναυσὶν ἄλλας κατεσκεύασαν, ὡστε γενέσθαι τὰς πάσας ἐκατὸν ἔβδομήκοντα. τὸν δὲ Μακεδονικῶν νεῶν οὐδὲν διακοσίων καὶ τεσσαράκοντα τὴν ναυαρχίαν εἶχε Κλείτος. οὗτος δὲ ναυμαχήσας πρὸς Εὔετίωνα τὸν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχον ἐνίκησε δύσιν ναυμαχίας καὶ συγνάς τὸν πολεμίων νεῶν διέφθειρε περὶ τὰς καλουμένας Ἐχινάδας νήσους. The translation is by R.M. Geer. See also Landucci, *Diodoro* 90–5.

36 Goukowsky, in the Budé text of Diodorus XVIII, *ad loc.* See also Anson, *Heirs* 34–6, also assuming that there were three battles; cf. Wrightson 2014.

240 ships (cf. Justin 13.5.8: 200 ships),<sup>37</sup> which appears to be the paper strength of the fleet, unless he has confused the numbers of the respective fleets. But Diodorus (18.15.8: τῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων θαλασσοκρατούντων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶν ἄλλας κατεσκέυασαν, ὥστε γενέσθαι τὰς πάσας ἐκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα) appears to indicate that the Athenians had already suffered one reverse in the Lamian War and were now preparing supplementary forces. The setback, according to the structure of Diodorus' narrative, occurred before the arrival of Kleitos and was, in all probability, the battle at the Hellespont. The victorious Makedonian fleet was thus the one sent by Alexander before his death, and this numbered 110 ships (Diod. 18.12.2). The Athenians, under Euetion, must have sailed originally to the Malian Gulf, where they gave support to Leosthenes' forces, which soon besieged Antipatros at Lamia.<sup>38</sup> When news reached them that Antipatros had summoned Leonnatos from Hellespontine Phrygia, a portion of the fleet—thought to be sufficient to deal with the 110 Makedonian ships—was deployed to the Hellespont only to be defeated near Abydos.<sup>39</sup>

That there was a sea battle at the Hellespont is clear from two Athenian inscriptions, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 398* and *493*, the former dated convincingly to 322/1–320/19.<sup>40</sup> The relevant passages read: τῆς δὲ ναυμαχίας τῆς ἐν Ἑλλη[σπόντῳ] γενομένης | πολλοὺς διέσφωσεν καὶ ἐφόδια δο[ν]ης ἀπέστειλεν καὶ αἴτιος ἐγένετο τοῦ σωθῆναι . . . (*II<sup>2</sup> 398a*, following M.B. Walbank's text); καὶ ἐπὶ πολέμου τοῦ προτέρου τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν συνδιέσφωσεν καὶ ἐφόδια δοὺς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν (*II<sup>2</sup> 493*, honoring Nikon of Abydos). The battle, as the decree in honor of Nikon suggests, was fought in the vicinity of Abydos, and its purpose, from the Athenian standpoint, was clearly to gain control of the Hellespont and prevent Makedonian reinforcements (brought by Leonnatos from Hellespontine Phrygia) from entering Europe and coming to the aid of Antipatros in Thessaly. But it should be noted that neither the inscriptional nor the literary sources mention Kleitos in connection with the battle near Abydos. But this is not an argument *e silentio*, as Wrightson suggests, since Diodorus says that Kleitos fought only two battles against Euetion: the second was at the so-called Echinades Islands and the first at Amorgos.

If the battle at the Hellespont was preliminary to Leonnatos' crossing, as I believe, it must have taken place, as T. Walek suggests, in March 322.<sup>41</sup> Cary

37 See also the comments of Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel 127–8.

38 Bosworth (2003b: 21) is correct in noting that the Makedonian fleet could not give support to Antipatros at Lamia, which was 10 kilometers from the sea. The same does not apply to the Athenians, whose troops controlled the land once the enemy had been blockaded.

39 But Bosworth 2003b: 20 rejects the notion that Makedonian forces needed a fleet in the Hellespont to ensure their crossing. “It is hard to see how any Athenian naval strategy could have achieved that end. . . [B]oth sides of the Hellespont were firmly in Macedonian hands. There was probably no firm base for an Athenian fleet to mount a watch for months on end, and do so in numbers large enough to frustrate a Macedonian crossing.” Whatever happened near Abydos had, in Bosworth's opinion, to do with the protection of the corn supply.

40 Walbank 1987, with earlier literature.

41 Walek 1924: 28, dating Leonnatos' death to May 322.

(1951: 383) points out that Kleitos could not have left the Levant before April and would not have reached Abydos until about the end of that month, by which time he would have been too late to aid Leonnatos' crossing. Thus, if the battle of Abydos preceded Leonnatos' entry into Europe, it must have been fought by Antipatros' fleet, as Ferguson noted,<sup>42</sup> the only logical consequence of our reconstruction.

Antipatros summoned reinforcements from Asia before moving south into Thessaly (autumn 323), appealing to both Krateros and Leonnatos for aid (Diod. 18.12.1). But he must have pinned his hopes primarily on Leonnatos, who was the closest of the satraps in Asia. Kleitos, who had accompanied Krateros from Opis to Kilikia, will scarcely have begun assembling his fleet before Antipatros' appeal. One is tempted to assume that his purpose in assembling the fleet was to secure the Hellespont for Krateros. But Ashton argues that this fleet was none other than the one that Alexander ordered to be constructed for his expedition against North Africa.<sup>43</sup> If this is correct, then Kleitos' fleet will have been constructed for a different purpose, but became the deciding factor in the Lamian War. Furthermore, Krateros' position was very different from that of Leonnatos. His legal position was in doubt: Alexander had sent him to replace Antipatros as regent of Makedonia, but Perdikkas had canceled these orders;<sup>44</sup> the army in Babylon had entrusted Krateros with the *prostasia* of Philip Arrhidaios' kingdom, but Perdikkas clearly controlled the Royal Army and the King himself. Thus, Krateros' late arrival in Europe must be explained, in part, by the uncertainty in Asia and the outcome of Leonnatos' battle with Antiphilos (May? 322).

The battle of Krannon occurred on 7 Metageitnion, which Beloch (IV<sup>2</sup> 1.74) equates with August 5, 322.<sup>45</sup> Unlike Leonnatos, Krateros did not recruit troops in Makedonia but came directly to the Peneus River, where he joined forces with Antipatros and relinquished the supreme command to him. Since the engagement was fought very soon after his arrival, it appears that Krateros did not cross the

42 Ferguson, *HA* 17, but n.1 on that page shows that Ferguson too thought the battle of Abydos was one of the two mentioned by Diod. 18.15.8. The commander of the Makedonian fleet at Abydos may have been Mikion, who shortly afterward landed at Rhamnous only to be killed by the Athenians led by Phokion (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1–4). Whether Mikion was the *nauarchos* or merely the commander of the forces conveyed by the Makedonian fleet is unclear, but it is virtually certain that the fleet in question was that deployed by Antipatros before Kleitos' arrival. Plutarch places the landing at Rhamnous just before the battle between Antiphilos and Leonnatos and before Krateros' crossing of the Hellespont. Diodorus' account (quoted above) makes it clear that the heavy Athenian losses came at the Echinades Islands.

43 Diod. 18.4.4; Ashton 1993: 128–9; this idea is refined somewhat in Ashton 2015; cf. Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 40: “Wenn die makedonische Flotte, die anfangs nur 110 Segel stark gewesen, dann 240 stark erscheint, so kann ihr wohl nur aus Kypros, Phoiniken, Kilikien Verstärkung gekommen sein; und schon Alexander hatte kurz vor seinem Ende auf die Nachricht von der beginnenden Aufregung in Griechenland 100 Kriegsschiffe fertigzustellen befohlen.”

44 Badian 1967b: 183 ff.

45 Bosworth 2003b: 14 dates the battle to late July 322, apparently following Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.237 (July 30).

Hellespont much before the beginning of July. And this begins to make Ashton's date of June 26 or 27, 322 for the battle of Amorgos look very attractive.<sup>46</sup>

The *Marmor Parium* (*FGrH* 239 B9) informs us that in the archonship of Kephisodoros (323/2) the Athenians were defeated by the Makedonians near the island of Amorgos: ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ γενομένου περὶ Λαμίαν Αθηναίοις πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς γενομένης Μακεδόσι πρὸς Αθηναίους περὶ Αμοργόν, ἦν ἐνίκων Μακεδόνες, ἔτη πεντήκοντα ἐννέα, ὥρχοντος Ἀθήνησιν Κηφισοδώρου. The battle is alluded to in Plutarch's *Demetrius*<sup>47</sup> 11.4, in a discussion of the character of Stratokles of Diomeia,<sup>48</sup> but the *de fort. Al.* 2.5 (= *Mor.* 338a), shows that the Makedonian navarch in this battle was Kleitos. Hence, unless the so-called Echinades can be, in some way, located near Abydos or Amorgos (thus Cary's map, 1951: 1 opp.), Kleitos' two sea battles did not include the one at the Hellespont.

Now it is generally assumed that the battle of Amorgos alone is mentioned by the *Marmor Parium* "because for the Athenians it was the most decisive battle of the campaign"<sup>49</sup> and that it was "the antithetic parallel to the Athenian-inspired victory at Salamis in 480 B.C."<sup>50</sup> As a result it is also considered Kleitos' last major sea battle in 322. But the *Marmor Parium* may have singled out the battle near Amorgos because it was the last naval engagement of the Year of Kephisodoros.<sup>51</sup> The engagement at the Echinades Islands belonged to the next archon year.<sup>52</sup> Morrison has argued that, since the Athenians towed their wrecks back to Peiraieus, they did not suffer serious losses, because "a heavily defeated fleet usually had to surrender its wrecks to the enemy, for whom they were a mark of victory."<sup>53</sup> Plutarch deliberately underestimates the Makedonian victory, when he says that Kleitos acted the part of Poseidon after sinking a mere "three or four Greek ships," in order to mock the admiral for his hubris. But the clear implication of the two passages in Plutarch is that Amorgos did not signal the end of Athenian sea power.<sup>54</sup> And this is further supported by Diodorus' emphasis on heavy Athenian losses at the Echinades (συνχάς τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν διέφθειρε περὶ τὰς καλούμένας Ἐχινάδας νήσους).

46 Ashton 1977: 10–1.

47 Stratokles, allegedly, reported an Athenian victory at Amorgos. It was three days before the news of the defeat put an end to Athenian celebration.

48 Morrison 1987: 93.

49 Ashton 1977: 1, summarizing earlier opinions.

50 Ashton 1977: 10–1 argues plausibly that the battle took place at the very end of June 322.

51 Euetion's command would thus have to have been extended or, if the *nauarchos* was one of the elected *strategoi* (Develin, *AO*, lists them separately and Hamel, *Generals*, does not name him), we must assume that he was re-elected. Little is known about him. Kirchner, *PA* 5461 may be identical with 5463 but nothing is known of his activities in 322/1.

52 Morrison 1987: 94.

53 Despite Plutarch's attempt to minimize Kleitos' effort, I see no support for Bosworth's claim that "around Amorgos [the Athenians] were again decisively defeated. After that resistance was useless" (2003b: 22) or for Ashton's view that "Cleitus had annihilated an Athenian fleet of over two hundred ships off the island of Amorgos" (2015: 113 n.13). Most extreme is the comment of Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 1.73: "es war eine Entscheidung von weltgeschichtlicher Bedeutung."

Thus the Athenians, having failed to prevent Leonnatos' crossing in March as a result of their defeat at Abydos, strengthened their existing fleet and sought to prevent Kleitos from entering the Aegean. A fleet sailing from the Levant would enter the Aegean, passing Rhodes, and proceed north, keeping Kos on its right and Astypalaia and Amorgos on the left.<sup>54</sup> A sea battle at Amorgos is thus very easy to explain, strategically and chronologically. The timing, late in the Year of Kephisodoros, can also be understood in terms of Krateros' late departure from Kilikia.

Cary (1951), however, thinks that Kleitos commanded the fleet at Abydos, and that the Athenians were contesting not the crossing of Leonnatos but Krateros. But, if the battle of Amorgos followed the one against Kleitos at the Hellespont, the question arises: Why was the second engagement fought there? I can see no good reason for Kleitos to move south after securing Krateros' crossing into Europe. The engagement there can best be explained as an attempt to intercept the new Makedonian fleet, which ought to have been arriving from the Levant sometime in June. Furthermore, it will not have been clear to the Athenians whether Kleitos' ultimate destination was the Hellespont, the Malian Gulf, or Peiraieus. Hence the vicinity of Amorgos was the obvious point at which to make the interception. The decisive sea battle of the Lamian War was yet to come.

Bosworth rightly faults modern scholars for failing to reach what he considers the obvious conclusion.<sup>55</sup> The battle of the Echinades Islands took place off the west coast of Greece, where those islands are known to exist, and there is no need for textual emendation or geographical fantasies. Bosworth argues that the “national business” (*διά τινας ἔθνικὰς χρείας*, Diod. 18.13.4) that caused the Aitolians to leave the Greek force near Lamia was, in fact, the activity of a Makedonian fleet near the Echinades. The expedition was charged with the restoration of Oiniadai, which the Aitolians had occupied, expelling its original population (Plut. *Alex.* 49.15). While this provides a better explanation for Makedonian activity in the west (rather than the simple wish to divert Greek attention by opening a second front), it poses some very difficult chronological problems. To begin with, the departure of the Aitolians must have occurred sometime in the winter of 323/2, since Leosthenes was still alive at the time.<sup>56</sup> Thus it

54 The significance of the location was recognized by Droysen II<sup>2</sup> 40 n.19, and he believes that Makedonians followed this up by sailing to the Echinades off Aitolia in order to create a diversion.

55 “Now, if there is a false trail to be followed, the whole academic confraternity tends to race down it in a hallooing pack . . .” (Bosworth 2003b: 17).

56 Bosworth (2003b: 18): “The Aitolians were certainly faced with a serious crisis in late 323, and in the following spring it still had not subsided. They were still absent from the allied army when it fought against Leonnatus . . . .” Cf. Droysen II<sup>3</sup> 40: “Der Nauarch Kleitos mußte vor allem jene Verstärkungen aus Asien an sich ziehen, um an den Küsten der Feinde landend Diversionen zu machen, welche deren Landmacht abzogen, oder wenigstens durch energische Demonstrationen zu hindern, daß die zum Winter nach Hause marschierten Bundesgenossen, wie namentlich die Aitolier, nicht zum Bundesheer nach Thessalien zurückkehrten.” Droysen assumes that Kleitos was in command of Antipatros' fleet (the 110 ships) and awaited reinforcements from Asia. This is clearly impossible, since Kleitos had been, until the outbreak of the Lamian War, with Krateros and the veterans in Kilikia. Droysen imagines Kleitos' fleet conducting diversionary landings along the Greek coastline.

must have been Antipatros' fleet, or rather a portion of it, that was engaged off the coast of Akarnania. Once Antipatros' fleet had been united with the one coming from Asia, the Makedonians enjoyed a distinct numerical advantage, but it seems highly unlikely that, at this critical juncture in the Lamian War, the Makedonians would preoccupy themselves with the affairs of Oiniadai—whatever it was that Bosworth feels they could or could not accomplish in Aegean or Hellespontine regions. An early spring arrival in 322 for Kleitos is equally unlikely, given the distance he had to travel, the possibility of interference off the island of Rhodes, and the unstable weather conditions in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, if Kleitos did, in fact, reach the Echinades in the spring and inflict heavy damages on the undermanned Athenians (they too must have had more pressing concerns in the Aegean), what need was there of a subsequent engagement off Amorgos? Surely by this time the Athenians could no longer hope for naval victory. And, why, given the strategic concerns of both parties, would they sail to the southeastern fringe of the theatre of war to wage the allegedly decisive battle?

Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility of corruption in the text of Diodorus: the reference to the Echinades Islands could have been caused by conflating the town of Echinos and the nearby Lichades Islands.<sup>57</sup> But, any reconstruction of the naval events of 322 must place the Echinades battle last. To begin with, it is doubtful that a serious Athenian naval defeat off Akarnania or in the Malian Gulf could have preceded the battle of Amorgos. First, we must consider the impact of the so-called Echinades battle on Athenian ships and manpower. Second, once Kleitos left the eastern Mediterranean and entered the Aegean, there was no need for either the Makedonians or the Athenians to return to Amorgos in order to do battle. The battle of Amorgos was not decisive in terms of enemy ships sunk or captured (despite Kleitos' theatrics). Perhaps, the Makedonians did fight a naval battle in western waters, but if their opponents were Athenians, this must have occurred before the surrender of Athens and the occupation of Mounychia at the beginning of October. But it is inconceivable that the Athenians would, for the sake of their Aitolian allies, leave Peiraieus undefended after Antipatros' escape from Lamia and the arrival of Krateros' relief force.

Wrightson argues that “a final battle in the Malian Gulf would be strategically unsound for the Greeks after Antipatros had left Lamia and joined the remnants of Leonnatos’ army.”<sup>58</sup> But is this really the case? Once Antipatros gained control

<sup>57</sup> Without following the “hallooing pack,” and fully aware of the dangers of textual emendation, I am still unwilling to rule out the Lichades Islands.

<sup>58</sup> Wrightson 2014: 531. His theory involves three battles by Kleitos: the first at Amorgos, the second at the Hellespont, and the third off the Echinades Islands in the west. This is in line with Waterfield 2011: 30: “Cleitus arrived from Cilicia, and when his ships joined Antipater’s the combined fleet defeated the Athenians twice in short order in June 322, off Abydus in the Hellespont *and then off the Aegean island of Amorgos*” (emphasis added). Similarly, Romm, *Ghost* 125: “Cleitus encountered the Athenians at Abydus, the best landing point for troops crossing into Europe, and soundly defeated them. Then he won a second victory at Amorgos in the Cyclades, *intercepting an Athenian fleet sent to retake the straits*” (emphasis added). One glance at a map shows that this is nonsense: where were these Athenians coming from that made it possible for Kleitos to intercept

of Thessaly, there was still the risk of a blockade at Thermopylai, and this a naval force in the Malian Gulf could have helped to prevent. The Persian navy in 480 had positioned itself there for similar reasons. Hence, if the correct reading in Diodorus should be “Lichades,” this would be a suitable place for the Athenians to make a last stand. On the other hand, if we are really dealing with a battle in the west, there is nothing in the text of Diodorus that requires an Athenian presence at the Echinades. After speaking of two engagements against Euetion, Diodorus mentions “ships of the enemy” ( $\tauὸν πολεμίων νεῶν$ ), but this would require a third battle for Kleitos, something which is doubtful.

them at Amorgos? Hammond, *HMac*. III, 113 devotes one paragraph to the naval war. He claims that the Athenians divided their fleet into three squadrons: one to guard the Hellespont, one to guard Attika, and one to prevent Makedonian reinforcements from Kilikia entering the Aegean. But he places Kleitos in the Thermaic Gulf at the beginning of the sailing season. Moving from here he defeated two of the Athenian fleets in succession, the first at the Hellespont and second at Amorgos. Then, he imagines two additional battles “probably in the Maliac Gulf.” Hence, instead of three battles (which we have dismissed as unlikely), Hammond postulates four.

## Appendix VII: Neoptolemos *archihypaspistes*

Berve II, 273 no. 548; Berve, *RE XVI* (1935) 2464 no. 7; Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.145–6; Schubert, *Quellen* 162 ff.; Wirth 1965: 283–8; Bosworth 1978: 227–37; Anson 1990; Heckel, *Who's Who* 174–5 “Neoptolemus [2].”

Neoptolemos’ patronymic is unknown, but Arrian introduces him as one of the Aiakidai; hence he was a scion of the Molossian royal house and perhaps a relative of Arybbas the *somatophylax*.<sup>59</sup> He probably took part in the Asiatic expedition from the beginning, although he is not mentioned until the siege of Gaza (late 332), where he was the first to scale the wall (Arr. 2.27.6). This act of courage did not go unnoticed by the King, who appointed Neoptolemos as the successor of Nikanor son of Parmenion: his designation as *archihypaspistes* (Plut. *Eum.* 1.6) must mean that from 330 until 323 he commanded the regular hypaspists (cf. Berve II, 273).<sup>60</sup> Neoptolemos may have been awarded the satrapy of Armenia in the settlement of 323. But the doctored text of Dexippus (*FGrH* 100 F8 §6), which reads Νεοπτολέμου <Ἀρμενίᾳ, Τληπολέμου> Καρμανίαν, is suspect since it does violence to the geographical sequence, and Armenia does not show up in any of the other corresponding lists. It is more likely that Νεοπτολέμου is an error for Τληπολέμου. Briant (*Antigone le Borgne* 152 n.8) is probably correct to regard him as *strategos* rather than satrap (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4.1; 5.2).<sup>61</sup> The satrapy

59 One of the Aiakidai: Arr. 2.27.6. He may have been related (perhaps distantly) to Perdikkas; for it is highly probable that the Aiakidai intermarried with the royal houses of Upper Makedonia, and the name of Perdikkas’ brother, Alketas, was common in the Molossian royal house. We know of at least two marriages between Argeads and Aiakids (Philip and Olympias; Alexander and Kleopatra); Beroa of Epeiros married the Illyrian Glaukias (Justin 17.3.19; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 3.1–2; cf. Sandberger, *Prosopographie* no. 22) and Aiakides, the father of Pyrrhos, married Phthia, daughter of Menon of Pharsalos (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 1.6–7; cf. Sandberger, *Prosopographie* no. 66). For the Molossian royal house see also Beloch IV<sup>2</sup> 2.145. Arybbas the *somatophylax*: Arr. 3.5.5; Heckel, *Who's Who* 56 “Arybbas [2].”

60 Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 104 thinks that Neoptolemos’ relationship with Alexander (though somewhat distant) may account for his command of the entire hypaspist corps at a time when the King was eliminating larger commands (e.g., the command of the Companion Cavalry was divided between Hephaestion and Black Kleitos after Philotas’ death).

61 Diod. 19.14.1, however, calls Philotas (sc. Philippos; cf. Billows, *Antigonos* 90 n.17) *strategos*, although he was clearly satrap of Parthia (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. *Succ.* 1.35).

was assigned by Alexander to Mithrenes in 331 (*Curt.* 5.1.44); but Orontes, who commanded the Armenians at Gaugamela (*Arr.* 3.8.5), is found ruling it in 317. He may have regained his ancestral territory at Triparadeisos, perhaps through the influence of his friend Peukestas. That Neoptolemos managed only to create havoc in Armenia (*Plut. Eum.* 4.1), suggests that he was not cooperating with any existing satrap.

When it became clear that war with Krateros and Antipatros was imminent, Perdikkas assigned Kappadokia and Armenia to Eumenes and instructed both his brother Alketas and Neoptolemos to obey the Greek commander (*Plut. Eum.* 5.2; *Diod.* 18.29.2; *Justin* 13.6.15). Alketas refused to serve, arguing that his Makedonians would be ashamed to fight against Krateros (*Plut. Eum.* 5.3). Neoptolemos remained with Eumenes but soon intrigued with Antipatros (*Arr. Succ.* 1.26) and plotted betrayal (*Plut. Eum.* 5.4), presumably intending to defect with his forces to the enemy once the engagement had begun.<sup>62</sup> Eumenes, discovering the plot, brought him to battle and defeated him (*Plut. Eum.* 5.5; *Diod.* 18.29.4–5; *Arr. Succ.* 1.27; cf. *PSI XII*, 1284, with Bosworth 1978: 227 ff.); Neoptolemos, however, escaped with some 300 horsemen (*Diod.* 18.29.6; cf. *Plut. Eum.* 5.6; *Arr. Succ.* 1.27; *Justin* 13.8.5). Taking refuge with Krateros, he persuaded him that the Makedonians in Eumenes' service would receive him favorably (*Plut. Eum.* 6.1–2); for the mere sight of Krateros would be enough to turn the tide. But, when Eumenes learned that Neoptolemos was stationed on the left (*Diod.* 18.30.3, 31.1), he placed his Makedonian troops opposite him and deployed his barbarians on his own left, facing Krateros (*Plut. Eum.* 6.7; 7.3). The stratagem worked, and Krateros, uttering curses against Neoptolemos (*Plut. Eum.* 7.4), found the enemy stubborn in its resistance. As fate would have it, he perished in the engagement.

The final struggle between Eumenes and Neoptolemos,<sup>63</sup> as reported by Plutarch (*Eum.* 7.7–12), Diodorus (18.31), and Nepos (*Eum.* 4.1–2), derives from a single primary source—Hieronymos (Schubert, *Quellen* 178–9), who emphasized the long-standing hatred of the two men. That Neoptolemos, who had berated Eumenes as the King's secretary (*Plut. Eum.* 1.6), found himself overcome in a bitter hand-to-hand struggle (*Arr. Succ.* 1.27: καὶ πίπτει μὲν Νεοπτόλεμος τῇ αὐτῷ Εύμενους τοῦ γραμματέως δεξιᾷ), is perhaps Douris' coloring.<sup>64</sup> Felled by his adversary, and prevented by a wound to the knee from rising from the ground, Neoptolemos directed a feeble blow to Eumenes' groin as the Greek was already stripping the armor from his body, a heroic scene which does for Eumenes what Kallisthenes had intended for Alexander in his description of the Granikos battle. One final thrust to the neck ended Neoptolemos' life (*Diod.* 18.31.5; *Justin* 13.8.8). Since Krateros had already fallen, and with the right wing in disarray,

62 Schubert, *Quellen* 163 envisions a more important role for Neoptolemos: that he would keep Eumenes in check in Asia Minor while Krateros and Antipatros proceeded to Egypt.

63 It occurred ten days after the initial engagement (*Plut. Eum.* 8.1).

64 Cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 196. The reference to Eumenes “the secretary” is sarcastic.

Neoptolemos' death signaled defeat (Diod. 18.32.1; cf. 18.37.1). Eumenes' attitude to his defeated adversaries was mixed: he regarded Krateros with honor, Neoptolemos with contempt (Plut. *Eum.* 7.13). But to have overcome both opponents greatly enhanced his reputation (Diod. 18.53.3).

Neoptolemos was a man of great pride and warlike spirit (Arr. *Succ.* 1.27 calls him ἀνὴρ στρατιωτικὸς καὶ πολέμος ἡριστευκώς). At some point after 330 he, or perhaps his family, commissioned Apelles to depict him on horseback, fighting the Persians (Pliny, *HN* 35.96; Pollitt 1990: 162). Like many other figures of this period, whose historians sided with the victors, Neoptolemos' reputation has suffered as a result of his clash with Eumenes.

## Appendix VIII: Antigenes, commander of the Silver Shields

Berve II, 41–2 nos. 83–4; Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 2399 no. 9; Heckel, *Who's Who* 30–1 “Antigenes [1a],” 1982a, 1985b and 2013a; Hammond 1984 and 1989; Roisman, *Veterans*.

A Makedonian officer of uncertain origin (possibly from Pella or Pallene<sup>65</sup>), Antigenes was born sometime around 380; for he was among the veterans discharged at Opis in 324 (Justin 12.12.8; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 16.7, who claims that none of the argyraspids, whom Antigenes commanded, was younger than sixty).<sup>66</sup> In all probability, he accompanied Alexander from the start of the expedition, and in late 331 in the military contest held in Sittakene he received second prize and, with it, the rank of chiliarch of the hypaspists (*Curt.* 5.2.5).

65 Plutarch claims (*Mor.* 339b = *de fort. Alex.* 2.7) that a certain Antigenes Πελληναῖος (or possibly Πελλαῖος?) was invincible in war but a slave to pleasure and vice; that he tried to enroll himself among the sick in order to return home with Telesippa, the woman he loved (*Mor.* 339c–d; cf. 181a); and that a certain Antigenes, a one-eyed man, tried to defraud Alexander, when he was paying the debts of his veterans (*Alex.* 70.4–6). In the *Moralia* (339b), Plutarch calls the one-eyed man Tarrhias (almost certainly, Atarrhias son of Deinomenes). And this leads to a virtually insoluble problem: since the man who lost one eye at Perinthos (in 340/39) is described as still young at the time (ἔτι νέος ὄν), and since both Antigenes, the commander of the Silver Shields, and Atarrhias (who distinguished himself at Halikarnassos) were well advanced in years at the time of Alexander’s death, we must suppose that there was a younger, one-eyed, man whose name was either Antigenes or Atarrhias. Are we to prefer the evidence of the *Life* to that of the *Moralia*? Or did the error occur in the *Life* because Plutarch confused Antigenes with Antigonos the One-Eyed? We must stop short of identifying this Antigenes with Antigonos the One-Eyed (Tarn II, 314 n.1), since the latter could not have been in Alexander’s camp when either of the reported incidents took place (cf. also Hamilton, *PA* 196; but see now Billows, *Antigonos* 27–9). If Plutarch is mistaken in calling him νέος in 340/39, it is still somewhat unusual to find no other source mentioning that the leader of the Silver Shields had lost an eye. Berve’s entry (II, 41–2 no. 84) obscures the problem. Nor do I see any reason for identifying the Antigenes of *Curt.* 5.2.5 with the man from Pallene, unless the one-eyed man was, in fact, Atarrhias.

66 I register here, for the record, Tarn’s absurd suggestion (II, 314) that Antigenes was the son and successor of the phalanx commander Koinos son of Polemokrates (emending Justin 13.4.14, *Susiana gens Coeno* to *Susiana Antigeni Coeni* [*sc. filio*]). Now, even if Tarn’s emendation is correct, and Antigenes really was the son of a man named Koinos, the relative ages and the careers of the two famous infantry commanders make it impossible to identify Antigenes as the grandson of Polemokrates.

He is not mentioned again until the battle with Poros in 326, where he appears along with Tauron and Seleukos in command of a division of infantrymen, though not *pezhetairoi*.<sup>67</sup> Seleukos commanded the *somatophylakes* (the Royal Hypaspists), Tauron the archers, and Antigenes' force most likely comprised the regular hypaspists. It is, however, unlikely that Antigenes commanded all the regular hypaspists: his exact functions in the battle at the Hydaspes are not spelled out, but the suggestion that he commanded a battalion of *pezhetairoi* or that he had authority over the Makedonian infantry in the engagement must be regarded as highly implausible. That Alexander would have entrusted such important units, which were accustomed to be led by the most prominent Makedonian aristocrats, to a man of Antigenes' relatively low standing, seems unlikely. Nor does it appear that Antigenes himself had risen to the rank of *archihypaspistes*, which again appears to have been reserved for men of higher social rank.<sup>68</sup> It may be that only Antigenes' chiliarchy, or possibly his and one other, had crossed the Hydaspes with the King. Antigenes commanded them and perhaps some of the light infantry (the Agrianes and the javelin men under Balakros). Perhaps on account of his age, and that of his troops, Antigenes is next found in conjunction with Krateros and the *apomachoi*, those no longer fit for active service, patrolling Drangiana and Arachosia and rejoining Alexander in Karmania (Arr. 6.17.3).

According to Justin 12.12.8, Antigenes was one of the commanders sent back from Opis to Makedonia in 324 in the company of Krateros, Polyperchon, Gorgias, Polydamas, White Kleitos, and 10,000 veterans (cf. Arr. 7.12.4; Curt. 10.10.15). But in late 323 they were still in Kilikia, and only in 322 do we find Krateros in Makedonia (Diod. 18.16.4–5) and Kleitos in the Aegean (Diod. 18.15.8–9). What became of Polydamas and Gorgias we do not know: neither is heard of again. Antigenes, however, could not have returned to Makedonia, since in 320 he was in Egypt, where he played a leading role in Perdikkas' assassination (Arr. Succ. 1.35; Diod. 18.39.6). Has Justin inserted his name in error? Antigenes was certainly old enough and due for retirement. If the argyrapspids are correctly regarded as superannuated hypaspists, we should expect them to be among the

67 Arr. 5.16.3; cf. Curt. 8.14.15. Of the seven phalanx brigades, two (Polyperchon and Alketas) had remained with Krateros directly opposite Poros' position; three others (Attalos, Meleagros, Gorgias [Krateros]) had been positioned upstream. That leaves two unaccounted for (Peithon [Koinos] and Kleitos). Tarn II, 190 implausibly regards Antigenes as the commander of Koinos' brigade; who replaced Kleitos as taxiarχ, we do not know.

68 If Antigenes replaced Nikanor as *archihypaspistes* in 330—setting aside the question of social status—this raises questions about why Atarrhias, who was awarded the first prize in the contest of valor (Curt. 5.2.5; cf. 8.1.36, where Kleitos singles him out for praise) and was especially prominent in the Philotas affair (Curt. 6.8.19 ff.; 7.1.5), was passed over. If Atarrhias did succeed Nikanor, thus explaining his prominence in 330, we cannot account for his replacement by Antigenes at some time before 326. Neoptolemos would thus have succeeded Antigenes in 324. It appears that we are dealing with three groups of hypaspist commanders: the commanders of the Royal Hypaspists (Hephaestion, Seleukos; possibly Admetos); the *archihypaspistes* (Nikanor, Neoptolemos); and the chiliarchs of the regular hypaspists (men who rose from the ranks).

10,000 discharged veterans. And, indeed, Alexander had replaced them with a Persian brigade of Silver Shields (ἀργυρασπίδων τάξις Περσική).<sup>69</sup>

Schachermeyr suggests that Krateros left Antigenes and the 3,000 argyrapspids in Kilikia and, after his death, Antipatros picked them up and led them to Syria, whence they were sent in due course to Sousiane (in 320).<sup>70</sup> But this view fails to take into account the fact that Antigenes and the argyrapspids were already in Perdikkas' camp when he invaded Egypt, and that Antigenes and his fellow conspirators murdered him before the news of Krateros' death was known (Diod. 18.37.1). And, in fact, Antipatros arrived in Syria *after* Peithon and Arrhidaios led the remnants of the Perdikan army out of Egypt to Triparadeisos (Diod. 18.39.1; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.30). Thus, if Antigenes came from Kilikia to Egypt, it was not in the company of Antipatros.

For this stage of Antigenes' career we must turn to the political situation in Kilikia. When Krateros and the veterans arrived in the satrapy in late 324, it was in turmoil. Harpalos had fled to Greece, ultimately from Tarsos, taking with him the courtesan Glykera and, doubtless, some of the treasures; for it is difficult to imagine that the man who plundered Babylon left Tarsos untouched.<sup>71</sup> Around this time, too, the Pisidians had killed in battle the Kilikian satrap, Balakros (Diod. 18.22.1), a former *somatophylax* and the son-in-law of Antipatros. Krateros spent the winter and the following spring restoring order to the area, which he was to hand over to the taxiarch Philotas, whom Alexander was preparing to send out from Babylon.<sup>72</sup> When Alexander died suddenly on June 10, 323, Krateros and the veterans remained in Kilikia virtually in a state of limbo; for Perdikkas, with the backing of the army, had cancelled Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros as regent of Makedonia.<sup>73</sup> Late in the year came Antipatros' appeal for help against the rebellious Greeks (Diod. 18.12.1). Krateros left Kilikia in late May or early June 322.<sup>74</sup>

Krateros departed for Makedonia, leaving some of his troops with Kleitos, who took the fleet into the Aegean. The 3,000 argyrapspids under Antigenes

69 Arr. 7.11.3; cf. Justin 12.12.3–4.

70 *Babylon* 14 n.10: “... doch hat sie [sc. die Argyrapiden] Krateros, wie mir scheint, nachher nicht nach Makedonien mitgenommen, sondern in Kilikien belassen, worauf sie nach dem Tod des Krateros von Antipater nach Syrien mitgeführt, und von dort nach Susa gesandt wurden.”

71 See Berve II, 75–80 no. 143 (Harpalos) and II, 112–3 no. 231; Heckel, *Who's Who* 126 “Glycera” (Glykera). For Glykera in Tarsos: Theopompos *ap.* Athen. 13.586c; 595d; cf. also Snell 1971: 104–37. For the date of Harpalos' flight (spring 324): Berve II, 78 n.1; Badian 1961: 24, 41–3; Worthington 1986a.

72 For Krateros departure, Arr. 7.12.4; Krateros must have recovered from a serious illness that threatened his life. For Philotas see Berve II, 397–8 no. 804; he is probably identical with the commander of light infantry, no. 803, and the *philos* of Antigonos (Diod. 18.62.4 ff.). See Heckel, *Who's Who* 219 “Philotas [6].”

73 Badian 1967b.

74 Schwahn 1931: 331–2, thinks Perdikkas' campaign against Ariarathes induced Krateros to leave Kilikia for Makedonia; he is followed by Errington 1970: 61. We cannot determine the precise chronology, but Diod. 18.16.4 synchronizes Krateros' arrival in Makedonia with Perdikkas' campaign against Ariarathes: ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς καὶ Κρατερός ἐκ Κιλικίας ἀναζεύχας ἤκει εἰς Μακεδονίαν . . . .

remained in Kilikia for the time, and Krateros augmented his army with new recruits. Diodorus (18.16.4) describes his force thus: ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς Ἀσίαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἔξακισχιλίους, τῶν δ' ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίους. At first sight, this seems to say that Krateros' infantrymen were composed of two groups: those who had been with Alexander from the start and those who had joined Alexander in the course of his campaigns. But this would be a curious distinction for the historian to make, and it is more likely that those who were picked ἐν παρόδῳ were fresh troops recruited by Krateros on his march to Makedonia, possibly from the satrapies in Asia Minor (Heckel 1982a: 61; cf. now Hammond 1989: 65 n.49, against Brunt, *Arrian II*, 489).<sup>75</sup> The argyraspids remained in Kilikia, entrusted with the protection of Philotas' satrapy and the treasury at Tarsos. But in 321 Perdikkas crushed the Pisidians and, in early 320, he moved into Kilikia *en route* to Egypt. Expelling Philotas, who remained faithful to Krateros, he won over the troops of Antigenes, whom he now led against Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 24.2; Justin 13.6.16). So it was that Antigenes came to the Nile, where, according to our accounts, he soon turned against Perdikkas, and, in the company of Peithon and Seleukos, murdered him.<sup>76</sup>

If this is indeed how Antigenes came to serve briefly with Perdikkas, then it must be that the argyraspids were formed before 320: that is, Antigenes joined Perdikkas as the commander of the Silver Shields, which is what the wording of Arrian (*Succ.* 1.35: Αντιγένει . . . τῶν ἀργυρασπίδων ἥγουμένω) implies. It appears that the argyraspids were formed in India (cf. Curt. 8.5.4), took the northern route to Karmania in 325 and set out for Makedonia in 324. If my reconstruction of Antigenes' activities is correct, the Silver Shields could not have been formed any later than 324, and Antigenes was their original commander.

Despite being awarded the satrapy of Sousiane in the settlement of Triparadeisos, Antigenes appears to have seen Sousa on only two occasions between 320 and his death in 315: first in 320, when he conveyed some of the treasure from there to Kyinda (Quinda) in Kilikia, and again in 317, when he accompanied Eumenes to the East. According to Dexippus' epitome of Arrian's *History of the Successors*, in the first division of the satrapies, the marshals of the empire merely confirmed an otherwise obscure Koinos, whom Alexander had installed in the satrapy in 325 (Dexippus *FGrH* 100 F8 §6; cf. *LM* 121; Justin 13.4.14). What became of him we do not know. Perhaps he was removed by the Perdikkan faction in 320, as was, for example, Archon of Pella, the overseer of

75 Cf. Schachermeyr, *Babylon* 169 n.147. Hammond, however, thinks the 4,000 veterans left in Kilikia served with Neoptolemos and then Eumenes (1984: 56–7; reiterated in 1989: 65); this is highly improbable (Heckel 1985b: 109–10); but these were not the argyraspids.

76 Arr. *Succ.* 1.35; Diod. 18.39.6; Nepos, *Eum.* 5.1 adds Seleukos; for Peithon's role see Diod. 18.36.5. Bosworth, *Legacy* 33, suggests that “Antigenes . . . acted as an emissary of Craterus, but was tempted to remain in Babylon, assuming command of the most prestigious infantry group in the Macedonian army.” I see no evidence for this view. Roisman 2014: 474 n.51 also rejects my discussion of Antigenes activities in Kilikia but does not provide a viable alternative.

Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 24); perhaps he was pro-Perdikkan and joined Dokimos in flight, condemned *in absentia* by the army in Syria. Nor do we know who administered Sousiane in Antigenes' absence, though Xenophilos is the most likely candidate (Curt. 5.2.16; cf. Diod. 19.17.3, 18.1, 48.6). But Antigenes' satrapal rank may be reflected by the fact that, in the battle of Paraitakene, Antigenes and Peukestas shared an *agema* of 300 horse (Diod. 19.28.3).<sup>77</sup>

Antigenes' position in Kilikia must have grown uncertain with the death of Antipatros in late 319 and the actions taken in the following year by Antigonos against Arrhidaios and White Kleitos. Philoxenos, the satrap of Kilikia, had good reason to fear Antigonos, in whose camp the deposed satrap Philotas had found refuge and hope of reinstatement. Letters from Polyperchon and the Kings calling upon the argyraspids to support their cause and serve with Eumenes had their desired effect (Diod. 18.58.1, 59.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.3), and Antigenes welcomed the outlawed Greek, though not without some suspicion and resentment (Nepos, *Eum.* 7.1). A compromise saw the theoretical command of their forces retained by the spirit of Alexander, in whose tent the commanders met to decide policy (Diod. 18.60.1–61.3; Plut. *Eum.* 13.7–8; Polyaenus 4.8.2; Nepos, *Eum.* 7.1–2). Entreaties and bribes from both Ptolemy (Diod. 18.62.1–2) and Antigonos' agents (Philotas and thirty others: Diod. 18.62.3–63.6) were rejected—though Antigenes found his colleague Teutamos wavering in his loyalty, an ominous sign (Diod. 18.62.5–6).<sup>78</sup>

The royalists soon moved eastward through Antigenes' satrapy (Diod. 19.15.5–6), which was now—if it had not earlier been—entrusted to Xenophilos, the commander of the citadel of Sousa (Diod. 19.17.3).<sup>79</sup> Though he resisted Antigonos, the satrapy itself was annexed and assigned to Seleukos (Diod. 19.18.1). For Antigenes, hope of recovering Sousiane lay in the defeat of Antigonos and his allies Peithon and Seleukos; to the argyraspids, these barred a return to Makedonia which had been pre-empted by the outbreak of the Lamian War. The forces from the Upper Satrapies now joined the cause of Eumenes led by the orientalizing Peukestas (Diod. 19.14.2–8), a man of no mean ambition. And their presence, together with Peukestas' rivalry with Eumenes, served rather to bolster the support of the argyraspids for the latter; Antigenes, who served Eumenes on the written orders of the Kings, was not disposed to support Peukestas, whom he regarded, more or less, as an equal. Instead he asserted the right of the Makedones to select a leader (Diod. 19.15.1–2), and Antigenes appears, as the army moved towards the Tigris, to have exercised some kind of joint command with Eumenes

77 That is, two *agemata* of 150 horsemen; cf. Diod. 19.27.2, where Eudamos has an *agema* of 150 cavalry, which Devine 1985a: 76 aptly refers to as “his satrapal *agema*.”

78 Teutamos: Berse II, 372 no. 744; Billows, *Antigonos* 85 n.8; Heckel, *Who's Who* 262 “Teutamus.” He may have been appointed at Triparadeisos to keep an eye on Antigenes; possibly, he was satrap of Paraitakene (Bosworth 1992a: 66–7).

79 He had been the garrison commander of the citadel since late 331 (Curt. 5.2.16; Arr. 3.16.9 names Mazaros in this context; he may have been the Persian officer whom Xenophilos replaced). Berse II, 246 no. 486; Heckel, *Who's Who* 157 “Mazarus.”

(cf. Diod. 19.17.4).<sup>80</sup> But, with Antigonos' forces threatening and the oriental element inclining towards Peukestas, the Makedonians opted for Eumenes, calling out for him in the Makedonian tongue (Plut. *Eum.* 14.8–11).<sup>81</sup>

At Paraitakene, Antigenes' subordinate role is clearly spelled out: together with Teutamos, he leads the argyrapids and the hypaspists (6,000 men in all), and he shares an *agema* (300 horse) with Peukestas (Diod. 19.28.1, 3); Eumenes has a squadron of 300 to himself. But the setback in Paraitakene put Eumenes' supreme command in jeopardy, and Teutamos plotted with other prominent officers to remove the Greek once he served his purpose in the upcoming battle. Plutarch (*Eum.* 16.2) includes Antigenes in this plot, but this is inconsistent with the other evidence and can be ascribed either to the tendency to lump the commanders of the argyrapids together or to a source hostile to Antigenes himself. In Gabiene, distressed because their baggage and the camp followers had fallen into Antigonos' hands, the Silver Shields delivered up Eumenes to the enemy (Diod. 19.43.7–9; Plut. *Eum.* 17; cf. Nepos, *Eum.* 10.1–2).<sup>82</sup> For this act of treachery they earned the reproach of posterity. Even Antigonos was disgusted with them—or so we are told—and he handed some 1,000 of them to Sibyrtios, satrap of Arachosia, ordering him to wear them out and destroy them (Diod. 19.48.3; Plut. *Eum.* 19.3; Polyaenus 4.6.15).

Antigenes himself was thrown into a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19.44.1), on the face of it, a fitting end for a fickle and odious man. Had he not abandoned the cause of Krateros and Philotas in Kilikia, plotted against and murdered Perdikkas in Egypt, and then handed over Eumenes to his enemies? Death by fire. But was this justice or a senseless act of barbarity?

The standard view of Antigenes must be reassessed. If he abandoned the faction of Krateros and Philotas, it was because he chose to support Perdikkas, who represented the concept of *Reichseinheit*, spoke for the Kings, and commanded the Royal Army. For Antigenes was a traditional Makedonian, a confirmed royalist. If he plotted against Perdikkas, it was because, like the other generals of note, he had become disillusioned with him: Perdikkas was a self-seeking individual with no sense of humanity and little regard for the sufferings of his troops.<sup>83</sup> And as for Eumenes, it is simply not true that he betrayed him. Plutarch (*Eumenes* 17.1–2) makes it clear that Teutamos and his followers (οἱ περὶ τὸν Τεύταμον) led the betrayal. Polyaenus 4.6.15 says that Antigonos rewarded Eumenes' captors with gifts, though he punished a large number of the Silver Shields.

80 When it was learned that Antigonos was in Media, Antigenes and Eumenes shared the opinion that the army should move back to the coast. But this was rejected by the satraps of Central Asia (Diod. 19.21.1).

81 The story is only partially told by Diod. 19.24.4 ff. During Eumenes' illness, Antigenes and Peukestas jointly led the army on its march (19.24.6).

82 For analyses of the battles of Paraitakene and Gabiene respectively, see Devine 1985a: 75–86; 1985b: 87–96; also Billows, *Antigonos* 94–104.

83 Justin 13.8.2: *sed Perdiccae plus odium adrogantiae quam vires hostium nocebat . . .*; cf. Diod. 18.33.3, 5; 18.36.1.

So it appears that the argyraspids and their commanders were divided on the matter of Eumenes. Although Antigenes was cruelly executed, there is no mention of Teutamos, who was doubtless among those rewarded by Antigonos. He had been willing to defect in Kilikia in 318, but had been prevented from doing so by Antigenes (Diod. 18.62.4–7). In fact, the record shows that Antigenes was consistently loyal to Eumenes: he willingly obeyed the orders of Polyperchon the regent (Diod. 18.58.1), allied himself with Eumenes (18.59.3), and resisted the embassies of Ptolemy (18.62.1–2), Antigonos (through the agency of Philotas, 18.62.4–7), and Seleukos and Peithon (19.12.2–3, 13.1). Hieronymos, in fact, has words of praise for him (ο δὲ Ἀντιγένης, συνέσει καὶ πίστεως βεβαιότητι διαφέρων, Diod. 18.62.6), which he would scarcely have written, had he regarded Antigenes as a traitor.

When Antigenes was put to death, it was as one of Eumenes' supporters. Nepos (*Eum.* 12.4), and perhaps Douris, alleged that Eumenes was strangled without Antigonos' knowledge, an absurd suggestion; Hieronymos, it appears, put the blame on the Makedones, who demanded Eumenes' death, no doubt reviving the charge that he had been responsible for Krateros' fate (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 10.7–8). And when these sources depict the Silver Shields as arrogant, jealous, and seditious, they are unfair to Antigenes, who met his end not, as we are led to believe, for his betrayal of Eumenes but for his steadfast support of him. Antigonos cannot be exculpated.<sup>84</sup>

84 For the death of Eumenes see Anson, *Eumenes* 188–90. Antigonos had already destroyed Alketas and mutilated his body (Diod. 18.47), captured and imprisoned Attalos, Polemon, and Dokimos (18.45); though Dokimos appears to have come to terms with Antigonos' wife Stratonike (19.16); see Simpson 1957b. Arrhidaios, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was his next victim (18.51–2); Billows' attempt to identify him with the honorand of *IG XII.9*, 212 is tenuous (*Antigonos* 375 no. 18). And the fall of Eumenes spelled doom for Antigenes, Eudamos, Amphimachos, Peukestas, Peithon, Kephalon, and Stasandros (Diod. 19.44.1, 46.1–4; cf. 19.48.2–3).

# Appendix IX: The sons of Larichos: Erigyios and Laomedon

Nearchos (*ap.* Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4 = *FGrH* 133 F1; cf. Whitby, *BNJ*) lists Laomedon son of Larichos among the Makedones from Amphipolis; other sources describe him as “Mitylenaian,” the ethnic also applied (once) to his brother Erigyios. Thus it appears that the family left Lesbos—perhaps in the political upheavals of the early 340s—and was settled by Philip II in Amphipolis.<sup>85</sup> Erigyios’ position as *hetairos* of the Crown Prince, Alexander, indicates that the family belonged to the most highly favored of Philip’s naturalized Makedones.

## Erigyios

Berve II, 151–2 no. 302; Lehmann-Haupt in Papastavru, *Amphipolis* 85–6 no. 35; Kirchner, *RE* VI (1909) 452; Heckel 1985a, and *Who’s Who* 119.

Erigyios son of Larichos (Arr. 3.6.5, 1.10) was Mytilenaian by birth (Diod. 17.57.3) and presumably, like his brother Laomedon, a naturalized Makedon who had been granted property in Amphipolis. *Hetairos* of Alexander, Erigyios was nevertheless not coeval with the Crown Prince: if Curtius’ description<sup>86</sup> of him as “white haired” and *gravis aetate* in 330 is correct, he was more likely to have been born c.380 and to have acted as an advisor of the young Alexander. Thus he was banished by Philip in the spring of 336 for his role in the Pixodaros affair. On Philip’s death in the autumn of that year, Erigyios returned to Makedonia (Arr. 3.6.6) and accompanied Alexander on his Asiatic expedition, although we cannot be certain in what capacity. Diodorus (17.17.4) claims that he commanded, from the very beginning, 600 Greek allied cavalry; but it becomes clear from Arrian that Erigyios was appointed hipparch only after Alexandros Lynkestes was deposed as the leader of the Thessalians in the winter of 334/3. When Philippos son of Menelaos succeeded Alexandros,

<sup>85</sup> Papastavru, *Amphipolis* 92, lists only the younger Larichos (no. 51) in his Prosopographia Amphilopolitana, perhaps correctly, since we cannot be sure if the elder Larichos was ever settled in Amphipolis.

<sup>86</sup> Curt. 7.4.34: *non tulit ferociam barbari dux illius exercitus Erigyius, gravis quidem aetate, sed et animi et corporis robore nulli iuvenum postferendus. is galea dempta canitiem ostentans . . .*

the vacant command of the Peloponnesian allies was assumed by Erigyios.<sup>87</sup> Thus he commanded the allied horse at Issos, where he was stationed on the left wing with Parmenion, and at Gaugamela.<sup>88</sup> Between these two battles, from the winter of 333/2 until the spring of 331, Erigyios appears to have remained with Menon son of Kerdimmas, the new satrap of Koile-Syria, protecting the area with the allied cavalry;<sup>89</sup> hence he played no part in the siege of Tyre and the Egyptian campaign.

Soon after the destruction of Persepolis and the transferring of the treasures to Ecbatana, Erigyios accompanied the King in his pursuit of Dareios III, at least as far as the Caspian Gates.<sup>90</sup> He is next attested leading the baggage train through Parthiene (Curt. 6.4.3) and rejoining the King at Arvae (Curt. 6.4.23) or Zadrakarta (Arr. 3.23.6).<sup>91</sup> At Phrada he is named as a member of the King's *consilium*, which met to discuss the Philotas conspiracy (Curt. 6.8.17); we may expect that he shared the view of the more prominent marshals that Philotas should be eliminated. Not much later, and together with Karanos, Andronikos, and Artabazos, he campaigned against the rebel Satibarzanes, whom he slew in single combat.<sup>92</sup> It was perhaps the crowning achievement of his career; for he did not live much longer and little else is known about him.

At the Iaxartes (Syr-Darya), Erigyios is mentioned once more as one of the King's advisors: he urged him not to cross the river and campaign against the Skythians (Curt. 7.7.21 ff.). But this advice was ignored by Alexander without serious consequence, except that a bout of dysentery forced the King to break off his pursuit of the enemy (Arr. 4.4.9). In the winter of 328/7, soon after the capture of the Rock of Sisimithres (= Chorienes), Erigyios died in Sogdiana, apparently from illness. Alexander buried him, and Philippos son of Agathokles (who had died at about the same time), with due honors (Curt. 8.2.40). Curtius' claim that he had been one of Alexander's foremost commanders (*inter claros duces*, 8.2.40) appears to be true and more than just eulogy.

<sup>87</sup> Arr. 3.6.6, cf. 1.14.3: Philippos son of Menelaos commanded the allied cavalry at the Granikos. At Gaugamela we find him in command of the Thessalians (Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.4; Curt. 4.13.29), and we must assume that the shuffling of commands was made during the winter of 334/3 or in the spring of 333 at the latest in Gordion.

<sup>88</sup> Issos: Arr. 2.8.9; Curt. 3.9.8 (both mention only the Peloponnesians without naming their commander). Gaugamela: Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.3; garbled by Curt. 4.13.29, who gives the command to Krateros (cf. Atkinson I, 425).

<sup>89</sup> Arr. 2.13.7; cf. Berve II, 151. For Menon son of Kerdimmas see Berve II, 259 no. 514; Heckel, *Who's Who* 166 "Menon [1]."

<sup>90</sup> Arr. 3.20.1; he appears to have commanded a hipparchy of the *hippeis mistophoroi* (Berve II, 151 n.3, followed by Lehmann-Haupt in Papastavru, *Amphipolis* 86).

<sup>91</sup> For his route, to Shahrud and through the Elburz range via the Chalchalyan pass to Zadrakarta (Gorgan), see Seibert, *Eroberung* 116; but cf. Bosworth I, 349–51, identifying Zadrakarta with Sari.

<sup>92</sup> Campaign against Satibarzanes: Curt. 7.3.2; A 3.28.2 omitting Andronikos. Single combat: Curt. 7.4.32–8; A 3.28.3.

## Laomedon

Berve II, 231–2, no. 464; Judeich 1895: 164 ff.; Stähelin, *RE XII* (1925) 755 no. 6; Bux, *RE XII* (1925) 756 no. 7; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 118 n.2; Lehmann-Haupt in Papastavru, *Amphipolis* 88–92, no. 50; Heckel 1981b, 1985a, and *Who's Who* 146.

Laomedon son of Larichos was apparently the younger brother of Erigyios and a Mytilenaian by birth.<sup>93</sup> Nearchos lists him as Amphipolitan,<sup>94</sup> hence a naturalized Makedon. An *hetairos* of Alexander, he was almost certainly not coeval with the King, but rather already mature when he settled in Amphipolis in the 350s or early 340s. His birthdate might belong to the late 370s. Laomedon was exiled by Philip in the spring of 336 (along with his brother Erigyios, Harpalos, Nearchos, and Ptolemy) for his part in the so-called Pixodaros affair, but recalled after Philip's death in October of that year.<sup>95</sup>

He accompanied Alexander to Asia and, because he knew the Persian language (δίγλωσσος ἦν [ές τὰ βαρβαρικὰ γράμματα]:<sup>96</sup> A 3.6.6), he was given charge of the Persian prisoners taken at Issos. In this respect, it is curious that Alexander chose to send Leonnatos to the captive Persian queens, and not Laomedon (note in Curt. 3.12.6–7 the emphasis on language skills), and it is possible that the original source of this information (accidentally or deliberately?) substituted the name of Leonnatos for Laomedon (cf. Heckel 1981b). At the Hydaspes he served as one of the trierarchs of Alexander's fleet (Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 §18.4 = Arr. *Ind.* 18.4). Nothing else is known of his career under Alexander.

After the King's death in June 323, Laomedon was awarded the satrapy of Koile-Syria, and it is likely that he aided his old friend Ptolemy in diverting Alexander's funeral carriage to Egypt. At Triparadeisos in May 320, his position as satrap was confirmed;<sup>97</sup> Ptolemy attempted to "buy" the territory from him in 319, but Laomedon rejected his offer (App. *Syr.* 52 [264]). Friendship gave way to political expediency and, not long after Antipatros' return to Europe, Ptolemy sent his general Nikanor (otherwise unknown) to capture Laomedon and occupy the satrapy (Diod. 18.43.2; cf. Paus. 1.6.4; App. *Mithr.* 9 [27], incorrectly

93 Son of Larichos: Arr. 3.6.5; *Ind.* 18.4. From Mytilene: Arr. *Succ.* 1.34; Diod. 18.3.1, 39.6; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §2; Justin 13.4.12; App. *Syr.* 52 [263]; cf. Diod. 17.57.3.

94 Nearchos, *FGrH* 133 F1 §18.4 (cf. Whitby, *BNJ*) = Arr. *Ind.* 18.4.

95 Pixodaros and exile: Arr. 3.6.5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 10.4, naming only Erigyios. His return to Makedonia: Arr. 3.6.6; for the date see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 23, Bosworth I, 45–6.

96 Brunt, *Arrian I*, 238 (with n.2), following Roos, thinks this is a gloss and proposes deletion. Bosworth I, 283 argues for retention of the words, suggesting that Laomedon could read, but not speak, Persian. Bosworth points out that "Peucestas is explicitly attested to have been the only Macedonian to speak Persian (cf. vi 30. 3, vii 6. 3)," but it should be noted that Laomedon was, in origin, an Asiatic Greek.

97 Arr. *Succ.* 1.5; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F8 §2; Diod. 18.3.1; Curt. 10.10.2; Justin 13.4.12; App. *Syr.* 52 [263]; this was the old Persian satrapy of "Abar-nahara" (Lehmann-Haupt, "Satrap" §26; cf. §129 ff.). According to the *Testamentum Alexandri*, this territory was assigned to Meleagros: Jul. Valer. 3.58; Leo 33; Ps.-Kall. 3.33.15; Metz, *LM* 117; cf. Heckel, *LDT* 67. Triparadeisos: Arr. *Succ.* 1.34; Diod. 18.39.6; App. *Syr.* 52 [263].


saying that Antigonos expelled Laomedon). Laomedon, however, bribed his guards and escaped to Alketas in Karia (App. *Syr.* 52 [265]). What became of him, we do not know. He may have perished along with many of Alketas' supporters at Kretopolis.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>98</sup> He may be the father of the Larichos honored at Priene (*OGIS I*, 215, 13); cf. Bosworth I, 283; Habicht, *Gottmenschen*<sup>2</sup> 88–9. Judeich's view 1895: 164 ff. that Laomedon was the occupant of the Alexander sarcophagus is incompatible with both the artistic and historical evidence.


# **Stemmata**

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
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
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### Stemma III: The house of Iolaos




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


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
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
Stemma VII: The house of Andromenes and the family of Perdikkas




Stemma VIII: The family of Harpalos




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
Stemma X: The Argead royal house



## Stemma XI: The last of the Achaimenids



## Stemma XII: The family of Pharnabazos



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